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Neoliberalism has fundamentally altered how diverse sectors such as energy, health, 
and transport have come to be understood and governed. In exercising their ‘freedom 
of choice’ individual consumers are now held responsible for the social or 
environmental consequences of their decisions and actions. States have accordingly 
sought to intervene, influence and change the choices of citizens in a variety of 
spheres of everyday life. This thesis, by exploring how they understand action, 
demonstrates why these interventions are severely limited. It examines different 
approaches which have or could inform such interventions and how they theorise, 
research, and propose to, govern citizen’s actions. Of those considered, it argues 
John Dewey’s pragmatist writings, especially on habit and experience, by providing 
a dynamic understanding of how action continually emerges out of an individual’s 
interactions with their social and physical environments are particularly pertinent.  
The relevance of this approach for contemporary sustainability and climate change 
debates is demonstrated through a focus on commuting, which has become a central 
concern of various behaviour change agendas. The thesis draws on a range of 
empirical materials generated and collected through interviews, go-alongs and 
ethnography during fieldwork with local and migrant workers in Auckland, New 
Zealand and London, United Kingdom. The methodology aimed to produce a range 
of data on the stable and dynamic aspects of the internal and external environments, 
and phases, of action. These empirical materials are employed to demonstrate both 
the limitations of the dominant psychological and economic behavioural models and 
the potential of a Deweyan-inspired approach for understanding action.  
The thesis is structured around three associated interventions. First, the soft or 
libertarian paternalist concept of ‘choice architecture’ is explored. This approach it is 
suggested is limited in that it fails to problematize and politicise the notion of choice 
or account for the emergence of purposive and meaningful action. The notion of 
‘habit infrastructures’ is introduced as a way of recognising how subjectivities and 
preferences are always conditioned but not determined by the histories and politics of 
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physical environments and established social norms, values and ideologies, as 
individuals always retain the capacity to act upon the world.  
Second, the notion that various ‘barriers’ prevent individuals from making more 
sustainable choices is critiqued. The concept is too static, fixed, ahistorical and 
individualistic to account for the complexities of action and social change. It is 
demonstrated that such a framing offers little insight into why the number of year 
round cyclists is increasing in Auckland and London, and how regular commuter 
cyclists anticipate, experience, and negotiate changing weather conditions alongside 
a range of other everyday routines and practices. Dewey’s theory of situations is 
instead shown to provide a way of understanding the continuous and contingent 
contexts in which these experiences unfold and associated habits emerge. 
Third, dominant behavioural models typically conceptualise habit and thought as 
polar opposites. Following Dewey the thesis argues they are better understood as 
phases within human experience. This argument is developed by exploring how 
people’s commuting practices emerge out of repeated encounters with particular 
environments. The transition from the unfamiliar to familiar is marked by a 
development of new habits which alter people’s sense and experience of these 
environments and allow them to negotiate and adjust to changes in these contexts 
often with little or no thought. Dewey thus can provide a useful starting point for 
rethinking the relationship between habit and thought in future interventions.  
Given the social, economic and political uncertainties it is unlikely that existing 
urban infrastructures and systems will be radically reconfigured in the near future. 
Even if they were, history reminds us technology without accompanying social 
change will not be sufficient to address crises such as climate change. Behaviour 
change interventions, therefore, will likely remain a primary policy response to the 
challenges posed by increasing carbon emissions, resource consumption and demand. 
This thesis contends such interventions need to move beyond existing dominant 
behavioural models if they are to facilitate change. John Dewey, with his tenacious 
insistence on the situated, relational, more-than-individual and emergent character of 
action, provides an alternative approach which helps to reveal both the challenges 
and possible openings for developing a less carbon and resource intensive world.  
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 Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Behaviour change, climate change and 
everyday mobility 
We are everyday robots on our phones, 
In the process of getting home, 
Looking like standing stones, 
Out there on our own. 
We are everyday robots in control, 
Are in the process of being sold, 
Driving in adjacent cars, 
Till you press restart. 
[…] 
Everyday Robots, Damon Albarn (2014). 
Everyday Robots, the title track to Damon Albarn’s 2014 album, was inspired by his 
experience of being stuck in the ‘mother of all traffic jams’ in Los Angeles: ‘I was 
just watching everyone around me… lost in their [own] little … worlds, on the 
telephone and listening to music, and that sense of autonomy … resonated [with me]’ 
(XFM, 2014). His subsequent lyrics capture the way in which the everyday commute 
is variously experienced as solitary (‘Out there on our own’) yet shared (‘adjacent 
cars’), mundane (‘everyday robots’; ‘Looking like standing stones’) and distracted 
(‘on our phones’). Meanwhile, passing references to ‘process’, ‘control’ and 
‘driving’ remind the listener of the purposeful, active and repetitive (‘Till you press 
restart’) nature of these journeys. Inadvertently Albarn captures a number of themes 
that run throughout this thesis. It explores contemporary commuting habits and 
experiences in Auckland, New Zealand and London, United Kingdom (hereafter UK) 
in the context of current debates on behaviour change, climate change and mobility. 
Moreover, his metaphor of the ‘everyday robot’ usefully draws attention to the 
challenge confronting states seeking to ‘reprogramme’ the ‘transport choices’ of 
citizens in less resource and carbon intensive ways, especially given their seemingly 
hardwired ‘habits’ (cf. DfT, 2011).  
1 
 The aim of this chapter is to contextualise and provide a general overview of the 
thesis. The remainder of the chapter comprises four sections. First, Sections 1.1 and 
1.2 position the thesis in the context of broader debates around sustainability, climate 
change, everyday mobility and behaviour change. Second, Section 1.3 situates the 
aims and research questions of the thesis in relation to these debates. Third, Section 
1.4 outlines the empirical and theoretical contributions the thesis makes to emerging 
debates on and approaches to behaviour change, climate change and mobility. 
Fourth, Section 1.5 details the structure of the thesis by providing an overview of the 
purpose and main arguments of each of the six remaining chapters. 
1.1 The problem with movement: Sustainability, climate 
change and transport 
This section reflects on how the thesis intersects with contemporary environmental 
debates. It examines how sustainability and climate change agendas have become 
increasingly concerned with the ecological implications of everyday movements in 
cities and how these interconnect with broader social, cultural and political 
dynamics.  
1.1.1 Sustainability and climate change 
The contemporary challenges of sustainability and climate change have profoundly 
shaped the ways in which the relationships between human, ecological and economic 
systems have come to be understood, managed and governed (Bulkeley & Betsill, 
2003; Bulkeley & Newell, 2010; Vallance et al., 2011; Whitehead, 2007). The 
Brundtland Report, for example, argued the necessity of ‘[d]evelopment that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987, p. 40). Meanwhile, the IPCC’s (1990, p. 52) 
First Assessment Report (FAR) drew attention to the fact that human activities were 
‘substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases’ 
resulting in ‘a significant disturbance of the natural carbon cycle’ (p. 52). It 
concluded that industrialised countries needed to ‘adapt their economies’ in ways 
that ‘limit emissions’ (IPCC, 1990, p. 52). Both of these influential reports 
highlighted how issues of population, food security, energy, industry, human 
2 
 settlement and transport could not be considered in isolation from one another and 
thus emphasised the need for change across all sectors of society.   
The language of subsequent IPCC (2007; 2014, p. 2) reports has been strengthened to 
the extent where it is now observed that ‘[h]uman influence on the climate system is 
clear’ (p. 2) and that ‘[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases’ will result in an 
increasing ‘likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and 
ecosystems’ (p. 8). Notably, they observe that the substantial emissions reductions 
required to limit warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels pose 
‘substantial technological, economic, social and institutional challenges’ (p. 20) and 
will require ‘policies and cooperation at all scales’ including ‘effective institutions 
and governance, innovation and investments in environmentally sound technologies 
and infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods and behavioural and lifestyle choices’ 
(IPCC, 2014, p. 25). For a number of reasons, transport (Banister, 2011; Hickman & 
Banister, 2014; Schwanen et al., 2011) and cities (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; 
Bulkeley & Newell, 2010) are considered to be particularly important in relation to 
debates on sustainability and climate change. 
1.1.2 Transport, the city and commuting 
The International Energy Agency (2012) suggests that nearly 94% of all freight and 
passenger transport relies on oil and, therefore, their continued growth ensures they 
remain a significant cause of anthropogenic climate change (Sims et al., 2014). In 
2011, transport accounted for 27% of global energy consumption and 22% of CO2 
emissions (IEA, 2012, 2013). It is considered to be one of the most challenging 
sectors to decarbonize (Sims et al., 2014), ‘given the myriad obstacles that exist to 
deep cuts in emissions and energy consumption through a combination of fewer and 
shorter trips, use of other transport modes, deployment of more fuel efficient 
vehicles, and utilization of less carbon-intensive fuels’ (Schwanen, 2015, p. 4; 
Schwanen et al., 2011). Cities are one site where attempts to reduce the resource and 
carbon intensive character of the transport sector have been initiated (see Hickman & 
Banister, 2014).  
Cities are considered to be important locales for addressing issues of sustainability 
and climate change in relation to a number of different sectors including transport for 
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 at least three reasons (Banister, 2008, 2011; Bulkeley, 2010; Bulkeley & Betsill, 
2003; Hickman & Banister, 2014; Whitehead, 2003). First, cities are sites ‘of high 
consumption of energy’ and local authorities potentially have power to influence 
these processes through ‘stronger use of the planning and land use development 
processes’ (Banister, 2011, p. 1538; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). Second, ‘local 
authorities have been engaging with issues of sustainable development’ in ways ‘that 
have implications for the mitigation of climate change’ (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003, p. 
2). Third, ‘local authorities have considerable experience in addressing 
environmental impacts within the fields of energy management, transport and 
planning, and many have undertaken innovative measures and strategies to reduce 
their impact on climate change’ (Banister, 2011; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003, p. 2; 
Hickman & Banister, 2014).  
Commuting intersects both concerns regarding energy and climate change, as well 
as, debates over the role cities may play in responding to these challenges (Hensher, 
2008; Watson, 2012). The term ‘commute’ has become ‘shorthand for the daily 
journey between work and home’ (Lyons & Chatterjee, 2008, p. 181) and is believed 
to originate from the ‘‘commuting’ of fares paid by nineteenth century Americans 
regularly travelling to work by train’ (Aldred, 2014, p. 450). The commute presents 
both a problem and opportunity for policy-makers seeking to facilitate less resource 
and carbon intensive modes of living (see Aldred, 2014; Lyons & Chatterjee, 2008). 
In most cities the private car remains the dominant mode of everyday mobility 
(Hickman & Banister, 2014; Sheller & Urry, 2000) which has implications not only 
for sustainability and climate change but also local air quality (Grimmond et al., 
2010), congestion (Flink, 1988), social exclusion and isolation (Preston & Rajé, 
2007; Stanley & Lucas, 2008) and public health and wellbeing (Lyons & Chatterjee, 
2008; Sallis et al., 2004). The routine and repeated nature of these journeys and the 
significant numbers of people travelling during ‘peak times’ (Lyons & Chatterjee, 
2008), however, can potentially enable the development of alternative and 
sustainable modes of ‘public’ transport including rail, bus, car-pooling and car 
sharing (Hickman & Banister, 2014; Kent & Dowling, 2013). Moreover, the mutual 
benefits of promoting ‘active’ modes of transport such as walking and cycling for the 
environment (i.e., emissions reductions, improvements in air quality) and health (i.e., 
physical exercise, stress reduction, weight loss, improvements in cardio-respiratory 
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 fitness) are increasingly recognised (see Rabl & de Nazelle, 2012; Sallis et al., 2004; 
Woodcock et al., 2009). These diverse rationales illustrate how daily journeys such 
as the commute are more than simply environmental problems and are intimately 
interconnected with broader social, cultural and political dynamics that shape various 
aspects of everyday life associated with home, work, school and leisure. 
Simultaneously, such rationales demonstrate why ‘the commute’ has become a site 
of importance for various behaviour change agendas. Section 1.2 now examines why 
attempts to understand everyday movement and to intervene, influence and change 
behaviour have come to focus on the autonomous or sovereign individual.  
1.2 The rise of the individual: Transport, neoliberalism and 
behaviour change 
The ways in which everyday movement has been theorised and understood both in 
research and policy has historically been dominated by transport studies which 
includes the subdisciplines of transport geography, transport economics, transport 
planning and transportation engineering (Law, 1999; Shaw & Sidaway, 2011) and 
urban planning (Banister, 2008; Sennett, 1994). The emergence of these disciplines, 
modern understandings of transport and attempts to regularise and govern movement 
have been traced back to William Harvey’s scientific discoveries in relation to the 
blood and respiratory systems of the human body (see Paterson, 2007, pp. 126-132; 
Sennett, 1994, pp. 255-281). Metaphors of circulation and flow subsequently came to 
guide the principles of urban design as enlightened planners wanted the city’s streets 
to be as clean, free flowing and efficient as a ‘healthy body’ (Foucault, 2007; 
Sennett, 1994, p. 263). It was during this period which ‘travel was reconceptualised 
as transport’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 131) or, more specifically, ‘the movement from one 
point to another in order to participate in the activities at the ‘trip destination’’ 
(Bonham, 2006, p. 58). Movement, particularly in urban settings, ‘was increasingly 
calculated, monitored and planned, but at the same time valued according to its 
purposefulness and efficiency of with which the journey was undertaken’ (Paterson, 
2007, p. 131). Efficient movement thus emerged as the principle which guided the 
‘arrangement of street-space and the ordering of urban traffic’ (Bonham, 2006, p. 58) 
and as part of what became during the twentieth century transport studies and urban 
planning, ‘as both academic disciplines and practices of city governments’ (Paterson, 
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 2007, p. 132). These developments have had at least two main implications. First, 
movement is understood as being derived from pre-existing demands at trip 
destinations such as work, shopping, leisure or housing. Second, trips are assumed to 
be made by sovereign individuals, each ‘contained in a body’ that is a distinct, 
autonomous and ‘equivalent unit’ that can be modelled as ‘discrete entities’ with 
separate trajectories (Law, 1999; Manderscheid, 2014). Such individualistic 
understandings have and continue to inform research and policy debates around 
transport, sustainability and climate change. These debates, however, also need to be 
understood in relation to the neoliberal reordering of social, economic and 
environmental life since the mid-to-late 1970s and the emergence of the behaviour 
change agenda. 
1.2.1 Neoliberalism and the emergence of behaviour change 
agenda(s)  
The autonomous and sovereign individual has also become a central figure in the 
neoliberal government and the behaviour change agenda. Neoliberalism has 
fundamentally altered the ways in which various sectors including energy, water, 
housing, health, and transport have come to be understood and governed in ways that 
have had implications for the environmental agenda. The privatisation, marketisation 
and deregulation of many of these sectors (Castree, 2010; Harvey, 2005) has resulted 
to a shift away from a production or provision-ethos of social policy where the 
demand and supply of such utilities or services were typically justified on the 
grounds of social welfare, population growth or macro-economic development 
(Cohen, 1998). The withdrawal or reduction of state intervention in, and the 
commodification of, such sectors has subsequently contributed to the development of 
a more consumer-oriented ethos, which is, underpinned by a belief that the market 
maximises freedom, centres on lifestyle, behaviour and individual choice (Castree, 
2010; Cohen, 1998). States are in many instances now acting more as market 
managers than providers who through privatisation and marketisation seek to 
establish conditions which maximise individual freedom and choice and reduce the 
dependence of individuals and communities on the state for the provision of the 
necessities of life (Castree, 2010; Harvey, 2005). This changing role has also entailed 
a redistribution of responsibility from states to individuals and households who in 
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 exercising their ‘freedom of choice’ as consumers are held responsible for any 
consequences of their decisions and actions (Castree, 2010). 
This consumer-centric ethos and autonomous understanding of freedom, choice and 
responsibility, has significantly shaped state responses to sustainability and climate 
change. This is apparent in a number of recent transport policy documents in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. For example, the New Zealand Transport Strategy 
(MoT, 2008, p. 5) which presents the government’s vision for an ‘affordable, 
integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable transport system’ in 2040 notes the 
important role that individual citizens will play in ensuring the successful delivery of 
the vision and in addressing climate change: 
[The] success [of the strategy] will depend on the everyday transport decisions and 
choices of individuals – where to live and work, what type of vehicle to purchase (if 
any) and how to travel. Behaviour change by New Zealanders will be essential if 
the growth in carbon emissions and other adverse effects of transport are to be 
reduced (MoT, 2008, p. 80).  
Similarly, Door to door: A strategy for improving sustainable transport integration 
outlines the UK Coalition Government’s vision for an ‘inclusive, integrated and 
innovative transport system’ where ‘making door-to-door journeys by sustainable 
means is an attractive and convenient option’ (2013, p. 8). Understanding and 
influencing individual’s travel choices is considered to be critical to achieving this 
vision and reducing transport related carbon emissions. Here, establishing what 
motivates these choices, ‘why people do not travel sustainably even when it is a 
viable option, and what deters them from making this choice’ are seen as particularly 
important (DfT, 2013, p. 13). The sentiment running through these and a number of 
other environmental policy documents (Defra, 2005, 2007, 2008; DfT, 2011; MfE, 
2007, 2008) is that a sea change in the behaviour of individual consumers, especially 
their everyday decisions and choices, is a prerequisite of a transition to a more 
sustainable and low carbon society (Shove, 2010; van Vilet et al., 2005). This 
philosophy, and the neoliberal agenda which underpins it, has legitimised substantial 
programmes of social environmental research which have sought to establish the 
economic and psychological determinants of human behaviour (for a review see 
Jackson, 2005). Moreover, it has contributed to the emergence of the behaviour 
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 change agenda which in various ways are informed by the empirical and theoretical 
insights generated by these programmes.   
Jones et al. (2013a; 2013b, p. 164) argue there have recently been concerted, but not 
necessarily unified, attempts to recognise how efforts directed at changing the 
‘behaviour of purportedly irrational individuals, communities and populations’ can 
be enhanced by such insights (although see Rose, 1999, pp. 22-52). They illustrate 
how such attempts have arisen out of ‘very different political priorities, media-
induced crises and institutional changes’ including climate change but also excessive 
alcohol consumption, obesity, problem gambling and road safety (Jones et al., 2013a, 
p. 42). In charting the evolution of the behaviour change agenda, Jones et al. (2013a) 
emphasise the need to understand that it has emerged at the ‘intersection of the 
private, public and third sectors’ rather than simply within the ‘bureaucracies of 
central government’ (p. 42). Moreover, they underscore the importance of 
recognising the ‘multiple, sometimes competing, policy formulations’ which employ 
behavioural science insights in the course of developing public policy and the 
‘hybrid forms that behavioural policy actually take’ with the ‘precise mix of 
ideational framing and practical expression’ varying from ‘from one behavioural 
initiative to another’ (Jones et al., 2013a, p. 42). This plurality and hybridity does not 
extend to the intellectual antecedents which underpin these behaviour change 
agendas, however, as individualistic approaches from especially psychology and 
economics continue to dominate (Burgess et al., 2003; Shove, 2010). The insights 
provided by these and other behavioural sciences are considered central to the 
development of neoliberal techniques and strategies for developing ‘subjects of 
responsibility, autonomy and choice’ (Rose, 2006, p. 155), as well as, correcting the 
‘social, ecological, economic and individual harms’ of neoliberalism (Jones et al., 
2013b, p. 170; Peck, 2010). As Section 1.3 elaborates the failure of these strategies 
and techniques, including programmes of behaviour change directed at transforming 
citizen’s everyday movements, have been attributed to their underpinning 
assumptions about the actions and decisions of individuals (see also Section 2.3.3).   
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 1.3 Situating the research and its aims 
There is a growing consensus amongst policy-makers (DfT, 2011; MoT, 2008), 
scientists, modellers and engineers (Ribeiro et al., 2007; Sims et al., 2014) and 
transport academics (Anable et al., 2012; Banister, 2008; Chapman, 2007) that ‘at 
least some level of behaviour change is unavoidable if carbon emissions from 
transport are to be reduced significantly’ (Schwanen et al., 2012, p. 522). 
Individualistic accounts of human behaviour have and continue to dominate the ways 
in which climate change (Shove et al., 2012; Urry, 2011) and transport 
(Manderscheid, 2014; Schwanen et al., 2011, 2012) have been theorised, understood 
and governed (Shove, 2010; Spaargaren, 2011). Behaviour change policies and 
interventions seeking to encourage individuals to make more ‘sustainable transport 
choices’ (DfT, 2011, p. 8) have had limited success. Globally the use and ownership 
of, and fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions associated with, private cars 
have continued to increase (Hickman & Banister, 2014; Sims et al., 2014). Even 
though reductions in car use per capita or ‘peak car’ (Headicar, 2013; Metz, 2010, 
2013; Meyer et al., 2012),  and corresponding increases in public transport patronage 
(Kenworthy, 2013) have been observed in some cities, the causes underlying these 
changes are complex and not easily attributed to individual transport choices 
(Goodwin & Van Dender, 2013; ITF, 2011).    
Recognising the limitations of individualistic approaches and the challenges of 
sustainability and climate change a range of scholars have sought to theoretically and 
empirically demonstrate how resource use and consumption (Burgess et al., 2003; 
Burgess et al., 1998; Hinchliffe, 1996; Shove, 2003; Shove et al., 2012; Spaargaren 
& Van Vliet, 2000; van Vilet et al., 2005; Warde, 2005) and everyday mobility 
(Banister, 2008; Bissell, 2010, 2014b; Larsen et al., 2006; Manderscheid, 2014; 
Schwanen et al., 2012; Sheller & Urry, 2006; Urry, 2004, 2007) are embedded within 
particular spatial, material, political, economic, cultural, social and personal contexts 
predominantly by engaging with socio-technical (Section 2.4.1), socio-cultural and 
practice approaches (Section 2.4.2). These diverse approaches in different ways 
emphasise the need to move beyond dominant individualistic models of behaviour 
and transport and to reconsider the internal and external environments, and habitual 
and reflective phases, of action. Instead insisting upon the importance of developing 
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 approaches and interventions which recognise how individual action (habitual and 
reflective) is enabled, constrained, permitted, and rendered possible in, and emerges 
out of, particular social and physical environments. The thesis engages with these 
approaches and wider scholarship on John Dewey’s pragmatism to propose a 
conceptual framework predicated on understanding the situated, relational, more-
than-individual and emergent character of action.  
1.3.2 Research aims, objectives and questions 
Drawing on this conceptual framework the thesis has two related aims:  
1. To identify the limitations of dominant understandings of the environments 
and phases of action in the context of behaviour change, climate change and 
everyday mobility. 
2. To demonstrate the ways in which a Deweyan-inspired approach provides a 
way of rethinking and advancing existing approaches to understanding the 
environments and phases of action. 
In doing so the intention is to contribute to critical studies of behaviour change, 
climate change and mobility by providing a dynamic understanding of how action 
and subjectivity continually emerge out of an individual’s interactions with their 
social and physical environments. These research aims are addressed in the thesis 
through empirical fieldwork in Auckland and London which has two objectives. 
First, to critically explore how the histories, politics and materialities of physical 
environments and established social norms, values and ideologies condition people’s 
habits and experiences of commuting in Auckland and London. Second, develop a 
Deweyan-inspired approach for undertaking research on contemporary urban 
commuting habits and experiences.  
The research questions are correspondingly aimed at developing both conceptual and 
empirical responses to the research aims and objectives. These are: 
1. How, why and with what consequences can the relationship between 
individuals and the social and physical environments of action be considered 
in non-dualistic and non-individualistic ways? 
2. How, why and with what implications might habit be understood as more 
than simply unreflexive and automatic responses to environmental cues? 
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 3. How, why and with what implications might the relationship between habit 
and thought be understood in a manner which is non-dualistic and non-
individualistic? 
4. What role do habit, experience and social and physical environments play in 
shaping subjectivity? 
The purpose behind each of these research questions is to ensure the thesis addresses 
broader debates around behaviour change, climate change and everyday mobility. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of these issues and the conceptual grounding for the 
more selective and empirically-driven responses to each of the research questions. 
The first question generates the focus of the study on the social and physical 
environments of Auckland and London and how they condition individual’s 
commuting habits, experiences and subjectivities and is examined explicitly in 
Chapter 4 and in less detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  The second research question seeks 
to move beyond understandings of habit as simply individualistic, automatic and 
mechanistic to consider habit as a dynamic and emergent entity which is decentred 
and distributed between body, mind and world. This question is addressed in 
different ways Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The third question seeks to rethink the 
relationship between habit and thought and draw attention to the ways in which 
thought is always more-than-individual and relational and is explored indirectly in 
Chapter 4, briefly in Chapter 5 and then in greater detail in Chapter 6. The fourth 
research question seeks to acknowledge that state-led behaviour change initiatives 
aimed at generating less resource and carbon intensive ways will by necessity 
involve not only changing physical infrastructures but also creating new individuals 
or subjectivities. This question is addressed most explicitly in Chapter 4 but also 
emerges in different ways in Chapters 5 and 6.  
1.4 Contributions of the thesis 
The thesis aims to make empirical and theoretical contributions to emerging debates 
on and approaches to behaviour change, climate change and mobility in three main 
ways. This contribution is predicated on a Deweyean-inspired approach which 
recognises how action continually emerges out of an individual’s interactions with 
their social and physical environments. First, drawing on empirically grounded 
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 fieldwork in Auckland and London the thesis illustrates the importance of 
understanding the ways in which commuting habits and experiences are always 
situated, relational, more-than-individual and emergent. The need to produce such 
knowledge is essential given behaviour change research and policymaking continues 
to be dominated by individualistic accounts of attitudes, behaviour and choice 
(Burgess et al., 2003; Shove, 2010). Theories of consumption (Gronow & Warde, 
2001; Southerton et al., 2004; van Vilet et al., 2005) and theories of practice (Shove 
et al., 2012; Spaargaren, 2011; Warde, 2005) have instead illustrated the need to 
understand how social, political and material contexts contribute to the ways in 
which resources are routinely used and consumed as part of habitual and mundane 
everyday practices. The thesis seeks to add to and advance these literatures by 
providing a more nuanced understanding of habit which recognises their role in 
continuity and change, thought and reflection, and constituting the self. In the 
process it also adds to emerging critical scholarship on habit (Bissell, 2014b; 
Carlisle, 2010, 2014; Dewsbury & Bissell, 2015; Schwanen et al., 2012; Sinclair, 
2011) and behaviour change (Jones et al., 2011; Pykett, 2012; Shove, 2010; Webb, 
2012; Whitehead et al., 2011). 
Second, the thesis develops a ‘more sophisticated appreciation of movement’ by 
engaging with existing debates in mobilities and transport geography literatures (see 
Section 2.2). Although primarily informed by the mobilities literature the thesis is 
still very much concerned with questions of policy relevance, a hallmark of much 
work in transport geography (Shaw & Hesse, 2010). It is not that mobility scholars 
are not actively engaged in (Jain & Lyons, 2008; Lyons & Urry, 2005), or unaware 
of the contribution their research could make to existing policy debates (Middleton, 
2011; Spinney, 2009). Mobility scholars1 have not had the same sustained 
engagement that transport geographers have had with questions of sustainability 
(Banister et al., 1997; Greene & Wegener, 1997) and climate change (Banister, 2007; 
Banister et al., 2011; Givoni & Banister, 2013). The thesis in this way takes seriously 
Shaw and Hesse’s (2010) call for a closer working relationship and understanding 
between these two geographical strands of thought and scholarship. Thus it 
contributes to mobilities research by not only examining the ‘specificity of particular 
1 John Urry (Dennis & Urry, 2009; Urry, 2004, 2008, 2013a) and Matthew Paterson (2007, 2014) are 
perhaps the main exceptions here. 
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 practices of mobility’ but also their relationship with broader ‘social and political 
imperatives and structures’ (Paterson, 2014, p. 570) and the possible implications 
such insights might have for policy. Simultaneously it seeks to advance transport 
geography by revealing how mobilities-inspired research can help to move beyond 
individualistic accounts of ‘travel behaviour’ which tend to dominate the 
subdiscipline (Schwanen et al., 2012).  
Third, it contributes to literatures on sustainable (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003, 2005; 
Whitehead, 2007) and low carbon cities and societies (Bulkeley et al., 2011; 
Bulkeley et al., 2013; Shove et al., 2008; Urry, 2013a; While & Whitehead, 2013). 
The thesis seeks to illustrate the potential for Deweyean pragmatism to inform 
transitions to a less resource intensive and carbon dependent modes of living. 
Drawing inspiration from John Urry’s recent writings the focus here is on attempting 
to ‘consider some of the possible futures that lie in store for different societies over 
the next few decades’ (Dennis & Urry, 2009; Urry, 2011, p. 139; 2013b). In contrast, 
to Urry who relies on scenarios, the thesis seeks to highlight the insights that might 
be generated from contextualised and empirically grounded research. Although it is 
impossible to anticipate the likelihood of disruptive innovation it is highly likely that 
walking and cycling, alongside other modes of low carbon and motorised transport, 
will become increasingly more important in less resource intensive societies (Dennis 
& Urry, 2009). While recognising the inherent uncertainties involved in this task 
(Urry, 2011), it is asserted that the insights generated from this study can help to 
identify both some of the challenges and opportunities for facilitating a shift to 
decarbonised transport systems and societies. The focus of the thesis thus is on 
attempting envision what low carbon forms of commuting might look like rather than 
specifically identifying how these shifts might be made.  
1.5 Thesis structure 
The remainder of the thesis is comprised of six chapters. The aim of Chapter 2 is 
two-fold. First, it examines four different approaches which have or could inform 
behaviour change interventions paying attention to how they theorise, research, and 
propose to, govern citizen’s actions. Second, and relatedly, outlines the conceptual 
framework which is used to critically analyse how contemporary commuting habits 
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 in Auckland and London emerge, persist and change. The chapter commences by 
drawing a distinction between the internal and external environments, and habitual 
and reflective phases of action. This schematic is then used to elaborate the four 
approaches to understanding action, these are: 1) individualist, 2) socio-technical; 3) 
practice; and 4) Deweyean pragmatism. Despite their historical, empirical and 
theoretical differences it is noted there is an overall consensus among these 
approaches that the habitual phase of action tends to dominate conduct. Underpinned 
by dualistic thought and notions of autonomous ‘choice’ and habits as unreflexive 
and automatic responses, it is argued individualist approaches provide a rather static 
and limited interpretation of action. The remaining three approaches, in contrast, 
provide more dynamic and relational accounts which are sensitive to the ways in 
which individual ‘choice’ is always conditioned by the social and physical or 
material contexts in which action unfolds. The thesis argues, of these three 
approaches, John Dewey’s pragmatism with its emphasis on flow and process and 
continuity and change provides the best conceptual framework for understanding 
how habitual and reflective action continually emerge out of an individual’s 
interactions or ‘transactions’ with their social and physical environments.  
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach of the thesis and more general 
issues associated with methodology. It begins by examining how the initial 
conception of the research which subsequently influenced the fieldwork and guided 
methodology was developed. Building on this the chapter then reflects on research 
design and how the sites of research and participants were selected with the intention 
of exploring the ways in which practices of thermal comfort are conditioned by 
particular social and physical contexts. This section elaborates on how while the 
project shifted from an initial focus on thermal comfort and practices to mobility and 
Deweyan pragmatism the emphasis remained on understanding the role context plays 
in conditioning, in particular, habitual and mundane action. The chapter goes on to 
explore the challenges associated with researching habits, routines and mundane 
practices and the different approaches researchers have employed to address these 
challenges. In developing this account particular attention is paid to instances of 
habit hitches, conflicts and shocks where taken-for-granted, embodied and automatic 
ways of operating are questioned, contested or interrupted and how these ideas 
informed the pilot research and subsequent development of the methodology. The 
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 sections that follow then elaborate on the various approaches employed during the 
pilot and PhD research including diaries, interviews, go-alongs and ethnography. The 
chapter concludes by discussing how the data was analysed by using the general 
procedures of ‘grounded theory’ methodology and reflecting on the limitations of the 
thesis.  
Chapter 4, the first of the three empirical chapters, examines the concept of ‘choice 
architecture’ which has been popularised by soft or libertarian paternalist thought or 
‘nudge theory’. It begins by examining how these ideas might be applied in the 
context of attempts to facilitate shifts towards low carbon mobility. Unlike other 
dominant individualist models it is argued that it provides a way of explaining how 
social and physical environments influence individual choice. Despite this the 
chapter argues the main limitations of this approach are three-fold. First, nudge 
accounts fail to consider how individual choices are pre-conditioned by social, 
political and material environments. Second, its emphasis on making subtle changes 
to existing choice infrastructures runs counter to the general consensus that climate 
change will demand large-scale transformations across all spheres of society. Third, 
and relatedly, such transformations will require regulations and restrictions that stand 
in direct contrast to libertarian paternalists’ ethos of personal choice and freedom. 
The notion of ‘habit infrastructures’ is introduced as an alternative way of 
understanding how social and physical environments pre-condition but do not 
determine action. This metaphor is developed initially through an examination of 
how cars have come to dominate cities around the world as a result of state 
promotion and the production of (auto)mobile subjectivities. Building on these 
insights the chapter then considers how particular policy and planning decisions have 
contributed to Auckland citizens auto-dependent lifestyles. Following on from this it 
then briefly considers declining patterns of car use and ownership in London before 
examining how a city’s complex transport infrastructures contribute to the 
emergence of particular (public)mobile subjectivities. The chapter concludes by 
arguing the notion of ‘habit infrastructures’ by providing a better understanding of 
how the internal and external environments of action can better inform attempts to 
realise environmental and climate change policy goals than that of ‘choice 
architectures’. 
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 Chapter 5 critiques the notion that individuals are prevented from making more 
sustainable transport ‘choices’ by various ‘barriers to action’. The chapter begins by 
elaborating on why weather and seasons will likely remain prominent in attempts to 
decarbonise transport. As a way of contextualising the discussion it explores various 
quantitative studies which have attempted to examine the impact and effect of 
hourly, daily and seasonal variations in weather and automated cycle count data from 
Auckland and London, reveal about cycling patterns. It is argued while such studies 
demonstrate important patterns they provide little explanation why these trends exist, 
how or why they have or might change, and how people anticipate, experience or 
negotiate such variations. Building on these observations the chapter argues there is a 
need to move beyond the notion of barriers and correspondingly introduces the 
concepts of socio-technical systems and practices, following Dewey, situations as 
possible alternatives. The next two sections draw on empirical material to explore 
how regular cyclists anticipate, experience and negotiate daily and seasonal 
variations in weather both at home and on the commute. In doing so Dewey’s theory 
of situations is employed as it is contended it provides the best way of understanding 
the continuous and contingent context in which these experience unfold and 
associated habits and meanings emerge. The chapter concludes by reflecting on what 
this account reveals about the limits of the notion of barriers to behaviour change.   
Chapter 6 addresses the way in which dominant behavioural models typically 
underpinned by dual process theories conceptualise habit and thought as polar 
opposites. Following Dewey the thesis argues they are better understood as phases 
within human experience in which habit determines the channels within which 
thought operates and thinking takes place within the fabric of habits. This argument 
is developed by exploring how people’s commuting habits emerge out of repeated 
encounters with particular social and physical environments in three ways. First, it 
begins by demonstrating how the initial period of travelling and commuting in a new 
city is marked by excitement, uncertainty and experimentation as people gradually 
learn to adjust to transport infrastructures, systems and customs. Second, the 
transition from excitement and uncertainty to familiar and certain is characterised as 
the arrival of the mundane commute. People are shown to respond in a range of 
different and sometimes interrelated ways including grinning and bearing it, trying to 
mix up the commute, and learning to value and actively use their travel time. The 
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 development of new habits during the initial phase it is argued correspondingly alter 
people’s sense and experience of these environments and allow them to regularly 
negotiate and adjust to changes in these contexts often with little or no thought. 
Third, by exploring cyclist’s ‘close calls’ and family life it is revealed that there is 
still potential for even the most mundane or settled commutes to be rendered 
problematic. During these periods it is illustrated that existing habits still qualify and 
determine the channel within which thought occurs. The chapter concludes by re-
emphasising the need to move beyond dual process accounts of habit and thought 
due to the significant role they play in action. Given the persistent importance he 
places on the temporality and situationality of experience, habit and thought, the 
chapter contends Dewey provides a valuable starting point for such a project. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by considering the research questions in relation to 
the conceptual framework and the research findings (Chapters 4-6). The chapter 
begins by briefly reflecting on the overall aims and focus of the thesis. In doing so it 
is emphasised that behaviour change for the purposes of sustainability and climate 
change will entail the widespread modification of existing habits and individual 
subjectivities. The research questions are then examined by revisiting the arguments 
made in the main empirical chapters to suggest important considerations for attempts 
to theorise, understand, and govern the environments and phases of action. In 
particular, it is reasserted that if behaviour change interventions are to play a 
meaningful role in facilitating change they need to move beyond existing dominant 
models of behaviour. Accordingly it considers how Dewey’s pragmatist writings 
provide a situated, relational and more-than-individual account for understanding 
how action emerges in particular social and physical environments and the strengths 
and limitations of this approach. Subsequently the research implications arising from 
the thesis are examined in relation to debates on behaviour change, climate change 
and mobility. The chapter concludes by considering some of the future areas of 
research generated from the thesis which might help to reveal both the challenges 
and possible openings for developing a low carbon economy and society through 
behaviour change interventions.  
17 
  
 Chapter 2. 
Re-inhabiting the commute: Rethinking attempts to 
de-carbonise everyday mobility 
2.1 Introduction: Theorising, researching and governing 
‘behaviour change’ 
Chapter 1 argued that behaviour change, transport and cities have come to be 
understood as central to efforts to redress the challenges of sustainability and climate 
change. Commuting was observed to be one site where states have attempted to 
intervene, influence and change the actions of citizens to reduce transport-related 
fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions. This chapter, focusing primarily on 
everyday mobility, examines four different approaches for understanding action 
which have or could inform such efforts paying particular attention to how they 
theorise, research, and attempt or propose to, govern citizen’s actions. In this context, 
the term ‘action’ rather than ‘behaviour’ is used in this chapter and throughout the 
thesis as the latter has become mainly associated with individualistic attempts to 
identify the psychological and economic determinants of human conduct (cf. 
Jackson, 2005; Jones et al., 2013b; Shove, 2010). There are two notable exceptions. 
First, reference is made to behaviour when individualistic approaches to action are 
discussed in Section 2.3 but also elsewhere in the thesis. Second, the phrase 
‘behaviour change’, reflecting its common usage, is used throughout the thesis to 
represent attempts to modify or change the actions of individuals. Meanwhile, the 
‘state’ is understood as a ‘mishmash of different peopled institutions with competing 
priorities’ which through ‘an amalgam of different instantiated practices’ gives ‘the 
impression of coherence and durability’ (Jones et al., 2013a, p. 33).   
The four approaches to action which will be examined in sequential order are: 1) 
individualist; 2) socio-technical; 3) practice-based; and 4) Deweyan pragmatism. 
Each section introduces the theoretical assumptions underpinning the approach 
paying particular attention to the ways in which they understand the environments 
and phases of action. In exploring the environments of action a broad distinction is 
made between the external and internal contexts in which action occurs. The 
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 external environment can be understood as the social and physical milieus or 
contexts which, each of the different approaches, consider to varying degrees 
important in shaping and influencing an individual’s actions, capacities and 
subjectivity (cf. Shilling, 2008). The internal environment, in contrast, might 
variously refer to a combination of bodily needs (instincts or impulses), sensory 
perceptions, emotions, values, desires, experiences, embodied capacities and skills, 
and conscious thought (cf. Hildebrand, 2008; Shilling, 2008). Importantly, each 
approach also differs in relation to the extent that they consider action to be the 
dynamic and continuous outcome of individuals interacting with their social and 
physical environments. There are some similarities, however, between socio-
technical, practice-based and Deweyan pragmatist accounts as they all recognise how 
individual action is always embedded in and conditioned by external contexts. 
A distinction is also made between different phases or modes of action. Recognising 
that each of these approaches understand action in rather different ways it is difficult 
to provide a comprehensive overview of each of these phases. There are some shared 
commonalities (cf. Aarts et al., 1998; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Neal et al., 2006; 
Schwanen et al., 2012; Shilling, 2008; Shove, 2012; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; 
Verplanken & Wood, 2006). The individualist, practice and Deweyan approaches, 
albeit in very different ways, usually draws a distinction between: 1) automatic, 
routine or habitual action; and 2) rational, deliberative or reflective action. The first 
mode, typically associated with habits, is generally understood as relatively stable or 
routinized dispositions or ways of acting which have arisen out of the repetition of 
past actions within particular contexts. They are acts characterised by a high degree 
of automation and routintisation both of which is are essential for ‘humans to operate 
effectively’ (Shilling, 2008, p. 12). By storing ‘the fruits of past experience’ habits 
‘economise and simplify our actions’ which allows us to negotiate our social and 
physical surroundings without having to plan, consciously control and monitor every 
move we make (James, 1890, p. 114; Scheffler, 1974, p. 123). In contrast, the 
rational, reflective or deliberative mode is marked by consciousness, awareness, 
planning, problem-solving and thought. There is some divergence on how regularly 
rational or conscious action occurs and the events or environments which give rise to 
it. The extent to which one phase or the other dominates action also varies across, 
and sometimes within, each approach but there does appear to be a growing 
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 consensus that automatic, routine or habitual action tends to prevail (cf. Shilling, 
2008; Shove, 2012; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Verplanken & Wood, 2006).  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. First, Section 2.2 
contextualises the chapter in relation to contemporary understandings of everyday 
movement. Second, Section 2.3 focuses on soft or libertarian paternalism or nudge 
theory as a way of illustrating how individualistic accounts understand the 
environments and phases of action and their potential application to behaviour 
change. Third, Section 2.4 introduces theories of socio-technical systems and 
practice and suggests despite both providing more dynamic and relational accounts 
of how social and physical contexts variously enable and constrain action, they still 
have a number of limitations. Fourth, Section 2.5 examines John Dewey’s 
pragmatism. This section finishes by outlining the Deweyan-inspired conceptual 
framework which is developed in the thesis to understand action. The chapter 
concludes in Section 2.6 reasserting the importance of the need to rethink existing 
dominant approaches to behaviour change if shifts to less resource and carbon 
intensive modes of everyday mobility and living are to be realised.  
2.2 Understanding everyday movement: From transport to 
mobilities studies 
The field of transport studies, as Section 1.2 noted, has historically dominated the 
ways in which everyday movement has been theorised and understood in both 
research and policy (Banister, 2008; Law, 1999; Shaw & Sidaway, 2011). Transport 
geography, in this context, has examined the spatial aspects of transport in two main 
ways. First, how the form, layout and extent transport systems are determined by a 
variety of factors including ‘topography (mountains, rivers, etc.), economic 
conditions, technological capability, socio-political situations and the spatial 
distribution of the places they link together’, and second, the impact of transport on 
social and economic activity (Black, 2003; Keeling, 2007; Shaw et al., 2008, pp. 4-
5). Traditionally transport geography (although see Schwanen, 2015; Shaw & Hesse, 
2010; Shaw & Sidaway, 2011) has been founded upon many features common across 
transport studies (see Banister, 2008; Schwanen & Lucas, 2011) including empiricist 
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 or positive assumptions, methods of data collection and modelling (Law, 1999; Shaw 
& Hesse, 2010).  
Despite multiple theoretical frameworks being used in transport studies to frame 
empirical research and model development, these are typically derived from 
analogous disciplines of psychology and economics (for overviews see Schwanen et 
al., 2011; Schwanen & Lucas, 2011). Notable frameworks include the random-utility 
theory (RUT) (Domenich & McFadden, 1975; McFadden, 1986, 2001), the Theory 
of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishein, 1980; Fishbein, 1973), Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) and Schwartz’s (1977) Norm Activation 
Model. Transport as a consequence tends be modelled as if mobility practices were 
derived from a set of largely given demands such as work, shopping, leisure, or 
housing and ‘not for the pleasure of the movement itself’ (Law, 1999, p. 580; Sheller 
& Urry, 2006). Similarly, trips are ‘imagined as being made by independent 
individuals, each contained in a body that is a distinct, separate and equivalent unit’ 
which can either then be modelled as ‘discrete entities with independent trajectories’ 
(Law, 1999, p. 581), or at the aggregate level, in relation to ‘place-inherent push and 
pull factors’ (Manderscheid, 2014, p. 189).  
Mobilities studies, in contrast, are predicated on a ‘mobilities turn’ or the ‘new 
mobilities paradigm’ which seeks to rethink existing approaches to understanding the 
movement of people, ideas and things (Adey, 2010; Cresswell, 2006; Hannam et al., 
2006; Sheller & Urry, 2006; Urry, 2007). This paradigm seeks to problematize ‘both 
‘sedentarist’ approaches in the social science[s] that treat place, stability and 
dwelling as a natural steady-state, and ‘deterritorialized’ approaches that posit a new 
‘grand narrative’ of mobility, fluidity or liquidity as a pervasive condition of 
postmodernity or globalization’ (Hannam et al., 2006, p. 5; Sheller & Urry, 2006). 
For Cresswell (2006; 2010, p. 18) mobility ‘exists in the same relation to movement 
as place does to location’. In his view mobility ‘involves a fragile entanglement of 
physical movement, representations, and practices’ (Cresswell, 2010, p. 18). Physical 
movement is ‘brute fact – something that is potentially observable, a thing in the 
world, an empirical reality’ which is ‘measured and analysed’ by modellers and 
transport planners (Cresswell, 2006, p. 3). Representations are the ‘ideas about 
mobility’ which are captured and conveyed in diverse forms from ‘film to law, 
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 medicine to photography, literature to philosophy’ and ‘make sense of it through the 
production of meaning’ (Cresswell, 2006, p. 3). Importantly, mobility is also 
‘practiced, it is experienced, it is embodied’, it is ‘a way of being in the world’ 
(Cresswell, 2006, p. 3). These entanglements Cresswell (2010, p. 18) argues have 
‘broadly traceable histories and geographies’ and as a result at any one time there are 
‘pervading constellations of mobility – particular patterns of movement, 
representations of movement, and ways of practising movement that make sense 
together’.  
Although the term ‘new mobilities paradigm’ is potentially problematic, there is 
something ‘new’ about how such scholars compared to earlier accounts of, for 
instance, ‘movement, migration and transport’, approach mobilities (see Cresswell, 
2010, p. 18; 2011). First, whereas migration and transport studies tend to focus on 
particular forms of moving, a ‘mobilities approach considers all forms of movement 
from small-scale bodily movements, such as dance or walking, through 
infrastructural and transport aided movements to global flows of finance or labour’ 
(Cresswell, 2011, p. 552). Second, ‘mobilities research thinks about a variety of 
things that move including humans, ideas and objects’ and ‘how these things move in 
interconnected ways and how one may enable or hinder another’ (Cresswell, 2011, p. 
552). Mobile technologies, for example, inform in different ways ‘corporal acts of 
moving and staying put’ (Berry & Hamilton, 2009; Cresswell, 2011, p. 552; Larsen 
et al., 2006).  
Third, mobility is understood ‘in relation to forms of place, stopping, stillness and 
relative immobility that are enabled by or enable mobilities’ (Adey, 2006; Cresswell, 
2011, p. 552; Hannam et al., 2006). Fourth, there is a general sentiment that an 
attentiveness to empirical mobilities demands both mobile theorization and mobile 
methodologies to ensure accounts do not privilege ‘notions of boundedness and the 
sedentary’ (Büscher & Urry, 2009; Cresswell, 2006, 2011, p. 552; Urry, 2007). Fifth, 
there has been an ‘increased focus on the differentiated politics of mobility whether 
at the scale of individuals lining up at an airport, men and women travelling to work 
on a daily basis or the global flows of the kinetic elite or refugees (Cresswell, 2010; 
2011, p. 552; Hanson, 2010; Silvey, 2005).  
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 In summary, understandings of everyday movement have and continue to be 
influenced by the empiricist and positivist assumptions of transport studies, and 
indirectly, through appropriation of cognizant theoretical frameworks, economics 
and psychology (see Section 2.3). Mobilities scholars have subsequently sought to 
address the limitations of these dominant individualistic understandings by deploying 
new conceptual (see Sections 2.4 and 4.3) and empirical approaches (see Chapter 3) 
to understanding movement. In the process they have demonstrated how ‘as subjects 
and objects move across spatial, social and cultural settings, they are not doing so 
independently of the political and economic structures that shape subjectivity, 
locality and mobility, but are actually embodying, recoding and updating larger 
material and symbolic regimes’ (see Section 4.3; D’Andrea et al., 2011, p. 158). 
Despite the potential contributions such insights could make to the behaviour change 
agendas mobilities scholars have not had the same sustained engagement that 
transport scholars have had with policy debates pertaining to sustainability and 
climate change (Shaw & Hesse, 2010). This thesis attempts to in part address this 
deficiency by reflecting on the possible implications of understanding mobility as 
always embedded in particular social, political and material contexts might have for 
understanding behaviour change. Alongside this it seeks to again illustrate how 
mobilities-inspired research can assist transport studies, but more specifically 
transport geography, to move beyond individualistic accounts of ‘travel behaviour’ 
which still remain prominent within the discipline (see Shaw & Hesse, 2010; Shaw 
& Sidaway, 2011). The remainder of this chapter now focuses on four different 
approaches to action which have to more or a lesser extent informed transport and 
mobilities studies, as well as, attempts to understand and intervene, influence and 
change the the actions of citizens in different spheres of life including everyday 
mobility. 
2.3 Attitudes, (irrational) behaviour and choice 
(architectures) 
The previous section observed how the field of transport studies has typically been 
informed by individualistic approaches derived from psychology and economics. 
Many of these frameworks including rational choice theories, the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishein, 1980; Fishbein, 1973) and the Theory of 
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 Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) have been equally prominent in wider 
environmental debates. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a full 
overview of these frameworks and their potential application to understanding 
transport (see Schwanen et al., 2011; Schwanen & Lucas, 2011) and behaviour 
change (see Burgess et al., 2003; Jackson, 2005). Some of the common features of 
these approaches, however, are elaborated in Sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 and elsewhere in 
the thesis (Chapters 5 and 6). Reflecting its growing prominence within policy-
making the remainder of this subsection focuses on soft or libertarian paternalism or 
nudge theory2 in order to illustrate how these individualistic accounts understand the 
environments and phases of action and their potential application to behaviour 
change. 
2.3.1 Libertarian paternalism: From homo economicus to Homer 
Simpson 
Since 2004, libertarian paternalism, or nudge theory as it is commonly known, has 
played a prominent role reshaping the ways in which states in many countries around 
the world have sought to design and implement public policies (Ly & Soman, 2013; 
Whitehead et al., 2014) including in a transport context (DfT, 2011; Jones et al., 
2011b, 2013b). This set of governance principles and practises is guided by various 
quasi-scientific and scientific insights about human decision making and action 
derived from various disciplines including behavioural economics, behavioural 
psychology and neuroscience (see Table 2.1). The libertarian aspect of this approach 
reflects a belief that generally ‘people should be free to do what they like-and to opt 
out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). 
The paternalistic facet ‘lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to 
try to influence people’s behaviour in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and 
better’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5).  
  
2 The terms libertarian paternalism and nudge or nudge theory are used interchangeably throughout 
the thesis.  
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 Table 2.1. Key intellectual influences of libertarian paternalism. Source: Jones et al. (2011a). 
Behavioural economics Preference theory 
Behavioural psychology Psychographics 
Cognitive design Social cognition 
Engineering psychology Social influence theory 
Ethology Social marketing 
Game theory Theories of affect 
Intuitive judgement theory Time preference theories 
Material psychology User centred design 
Neuroeconomics Visual perception theory 
Neuropsychology  
There are three central tenets upon which libertarian paternalism is founded. First, 
the ‘humans’ who live in the real world are distinctly different from the utility 
maximising homo economicus of mainstream economic theory. Humans frequently 
employ various biases such as heuristics, models, inclinations, gut feelings and 
mental shortcuts when making choices between options (Ariely, 2008; Camerer et 
al., 2003; Gilovich et al., 2002; Simon, 1955; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Unlike homo 
economicus humans experience ‘bounded rationality’ whereby one’s ability to make 
rational decisions is constrained or restricted by the amount of time and energy 
available and a lack of sufficient access to suitable information (Simon, 1955, 1982). 
At other times, and despite the best of intentions, people’s decisions are 
unexpectedly shaped by impulse, arousal or temptation (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
These claims, and the experimental and ‘real world’ studies of human behaviour 
which they are underpinned by, initially emerged out of cognitive and social 















Commonly referred to as dual-process or dual-system theories (for overviews see 
Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Weber & Johnson, 2009), these accounts 
distinguish between habitual or automatic and rational or reflective cognitive systems 
and/or modes of behaviour (see Table 2.2). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) emphasise 
the differences between these two systems by contrasting the dispositions of two 
fictional characters. The rational and objective Mr Spock from the science fiction 
franchise Star Trek is the embodiment of the reflective system and by association 
homo economicus. Spock’s planned and objective approach is marked by slow and 
deductive thought unaffected by impulses, arousal and emotion. In contrast, the 
automatic system is fast, uncontrolled, associative, effortless and unconscious. This 
system is personified by the lazy, impulsive, and thoughtless Homer Simpson, from 
the television series The Simpsons, who ‘seems to have forgotten where he put his 
[r]eflective system’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 22). Thus the automatic system ‘is 
rapid and is or feels instinctive’ and ‘does not involve what we usually associate with 
the word thinking’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 19). The heuristics and biases which 
humans are said to rely on in everyday life are considered to arise out of the interplay 
between these two systems. More importantly, it is the automatic system which is 
said to dominate most thought and action (Ariely, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003; 
Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gilovich et al., 2002; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
Second, it is assumed that the dominance of the automatic system and the reliance on 
heuristics and biases result in people commonly making ‘irrational’ or misinformed 
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 choices which can have negative and costly implications for their personal health, 
financial security and overall happiness (Ariely, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003; Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008). It is possible to train the automatic system through ‘repetition’ 
but this requires a ‘lot time and effort’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 21). For 
example, this system starts out with no idea of how to ride a bicycle or drive a car. 
After ‘countless hours of practice’ an ‘accomplished’ cyclists or driver can ‘avoid 
reflection’ and simply relying on their automatic system ‘just do it’ (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008, p. 21). The problem is that most of the time the ‘untrained’ automatic 
system dominates thought and action ensuring that the forces of ‘inertia, 
procrastination, [mindlessness, temptation, arousal] and imitation drive our 
behavio[u]r’ (Ariely, 2008; Gilovich et al., 2002; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 238). 
This is because the automatic system is ‘associated with the oldest parts of the brain 
[which] we share with lizards’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 20). As a consequence 
libertarian paternalists, and many psychologists and neuroscientists (see Ledoux, 
1998; Lieberman et al., 2002), suggest behaviour is largely pre-determined by our 
evolutionary past as our ‘ancient brain’ has ‘not evolved much in thousands of years’ 
and as a consequence ‘remains much like that of our early ancestors … concerned 
[mainly] with exploitable resources and immediate groups, risks and needs’ (Gifford 
et al., 2011, p. 812). Thus our ancient brain contributes to ‘individuals mak[ing] 
pretty bad decisions [that] they would not have made if they had paid full 
attention…, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control’ (Ariely, 2008; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 21). Typically the costs of the bad decisions individuals 
make such as eating unhealthy foods, selecting the wrong health or retirement plan or 
failing to reduce their speed for a dangerous corner (see Section 4.2) are collectively 
shared by other members of society (e.g., cost of health care; car insurance 
premiums) (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
Third, elements of physical and procedural environment including technologies, 
interfaces, architecture and infrastructure, shape the possible ways in which users 
interact with people, objects and their surroundings (Norman, 1988). Importantly, 
these rather ubiquitous elements provide the ‘choice architecture’ or contexts in 
which humans live and operate. The design and configuration of ‘choice 
architectures’ can serve to perpetuate existing biases of the automatic system and as a 
result actively contribute to the propensity for humans to routinely make irrational 
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 decisions (Norman, 1988; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Additionally, ‘social norms’ or 
‘influences’ are an important feature of the context in which individuals make 
decisions and judgements and can influence what they do and think (Cialdini, 2009 
[2001]). This is because the actions and thoughts of other people ‘conveys 
information’ to an individual about what ‘might be [their] best’ course of action or 
way of thinking (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 54). Similarly, ‘peer pressure’ 
encourages individuals concerned about how others perceive them to ‘go along with 
the crowd to avoid their wrath or curry their favour’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 
54). Libertarian paternalists contend that by harnessing the ‘power’ of these physical 
and social environments or ‘choice architectures’ it is possible to ‘nudge’ individuals 
towards better decisions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
Libertarian paternalism in this way moves beyond social psychological accounts 
which interpret a wide variety of external ‘factors’ as motivators and barriers to 
action including, but not limited to: 
government regulations; other legal and institutional factors; … the physical 
difficulty of specific action; capability and constraints provided by technology and 
the built environment (e.g., building design, availability of bicycle paths, solar 
energy technology); … and various features of the broad social, economic, and 
political context (e.g., the price of oil, the sensitivity of government to public and 
interest group pressures …) (Stern, 2000, p. 415).  
These diverse external factors are simply understood as ‘weak’, ‘neutral’ or ‘strong’ 
motivators or barriers to action (e.g., Corraliza & Berenguer, 2000; Guagnano et al., 
1995; Lüdemann, 1998; Steg & Vlek, 2009, p. 312) and no attempt is made to 
explain how they drive or prevent certain behaviours (see also Section 4.2; Shove, 
2010). For example, the Attitude-Behaviour-Context/Constraint model (Stern, 2000), 
represented in Figure 2.1, holds the relationship between attitudes (A) and behaviour 
(B) is strongest in situations where contextual factors (C) are weak or neutral. 
Conversely, when contextual factors (e.g., the presence or absence of cycle 
infrastructure) are either significantly negative or positive they are deemed capable 
of preventing individual from, or almost compelling them to, perform a specific 
behaviour (i.e., cycle). This is in direct contrast to libertarian paternalists who stress 
the importance of understanding how these external environments shape the actions 
and decisions of individuals.  
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Figure 2.1. The Attitude-Behaviour-Context Model applied to cycling. Modified from Guagnano et al. 
(1995). 
Nudging involves subtly re-configuring the physical or social contexts in which 
decision making occurs in ways that encourage people to make choices in their own 
best interests without forbidding any options (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). These 
attempts are legitimised by the observation that there is no such thing as ‘neutral’ 
design as any information, policy or product inevitability entails the framing a user’s 
choices (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 3). Libertarian paternalists are thus attentive to 
how a user’s preferences are mediated by how their automatic system interacts with 
choice architectures, which differs significantly from more ‘traditional’ approaches. 
A number of social psychology theories, for instance, focus on ‘breaking’ or 
‘defrosting’ habits by disrupting the environment which cues an individual’s 
automatic response (see Section 6.2.1). Nudge, in contrast, attempts to work with 
rather than against people’s automatic system and their predictably irrational biases 
(Ariely, 2008; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For example, a ‘choice architect’ such as 
the manager a school cafeteria is in a position where they can potentially encourage 
children to improve their diets by rearranging the layout of cafeteria so that healthy 
30 
 food is at eye level (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 3). Such an intervention counts as a 
nudge as it is ‘easy and cheap to avoid’ and as it does ban unhealthy food, it is in no 
way mandatory (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). The implications and limitations of 
nudging and choice architecture are briefly elaborated below before being further 
considered in Section 4.2.  
2.3.2 Nudge theory, MINDSPACE and the behaviour change agenda(s) 
A key attraction of libertarian paternalism is that it has allowed policy makers to shift 
away from narrow accounts of human decision-making based on, for instance, 
rational choice models (Becker, 1976; Elster, 1986) and the Theories of Reasoned 
Action (Ajzen & Fishein, 1980) and Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). These earlier 
economic and psychological models suggest individuals corresponding with their 
pre-existing attitudes, beliefs and values make rational and logical ‘choices’. 
Accordingly, information ‘presented in attractive’ and ‘accessible ways’ and 
appropriate financial incentives are all it that are required to encourage individuals to 
change their minds and make ‘environmentally friendly’ choices (Burgess et al., 
1998, p. 1446; Dolan et al., 2010). Greater levels of awareness and concern have not 
resulted in the majority of individuals adopting environmentally sustainable lifestyles 
(Spaargaren, 2011). There is an observed ‘value-action’ or ‘attitude-behaviour’ gap 
where people holding particular attitudes or values fail to act correspondingly (Blake, 
1999; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). More recent, behavioural accounts have 
attributed this gap to the dominant role habits or the automatic system and/or the 
social and physical environment (‘choice architecture’) play in shaping or 
influencing individual action and thought (e.g., Blake, 1999; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 
2002; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Norman, 1988; Stern, 2000; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; 
Verplanken & Wood, 2006).  
Building on ‘major advances’ (p. 7) in behavioural science understandings of ‘the 
factors that shape and affect our behaviour’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 12), nudge has 
thus helped facilitate the development of policies3 which consider ‘the role of 
emotion, social [, procedural and physical] context[s], automatic response, mental 
3 Here, it is important to note that there are now a wide range of nudge-inspired policies emerging and 
not all of these display the same flaws that the thesis identifies in the broader policy project (for 
further details see Whitehead et al., 2014). 
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 shortcuts, and intuition within human behaviour’ (Whitehead, 2014, p. 11, see for 
example: DfT, 2011, 2013; MED, 2006). An additional attraction according to nudge 
advocates is that it provides the ‘real Third Way’ between left and right-wing politics 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; 2008, p. 252) by preserving ‘personal freedom of choice’ 
and ‘supporting the establishment of a more caring and supportive system of 
government’ (for critical discussions see Jones et al., 2011b; Jones et al., 2013b; 
Pykett et al., 2011, p. 301). 
In Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, pp. 81-100) outline what they consider to be 
the six ‘basic principles of good (and bad) choice architecture’ (p. 83) through the 
mnemonic ‘NUDGES’ (iNcentives, Understand mappings, Defaults, Give feedback, 
Expect error, Structure complex choices) (p. 100). Most of these principles have 
subsequently been incorporated into the Institute of Government (Dolan et al., 2010) 
report MINDSPACE: Influencing behaviour through public policy. Notably, this 
report ‘helped to make the case for the establishment’ (para. 3) of the UK Cabinet 
Office’s Behavioural Insights Team which continues to use this framework ‘to aid 
the application of behavioural science to the policymaking process’ (BIT, 2014, para. 
4). Commissioned by the Cabinet Office and developed with academics from the 
London School of Economics and Imperial College, it sets out a practical checklist of 
the nine ‘most robust (non-coercive) influences on behaviour’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 
8). This checklist, captured in the mnemonic ‘MINDSPACE’ and presented in Table 
2.3, omits what the authors consider to be ‘hard’ or ‘coercive’ instruments such as 
legislation and regulation which despite being ‘very effective’ at ‘compel[ling] us to 
act in certain ways’ are often ‘costly and inappropriate in many instances’ (Dolan et 
al., 2010, p. 7). ‘Less-coercive’ or ‘soft’ policy instruments such as incentives, 
information provision and sophisticated communications techniques, meanwhile, are 
often less expensive and ‘sometimes very effective’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 7). 
MINDSPACE like nudge, therefore, does not forbid any choices, recognises that the 
‘choice environment’ is ubiquitous, and seeks to work with the automatic system 
(Dolan et al., 2010, p. 12).  
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 Table 2.3. The nine ‘most robust (non-coercive) influences on our behaviour’ captured in the simple 
mnemonic – MINDSPACE. Source: Dolan (2010, p. 8). 
Behavioural influence How it influences behaviour 
Messenger we are heavily influenced by who communicates information 
Incentives our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental 
shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses 
Norms we are strongly influenced by what others do 
Defaults we ‘go with the flow’ of pre-set options 
Salience our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us 
Priming our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues 
Affect our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions 
Commitments we seek to be consistent with our public promises, and 
reciprocate acts  
Ego we act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves 
By ‘condensing’ new evidence and insights from the behavioural sciences into a 
‘manageable’ checklist MINDSPACE it is argued can provide policy makers with a 
‘powerful new set of tools’ to help address challenges as diverse as crime, obesity 
and environmental sustainability (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 7). Drawing on the 4 E’s 
framework, originally developed by Defra (Defra, 2008; Jackson, 2005), they 
illustrate how in practice MINDSPACE can build on ‘existing methods of policy-
making’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 9). The 4Es are ‘four actions that should underpin 
government’s attempts to change behaviour: Enable, Encourage, Engage and 
Exemplify’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 9). MINDSPACE, as Figure 2.2 highlights, 
requires ‘two supporting actions: Explore, which takes place before policies are 
implemented, and Evaluate, which judges the success of the policy’ (Dolan et al., 
2010, p. 9).  
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Figure 2.2. The 6E’s framework for applying MINDSPACE. Source: Dolan et al. (2010, p. 9).  
MINDSPACE in this manner does not radically reformulate existing policy 
understandings of, and approaches to, governing the environments and phases of 
action. This is of course not to suggest that like nudge it does not encourage policy 
makers to rethink their pre-existing assumptions about the rationality of individuals 
and to recognise the role choice environments play in shaping individual action and 
thought. Indeed, as the authors observe, the report is marked by a shift away from 
what are deemed to be largely ineffective and expensive approaches which seek to 
alter behaviour by simply ‘changing minds’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 15). 
MINDSPACE, by focusing ‘on the more automatic processes of judgement and 
influence’ and ‘altering the context within which people act’, instead aims to 
‘chang[e] behaviour without changing minds’ (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 14). In doing so 
MINDSPACE like nudge continues to be underpinned, however, by many of the 
assumptions of earlier psychological and economic models. 
2.3.3 Individualistic understandings of the environments and phases 
of action 
Nudge and MINDSPACE, like many other individualistic approaches, embody at 
least six interrelated assumptions about researching and governing behaviour change 
(see also Jackson, 2005; Shove, 2010; Strengers, 2012; Whitford, 2002). First, the 
34 
 ‘individual’ is assumed to be the most appropriate unit of analysis, policy and 
intervention. Second, individuals are assumed much like a ‘portfolio’ (see Hindess, 
1988), to ‘carry a relatively stable and pre-existing set of beliefs’, values, ‘desires 
[and biases] from context to context’ (Whitford, 2002, p. 325). Subjectivity is thus 
understood as something pre-given and insulated from an individual’s social and 
physical surroundings. Third, behaviour is an essentially linear process which is 
driven or prevented by the elements of an individual’s portfolio and other antecedent 
factors such as habits and the design and configuration of facilitating or choice 
contexts (Burgess et al., 2003). Habits, when considered in this context, tend to be 
viewed as simply unreflexive and automatic responses to environmental cues. 
Fourth, humans are assumed to exist separately from the non-human world of nature 
and technology (Spaargaren, 2011; Strengers, 2012). Fifth, only humans are 
understood to possess agency or the ability to act (Spaargaren, 2011; Strengers, 
2012), although it could be argued nudge accounts at least recognise some 
resemblance of non-human agency (for a critical discussion see Pinch, 2010; 
Selinger & Whyte, 2010). Six, change is considered to be ‘orderly, predictable and 
controllable’ process (Strengers, 2012, p. 228) as behaviour can be divided into 
discrete components each of which is ‘amenable to interventions designed to re-
engineer choices step by step’ (Webb, 2012, p. 113). Moreover, any reductions in 
resource consumption and carbon emissions associated with behavioural changes are 
presumed to be long-lasting (Strengers, 2012).  
The remainder of this chapter considers three alternative approaches (Sections 2.4-
2.5) to understanding action which provide more dynamic, relational and importantly 
non-individualistic accounts of how the social and physical environments of action 
condition but do not determine individual action. In doing so, it will be argued that 
the six assumptions embedded within individualistic approaches severely limit their 
potential to explain how high carbon and resource intensive patterns of mobility have 
emerged and how and why they might change.  
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 2.4 Reconfiguring behaviour change: From individuals as 
(ir)rational decision makers to ‘carriers’ of practices 
embedded in socio-technical systems 
This section introduces theories of socio-technical systems and practice which have 
been taken up by scholars interested in recognising the ‘crucial role of the mobility 
of people, goods, information and ideas for society and social life’ (Schwanen & 
Lucas, 2011), as well as, those seeking to either inform or reshape existing academic 
(e.g., Hargreaves, 2011; Shove, 2010; Watson, 2012) and policy (e.g., Darnton et al., 
2011; Jackson, 2005; Southerton et al., 2011; Shove, 2012b) debates associated with 
environmental and climate change issues. There are at least two important 
differences between these and the individualistic approaches elaborated upon in 
Section 2.3. First, nudge and social psychology theories seek to predict which, and in 
what circumstances, individuals will, for instance, drive a car by identifying the key 
factors that shape and affect behaviour (Schwanen & Lucas, 2011). In contrast, 
socio-technical and practice scholars are more sceptical of the possibilities of 
predicting behaviour and instead would seek to understand the role and dominance of 
the car in contemporary societies (Schwanen & Lucas, 2011; Shove et al., 2015). 
Second, the individual, the fundamental unit of analysis in nudge and social 
psychology approaches, is not as central to socio-technical and practice accounts. 
Rather, as Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 elaborate, they consider either systems or 
practices as the central units of analysis. As there are a number of overlaps between 
the limitations of socio-technical and practice-based approaches these will be 
considered together in Section 2.4.3. 
2.4.1 Socio-technical systems: System dynamics, co-evolution and 
the system of automobility 
Socio-technical accounts seek to examine at a systemic or macro-level how 
environmentally problematic ways of life emerge, are reproduced and how they 
change. Drawing on traditions such as innovation studies, science and technology 
studies (STS), evolutionary economics, history, and complexity theory this literature 
in different ways seeks to highlight how individual decisions and choices are always 
embedded in social, technical, political, cultural and economic settings (Bijker et al., 
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 1987; Fleck, 1993, 2000; Geels, 2005b; Rip & Kemp, 1998). Ideas and concepts 
from these diverse traditions have been mobilised in different ways by scholars who 
have sought to analyse the rise of existing unsustainable and high carbon lifestyles 
and to identify the possibilities for transitions to less resource and carbon intensive 
societies (Geels, 2005b; Rip & Kemp, 1998; Shove, 2003; Spaargaren and van Vliet, 
2000).  
Despite these differences, there are at least three broad conceptual overlaps between 
Frank Geels (2005b, 2012) use of the multi-level perspective (MLP), inspired by 
evolutionary economics, innovation studies and STS, and John Urry’s (2000; 2004; 
Dennis & Urry, 2009) use of complexity theory, to account for the continuing 
dominance of the car and to explore the likelihood of transitions to low-carbon or 
‘post-car’ transport systems (see also Shove, 1998; Watson, 2012). First, they both 
recognise that society and technology are inextricably linked. This is embodied in the 
term ‘socio-technical system’ which recognises how ‘the social’ and ‘the technical’ 
are always dynamically ‘intertwined’, constitutive of ‘each other’ and co-evolve 
together (Geels, 2005b, p. viii).  
Second, Geels and Urry hold it is not possible to understand car use without 
reference to the other elements of this socio-technical system which have become 
‘inter-related in structured and systemic ways’ (Watson, 2012, p. 492). This focus 
enables both scholars, albeit in different ways, to examine the processes which have 
given rise to the ‘dominant structure of personal mobility’ (Watson, 2012, p. 492). 
Geels, for example, charts between 1860 and 1930 the transition from a land-based 
road transport system dominated by horse-drawn carriages to automobiles in the 
United States (see Geels, 2005b, pp. 144-192). He argues that this was a result of 
interactions between the ‘heterogeneous’ elements of the automobile system, 
presented in Figure 2.3, and the way in which ‘changes in one element triggered 
changes in another’ and over time these ‘developments gradually linked up’ (p. 146). 
He also identifies the main social groups (see Figure 2.4) who in the context of 
existing rules, regulations and policies, markets and user practices and production 




Figure 2.3. Socio-technical system in personal land-based transportation. Modified from Geels 
(2005b, p. 147). 
 
Figure 2.4. Social groups in personal land-based transportation. Modified from Geels (2005b, p. 148). 
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 Correspondingly, Urry (2004, p. 27) draws on these and other elements in 
conceptualising automobility as ‘a self-organising auto-poetic, nonlinear system that 
spreads world-wide, and includes cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and 
many novel objects, technologies and signs’.  More specifically, it is the 
‘combination’ of six social and technical elements that have been responsible for the 
expansion and continuing ascendancy of the car and the ‘specific character of 
domination’ that it entails (p. 27). Accordingly, automobility is: 
• ‘the quintessential manufactured object produced by the leading industrial 
sectors and the iconic firms [of the] twentieth-century’ (e.g., Ford, GM, 
Rolls-Royce, Mercedes, Toyota and VW), and ‘the industry which has 
generated key concepts … employed in understanding the development of … 
the trajectory of contemporary capitalism’; 
• ‘the major item of individual consumption which provides status to its 
owner/user through the sign-values with which it is associated with (speed, 
home, safety, sexual desire, career success, freedom, masculinity)’; 
• ‘a machinic complex constituted through the car’s technical and social inter-
linkages with other industries, including car parts and accessories; petrol 
refining and distribution; road-building and maintenance; hotels, roadside 
service areas and motels; car sales and repair workshops; suburban house 
building; new retailing and leisure complexes; advertising and marketing’;  
• ‘the single most important environmental issue resulting from the exceptional 
range and scale of resources used in the manufacture of cars, roads and car-
only environments, and in coping with the material, air quality, medical, 
social, ozone, visual, noise, [carbon emissions (CO2)], and other 
consequences of automobility’; 
• ‘the predominant form of quasi-private mobility which subordinates other 
‘public’ mobilities of walking, cycling [and] travelling by rail’, and 
‘reorganises how people negotiate the opportunities for, and constraints upon, 
work, family life, leisure and pleasure’; and  
• ‘the dominant culture that organises and legitimates socialities across 
different genders, classes [and] ages’, ‘sustains major discourses of what 
constitutes the good life’ and ‘provides potent literary images and symbols’ 
(Urry, 2000, pp. 57-58).  
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Figure 2.5. Multi-level perspective on transitions. Source: Geels (2012, p. 474). 
Third, both scholars recognise that the current system of automobility is 
characterised by ‘stability, lock-in and path dependence, which give rise to 
incremental change along predictable trajectories’ (Geels, 2012, p. 472) and 
continually reproduce the dominance of the ‘petroleum car’ (Urry, 2004, p. 27). This 
stability and path dependence is by no means fixed forever or irreversible, however, 
and a transition to low-carbon or post-car system is possible but this process will be 
non-linear. Geels (2012, p. 472), for instance, observes that ‘alternatives are being 
proposed, developed and tried by pioneers, entrepreneurs, social movements’ and 
others outside the existing system. In doing so, he notes that these alternatives 
‘typically face an uphill struggle’ against the existing system, ‘because they are more 
expensive (since they have not yet benefited from economies of scale and learning 
curves), require changes in user practices, face a mismatch with existing regulations, 
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 or lack an appropriate infrastructure’ (Geels, 2012, p. 472). For Geels, the transition 
to a low carbon transport system, following the basic premise of the MLP (see Figure 
2.5), will be the outcome of non-linear processes which result from the ‘interplay of 
multiple developments at three analytical levels: niches (the locus for radical 
innovations), socio-technical regimes (the locus of established practices and 
associated rules), and an exogenous socio-technical regime’ (Geels, 2012, p. 472). 
Policy-makers seeking to encourage such a transition should accordingly adopt a 
two-pronged strategy: a) ‘stimulate the emergence and diffusion of niche-
innovations’; and b) ‘enhance the selection pressure on the existing regime through 
economic instruments (e.g., carbon taxes, emission trading, road pricing) and 
regulation (e.g., environmental legislation)’ (Geels, 2012, p. 479). 
Urry (2004) meanwhile employs the notion of the butterfly effect from chaos theory 
to suggest that precise source of ‘the trigger and the tipping point at which local 
changes bring the system as a whole into disequilibrium cannot be predicted a priori’ 
(Schwanen & Lucas, 2011, p. 23). Nonetheless, he identifies a number of ‘technical-
economic, policy and social transformations that in their dynamic interdependence 
might tip mobility into a new [post-car] system’ (Urry, 2004, p. 33; for a more 
detailed discussion see Dennis and Urry, 2009): ‘developments in fuel systems and 
new materials for building car bodies, the integration of information and 
communication technologies into cars, the growing importance of ITCs more 
generally, the increasing de-privatisation of cars (e.g., car-sharing), and changes in 
the discourses about climate change and transport policy’ (Schwanen & Lucas, 2011, 
p. 23). Moreover, he contends that whatever form of post-car system emerges it will 
need to provide at least the same level of flexibility as the petroleum car as ‘the 
pattern of 19th century ‘public mobility’, of the dominance of buses, trains, coaches 
and ships, will not be reproduced’ (Urry, 2004, p. 36). This is because ‘the car 
system has co-produced forms of mobility, family life, community, work and leisure 
that highly individualised, fragmented, paced and stretched across geographical 
space that cannot easily, if at all, be undone’ (Schwanen & Lucas, 2011, p. 24). 
Overall, socio-technical accounts highlight the importance recognising the ways in 
which individual decisions and choices are always embedded in and conditioned by 
dynamic and co-evolving socio-technical systems. Such accounts thus refuse to 
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 ‘distinguish prematurely between technical, social, economic and political aspects’ of 
resource consumption and use (Guy, 2006, p. 650) or consider certain standards or 
expectations of, for instance, comfort, cleanliness or convenience as pre-existing or 
given (Shove, 2003; see also Sections 4.3 and 5.3.1). A number of these insights and 
concepts as Section 2.4.2 below highlights have been employed as part of attempts to 
explain how a range of resource intensive practices emerge, persist, fade and 
disappear. 
2.4.2 Theories of practice: The elements and performances of 
(un)sustainable and carbon (un)intensive lifestyles 
‘Practice theories’ or ‘theories of social practice’ have been elaborated by a diverse 
range of thinkers including Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984), Anthony Giddens (1979, 
1984), Bruno Latour (1993), Harold Garfinkel (1967), Charles Taylor (1971), Michel 
Foucault (1988; 2002 [1970]), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) and Martin Heidegger 
(1962) among others (cf. Schatzki, 1996, 2001; Reckwitz, 2002). These accounts are 
far from unified but all consider practices to be the primary unit of analysis 
(Schatzki, 2001; Reckwitz, 2002). In doing so they attempt to move beyond micro or 
macro-scale explanations which either attribute action to, and understand social 
order, stability and change as the outcome of, self-contained individuals and the sum 
of their actions (Section 2.3) or social/socio-technical systems or structures which to 
a large extent determine the actions of individuals (Section 2.4.1). Instead, ‘practice-
based approaches can be regarded as ‘meso’ level analytical constructs’ (McMeekin 
& Southerton, 2012, p. 350) which hold ‘individual actions are constituted by 
practices’ (the micro-scale) and social order, stability, and change ‘come into being 
through practices’ (the macro-scale) (Røpke, 2009, p. 2491). Social life 
correspondingly is considered to consist of a wide range of practices including 
cooking, eating, working and educational (Schatzki, 2002) or, in the current context, 
walking, cycling, driving or public transport practices (Watson, 2012). Theodore 
Schatzki (1996, p. 133, 2002) and Andreas Reckwitz (2002) have sought to generate 
‘deeper understandings of both the nature of practice and key themes that link 
practice theories’. They conceptualise practices in similar yet distinct ways. These 
similarities and differences are now briefly considered as their formulations have 
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 become central to the ways in which theories of practice have been deployed in 
debates around sustainability and climate change.  
Towards a ‘general’ theory of practice 
A practice for Schatzki is a ‘temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of 
doings and sayings’ (1996, p. 89) or a ‘bundle’ or ‘organised constellation of 
activities’ (2002, p. 71). As ‘organized nexuses’ practices ‘hang together’ or are 
‘linked’ (p. 77, original emphasis) by four elements (see Schatzki, 2002, pp. 77-88): 
1) practical understandings or know-how; 2) rules; 3) a teleoaffective structure (a 
compound of teleological and affective); and 4) general understandings. Similarly, 
Reckwitz (2002, p. 249) defines a ‘practice’ (Praktik) as a ‘routinized type of 
behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of 
bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background 
knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge’. A practice, such as ‘a way of cooking, of consuming [or] 
of working’, he suggests, forms ‘a ‘block’ whose existence necessarily depends on 
the existence and specific interconnectedness of these elements, and which cannot be 
reduced to any one of these single elements’ (Reckwitz, 2002, pp. 249-250). 
Simultaneously, a practice ‘represents a pattern which can be filled out by a 
multitude of single and often unique actions reproducing the practice’ (Reckwitz, 
2002, p. 250). In this way Schatzki and Reckwitz both draw a distinction between a 
practice as a ‘block’ or ‘pattern’ (i.e., nexus or array) and ‘behaviour’ or ‘action’ 
(i.e., a doing or saying). 
The ‘single individual’, Reckwitz suggests, ‘as a bodily and mental agent’, ‘acts as 
the ‘carrier’ (Träger) of a practice – and, in fact, of many different practices which 
need to be coordinated with one another. Thus, she or he is not only a carrier of 
patterns of bodily behaviour, but also of certain routinized ways of understanding, 
knowing how and desiring’ (2002, p. 250). Significantly, these ‘conventionalized 
‘mental’ activities of understanding, knowing how and desiring are necessary 
elements and qualities of a practice in which the single individual participates, not 
qualities of the individual’ (2002, p. 250). As a result, the practice is ‘not only 
understandable to the agent or the agents who carry it out, it is likewise 
understandable to potential observers (at least within the same culture)’ (2002, p. 
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 250). Practices are ‘social’ for Reckwitz, therefore, because as ‘a ‘type’ of behaving 
and understanding’ a practice ‘appears at different locales and at different points of 
time and is carried out by different body/minds’ (2002, p. 250). Schatzki (1996) also 
holds that practices are ‘inherently social because participating in one entails entering 
a complex state of coexistence with other [people]’ (p. 169) including those ‘within 
the same or different settings’ (p. 187) and ‘past and future participants as well’ (p. 
192). Taking these observations even further he asserts ‘practices are the locus of 
sociality in human life’ as ‘individuals and relations among individuals … exist only 
within practices’ and ‘social formations’ such as ‘families, artistic movements, 
governments, and economies’ are ‘built out of the forms of coexistence opened in 
practices’ (1996, p. 172).  
Schatzki acknowledges ‘human coexistence is not simply a matter of people carrying 
on organized activities, but also one of their acting in a world of inter-related 
artifacts, organisms, things, and people through which their fates as humans are 
coupled together’ (2002, p. 117). Equally though, he draws a firm distinction 
between ‘human practices’ (2002, p. 118) and ‘non-human agency’ which is a 
‘distinct facet’ of social orders that are established by, rather than a component of, 
practices (p. 122). Thus he makes explicit ‘that human activity takes the lead in the 
mesh of practices and orders where human coexistence takes place’ (2002, p. 119). 
In contrast, ‘objects are necessary components of many practices [and] just as 
indispensable as bodily and mental activities’ for Reckwitz (2002, p. 250, emphasis 
added). He stresses that the ‘stable relation between agents (body/minds) and things 
within certain practices reproduces the social, as does the ‘mutually’ stable relation 
between several agents in other practices’ (2002, p. 250). Additionally, ‘one can 
assume that most social practices consist of routinized relations between several 
agents (body/minds) and objects’. Reckwitz continues, that as ‘the social is also to be 
located in practices in which single agents deal with objects … and in this sense also 
the objects – television sets, houses and brownies – are the place of the social insofar 
as they are necessary components of social practices’ (2002, p. 250). 
(Un)sustainable lifestyles, climate change and practice 
The concepts and propositions developed by Schatzki (1996, 2002) and Reckwitz 
(2002), and earlier theorists, in particular, Bourdieu (1977, 1984) and Giddens (1979, 
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 1984), have been taken up by a range of scholars interested in their potential to open 
up new lines of enquiry and insights into existing unsustainable lifestyles and 
patterns of consumption (for overviews see Warde, 2005; Røpke, 2009; Spaargaren, 
2011; Shove et al., 2012). Following Schatzki and Reckwitz, much of this work 
makes distinctions between ‘practice-as-entity’ (e.g., block, nexus, array) and 
‘practice-as-performance’ (e.g., action, doing or saying) and regards individuals as 
‘carriers’ or ‘hosts’ of practices (Røpke, 2009; Shove et al., 2012). Subsequently, 
these concepts have been employed to describe and analyse the processes through 
which more or less resource intensive practices, as entities and performances, 
emerge, persist, fade and disappear. To illustrate such an approach, the remainder of 
this section focuses primarily on how Elizabeth Shove and colleagues (Shove & 
Pantzar, 2005; Shove et al., 2012; Watson, 2012) have operationalised these concepts 
in their ‘social practice theory’. 
Shove et al. (2012, p. 7) suggest that as an entity a practice ‘exists as a recognizable 
conjunction of elements’ which ‘can be spoken about and more importantly drawn 
upon as a set of resources’ during the doing of a practice. Using the elements 
identified by Reckwitz as a starting point, they develop ‘an even simpler scheme 
based on just three elements’ (Shove et al., 2012, p. 23). First, materials encompass 
‘objects, infrastructures, tools, hardware and the body itself’ (p. 23). Second, 
competences are considered the ‘multiple forms of understanding and practical 
knowledgeability’ including knowing ‘in the sense of being able to evaluate a 
performance’ and ‘having the skills required to perform’ a practice (p. 23). Third, 
meanings represent both ‘mental activities, emotion and motivational knowledge’ 
and the ‘social and symbolic significance of participation at any one moment’ (p. 
23). A practice is thus the ‘interdependent relations between materials, competences 
and meanings’ (p. 24). But it is ‘only through successive moments of performance’ 
by the carriers of these practices ‘that the interdependencies between elements which 
constitute the practice-as-entity are sustained over time’ (p. 7).  
Cycling and driving, for example, involve specific ‘technologies and material traces’ 
(e.g., cars, bicycles, accessories, roads, signs and repair shops), ‘competences and 
modes of bodily comportment, and distinctive ways of engaging with the world 
being moved through’ and associated ‘social meanings, norms and rules’ (Watson, 
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 2012, p. 489; see also Sections 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2). The practices of cycling and 
driving exist as ‘an entity’, however, ‘only in and through its performance by 
practictioners’, in this instance, ‘people riding a bicycle’ or ‘driving a car’ (Watson, 
2012, pp. 489-490). Practices by ‘being constituted through performances’ are 
‘ultimately rooted in embodied actions, habits and routines of daily experience’, 
including those ‘involved in accomplishing personal mobility’ (Cresswell, 2010; 
Watson, 2012, p. 490). Correspondingly, the rest of this subsection considers three 
key mechanisms of change which Shove et al. (2012) identify by conceptualising 
practice in this manner.  
First, the elements constituting a practice can change. Practices exist only when 
elements are integrated, which at a basic level means there are at least two related 
possibilities (see Figure 2.6). The relevant elements exist but have not been linked 
(proto-practices) or ‘practices disintegrate when links are no longer sustained’ (ex-
practices) (Shove et al., 2012, p. 24). For example, ‘the origin, rules of the road and 
related forms of competence crossed over from the world of the horse to that of the 
car, as did many material aspects of design’ (p. 26). The first car bodies were: 
constructed by carriage builders accustomed to painstaking and customized forms 
of craft production. The structures they were used to making did not suit the new 
demands of a short wheelbase, and their working methods failed to deliver the 
forms of standardization required. Many adaptations were needed but many 
traditional features carried across and informed both the style and the format of 
powered vehicles (Shove et al., 2012, p. 26). 
Many of the ‘materials and forms of competence’ as a result ‘migrated between co-
existing practices’ (p. 27). Early gasoline-powered cars were ‘extremely troublesome 
and prone to breaking down’ and, therefore, to required specific knowledge and 
competences to maintain, repair and keep them running (p. 27). Wealthy car-owners 
thus either had to be mechanically minded or employed chauffeurs to drive and act as 
mechanics. This ‘limited the rate at which the practice spread and influenced the 
image of risk and adventure associated with it’ (p. 27). The eventual widespread 
adoption of the car accordingly was not only due to mass production and increasing 
affordability. The material reconfiguration of the car was also essential. Through the 
inclusion of features such as automatic starting and signalling ‘certain capacities’ 
were passed ‘from person to machine’ which meant cars ‘became more reliable and 
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 easier to operate’ (p. 30). These advancements in turn changed the meanings and 
competencies associated with driving which illustrates how a practice co-evolves as 
different elements shape each other (see Shove et al., 2012, pp. 26-41 for a more 
extensive discussion).   
 
Figure 2.6. Proto-practices, practices and ex-practices. Source: Shove et al. (2012, p. 25). 
Second, the ‘population of ‘carriers’ of the practice – people who perform it – can 
change’ (Shove et al., 2012; Watson, 2012, p. 491). Despite de-centring the 
individual from their analyses, practice-based approaches hold ‘that the contours of 
any one practice – where it is reproduced, how consistently, for how long, and on 
what scale – depend on changing populations of more or less faithful carriers or 
practitioners’ (Shove et al., 2012, p. 63, original emphasis). Practices ‘compete for 
suitably committed carriers’, the ‘availability of which depends on the relative status 
and positioning of coexisting practices’ (Shove, 2012a, p. 102). The foregoing 
example highlighted how the emergence of the driving ‘exploited connections forged 
and reproduced’ by practices that co-existed and went before such as horse-riding 
and cycling (Shove et al., 2012, p. 67). Correspondingly, existing communities and 
networks, in this instance, carriage builders, rich pioneers, city-planners, municipal 
engineers, the state, and steel, rubber, glass and road-building companies among 
others (see also Sections 2.4.1 and 4.3), were central to how these new arrangements 
formed acting as either ‘containers that limit[ed] their diffusion’ and as ‘conduits 
through which they flow[ed]’ (Shove et al., 2012, p. 66).  
The rise of the car coincided, unsurprisingly, with a significant decline in cycling in 
Europe between the 1940 and 1970s (Watson, 2012). In the UK, for instance, cycling 
which in 1952 accounted for 23 billion km and 13% of mode share by 1972 had 
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 declined to 5 billion km and 1% of mode share (DfT, 2006). This involved a ‘process 
of defection’ whereby many practitioners were recruited to the practice of driving 
which had implications for the persistence of cycling as a practice (Watson, 2012, p. 
491). This was not a ‘tale of direct substitution’, however, as the ‘growth of the 
system of velomobility provided the basis of some of the elements of the coming 
system of automobility’ (Watson, 2012, p. 492). Moreover, ‘cars do not simply 
replace bicycles but afford a different range of uses, meanings and purposes’ 
(Watson, 2012, p. 492). The constituent elements of, and the way it bundles with 
other practices, have ensured driving has taken on ‘habit-like tendencies’ (p. 103) in 
that it entails or implies ‘frequent enactment’ (p. 104) whereas cycling for many 
practitioners still persists on albeit on a ‘more infrequent or erratic basis’ (Shove, 
2012a, p. 104). Habits in this way are understood as those that are ‘recurrently and 
relatively consistently reproduced’ rather than as ‘a sub-set of behaviour, 
characterised by distinctive driving or stabilising forces’ (p. 101; see Section 2.3). 
The constituent elements of meaning, materiality and competence of habitually 
enacted practices are ‘established, settled and provisionally in place’ (Shove, 2012a, 
p. 105). The emergence and continuing dominance of driving thus cannot be 
understood in terms of ‘changing individual preferences’ or habits (Watson, 2012, p. 
491) but instead by paying attention to how past and present connections, 
communities and networks of practitioners have produced and continue to reproduce 
driving-as-entity. 
Third, the ‘way in which one practice bundles together with others is significant for 
changes to both the elements of practices and processes of recruitment’ (Shove et al., 
2012; Watson, 2012, p. 491). Practices ‘relate to each other at the level of how 
people perform them in the organisation of their days – so driving or cycling of 
course can be nested between home and work or home and shopping, with their 
attendant practices’ (Watson, 2012, p. 491). Such ‘[i]nter-practice relations’ can 
‘have emergent, cumulative and often irreversible effects for individual practices, for 
the elements of which they are composed, and for the spatial and temporal texture of 
daily life’ (Shove et al., 2012, p. 81). A practice approach accordingly enables 
analysis of the co-evolution of practices of, for instance, mobility, with the other 
practices with which they are bundled in space and time. In this context, Watson 
(2012, p. 491) observes: 
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 the shifting character of grocery shopping is inseperable from shifting patterns of 
personal mobility, with out of town supermarkets co-evolving with patterns of 
personal car mobility, and with the broader restructuring of the temporal rhythms of 
daily life that are enabled by, and make necessary, the convenience of provisioning 
a household with a single shopping trip to one destination. In the process, the 
concentration of grocery retail, in space (large supermarkets) and time (e.g., once a 
week), has made I more difficult for cycling, walking and public transport to retain 
practitioners.  
Accordingly, understanding ‘the relations between practices – not just interdependent 
but also competitive relations’ are critical to appreciating the dynamics within 
practices (Shove et al., 2012; Watson, 2012, p. 491). This is because processes of 
change whether to ‘the elements of a practice or to the patterns of recruitment and 
defection of practitioners to it, are rarely entirely endogenous to the practice 
concerned’ (Shove et al., 2012; Watson, 2012, p. 491). Instead, change occurs as a 
result of the ‘shifting relative location of a practice within broader systems of 
practice’ (Shove et al., 2012; Watson, 2012, p. 491). 
In summary, practices involve the ‘integration of elements’ through performances 
and ‘change when new elements are introduced or when existing elements are 
combined in new ways’ (Shove et al., 2012, p. 120). If they are to survive practices 
‘need to capture and retain practitioners willing and able to do the integrating’ and, 
therefore, ‘willing and able to keep them alive’ (p. 120). Meanwhile, ‘[r]elations 
between practices take different forms’, some of which are ‘collaborative’, 
‘competitive’, ‘weak’ or ‘strong’, and ‘matter for the trajectories of the elements and 
individual practices of which composite bundles and complexes of practice are 
made’ (p. 120). As result practice-based approaches provide different interpretations 
of action, stability and change to individualistic and socio-technical accounts. The 
implication of such an account for behaviour change is that ‘policy makers and other 
actors, past and present, can and do influence: a) the range of elements in circulation; 
b) the ways in which practices relate to each other; c) the careers and trajectories of 
practices and those who carry them; and d) the circuits of reproduction’ (p. 120). 
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 2.4.3 Limitations of practice-based and socio-technical accounts 
There are a at least six limitations associated with practice-based accounts 
(Spaargaren, 2011; Warde, 2005, 2014) many of these overlap with socio-technical 
approaches (McMeekin & Southerton, 2012; Shove & Walker, 2007; Shove & 
Walker, 2010). For this reason, the limitations of both approaches are now 
considered together. It is important to acknowledge in this context that socio-
technical systems and practices can be conceptualised in a diverse range of ways, 
some of which address the limitations identified here and elsewhere (Chapters 4 and 
5). This critique, therefore, is more specifically directed at the ways in which these 
concepts have been deployed to understand the issues of sustainability and climate 
change. 
First, the individual rarely features in ‘systemic’ accounts of socio-technical 
approaches (Paterson, 2007) while in social practice accounts individuals are 
typically understood as ‘carriers of a practice’ (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 256) or ‘the 
intersection of practices’ (McMeekin & Southerton, 2012, p. 351). As a result, both 
approaches typically fail to recognise the importance of individual subjectivity (Kent, 
2014; Paterson, 2007). Second, some socio-technical explanations, including Urry’s 
(2004) account of the system of automobility and to a lesser extent the multi-level 
perspective employed by Geels (2005b, 2012), fail to consider how the development 
of these systems are influenced by different political decisions which favoured 
particular interests, normative visions and modes of power and the ways in which 
these were disputed and challenged (see Chapter 4; Smith et al., 2005; Paterson, 
2007; Goodwin, 2010). Geels (2010, p. 506), in this context, notes that by focusing 
on the role of social groups the multi-level perspective does in part consider issues of 
power and politics. Despite this, he concedes that this typically done in an ‘ad hoc 
way’ and does not ‘provide detailed explanations of sources and changes of power’ 
(Geels, 2010, p. 506; see also Smith et al., 2005). Similarly, practice theorists have 
also been criticised for paying limited ‘attention to the creation of norms, standards 
and institutions which produce shared understandings and common procedures’ 
(Warde, 2014, p. 295). There have been attempts more recently, however, to 
recognise the political nature of objects, technologies and infrastructures including 
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 transport and urban planning and how this has and continues to influence the 
development of automobility (Shove et al., 2015).  
Third, corresponding with the first point both socio-technical and practice 
approaches by moving away from the individual as the central unit of analysis tend 
to overlook the importance of the promotion and production of particular 
subjectivities which are a central aspect to the continual emergence and 
(re)production of and changes in dominant practices such as driving (see Chapter 4; 
Paterson, 2007; Manderscheid, 2014). Fourth, in stressing the significance of 
collective meanings both approaches tend to underplay the dynamic ways in which 
individuals make sense of and negotiate these meanings in everyday life (see Chapter 
5; cf. Dewey, 1929a). Fifth, and relatedly, both approaches tend to largely overlook 
the role that reflection, deliberation and thought play in shaping practices (see 
Chapter 6). Sixth, practice accounts provide a more sophisticated understanding of 
habit than individualistic accounts by recognising how they are shaped by particular 
social and physical contexts but in doing so only consider them to be the outward 
performances of action (Schwanen et al., 2012). Consequently, they tend to neglect 
that habits are a disposition or a capacity which is a source of change, an active 
tendency or a force, constantly emerging out of specific environments and as 
fundamental to subjectivity (Dewey, 1922a; Schwanen et al., 2012). Overall, practice 
and socio-technical approaches typically fail to recognise the important role that 
habits, meanings, subjectivity and thought play in contributing to the emergence, 
persistence and disappearance of unsustainable practices. 
2.5 Rethinking the environments and phases of action 
through John Dewey’s pragmatism 
There are a ‘number of points of connection’ (Shove et al., 2012, p. 5) between 
practice and socio-technical approaches and Deweyan pragmatism which is 
introduced in this section. To begin all three approaches refuse to differentiate in 
advance the social and physical environments of action or accept that particular 
standards or expectations such as the comfort, cleanliness and convenience of the car 
as pre-existing or given. Rather as elaborated above they seek to examine how 
individual action is always embedded in particular social institutions and 
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 arrangements and material or physical settings. Despite practice and socio-technical 
accounts fail to sufficiently recognise the important role that habits, meanings, 
subjectivity and thought play in contributing to the emergence, persistence and 
disappearance of unsustainable practices. This section argues that Dewey’s 
pragmatist philosophy is particularly relevant to contemporary problems such as 
sustainability and climate change as he emphasises that answers to these challenges 
should be ‘sought amid the processes and materials of life, not in a realm beyond our 
experience or in the distance future or past’: 
[T]he process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static 
outcome and result, becomes the significant thing … The end is no longer a 
terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the existent 
situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, 
maturing, refining is the aim in living (Dewey, 1920, p. 177). 
As Hildebrand (2008, p. x, original emphasis) observes Dewey’s philosophy is ‘one 
of change’, he writes ‘not just about change’, however, ‘but for a changing world’. 
Embedded within his various writings is a ‘moral commitment’ for human 
achievements such as education, politics, aesthetics and religion ‘to adapt, survive 
and grow’ (Hildebrand, 2008, p. x). As a consequence, ‘Dewey’s philosophy stands 
out as a twenty-first-century philosophy of sustainability’ (Hildebrand, 2008, p. x). 
The remainder of the section argues that Dewey provides a dynamic understanding 
of how action continually emerges out of an individual’s interactions or 
‘transactions’ with their social and physical environments. It begins by examining his 
account of habit which he sees as being central to experience (Section 2.5.1). Having 
examined this concept his understanding of nature and experience are elaborated 
upon (Section 2.5.2). Section 2.5.3 discusses how for Dewey thought and inquiry 
arise out of indeterminate or problematic situations. The implications of these 
insights for understanding action are then summarised in Section 2.5.4. 
2.5.1 Dewey on habit: Dispositions, customs, plasticity and 
breakdown 
For Dewey (1922a) habits are different from instincts, or what he often terms 
‘impulses’. Impulses are ‘the unlearned active energy of the organism’ (Scheffler, 
1974, p. 212) while habits ‘are acquired through life rather than given as a 
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 constituent of our biological nature’ (Sinclair, 2011, p. 66). Habits by their nature are 
‘assertive, insistent, self-perpetuating’ and become physiologically ingrained and 
enable and anticipate action (Dewey, 1922a, p. 58). Impulses are channelled, 
repressed and released by habits which emerge out of the interactions, or what he 
comes to later term ‘trans-actions’ (see Section 4.3.2, p. 133; Dewey & Bentley, 
1949, p. 79), between an organism and its environment. As Dewey observes ‘natural 
operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are 
functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person’: 
They are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired 
dispositions. The same air that under certain conditions ruffles the pool or wrecks 
buildings, under other conditions purifies the blood and conveys thought. The 
outcome depends upon what air acts upon (Dewey, 1922a, p. 16). 
Dewey (1922a) considers not only the physical but also the social and cultural 
contexts in which habits develop. Custom or the ‘widespread [uniformity] of habit’ is 
central to his account and helps to explain the continuing persistence of habits as 
‘individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior customs’: 
Each person is born an infant and every infant is subject from the first breath he 
draws and the first cry he utters to the attentions and demands of others. These 
others are not just persons in general with minds in general. They are beings with 
habits, and beings who upon the whole esteem the habits they have, if for no other 
reason than that, having them, their imagination is thereby limited. The nature of 
habit is to be assertive, insistent, self-perpetuating (Dewey, 1922a, p. 58).  
The simple observation that there are a wide ‘variety of individuals and cultures’ is 
evidence for Dewey of the fact that although we may share ‘basic instincts’ these 
subsequently ‘develop into so many different habits and customs’ (Hildebrand, 2008, 
p. 19). 
Habits to reiterate then are tendencies and dispositions which emerge in particular 
physical, social and cultural contexts and tend to persist as we form our habits in 
conditions set by previous customs. Rather than fixed or stable entities habits 
gradually change over time as particular actions or movements are repeated. 
Moreover, such actions are increasingly carried out without conscious deliberation or 
thought. Dewey (1922a) emphasise this does not necessarily mean they become 
unintelligent, mechanical or routine movements. On the contrary, the plasticity of 
53 
 habits can result in certain dispositions being infused with intelligence, grace and 
soul which enable creativity and novelty. It is for this reason that Dewey asserts that 
intelligence and habit, and life and mechanism should not be opposed: 
All life operates, through a mechanism, and the higher the form of life the more 
complex, sure, and flexible the mechanism. This fact alone should save us from 
opposing life and mechanism, thereby reducing the latter to unintelligent 
automatism and the former to an aimless splurge. How delicate, prompt, sure and 
varied are the movements of a violin player or an engraver! How unerringly they 
phrase every shade of emotion and every turn of idea! Mechanism is indispensable. 
If each act has to be consciously searched for at the moment and intentionally 
performed execution is painful and the product is clumsy and halting. Nevertheless 
the difference between the mere technician is unmistakable. The artist is a masterful 
technician. The technique or mechanism is fused with thought and feeling. The 
‘mechanical’ performer permits the mechanism to dictate the performance. It is 
absurd to say that the latter exhibits habit and the former not. We are confronted 
with two kinds of habit, intelligent and routine. All life has its élan, but only the 
prevalence of dead habits deflects life into mere élan (Dewey, 1922a, pp. 70-71). 
Reflecting his interest in process Dewey (1922a) is attentive to providing an account 
of how habits and customs might be changed and how habits breakdown. Here he 
reinforces the need to take into account the interaction between the individual and 
their environment. More specifically, he emphasizes the difficulty of changing habits 
without making a change in the conditions which have formed a habit using the 
example of a man with bad posture: 
A man who does not stand properly forms a habit of standing improperly, a 
positive, forceful habit. The common implication that his mistake is merely 
negative, that he is simply falling to do the right thing, and that the failure can be 
made good by an order of will is absurd. One might as well suppose that the man 
who is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one who fails to drink water. 
Conditions have been formed for producing a bad result, and the bad result will 
occur as long as those conditions exist. They can no more be dismissed by a direct 
effort of will than the conditions which create drought can be dispelled by whistling 
for wind. It is as reasonable to expect a fire to go out when it is ordered to stop 
burning as to suppose that a man can stand straight in consequence of a direct action 
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 of thought and desire. The fire can be put out only by changing objective 
conditions; it is the same with rectification of bad posture (Dewey, 1922a, p. 29). 
It is for this reason that Dewey advocates the ‘continual adjustment and renewal of 
habits through intelligence’ (Scheffler, 1974, p. 212). Here and in his account of how 
habits breakdown, he places particular emphasis on the role of impulse. For Dewey 
the operation of intelligence or thought occurs when an individual encounters 
‘difficulty, conflict, stress, or breakdown in prior habit’ (Scheffler, 1974, p. 223). In 
such instances impulses that would typically be channeled through habit and custom 
can generate change and the renewal of habits. Impulses are for Dewey (1922a, p. 
93) ‘the pivots upon which the reorganization of activities turns, they are agencies of 
deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality’. As 
Scheffler (1974, p. 216) cautions, however, ‘impulse is not self-sufficient in such 
reorganization, which may proceed intelligently or unintelligently’: 
Intelligence is a mode of utilization of impulse. Interpreted as a higher level of 
moral disposition, it is itself not opposed to habit. It is, rather, a superordinate habit 
of habit-improvement and reconstruction’. 
More importantly, Dewey argues that the ‘capacity for reflection, our ability to pause 
and consider alternative ways of proceeding in our actions, is a derived ability, 
grounded in the more basic habitual comportment in the world’ (Brinkmann, 2004, p. 
11). Intelligence and thought, judgement, deliberation, reflection and reason, are no 
different to other habits and ‘have one and the same function: to restore that balance 
which because of changing internal and external conditions is constantly interfered 
with in spite of all habit can do’ (Allport, 1951, p. 277-278). In other words 
(Brinkmann, 2004, p. 11, emphasis in original): 
we ‘know how by means of our habits’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 177, emphasis in 
original), and this knowing how actually underlies, and is even a precondition for, 
our ‘knowledge of and about things, knowledge that things are thus and so, 
knowledge that involves reflection’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 177). 
In order to say more about the breakdown of habit we first need to examine the way 
in which Dewey comes understand experience and the importance he places on the 
problematic aspects of the situation. 
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 2.5.2 Dewey on experience and nature: Events and situations 
Dewey emphasises that experience is a process rather than a thing or object that we 
have or possess: 
We begin by noting that ‘experience’ is what [William] James called a double-
barrelled word. Like its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and 
suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are 
acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, 
imagine – in short, processes of experiencing (Dewey, 1929a, p. 10). 
Such a conceptualisation also recognises that an experience is not an ‘isolated fact’ 
but rather ‘a nexus of active relations which is not only continuous with the world 
but with the past, the present, and the future’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1559). Experience is, 
therefore, temporal and dynamic, and much like habit, constantly emerges out of an 
organism’s transaction with their environment.  
Nature, for Dewey, is central to ‘how we experience what we experience’ 
(McDermott, 1973, p. xxv). Rather than abstracted or separated from: 
experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature–stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. 
Things interacting in certain ways are experienced; they are what is experienced. 
Linked in certain other ways with another natural object–the human organism–they 
are how things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it 
has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That 
stretch constitutes inference (Dewey, 1929a, p. 4). 
Nature, in other words, ‘has a life of its own, undergoing its own relatings, which in 
turn become what we experience’ (McDermott, 1973, p. xxv). Moreover, it is 
because of the immediacy of our relationship with nature that knowledge ‘stretches’ 
and grows ‘in increasing sophistication and complexity’ (Ryan, 1997, p. 1010). Our 
constant relations or continuity with nature has other implications. Most notably, we 
experience the world as contingent, precarious and uncertain: 
Man fears because he exists in a fearful, an awful world. The world is precarious 
and perilous. It is as easily accessible and striking evidence of this fact that 
primitive experience is cited. The voice is that of early man; but the hand is that of 
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 nature, the nature in which we still live. It was not the fear of gods that created the 
gods (Dewey, 1929a, p. 39). 
The need for human thought and action is directly attributable to the indeterminacy 
of the future and the recognition that change is a fundamental state of nature (Dewey, 
1929a). Human experience, for Dewey (1929a) then, is continuous, unified and 
evolves in relation to nature and its unfolding processes and events, which because of 
their precarious, contingent and indeterminate character, ‘serve up problems, and 
meaning, for humans’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1560). 
Events 
In outlining his account in Experience and Nature, Dewey (1929a) develops the 
concepts of events and situations as a way of capturing our complex relationship with 
and experience of nature. ‘Events’ or what he sometimes terms as ‘affairs’ are a way 
of articulating the continuous, precarious, contingent and changeable character of 
existence. In doing so he seeks to emphasise that ‘everything in the universe 
happens; everything has a beginning and an end. All objects of our concern are made 
or formed, and all of them decay and vanish’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1560): 
Empirically, individualized objects, unique affairs, exist. But they are evanescent, 
unstable. They tremble on the verge of disappearance as soon as they appear 
(Dewey, 1929a, p. 123). 
Dewey (1929a, p. 62) asserts that even things and objects that we identify as 
‘structures’ are traits of events rather than ‘something intrinsic’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 
1560). Events do not necessarily involve human participation and experience 
because, as observed earlier, ‘nature has a life of its own’ (McDermott, 1973, p. 
xxv). Despite seeming to be an inherently stable object, ‘a structure is only stable in 
its relatively slow rate of change compared to what we typically call a process (a 
more perceptibly changing event)’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1560). Events, as a result, are 
‘the sets of natural complexes, ever-changing constellations of natural elements, 
which produce structures and processes’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1560). In elaborating on 
Dewey’s notion of experience, Cutchin helpfully uses the example of a building as a 
way of clarifying the relationship between structures and events: 
[A] building can be viewed literally and theoretically as a structure, but it is a 
certain set of elements and events that come together for it to take form: the 
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 development of an idea to build, a loan being granted, materials being delivered, 
and coordinated labour are events that produce the so-called structure. The building 
is the emergent and changeable empirical characteristic, the by-product of certain 
events (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1560). 
Events or affairs, as the example of the building suggests, are emergent, have 
qualities and histories. Moreover, events are the source of change in nature, and in 
turn, nature is ‘an affair of affairs’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 83), ‘wherein each affair, no 
matter how linked up it may be with others, has its own quality’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 
1560). In this way each event is unique but can never be completely separated from 
other events which we might, therefore, view as ‘a multitude of interactions in space-
time’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561). Put another way, ‘nature consists of a series of 
overlapping and interpenetrating transactions’ (Bernstein, 1966, p. 84). Events as 
consequence can be ‘contextually differentiated based on the specific mixture of 
overlapping elements’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561). The implication of this is that our 
unified experience of nature involves ‘an explicitly temporal perspective on nature 
and causation’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561): 
Every event as such is passing into other things, in such a way that a later 
occurrence is an integral part of the character or nature of present existence. An 
‘affair’, Res, is always at issue whether it concerns chemical change, the emergence 
of life, language, mind or the episodes that compose human history. Each comes 
from something else and each when it comes has its own initial unpredictable, 
immediate qualities, and its own similar terminal qualities. The later is never just 
resolved into the earlier […]. We may explain the traits of maturity by better 
knowledge of childhood, but maturity is never just infancy plus (Dewey, 1929a, p. 
93). 
For Dewey then, events are ‘always emergent with dynamic qualities, but events also 
have ends, or terminal points’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561). Our experiences of the 
weather and seasons (see Chapter 5) are testament to the fact that events, however, 
‘are not final because their ends are actually transitions into new event beginnings’, 
in other words, ‘new events emerge out of the old’ (Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561).  
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 Situations and meaning 
Dewey (1929a), through the concept of events or affairs, attempts to capture how 
nature is experienced as a continuous unfolding of various processes and happenings 
which are inherently contingent, precarious and uncertain. The concept of situations, 
on the other hand, allows him to ‘reconcile the depth and holism of experience vis-à-
vis nature and the dynamic emergence of events and affairs for human action’ 
(Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561). We never encounter events as separate entities, he 
contends, because they are always intertwined:  
In actual experience, there is never any such isolated singular object or event; an 
object or event is always a special part, phase or aspect of an environing 
experienced world – a situation. The singular object stands out conspicuously 
because of its especially focal and crucial position at a given time in determination 
of some problem of use or enjoyment which the total complex environment presents 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 72). 
Situations ‘provide the context for understanding events and meanings’ (Cutchin, 
2008, p. 1561) and are illustrative of the ‘lived qualitative unity of continuously 
developing experience’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 105). For Dewey (1938) situations have 
a number of specific dimensions including: 
they are open-ended, durational-extensional-existential affairs not to be confused 
with ‘surroundings’; they are both immediate and mediated by human thought and 
action; they have problematic aspects for those experiencing them, and; although 
they are unique, but as parts of a field, they are connected to other situations (see 
also Alexander, 1987, pp. 106-110; Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561). 
Experience takes place, therefore, in situations which ‘are individuals … each one is 
just that one and no other and as such will never be repeated. Yet situations are not 
atomic; they have relations with each other and with the past and future; there may 
be traits appearing in a uniquely qualified way in one situation which appear in a 
differently qualified way in another’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 113). He understands these 
individuals as ‘a process, an activity, which always has potentialities to act and be 
acted upon’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 114). Characterised in this way situations are 
‘organic wholes’ which have ‘both an immediate aspect and a mediated one, an 
actual and a potential side, a radically unique and a formal or general character’ 
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 (Alexander, 1987, p. 114). Situations are undergone or had, enjoyed or suffered, in 
experience. The ways in which they are had or undergone is mediated in part by 
habits and as discussed below meanings. ‘Habits enter into the constitution of the 
situation; they are in and of it, not, so far as it is concerned, something outside of it’ 
(Dewey, 1911, p. 552).  
Meanings ‘reflect the complexity of situations as both immediate and mediate, as 
qualitative and relational’ and are derived from the use and interpretation of things 
(Alexander, 1987, p. 118). It is the ‘double function of meaning, namely signification 
and sense’ which ensures the mind (intellect) is present in a situation (Dewey, 1929a, 
p. 261). Sense is ‘the meaning of the whole situation as apprehended’ (Dewey, 
1929a, p. 261). Meanwhile, signification ‘involves using a quality as a sign of 
something so that it may serve as a ‘clew’ to the sense of a situation’ (Tiles, 2003, p. 
60). Habits and a sense for a situation ensure the ‘flood of action … overrides all but 
the most considerable obstructions’ as it ‘flows [too] forcibly and rapidly in one 
direction to be checked’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). These ‘‘moment[s]’ of hesitation’ 
force us to ‘stop and think’, observe, recollect and anticipate before redirecting or 
intensifying a particular course of action (Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). It is during these 
‘problematic’ or ‘undetermined’ moments an object or event is distinguished as a 
functional part of a situation and as a consequence they become events ‘with 
meanings’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). They have discriminated qualities of a qualitative 
situation because of they have ‘meanings which go beyond the moment or the 
immediate situation ’, they ‘are relations’, distinguished because of their use or 
potential consequences (Alexander, 1987, p. 115; Tiles, 2003).  
Figure 2.7 provides a static, but importantly not a God’s eye, view of John Dewey’s 
process ontology. The ‘spatial separation of ‘nature’ and ‘experience’ is not intended 
to indicate an ontological or epistemological differentiation, only a temporal one – as 
‘nature’ is what has not yet been experienced, not what cannot be experienced’ 
(Hildebrand, 2003, pp. 62-63). ‘Transudative’ denotes the ‘period exchanges’, which 
are characteristic of ‘functioning’, that occur across boundaries as the ‘categories 
(experience and objects known, experience and nature) are mutually constitutive’ 
(Hildebrand, 2003, p. 63). As Dewey remind us: ‘Experience is not a veil that shuts 
man off from nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of 
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 nature’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. iii). ‘Plastic’ signifies the fact that ‘the content of 
knowledge may increase or decrease, depending on the circumstances surrounding 
inquiry’ (Hildebrand, 2003, p. 63). Knowledge (‘objects known’), Hildebrand 
explains lies inside ‘experience’ in the diagram ‘because knowing is one among 
many varieties of experience’. This is a point which Dewey re-iterates, ‘Knowledge 
itself must be experienced; it must be had, possessed enacted, before it can be 
known. . . . We have to identify cases of knowing by direct denotation before we can 
have a reflective experience of them, just as we do with good and bad, red and green, 
sweet and sour’ (Dewey, 1981 cited in Hildebrand, 2003, p. 62). 
 
Figure 2.7. A static (but not God’s-eye) view of John Dewey’s process ontology. The ‘spatial 
separation of ‘nature’ and ‘experience’ is not intended to indicate an ontological or epistemological 
differentiation, only a temporal one – as ‘nature’ is what has not yet been experienced, not what 
cannot be experienced’. Source: Hildebrand (2003, pp. 62-63). 
2.5.3 Dewey on thought and inquiry: The indeterminate or 
‘problematic’ situation 
In Section 2.5.2 we saw how it is during the problematic situation that reflective 
thought, or what Dewey understands as inquiry, arises. Unlike other scholars who 
reserve the term inquiry for scientific endeavours, Dewey (1929b, pp. 86-87) 
emphasises active inquiry and experimentation are part of everyday life. In doing so 
he emphasises three features of inquiry. First, he understands all forms of 
experimentation in terms of doing or activity which entail ‘the making of definite 
changes in the environment or in our relation to it’ (p. 86). Second, ‘experiment is 
not a random activity but is directed by ideas which have to meet the conditions set 
by the need of the problem inducing the active inquiry (p. 86). It is the third and final 
feature through which ‘the other two receive their full measure of meaning’ (p. 86). 
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 The ‘outcome of the directed activity’ he asserts result in ‘the construction of a new 
empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such 
that the consequences of directed operations form the objects that have the property 
of being known (pp. 86-87). He illustrates these points by giving the example of a 
‘rudimentary prototype of experimental doing’ which is ‘found in ordinary 
procedures’: 
When we are trying to make out the nature of a confused and unfamiliar object, we 
perform various acts with a view to establishing a new relationship to it, such as 
will bring to light qualities which will aid in understanding it. We turn it over, bring 
it into a better light, rattle and shake it, thump, push and press it, and so on. The 
object as it is experienced prior to the introduction of these changes baffles us; the 
intent of these acts is to make changes which will elicit some previously 
unperceived qualities, and by varying conditions of perception shake loose some 
property which as it stands blinds or misleads us (Dewey, 1929b, p. 87). 
Inquiry, as Dewey’s example of an unfamiliar object illustrates, comes from a 
situation, not from an individual or a mental state. This situation is ‘characterized by 
a ‘pervasive qualitative character’ of, for instance, ‘doubtfulness, precariousness, 
uncertainty, indeterminacy [and] unsettledness’ (Brown, 2012, p. 278). Moreover, 
the situation is ‘in part defined by the interactions or transactions between agents and 
environments that characterize human practices’ and ‘the doubtfulness that 
characterizes an indeterminate situation is a result of some discoordination or 
disequilibrium in those interactions’ (Brown, 2012, p. 278). The example highlights 
how inquiry, therefore, is a ‘transformation in the sense that the resolution of a 
problematic situation or perplexity in general requires not just a change in the 
inquirer’s state of mind or beliefs but a change in the situation itself’ (Brown, 2012, 
p. 279). Such a change and the associated resolution of a problem may not 
necessarily involve a physical modification of the environment: 
changing the beliefs, attitudes, and habits of the inquirer changes the relations, 
interactions, and activities that characterize the situation and will lead to immediate 
changes to the potentialities of objects and mediate physical changes to the 
environment that follow from putting the solution into practice (Brown, 2012, p. 
279). 
The final product of inquiry is a judgement: 
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 The objective and final product of inquiry is a judgment. Inquiry continues until one 
of the hypotheses is adjudged to be the most warranted among the alternatives, and 
the alternatives have been more or less ruled out. A judgment that satisfies the 
conditions of good inquiry and can be used as a settled means to future inquiry has 
the property of warranted assertability (Brown, 2012, p. 280). 
Dewey’s account of inquiry, as Figure 2.8 demonstrates, is two-dimensional in that 
the first dimension is ‘captured by the definition’ and the second ‘by the functional 
phases’ (Brown, 2012, p. 284). The first dimension, more specifically, accounts for 
the origin and goals of inquiry. Inquiry starts with an ‘indeterminate situation, taken 
up as a problematic situation by the inquirer, while inquiry results in judgment and 
the resolution of that indeterminate situation into a situation that is determinate and 
unified’ (Brown, 2012, p. 280). Thus inquiry has three temporal stages an 
‘indeterminate situation, inquiry, and judgment’ (Brown, 2012, p. 280). 
 
Figure 2.8. Dewey’s two-dimensional theory of inquiry. The first dimension is the linear sequence of 
stages captured by Dewey’s ‘definition’ of inquiry. The second dimension is the nonlinear set of 
functional phases that Dewey calls the ‘pattern of inquiry’.  Source: Brown (2012, p. 286). 
The second dimension is the ‘characteristic pattern of inquiry as a set of functionally 
defined and interrelated phases in a reciprocal and iterated process—following this 
pattern is what makes inquiry ‘controlled and directed’’  (Brown, 2012, p. 280). 
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 Brown (2012, p. 286) summarises these five functional phases in the following 
manner: 
1. Observation collects data or determines the facts of the case in order to take stock 
of the fixed conditions of the situation that shape the problem.  
2. Institution of a problem specifies what is perplexing or indeterminate in the 
situation in order to formulate a problem statement.  
3. Suggestion proposes hypotheses (or ideas) for solving the problem.  
4. Reasoning refines hypotheses, brings hypotheses into relation with larger theories 
and conceptual frameworks, coordinates observations and hypothesis, suggests new 
observations, and proposes experimental tests.  
5. Experimentation tests the hypothesis by tentative or limited application to the 
situation that involves intervening or acting in the situation. 
This pattern includes ‘normative (but defeasible) constraints on inquiry, but it does 
not distinguish between scientific from non-scientific types of inquiry, nor does it 
present a set of methodological procedures or a step-by-step algorithm guaranteed to 
produce successful results’ (Brown, 2012, p. 280). 
2.5.4 Implications of a Deweyan-inspired framework for 
understanding the environments and phases of action 
A conceptual framework inspired by Deweyan pragramatism has five interconnected 
implications for understanding contemporary commuting habits in Auckland and 
London, and the environments and phases of action more generally. First, the 
individual continuously becomes a self or a subject through experience as they act on 
and simultaneously are acted upon by the social and physical environments (Sections 
2.5.1 and 2.5.2). Second, habits which are formed and operate in action are active, 
energetic and dominant modes of response which emerge in particular environments 
and are central to the constitution of the self (Section 2.5.1). Third, the environments 
of action are experienced as situations which are organic wholes characterised by 
immediacy and mediacy, actuality and potentiality, uniqueness and generalness 
(Section 2.5.2). Fourth, events or objects, which are functional parts of situations, 
take on meaning through shared social activities but also in instances whereby 
temporary interfering or inhibiting action an event or object becomes problematic 
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 (Section 2.5.2). Fifth, habit always qualifies thought by limiting the channels in 
which it operates and providing a background of objects and meanings that allow us 
to assess and evaluate a setting and, therefore, habit and thought should not be 
understood as separate but rather as different phases in human experience (Section 
2.5.3). 
2.6 Conclusion: Rethinking attempts to de-carbonise 
habits of mobility 
This chapter has explored how individualist, socio-technical, practice and Deweyan 
pragmatism have or could inform attempts to reconfigure existing unsustainable and 
high carbon lifestyles and patterns of consumption in less carbon and resource 
intensive ways. The similarities and differences between these approaches are 
summarised in Table 2.4. As a way of situating this discussion the chapter began by 
making a distinction between the environments and phases of action. The 
environments of action were taken to be both internal (bodily needs, sensory 
perceptions, emotions, values, desires, experiences, embodied capacities and skills, 
and conscious thought) and external (social and physical contexts). Meanwhile, in 
delimiting the phases of action a distinction was made between automatic, routine or 
habitual action on the one hand and rational, deliberative or reflective action on the 
other. In characterising action in this way it was noted that each of the approaches 
differ in the ways they understand these environments and phases. The degree to 
which each paradigm assumes human behaviour to be a dynamic and continuous 
consequence of individuals interacting with their social and physical environments 
varies. In contrast, although the paradigms diverge on how often rational or 
conscious action occurs and the events or environments which give rise to it there is 
some consensus that automatic, routine or habitual action tends to prevail. These 
differences and similarities were then explored by examining each of these 
approaches in turn. 
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Individuals and  their attitudes are 
key units of analysis and policy 
Producers/states and their strategies 
are key units of analysis and policy 
Practices (and their elements such as 
competences, meanings and 
materials) are the central unit of 
analysis and change 
The stability and change of habits 
(characterised by assemblages of 
body-mind-world) are the central 
unit of analysis and change 
Behavioural change of individuals is  
decisive for environmental change 
Technological innovation within the  
production sphere is decisive for 
change 
Changing the elements of practices 
are decisive for change 
Formation, endogenous renewal and 
displacement of habit assemblages is 
decisive for change 
Individual choices are the key 
intervention   targets (micro level) 
Socio-technical systems are the key 
intervention targets (macro-level) 
The elements that ‘hold’ practices 
together are the key intervention 
targets (meso-scale)  
Relatively stable habit assemblages 
of body-mind-world are the key 
intervention targets (meso-scale) 
End-users/consumers determine the 
fate of green products, ideas and 
technologies 
Technologies and markets determine 
the fate of green products, ideas and 
technologies 
How they are taken up, change 
through changing or mixing 
elements, and through innovation in 
practice determines the fate of green 
products, ideas and technologies 
How they are incorporated into and 
gradually change or displace existing 
and relatively stable habit 
assemblages, in turn, becoming new 
tendencies, determines the fate of 
green products, ideas and 
technologies 
Key policy instruments and 
approaches: social (soft) instruments 
(persuasion through information 
provision) 
Key policy instruments and 
approaches: the   use of direct 
regulation targeting providers (laws, 
market based instruments) 
Key policy instruments and 
approaches: identifying and 
supporting the creation of 
technological, social and cultural 
innovations. 
Key policy instruments and 
approaches: identifying and 
supporting the creation of 
technological, social and cultural 
innovations and the development of 
new bodily capacities and 
tendencies.  
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 First, it was argued that libertarian paternalism or nudge theory is the latest of a 
number of individualistic approaches which have informed attempts to research, 
theorise and govern the actions of citizens. This approach reflecting its economic and 
psychological origins starts from the assumption that individual choice or the micro-
scale is the most suitable component of analysis, policy and intervention. It was 
argued despite attempting move beyond earlier individualistic approaches informed 
by rational choice that libertarian paternalism is still underpinned by a number of 
individualistic assumptions. These include, but are not limited to, being founded on 
binary positions (e.g., mind and body; subject and object; internal and external), 
failure to account for the ways in which choice is conditioned, constrained and 
enabled and a simplistic portrayal of habit as the unreflexive and automatic response 
of individuals to environmental cues. Reflecting these limitations it was suggested 
this paradigm provides a rather static and restricted account of the environments and 
phases of human action which severely limits the role it can play in facilitating shifts 
to less resource and carbon intensive modes of everyday mobility. 
Socio-technical and practice-based approaches and Deweyan pragmatism were then 
introduced. Socio-technical approaches seeks to examine at a systems level how 
environmentally problematic ways of life emerge, are reproduced and how they 
change. This literature it was observed emphasises the ways in which the social and 
the technical become intertwined and co-evolve together. Notions of social-technical 
systems and co-evolution it was observed have been employed as part of attempts to 
explain how a range of resource intensive practices emerge, persist, fade and 
disappear by practice theorists. Practice-based approaches provide meso-scale 
accounts which urge analysts and policy makers to turn their attention to the various 
elements which ‘hold’ practices together (‘practice-as-entity’) and how they are 
(re)produced (‘practice-as-performance’). Through such attentiveness they are able 
to illustrate how action is a dynamic and relational achievement which is 
conditioned, enabled and constrained by social and physical contexts. Dewey’s 
pragmatism also offers a meso-scale account which shares a number of similarities 
yet remains distinct from socio-technical and practice-based approaches. Following 
Dewey action is considered to continually emerge out of an individual’s interactions 
with their social and physical environments. Such an interpretation recognises the 
dynamic, relational, more-than-individual, contextualised and embodied nature of 
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 action. In the process he provides a means through which to account for the 
significance of habits, meanings and subjectivity play in contributing to 
unsustainable and resource intensive ways of life which is lacking in socio-technical 
and practice-based approaches. 
Overall, this chapter has sought to emphasise that if shifts to less resource and carbon 
intensive modes of everyday mobility and living in general are to be realised we need 
to rethink existing understandings of the environments and phases of action. In 
particular, there is an imminent need to develop a deeper understanding of how 
habits emerge, persist and change. This is because habits not only dictate action they 
also mediate our interactions with the social and physical world and constitute who 
we are as individuals. The individualist, socio-technical and practice approaches it 
has been suggested are inadequate in this context. Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy, in 
contrast, provide a point from which we might start to re-think habits as ‘active and 
self-perpetuating, as more than repetition and automaticity, as separate from instinct’, 
and as a means of overcoming Cartesian or Kantian dualisms such as mind-body, 
internal-external, freedom-necessity and subject-world (Schwanen et al., 2012, p. 
526). More specifically, such a conceptualisation of habit enables an understanding 
of: a) the practical challenges associated with changing behaviour and; b) how new 
modes of conduct might emerge and take hold. Each of the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4-6) that follow seeks to illustrate the potential of a Deweyean-inspired 
approach for understanding the environments and phases of action. 
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 Chapter 3. 
Researching the mundane and habitual: Modes and 
moments of engagement with everyday mobilities 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the methodological approach of the project and broader issues 
related to methodology. The aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the 
empirical basis of the analytical chapters that follow. It outlines a rationale for the 
approach adopted in researching the issues raised in Chapters 1 and 2 and explains 
how the conceptual framework is developed into a research project. Unlike the 
majority of the PhD, this chapter is written from a first person perspective. The only 
other occasions in the thesis when this perspective is employed are in excerpts from 
field notes or interviews. The remainder of the chapter is divided up into seven 
sections. First, Section 3.2 elaborates on my approach to the thesis including how the 
subsequent empirical and conceptual focus of the thesis emerged out of initial pilot 
research and fieldwork in London and an engagement with literatures on comfort and 
mobility. Second, Section 3.3 discusses the challenges involved in researching 
habitual and routine practices before detailing my research approach. Third, Section 
3.4 provides a brief overview of pilot research undertaken in Christchurch, New 
Zealand (Section 3.4.1) and London, UK (Section 3.4.2) and what implications it had 
for the thesis. Fourth, Sections 3.5 provides details about the semi-structured 
interviews and the go-alongs conducted as part of the research. Fifth, Section 3.6 
elaborates upon how the data was analysed using the general procedures of the 
‘ground theory’ methodology. Sixth, Section 3.7 identifies the limitations of the 
thesis. Seventh, it concludes in Section 3.8 by briefly reiterating the aim and purpose 
of the chapter.  
3.2 Approaching the thesis 
This section elaborates on my approach to the thesis in three ways. It starts by 
examining how the ideas underpinning what was eventually a successful application 
to the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission of the UK developed during my 
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 three years working as a social scientist. Following on it explores how these research 
interests informed my first year PhD proposal and significantly shaped the eventual 
design and approach to the thesis. Third, it details how subsequent empirical and 
conceptual focus of the thesis emerged out of initial pilot research and fieldwork in 
London and an engagement with literatures on comfort and mobility.   
3.2.1 Research inception: Shifting ideas and countries 
The PhD research was funded through the Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowship Plan. In the detailed research proposal submitted as part of the 
application I proposed to investigate how current, emerging and future trends in 
everyday consumption could result in shifts that exacerbate the impacts of and 
further contribute to climate change. Possible shifts I identified were two-fold. First, 
the potential that increasing public interest in growing food at home or in allotments 
might result in greater demand for water and oil. Second, the possibility that 
temperature increases might result in increased installation and use of high energy 
technologies and systems such as air-conditioning in residential properties. This 
initial proposal reflected research interests developed during my three years working 
as a social scientist at GNS Science, a government-owned research and consultancy 
organisation in Lower Hutt, New Zealand. This role contributed to my thinking in 
three ways. First, I became increasingly aware of the difficulties associated with 
facilitating shifts towards less resource intensive and low carbon modes of living and 
the limitations of individualistic approaches to behaviour change (see Section 2.3.3). 
Moreover, I began to engage with various social science literatures which 
emphasised the need to re-imagine and re-frame climate change as locally 
understood and relevant issues (e.g., Brace & Geoghegan, 2011; Macnaghten, 2003; 
Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007; Owens, 2000; Prins et al., 2010; Shove, 2003, 
2010; Slocum, 2004). 
Second, involvement in a project which examined residential heating and cooling 
further encouraged a developing interest in everyday practice (Doody & Becker, 
2011). The research revealed there was increasing uptake of air-source heat pumps 
and that people were starting to intermittingly use these rather than passive methods 
(i.e., opening windows and doors) for cooling in the summer. Consequently, it 
appeared that the growing popularity of ‘energy efficient’ heat pumps was creating a 
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 new energy demand during summer and potentially new expectations of comfort (see 
also Gram-Hanssen et al., 2012). Additionally, many migrant (see also Cupples et al., 
2007) and New Zealand-born participants suggested that due to their lack of 
insulation, double-glazing and central heating, that New Zealand houses were cold 
and uncomfortable. In making sense of these findings, I was drawn to Elizabeth 
Shove’s writings on comfort (Chappells & Shove, 2005; Shove, 2003), buildings and 
design (Shove et al., 2008; Shove et al., 2007) and social practice theory (Shove, 
2004; Shove & Pantzar, 2005). Her work and these insights encouraged me to further 
reflect on how energy and other resources are consumed in the course of a range of 
habitual and routine activities and the role that particular contextual conditions (e.g., 
the installation of a heat pump or shifting countries) play in shaping people’s 
expectations of thermal comfort.  
Third, I became interested in the emerging literature on low carbon lifestyles. Here, 
Kingsley Dennis and John Urry’s (2009) book After the Car, which explores how the 
future of travel is being shaped by climate change, peak oil, population growth and 
the digitisation of many aspects of economic and social life was especially important. 
Heather Chappells and Elizabeth Shove’s (2005) work which explored the extent to 
which standardised notions of thermal comfort and responses to anticipated climate 
change are becoming embedded in the specification and construction of future 
building, heating and cooling technologies was another significant influence (see also 
Shove et al., 2008). In different ways, these works highlighted the possibility of 
generating insights into the trajectories of contemporary patterns of demand and 
consumption and how these might be reconfigured in less resource intensive and 
carbon dependent ways. These three areas of interest, albeit in different guises, 
formed the basis of the application for the Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowship Plan, my first year proposal and eventually the thesis. The next section 
elaborates on how these interests informed the design of the research and how the 
project shifted from originally focusing on thermal comfort and practices to everyday 
mobility and Deweyan pragmatism. 
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 3.2.2 Developing the thesis: Social practice theory and thermal 
comfort 
These research interests and the initial empirical and conceptual focus were apparent 
in my first year PhD proposal. The original aim of this proposal was to demonstrate 
how significant behaviour changes might be facilitated by focusing on people’s 
thermal comfort practices in and around the home. The three related objectives were: 
1. To examine how the ways and processes of facilitating changes in practices 
and behaviours around the home have been understood in previous research. 
2. To understand how current thermal comfort practices in and around the home 
have emerged, persisted and changed. 
3. To examine the ways in which current thermal comfort practices might be 
(re)configured in the future. 
Moreover, I proposed that I would develop a theoretical framework informed by 
socio-cultural/technical understandings of comfort and social practice theory (see 
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2).  
The design of the methodological approach and the project from the outset 
corresponding with this theoretical framework was guided by three central concerns. 
First, exploring ways of investigating routine, mundane and habitual activities which 
people may often perform without thought, consider inconsequential or rarely reflect 
upon (see Section 3.3). Second, identifying methods which provide some insight into 
how individuals engage with and use things, objects, technologies and infrastructures 
in sensuous and embodied ways. Third, ensuring that this approach was sensitive to 
the ways in which an individual’s actions are always conditioned by their social and 
physical environments. These last two concerns corresponded with social practice 
theory’s focus on the elements or entities which are integrated during routine action, 
namely: 1) the material (objects, infrastructures, human bodies); 2) the symbolic 
(meanings, cultural conventions, norms) and 3) the procedural (know-how, 
competences).  
Reflecting upon these concerns the decision was made to proceed with the original 
plan of conducting research in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom proposed 
in the Commonwealth Scholarship application. This decision was initially based on 
my desire to understand the role that different histories of building and construction 
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 (e.g., housing types, building materials), technologies (e.g., wood burners, central 
heating, heatpumps) and systems of provision (e.g., gas and electricity) played in 
shaping social norms and conventions and how these both in turn conditioned 
people’s thermal comfort practices. Here, I was particularly interested in further 
exploring some of the findings from the GNS Science research, especially migrant 
and local people’s experiences of thermal comfort. Accordingly, I decided to focus 
on New Zealand and British migrants for practical and logistical reasons (e.g., 
existing contacts and networks, language) but also, reflecting New Zealand’s British 
colonial past and ongoing associations, many cultural similarities.  
Table 3.1. The characteristics of the two fieldwork sites, Auckland, New Zealand and London, UK. 
Characteristic Auckland, NZ London, UK 
Population 1,415,550 7,825,200 
Area 482.9 km2 1,570 km2 
Density 2,900/km2 4,978/km2 
No. of expatriate 
residents 
90,429 (UK-born) 27,493 (NZ-born) 
Climate type Warm-temperate oceanic 
climate 
Temperate oceanic climate  
Average high °C  19.0 15.2 
Average low °C 11.3 7.5 
Precipitation (mm) 1212.4 592.2 
% Humidity 82.3 92.3 
Mean sunshine hours 
(Year) 
2003.1 1480.5 
Main housing types Detached, wood construction Attached/semi-detached, 
brick construction  
Main heating types Wood burners, electric heating Gas central heating 
 
Auckland and London were subsequently selected as the two fieldwork sites (see 
Table 3.1). London was chosen as it is one of the most popular destinations for 
temporary or permanent New Zealand migrants in the UK. Similarly, Auckland was 
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 selected as it is locale where the highest numbers of British born migrants in New 
Zealand have settled. The research was not explicitly designed, however, to be a 
comparative study. Instead, the intention was to understand the role that the social 
and physical environments of Auckland and London played in conditioning 
individual’s actions and thoughts. Moreover, it was envisaged that these ‘new’ 
conditions might contradict or challenge migrant’s cherished, embodied and 
unreflexive ways of doing thus creating opportunities for these participants to further 
reflect on their current and previous experiences and expectations of thermal 
comfort. Table 3.1 presents some of the social and physical characteristics of both of 
the fieldwork sites which might have implications for thermal comfort. Section 3.2.3 
now details how the current empirical and conceptual focus of the thesis emerged out 
of initial pilot research and fieldwork in London.  
3.2.3 Reconfiguring the thesis: From practices and thermal comfort to 
mobility and Deweyan pragmatism 
The initial research conducted in Christchurch, New Zealand sought to understand 
the potential of using research diaries as a means of examining habitual and routine 
everyday activities associated with thermal comfort in and around the home (Section 
3.4). Some of the empirical materials generated revealed the ways in which comfort 
was negotiated in various embodied and sensuous ways in a range of different 
spaces. These materials encouraged me to reflect on the limitations of understanding 
these practices simply through the lens of ‘thermal comfort’. This encouraged me to 
read further around the notion of comfort. The RGS-IBG (Royal Geographical 
Society-Institute of British Geographers) Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland on 3-5 
July 2012 helped to reinforce many reservations that had emerged out of my close 
reading of this literature. Two sessions titled ‘Geographies of comfort: People, 
energy and domestic habitation’ were particularly important in this context. All of 
the talks in these sessions focused on ‘thermal comfort’, practices (predominantly 
heating and cooling) and, with the exception of two talks (e.g., care homes and work 
places), the ‘home’. There appeared to be little reflection on the ways in which 
comfort is configured or shaped by other experiences, senses, histories and things 
that do not directly influence the buildings climatic envelope. None of the papers 
considered the ways in which engagements with weather and other places (e.g., the 
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 office, the park, public transport and the garden) influenced the ways in which 
comfort was experienced and conceptualised. Some of my observations were 
reiterated in the concluding roundtable discussion with Karen Bickerstaff, Dale 
Southerton and Stefan Bouzarovski. Bickerstaff and Bouzarovski both observed 
among other matters that there was too much focus on thermal comfort rather than 
comfort more generally and social practice theory at the expense of other theoretical 
resources such as literatures on embodiment, the home and home-making.  
Pilot interviews conducted in August 2012 (Section 3.4.2) were informed by a 
growing unease with my initial empirical and conceptual focus. Correspondingly, 
these interviews were used as a way of exploring how people generally talked about 
and reflected on embodied and sensuous experiences of comfort and discomfort in a 
range of everyday spaces both in and around home and work. As a consequence of 
these pilot interviews as well as my reading of the literature and experiences at the 
RGS-IBG, I decided to shift my focus towards developing a relational understanding 
of comfort. The aim in doing so was to be attentive to the multiple forms of comfort 
and how it is embodied, materialised and negotiated through particular practices as 
people move between the different time-spaces in and around home and work. The 
pilot interviews with New Zealand migrants highlighted how participants had 
adapted and become attuned to taken for granted aspects of their previous lives. For 
example, a number of participants discussed the challenges of getting used to life 
without a car, travelling on public transport and spending more time outside in the 
‘miserable’ or ‘horrible’ London weather. This encouraged me to proceed with 
conducting the research with both locals and migrants but also to explore the 
relationship between notions of comfort, people’s everyday journeys and 
engagements with the weather. Moreover, it prompted me to centre the study on 
individuals who travelled to work most days of the week as they typically inhabit 
multiple time-spaces each day.  
This shift in empirical focus and initial fieldwork in London prompted further 
reflection on and modifications to my methodological and conceptual approaches in 
two ways. First, I started to engage with the mobilities literature which encouraged 
me to further reflect on the possibility of employing ‘mobile methods’ and 
technologies (Section 3.3.1) as another way of generating insights into how the 
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 configuration of technologies, transport infrastructures and urban forms shape social 
and cultural life on the move (Cresswell, 2006; Sheller & Urry, 2006). 
Correspondingly, I decided to adopt a more ‘ethnographic’ and ‘grounded’ approach 
which drew upon a range of methodological ‘tools’ (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 14) or 
modes of ‘engagement’ (Merriman, 2014, p. 179) including semi-structured 
interviews, go-alongs, participant observation (Section 3.5) and ongoing systematic 
analysis (Section 3.6).  
Second, a number of interesting themes began emerging out of the initial interviews 
conducted during the first period of fieldwork in London (Section 3.5.1). The ways 
in which participants talked about their journeys or their commutes were often not 
easily encapsulated just by the notion of comfort. Many participants talked about 
various adjustments they had to make including becoming more organised, an 
increased preparedness for walking and being outside and the adoption of particular 
approaches for dealing with the close proximity of others on especially the tube. In 
attempting to make sense of these empirical materials, I felt that social practice 
theory did not provide me with the conceptual tools and resources to sufficiently 
understand the concepts and interpretations emerging out of my grounded analysis. 
In particular, I found that the notion of individuals as simply ‘carriers or practices’ 
did not seem to capture the ways in which individuals modified and reconfigured 
their practices through reflection and experimentation and how this, along with an 
increasing familiarity with these everyday spaces, seemed to alter their individual 
meanings and subjectivities.  
It was during this time that I had become increasingly interested in the re-emerging 
interest in habit in geography (Bissell, 2011, 2013; Middleton, 2011; Schwanen et 
al., 2012) and the humanities and social sciences more generally (Bennett et al., 
2013; Carlisle, 2010, 2014; Crossley, 2013; Sinclair, 2011). Much of this work was 
inspired by the English translation of Felix Ravaisson’s (2008 [1838]) Of Habit. A 
few scholars also drew attention to John Dewey’s pragmatist writings which like 
Ravaisson emphasised the importance of understanding habits as a disposition or a 
capacity which is a source of stability and change, an active tendency or a force, 
constantly emerging out of particular social or physical environments and 
fundamental the self or subjectivity (see Crossley, 2013; Schwanen et al., 2012). This 
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 stimulated me to read both Ravaisson (2008 [1838]) and Dewey (1922a). Although 
both authors stressed the relational, more-than-individual and dynamic nature of 
habit, I was particularly drawn to Dewey’s work as it provided a more contextualised 
and detailed analysis of how habits, meanings and thought emerge in particular social 
and physical settings and their implication for social and moral life.  
Subsequently, I adopted a Deweyan-inspired approach to understanding habit which 
was later expanded to encompass his other writings especially on experience (1929a) 
and logic (1938) as these assisted me in further interpreting and understanding my 
empirical materials. Moreover, this new conceptual framework combined with my 
empirical materials encouraged me to direct my empirical focus towards 
understanding the environments and phases of action associated with everyday 
mobility rather than just simply comfort, although this remained a guiding concern. 
Correspondingly I decided to retain Auckland and London as my fieldwork sites as 
Section 3.5 notes for a number of reasons which still allowed me to understand the 
role that social and physical environments play in conditioning individual action and 
thought. 
Overall, despite the empirical and conceptual differences between the 
Commonwealth Scholarship and first year proposals and the thesis, at least five 
similarities can still be identified between the earlier and later manifestations of the 
project, all of which informed the design of the research. First, they are all explicitly 
concerned with examining existing approaches to theorising, understanding and 
governing action especially in relation to debates around behaviour change, 
sustainability and climate change. Second, the empirical focus of the research is on 
understanding how resources (e.g., oil, electricity, wood, coal, embodied energy) are 
routinely consumed and used as part of habitual and mundane everyday activities. 
Third, in the process they attempt to demonstrate how such an empirical and 
conceptual focus can help to move beyond the limitations especially of 
individualistic approaches to behaviour change. Fourth, each of the different 
manifestations attempt to generate insights into how contemporary practices or habits 
might inform the transition to more sustainable and low carbon lifestyles. Fifth, 
following Shove et al. (2012) it was noted in Section 2.5 that there are a number of 
overlaps between the ways in which social practice theory and Deweyan pragmatism 
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 understand the environments and phases of action. In particular, both approaches 
recognise that action is variously enabled, constrained, permitted and rendered 
possible by social norms, cultural conventions, political institutions, rules and 
regulations, existing infrastructures and systems of provision. The next section 
examines the difficulties associated with researching habits, routines and mundane 
practices and the different approaches researchers have used to address these 
challenges. 
3.3 Researching everyday practices and movements 
Scholars have studied a range of habitual, routine and mundane everyday practices 
using more ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ methods such as interviews, focus groups, 
questionnaires and participant observation. Other scholars have stressed the need to 
develop ‘non-representational’ and ‘mobile’ methods in order to better capture the 
fleeting, multiple, embodied and multi-sensory nature of everyday life. Section 3.3.1 
briefly considers both sides of these debates before outlining how methods are 
approached in the context of the thesis (Section 3.3.2). 
3.3.1 Everyday practices, movements and methodological 
appropriateness 
The potential for talk-based methods such as interviews and focus groups to provide 
insights into the complexities, time-spaces and flows of everyday life is increasingly 
being questioned (Büscher & Urry, 2009; Latham, 2003, 2010; Macpherson, 2010; 
Pink, 2005, 2011; Sheller & Urry, 2006; Spinney, 2009). For example, Latham 
(2003; 2010, p. 90) asserts it is unreasonable to ‘expect people to be able to reliably 
remember the frequency of activities that they carry out routinely on a day-to-day 
basis, and often without much thought’ (although see Southerton, 2003; Southerton 
& Tomlinson, 2005). Alongside others (Pink, 2005; Spinney, 2009) he argues that 
research participants will generally struggle to say anything about everyday events 
that are often ‘fleeting and mundane, or just plain routine and lacking in any obvious 
social consequence’ (Latham, 2010, p. 90). Moreover, such methods may not 
apprehend the symbolic and cultural conventions of a practice (Shove, 2003), the 
context in which it is performed and experienced (Spinney, 2009) and the sensory, 
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 emotional and embodied nature of action (Macpherson, 2010; Pink, 2005, 2011; 
Spinney, 2009).  
In their place, these scholars have emphasised the need to supplement or often 
replace these ‘conventional’ and ‘representational’ methods with ‘non-
representational’ and ‘mobile’ methods. For instance, many mobilities scholars 
emphasis ‘[t]he imperative to move, be and see with’ (Merriman, 2014, p. 174) 
subjects: 
[A]s a consequence of allowing themselves to move with and to be moved by 
subjects, researchers can become tuned into the social organisation of ‘moves’. … 
By immersing themselves in the fleeting, multi-sensory, distributed, mobile and 
multiple, yet local, practical and ordered making of social and material realities, 
researchers come to understand movement not as only governed by rules but as 
methodologically generative (Büscher et al., 2010, p. 7). 
This imperative has seen scholars draw upon ‘video, ethnographic and participative 
methods, ‘go-alongs’, and a host of other techniques in an attempt to apprehend the 
mobile practices of cyclists, walkers, ferry passengers, drivers and other mobile 
subjects’ (Anderson, 2004; Laurier, 2004; Laurier et al., 2012; Laurier et al., 2008; 
Merriman, 2014, p. 169; Middleton, 2011; Spinney, 2009, 2011; Vannini, 2012; 
Watts, 2008). Moreover, it is increasingly argued by mobilities scholars that these 
new techniques and methods as well as theoretical stances ‘are necessary to allow 
academics to apprehend’ the ‘practices and sensations of human embodied 
movement’ which as ‘fleeting occurrences’ often ‘elude representation’ (Büscher et 
al., 2010; Fincham et al., 2010; Merriman, 2014, p. 182; Spinney, 2009, 2011).   
These claims and their associated assumptions have been questioned in at least two 
ways. First, some emphasise the continuing appropriateness of using talk-based 
methods such as interviews and focus groups in order to understand everyday 
practices (Bissell, 2014a; Hegger et al., 2011; Hitchings, 2012). Hitchings (2012) 
uses examples from his interview-based studies of office workers use of nearby 
urban parks and older people’s approaches to staying warm during winter to 
demonstrate that people are capable of talking about rather mundane actions which, 
to some extent, may be performed without conscious consideration. Similarly, 
Hegger et al. (2011, pp. 52-53) note how focus groups helped them to understand the 
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 ways in which ‘meanings and rationalities’ associated with water-based consumption 
practices in the Netherlands. 
Other scholars have questioned the claims made about and assumptions often 
underpinning non-representational and mobile methods (Dewsbury, 2010; Merriman, 
2014). In particular, it is often argued that such methods enable the researcher to 
observe events ‘first-hand’ allowing them to gain a ‘closeness’, immediacy and 
‘proximity’ (Fincham et al., 2010, pp. 4-5) which ‘is all-too-often associated with an 
authentic experience that can enable the researcher to more accurately know and 
interpret the practices in question’ (Büscher et al., 2010; Merriman, 2014, pp. 175-
176; Spinney, 2009, 2011). It is presumed ‘[v]ideo-recording technologies and 
participative techniques are valorised for their ability to enable the research to 
witness or capture the unfolding of live events and the contexts of action’ (Merriman, 
2014, p. 176). Consequently, ‘such manoeuvres often appear to assume that such 
practices, contexts, spaces and events are singular’ which ‘can be accurately 
witnessed, captured, represented or portrayed’ (Dewsbury, 2010; Merriman, 2014, p. 
176). As Dewsbury (2010, p. 330) asserts alongside many science and technology 
studies scholars (e.g., Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1993, 2005; Mol, 2002) there is, 
however, ‘no one world out there’ waiting to be discovered. This is a point which 
Dewey also emphasised in articulating how his pragmatism differed from other 
forms of realism (see Hildebrand, 2003, pp. 30-86): 
Neither is the distinction between monistic and dualistic realism exhaustive. There 
remains pluralistic realism, which is precisely the theory I have advanced. The 
things which are taken as meaning or intending other things are indefinitely 
diversified, and so are the things meant. Smoke stands for fire, and odo[u]r for a 
rose … and so on ad infinium. Things are not mental states. Hence the realism. But 
things are indefinitely many. Hence the pluralism (Dewey, 1922b, p. 356). 
Accordingly, there is a need to acknowledge that the world is ‘multiple, open-ended’ 
(Merriman, 2014, pp. 176-177) and ‘more elusive than we can [research and] 
theorise’, as ‘the world does not add-up’ (Dewsbury et al., 2002, p. 437; Law, 2004). 
As a result, ‘witnessing something or engaging with someone face-to-face, on the 
ground, does not provide some authentic or singular way of understanding, 
witnessing, or knowing a subject, thing or event’ (Merriman, 2014, p. 179). Instead, 
as Merriman (2014, p. 179) asserts it ‘provides a particular kind of engagement that 
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 is different from (but not superior to) other embodied practices of engagement’ such 
as ‘reading about an event’ or ‘watching a video recording of it’. The implication of 
Merriman’s account is returned to at the end of Section 3.3.2 which now elaborates 
on how methods are approached in the thesis.   
3.3.2 Facilitating habit hitches, conflicts and shocks 
Dewey’s (1922a, 1929a) account of the relationship between habit and thought is 
particularly insightful in the context of understanding how research practices can 
help facilitate moments of reflection on habit. As noted in Section 2.6.1, for the most 
part Dewey asserts that our habits are able to function successfully. Even in ‘novel 
and precarious circumstances’ they are able to direct ‘our conduct in a way that 
avoids potential hazards’ if there is ‘some aspect of the situation that enables the 
habit to function successfully’ (Carter & Scott, 2013, p. 83). Here ‘the habit is able to 
refilter the novel situation to make it resemble some other, more familiar, one’ 
(Carter & Scott, 2013, p. 83). This is not always the case as in some instances ‘habits 
prove inadequate to the perpetual task of coming to terms with the environment’ 
(Allport, 1951, p. 274) and impulse is released ‘to energise deliberation’ (Scheffler, 
1974, p. 218). It is such a ‘hitch in [the] workings [of a habit] which occasions 
emotion and provokes thought’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 178). Habits hitches or what he 
also terms as conflicts or shocks for Dewey play an important role in action giving 
rise to reflection, observation, memory and ingenuity: 
Conflict is the gladfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates 
invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and 
contriving. Not that it is always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non 
of reflection and ingenuity (Dewey, 1922a, p. 300).  
These hitches, conflicts or shock arise because some aspect of the environing 
conditions becomes problematic for our existing habits. Thinking, for Dewey, ‘would 
not exist … in a world which presented no troubles’ (Dewey, 1916, p. 19) because 
‘we could get by with our habits and our traditional ways of action’ (Campbell, 1995, 
p. 56). In this way thinking is also like any other habit in that it is an activity which 
emerges in our bodies and brains in relation to our immediate surroundings. Thought 
comes from ‘the suggestion of the environment’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 314) and is thus 
‘something that happens to us’ (1910, p. 34). ‘It thinks’, he asserts, ‘is a truer 
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 psychological statement than ‘I think’. Thoughts sprout and vegetate; ideas 
proliferate’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 314).  
Returning to the implication of Merriman’s (2014) argument, different methods such 
as interviews, go-alongs, auto-ethnography and participant observation can be 
understood as providing the researcher with different kinds of engagement with 
particular subjects, materialities and events. A researcher’s line of questioning or 
their presence on their commute can force participants to ‘stop and think’ and 
observe, recollect and reflect on their lives, habits and experiences (Dewey, 1929a, p. 
314). Participant’s responses or actions can equally prompt new lines of enquiry for 
researchers. More importantly, other aspects of the environing conditions such as the 
actions of other commuters or particular objects, technologies or infrastructures can 
also trigger thought for researchers and participants alike (Anderson, 2004; Anderson 
& Jones, 2009; Elwood & Martin, 2000; Sin, 2003). In the context of my own 
research practices, I came to adopt a broadly ethnographic and grounded research 
methodology which used a range of methodological tools or modes of engagement as 
the following sections elaborate including semi-structured interviews, go-alongs, 
participant observation and ongoing systematic analysis. Moreover, I understood the 
research process and my empirical materials as being co-produced by researchers, 
participants and their social and physical contexts in which the research unfolded. 
3.4 Pilot research: Understanding everyday practices of 
comfort 
This section provides a brief overview of pilot research undertaken in Christchurch, 
New Zealand (Section 3.4.1) and London, UK (Section 3.4.2) and what implications 
it had for the thesis. 
3.4.1 Research diaries: Christchurch, New Zealand 
Research diaries were piloted as a means of examining habitual and everyday 
activities during the first year of my PhD in my home town of Christchurch, New 
Zealand. Five participants agreed to keep a written diary over the course of one week 
(25-31 January 2011) about the ways in which they negotiated their everyday 
comfort over this period in different time-spaces. The intention was that the diary 
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 would provide participants with an opportunity to ‘mediate on - or at least be more 
actively aware of – the routine and ordinary [nature] of their [practices], whilst also 
providing a detailed time-space account of [these practices]’ (Latham, 2003, p. 
2002). The original aim was to adopt the ‘diary, diary-interview method’ (DDIM) 
(Zimmerman & Wieder, 1977), where the diary forms the basis of an interview with 
the diarist. As my visit significantly overlapped with summer holidays in New 
Zealand it was not possible to complete the follow-up interviews. Short discussions 
were held, however, with each of the participants about their experience of the 
process including how easy the diaries had been to complete and the amount of time 
it had taken. 
The quality of the diary entries and relevance of the materials generated was largely 
dependent on the respondent completing the diary. For example, two participants 
only made very brief entries each day whereas the other three participants wrote full 
accounts every day. The participants who included more detailed accounts tended to 
be more reflective about the various ways they tried to manage their thermal comfort 
and how such attempts were shaped by their surrounding environments and weather 
conditions. Reflecting this, two of these participants, Kevin and Catherine, made 
observations that suggested the process of completing the diary had made them more 
aware of their everyday thermal comfort practices. Kevin observed ‘I’m astonished 
at how much time I spend in air-conditioned environments’. Catherine wrote about 
her changing understanding of the notion of comfort: 
Developing a new appreciation of ‘comfortable’ as [the] week goes by. Have 
become aware of how difficult – partly because of circumstances this week – [it is] 
to be comfortable in environments [in] which I had no control. E.g., unable to open 
windows or move up air-con [at the hospital]. [This] has made me more mindful of 
the need to wear removable clothing layers. 
In contrast, Robert and Scott who both only provided brief accounts suggested they 
were already aware of their existing practices and that these did not change much 
during the summer. In Scott’s case he commented that, for the most part, he controls 
his comfort through his clothing:  
My activities are governed by what I have to do and where I have to be. At this time 
of the year, the only usual requirement is to adjust clothing layers to deal with low 
amplitude differences in temperature. Buildings I work in have external 
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 environmental controls (i.e., I cannot change them!) so clothing adjustments [are] 
the only recourse. 
Overall, this pilot revealed both the potential benefits and limitations of using diaries. 
It reaffirmed that diaries were one means through which participants could reflect on, 
and in some instances, become more conscious of routine and everyday practices. 
This appeared to be particularly the case for Kevin and Catherine who both dedicated 
more time and energy into completing their entries. Despite their shorter entries, 
Robert and Scott’s accounts still revealed some useful insights into how comfort is in 
part conditioned and negotiated in relation to the built environment. The main 
limitations highlighted were that the type of materials generated was much more 
dependent on the commitment, interest and assumptions of research participants. The 
three research participants who completed full entries over the seven days all 
commented that although being an enjoyable process, it was particularly time 
consuming. An additional problem was the challenge of interpreting and reading 
participants’ entries but this could be to some extent addressed through a follow-up 
interview (Latham, 2003; Zimmerman & Wieder, 1977). I eventually decided not to 
use diaries as I was concerned about the potential time involved in introducing 
participants to the process and following up the diaries with interviews and the 
demands it places on participants.  
3.4.2 Pilot interviews: London, United Kingdom 
As Section 3.2.3 outlined the pilot interviews were informed by a growing unease 
with empirical and conceptual focus of the thesis. The purpose of my pilot interviews 
was subsequently three-fold. First, to explore the ways in which people generally 
talked about and reflected on (dis)comfort in a range of everyday spaces both in and 
around home and work. Second, to gain some insight into the logistical and practical 
challenges that conducting fieldwork with both local and migrant research 
participants in London might entail. In particular, I wanted to get some sense of how 
easy it would be to gain access to research participants through different networks, 
online forums and personal contacts. Third, building on my research diary pilot, I 
wanted to understand how suitable semi-structured qualitative interviews might be at 
helping me to gain insights into the embodied and sensuous natures of people’s 
everyday practices and how they are shaped by different social and physical 
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 environments. In effect I was trying to reflect on Hitchings (2012) assertion that 
people can talk about their practices.  
Thirteen semi-structured interviews were carried out around London between 13 and 
20 August 2012. In total, seven ‘local’ professionals, one retiree and five New 
Zealand migrants were interviewed. The interviews were structured around four lines 
of enquiry. They began by briefly reflecting on what it was like to live in London as 
a way exploring how the city influenced people’s conceptions of everyday life and 
(dis)comfort. The questions then focused on the interviewee’s home as a way of 
examining the extent to which comfort emerged as important in this context without 
promoting them. Comfort was the next area of enquiry and the ways in which people 
interpreted the notion, how it had changed over time, the role it played in their 
everyday life and the spaces of (dis)comfort. The interview concluded with some 
questions associated with the nature and acceptability of contemporary lifestyles. I 
also asked the New Zealand migrants to reflect on how living in London had 
changed their lifestyle.  
People were capable of talking about a range of general and specific topics despite 
the fact as Jeremy observed they did not necessarily reflect on these matters very 
often: 
[The questions] were very good and interesting […]. A lot of the time you never 
think about [these things]. I suppose I've never considered the differences between a 
comfortable life and the good life. Things like that. I think the questions were good. 
A significant argument often levelled against using only interviews is that individuals 
may find it difficult or challenging to talk about what to most people might be 
ordinarily routine, mundane and everyday occurrences (Latham, 2003, 2010). 
Initially reading over the pilot interview transcripts, I was struck by how general 
many responses were to my various questions. What appeared to be lacking were 
more routine and everyday accounts of life. There were a few examples scattered 
throughout the transcripts including Jeremy and Jane’s accounts which both also 
revealed the interconnections between home, commuting and work: 
Jeremy […] I work long hours in a relatively stressful job and the commute as 
well. My commute is the best part of an hour. So you get on the tube at 
7 o’clock or whatever. You’re standing up on the train. There [are] 
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 people barging into you. It is hot and it’s noisy. Then you’ve got twelve 
hours of work. Where it is quite stressful with loads of deadlines and 
then you’ve got another long tube journey home. So all that time you’ve 
got stress on your mind. No time to sit and think or read a book or 
whatever. So for me when you get home it is about switching off […] 
and relaxing. 
Jane You get to a certain point in the evening where I like to be just relaxed 
see. Get everything done and just sit. It depends if I've got an evening 
meeting I'm ok with that. But if I was at home it would be go in. Have 
dinner. Clear up. And then that is when I want to chill. That's so when. 
When the dishes are done and everything is finished. 
Upon further inspection I observed that the absence of these routine and everyday 
occurrences largely reflected my questioning. In instances where I asked more 
specific questions most participants responded accordingly. For instance, Victoria, a 
New Zealand migrant, observed how she had gradually come to terms with the 
London lifestyle including commuting. When asked to elaborate further she 
discussed how she had ‘got used to’ her long commute: 
I get on a train to Vauxhall and then I get on a tube up to Highbury and Islington 
and then I got on the Overground. It is about an hour-fifteen. It actually goes really 
fast which is surprising. I used to hate commuting. So if you go back to just over 
two years ago. I used to always live just within walking distance in Devon and 
London I used to live in walking distance. And then I sort of moved and then I had 
to start commuting. And I didn't enjoy it but. In the new flat it just goes quite fast. 
So I think I'm finally just getting used to it really. 
Such responses demonstrated the importance of reflecting on the types of questions I 
was asking and the ways in which I was asking them. Given that the pilot interviews 
were designed to be exploratory, however, I did not spend as much time focusing on 
specific practices. Following Hitchings (2012) recommendations I felt there was also 
scope to present participants with hypothetical situations or other people’s practices 
as a way of encouraging them to deliberate on their own rationales. The pilot thus 
indicated that interviews again provided a useful mode for engaging with the ways in 
which people negotiated comfort in a range of different time-spaces. In the course of 
travelling to and from the interviews on different Underground and Overground lines 
and at different times of the day, I began to gain a further appreciation of how the 
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 rhythms and materialities of different lines could contribute to their experiences of 
these spaces and how such experiences could change over time. Overall, as noted in 
Section 3.2.3, the pilot interviews encouraged me to start thinking about other modes 
of engaging with people’s practices, understanding comfort in multiple forms and the 
interconnections between home, the commute and work. 
3.5 Modes of engagement with everyday mobilities 
Despite the empirical and conceptual shift of the thesis, Auckland and London were 
retained as the fieldwork sites for at least three reasons. First, London is one of the 
most popular destinations for temporary (e.g., working holiday visa) (Wilson et al., 
2009a, 2009b) or permanent New Zealand migrants in the UK (ONS, 2011). 
Correspondingly, the highest numbers of British born migrants in New Zealand live 
in Auckland (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). Second, Auckland and London are sites 
of contrasting transport infrastructures, car dependence and public transport use (see 
Chapter 4; Table 3.2). In comparison, the car has played a less significant role in 
everyday life in London, reflecting the cities complex and extensive public transport 
system. Third, transport remains a concern in both cities and there are efforts to 
encourage more walking and cycling. Auckland and London suffer from significant 
road congestion and many of the problems of excessive car use (e.g., air pollution; 
greenhouse gas emissions; motor vehicle related-deaths) (Auckland Council, 2014; 
Pooley et al., 2005). Overcrowding is also a considerable problem in London on the 
underground, local and regional trains and buses. The remaining subsections 
elaborate upon the different methodological tools or modes of engagement used to 
examine everyday mobility in both cities.  
3.5.1 Qualitative interviews 
This section provides details about the semi-structured interviews conducted as part 
of the PhD fieldwork. More specifically, it describes how participants were recruited, 
the number of people interviewed, the settings for the interviews and how they were 
designed and structured. 
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 Table 3.2. Comparison of mode share of journeys to work in Auckland, New Zealand and London, 
United Kingdom 
Mode share of journeys Auckland, NZ 
 (MOT, 2014) 
London, UK 
 (ONS, 2013) 
Private vehicles (car/motorcycle) 88% 38% 
Public Transport 8% 36% 
Walking 3% 24% 
Cycling 1% 2% 
Participant recruitment 
In an effort to gain access to a range of participants, a number of different channels 
were used for recruitment. These included online advertisements on professional, 
interest and expatriate group pages on Facebook and LinkedIn, directly contacting 
companies and schools and asking them to place an advertisement via email or their 
online and offline noticeboards, making use of existing contacts and snowballing. A 
website was set up to help facilitate the process which included details about 
participant involvement, project procedures, the intended outcomes of the research 
and a form through which people could register their interest (see Appendix 1). 
In total, 95 interviews were conducted as part of the fieldwork between October 2012 
and September 2013 (see Table 3.3). Fifty four interviews were conducted in London 
and 41 in Auckland. Initial advertisements on a New Zealand expatriate Facebook 
group in London attracted a good deal of interest (n=20). I chose to interview all of 
these individuals rather than selecting them on the basis of particular socio-
demographic or mobility characteristics. This was mainly because I felt it would 
provide me with a good opportunity to recruit other participants through these 
contacts. After these initial interviews I was more selective about whom I 
interviewed in both London and Auckland. In particular, as I was interested in how 
people’s habits associated with their commutes changed with different modes of 
mobility and over time, I focused on obtaining a diverse sample of local and migrant 
participants in regards to mobility (car; bus; train; underground; walk; cycle), age 
(18-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60+) and the amount of time they had been living in the 
city (≤2 years; 2-5 years; >5 years). The characteristics of those interviewed are 
summarised in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
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 Table 3.3. Summary of the total number of interviews conducted as part of the PhD and the time of 
year and season during which they were conducted.  
Location Season Dates Interviews 
London Autumn 15 Oct - 3 Nov 2012 31 
Autumn/Winter 19 Nov - 14 Dec 2012 13 
Winter 14 Jan - 2 Feb 2013 8 
Summer 29 Jul - 1 Sept 2013 2 
Subtotal 54 
Auckland Summer/Autumn 19 Feb - 27 Mar 2013 16 
Autumn 1 - 29 Apr 2013  14 
Autumn 7 - 17 May 2013 3 






 Table 3.4. An overview of the relationship between gender and interview participants’ main mode/s of 
travel to and from work in each city. As people often travelled by multiple modes (e.g., bus, train and 
underground), especially in London, the totals are greater than the number of people interviewed. 




Auckland Female 3 4 11 0 
Male 6 2 6 2 
Sub total 9 6 17 2 
London Female 7 4 1 0 
Male 2 4 4 0 
Sub total 9 8 5 0 
Total 18 14 22 2 
 
Location Gender Train Tram Underground Walking 
Auckland Female 1 N/A N/A 9 
Male 2 N/A N/A 6 
Sub total 3 N/A N/A 15 
London Female 15 1 12 28 
Male 4 0 9 13 
Sub total 19 1 21 41 
Total 22 1 21 56 
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 Table 3.5. A breakdown of the number of people interviewed in each city by their country of birth and 
age. 
Location Country of birth 
Age 
18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Total 
Auckland New Zealand 2 10 1 6 2 21 
United Kingdom 2 4 5 3 1 15 
Other Country 1 4 0 0 0 5 
Subtotal 5 18 6 9 3 41 
London New Zealand 21 14 1 2 0 38 
United Kingdom 2 4 1 3 2 12 
Other Country 0 4 0 0 0 4 
Subtotal 23 22 2 5 2 54 
Total 28 40 8 14 5 95 
Although the sample was not designed to be representative, there are at least four 
matters of note. First, more women were interviewed than men in both Auckland and 
London. Second, in the London sample people travelling by private car are 
underrepresented compared to 2011 Census data on method of travel to work (ONS, 
2013). Third, most of the people interviewed were born either in New Zealand 
(Auckland: 51%; London: 70%) or the United Kingdom (Auckland: 37%; London: 
22%). Fourth, the majority of people interviewed were either between the ages of 18-
29 (29%) or 30-39 (42%). The overrepresentation of woman and New Zealand born 
participants in my London sample is partly attributable to the fact that many of the 
people who initially volunteered to participate were reached via an advert placed on a 
New Zealand Facebook group were females. Correspondingly, the 
overrepresentation of people in the 18-29 and 30-39 age groups in London in part 
reflects that most of the New Zealanders interviewed were on or originally migrated 
to London on two-year youth mobility working visas which can only be applied for 
at the age of 30 or younger.  
The interviews were semi-structured and typically lasted around one hour. The vast 
majority of interviews (93%) were conducted one-on-one with interviewees. There 
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 were three instances where this was not the case. On one occasion, a concurrent 
interview with three flatmates was conducted, and on two others, couples from the 
same household were interviewed together. The interviews were arranged and carried 
out at times and in locations best suited for participants. Most of the interviews in 
London were conducted in public (bars/pubs (n=23, 43%); cafes (n=19, 35%)) rather 
than private settings (home (n=4, 7%); work (n=8, 15%)). In Auckland, a similar 
proportion of the interviews took place in public (bars/pubs (n=6, 15%); cafes (n=12, 
29%); beach (n=1, 2%)) and private spaces (homes (n=9, 22%); work (n=13, 32%)). 
This discrepancy in part reflects the fact it is more common to meet people ‘out’ in 
London on the way home from work (in part due to transport logistics and distances 
travelled), the small size or lack of communal space in apartments/houses and the 
difficulties or challenges of getting into workplaces (i.e., security). Additionally, in 
Auckland more participants were contacted through existing networks and so were 
perhaps less concerned about meeting someone they had not met before either at 
home or at work.  
Interview design and structure 
In developing the interview schedule I was conscious of the challenges of trying to 
encourage people to talk about everyday activities which might seem rather 
inconsequential, mundane, or even perhaps dull and boring. Building on my 
experiences with the pilot interviews I felt it was important to thus be sensitive to the 
nature, order and structure of the questions. With this in mind, the interview schedule 
was developed around six lines of enquiry which was broadly designed to mirror a 
‘day in the life’ of a participant (Appendix 2). The rationale for this approach was 
that day in the life is a familiar cultural reference in films (One Day in the life of Ivan 
Denisovich (1970), The Hours (2002) and One Day (2011)), television programmes 
and series (documentary (The Osbournes (2002-2005), Morgan Spurlock’s A Day in 
the Life (2011-)) and fictional (Coronation Street (1960-), Eastenders (1985-), 
Friends (1994-2004)) and books (Virginia Woolf’s (1925) Mrs Dalloway and James 
Joyce’s (1922) Ulysses). Moreover, it provided a logical structure and progression 
for the interview.  
The interview started with me outlining their involvement, their rights as a 
participant and the intended outcomes of the research. Participants were then given 
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 an information sheet with my contact details and asked to sign a consent form. 
Following this, the interview commenced with a discussion of how the participant 
had come to live in London or Auckland and their experiences of living in the city. 
This then transitioned into a series of questions about the interviewee’s home 
including how they had come to live there, and descriptions of their house, regular 
home-based activities and vision of the ideal home. The purpose of these initial lines 
of inquiry was two-fold. First, during the pilot interviews I found that the open and 
general nature of both sets of questions for the most part helped participants to relax 
and facilitate further discussion. Second, by providing an opportunity for people to 
reflect on the relationship between the city in which they lived and their current 
residence, these questions helped me to situate and contextualise later discussions. 
Developing these initial lines of enquiry, the next series of questions were centred on 
preparing for the commute, the commute to work and the commute home. It was 
during this section of the interview that I tried to encourage people to talk about the 
various habits and routines associated with their commute. Some participants were 
more than happy to talk about the various intricacies of getting ready for and 
travelling to work. Other participants were less forthcoming and required a lot of 
prompting. In the course of their descriptions, most interviewees did not talk at 
length about showering, how they decide what to wear and how this decision is 
influenced by the weather. As a result I often ended up having to ask follow-up 
questions on these topics. As Table 3.3 highlights, the majority of the interviews in 
both cities were undertaken during autumn and winter and this initially influenced 
some people’s responses to these follow-up questions. This was in part overcome by 
prompting people to think about different seasons during the interview and also by 
joining people on their commutes at different times of the year. 
In earlier interviews, some participants were initially surprised about the detailed 
nature of the interview, especially in relation to questions about showering and 
getting dressed in the morning.  Despite this, most people were happy to respond to 
my various follow-up questions even if they had found them slightly unusual or out 
of the ordinary. One early interview participant in particular, however, appeared to 
be a little unsettled by the interview process. In light of this, I tried to clearly 
highlight at the beginning of the interviews that followed this encounter that some of 
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 the questions might seem rather detailed and even appear slightly strange or unusual. 
This addition to the preamble seemed to help overcome this problem in future 
interviews. In fact many interviewees enjoyed having the opportunity to discuss and 
reflect on their everyday routines and activities. 
Comfort was the final area of enquiry. The focus here, following the pilot interview 
schedule, was on the ways in which people understood comfort, the function it 
played in their day and spaces of comfort and discomfort. During the interviews with 
migrants I preceded the questions on comfort by asking participants how they had 
found what I termed the ‘British’ or ‘New Zealand’ lifestyle. This question opened 
up a number of discussions around commuting, transport, the pace of life and 
housing. More importantly, it provided another way of revealing instances where 
previously taken-for-granted assumptions and habitual ways of operating had been 
disrupted or challenged. As a consequence, people again reiterated how they had 
adjusted or adapted when faced with these situations. In doing so they helped to 
provide me with further insight into how habits gradually form over time. Similarly, 
during the pilot interviews I found the questions on comfort helped people to think 
about the relationship between their home, the commute and work and the various 
ways in which they negotiate these spaces in the course of their everyday routines 
and activities. As a consequence, I felt they might also help me to gain insights into 
how ‘the strains of the daily commute [might] become easier to bear’ over time 
(Bissell, 2014b, p. 485).  
In drawing the interview to a close, I thanked participants for their time and asked 
them if they knew of anyone else who might be interested in being involved in the 
study. I then explained how as part of the research I was interested in travelling with 
people on their commutes and asked if it might be possible for me to join them at 
some stage in the future. In this way, the interview served three main purposes. First, 
it provided a means through which gain insights into the rigidity, flexibility and 
contingencies in participant’s everyday routines and activities and how these shape 
their journeys to and from work. Second, it allowed the interviewee and me to meet 
and get to know each other. Third, and related to the second point, it was envisioned 
this would allow us both to assess whether we were comfortable at the prospect of 
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 joining each other on a go-along. I now turn my attention to how go-alongs were 
used to understand people’s everyday commutes.  
3.5.2 Go-alongs 
Go-alongs involve a researcher ‘accompany[ing] individual informants on their 
‘natural’ outings, and through asking questions, listening and observing – actively 
explor[ing] their subject’s stream of experiences and practices as the move through, 
and interact with, their physical and social environment’ (Kusenbach, 2003, p. 463). 
This section will discuss the purpose that go-alongs played in generating a further 
understanding of participant’s commuting habits and experiences. 
Participant recruitment 
Participants were asked at the end of the interview as to whether it would be possible 
to join them on their commute. Most interviewees (n=91; 96%) indicated that it 
would potentially be possible to do so. Not all interviewees responded, however, to a 
later email request and some who initially expressed an interest decided to opt out for 
various reasons such as concerns over the time involved, the timing of the commute 
(e.g., it coincided with annual leave) or other work and family commitments. Here, I 
was also aware that for some of my early participants they may have lost interest due 
to the lag between the interview and the follow-up email about commuting. 
Furthermore, I was concerned that the prescriptive nature of my early follow-up 
email, which included my ideal scenario for a go-along (see Appendix 3), may have 
been off-putting or discouraging for some participants. Reflecting upon these 
matters, I tried to contact and arrange commutes closer to the original interview and 
to be less prescriptive in my initial follow-up email only asking participants for 
additional access either when we were arranging a time to meet (usually after two or 
three emails), or in some instances, on the actual day of the go-along as this allowed 
me to better gauge the acceptability of such a request. Of the participants who agreed 
to let me join them, I did not end up commuting with everyone. In some instances 
this was because we were not able to arrange a suitable time or I felt that I had 
already commuted with a similar participant.  
In total, 104 go-alongs were completed between November 2012 and June 2013 (see 
Table 3.6). Twenty one out of the 56 people (38%) interviewed in London and 29 out 
95 
 of the 41 people (71%) allowed me to join them on one or more legs of their 
commute. I commuted with 14 of these participants (67%) in both autumn/winter and 
summer in London and 9 participants (31%) in Auckland. As Table 3.6 highlights, 
most of the go-alongs (67%) in London were only one way whereas in Auckland 
there were almost as many return journeys (47%) as there were one way (53%). 
Additionally, I travelled with 3 Auckland participants by two different modes of 
transport on separate days (2 by car on one occasion and train the next and 1 by bus 
and then bicycle). Table 3.7 documents the diversity and different modes of mobility 
on which I joined participants during go-alongs and their gender. Once again, the 
numbers of people travelling by private car are underrepresented in the London 
sample (ONS, 2013). 
Go-along protocol 
The go-alongs were arranged and carried out at times best suited for the participants 
who had agreed to take part. Some participants were happy for me to join them on 
both legs of their journey and others preferred for me to only join them in one 
direction. Additionally, there were at least three occasions in London because of the 
time of departure and the distance the participant commuted that it was not possible 
to join them on a morning commute. In all three instances I commuted with these 
participants in the evening. As eluded above, after receiving mixed responses to my 
early follow-up email, I would only enquire as to whether it was possible to meet 
people 5 to 10 minutes before they departed in my second or third email or text 
message confirming the day and time of the go-along. The aim and purpose of this, 
as I explained to participants, was to see the final stages that they went through 
before heading off on their commute. The additional benefit of this was that it also 
provided me with a buffer time if I encountered any delays on the journey to a 
participant’s residence. It was more common for participants to agree to me seeing 
the final stages before their departure to work but less common on their departure 
going home. Similarly, people were more likely to invite me into their home rather 
than their workplace to talk me through the final stages of their commute either way. 
This was in a large part due to the fact it was often difficult to gain access to people’s 
work places because of security measures in both cities. Additionally, it is likely 
some participants were not comfortable having me join them in their place of 
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 employment for other reasons such as feeling self-conscious or embarrassed or it not 
being considered appropriate in light of their workplace culture or setting. 
Table 3.6. Summary of the total number of commutes conducted as part of the PhD and the time of 
year and season during which they were conducted.  








London Autumn 15 Oct - 3 
Nov 2012 0 0 0 0 
Autumn/Winter 19 Nov - 
14 Dec 
2012 
2 2 6 4 
Winter 14 Jan - 2 
Feb 2013 11 5 21 16 
Summer 29 Jul - 1 
Sept 2013 11 5 21 16 
Subtotal 24 12 48 215 
Auckland Summer/Autumn 19 Feb - 
27 Mar 
2013 
3 6 15 9 
Autumn 1 - 29 Apr 
2013  0 2 4 2 
Autumn 7 - 17 
May 2013 2 5 12 7 
Autumn/Winter 28 May - 
29 Jun 
2013 
15 5 25 18 
Subtotal 20 18 56 297 
Total 44 30 104 507 
 
  
4 Note this number represents the total number of go-alongs completed during this period. This is 
calculated by doubling the ‘Both Ways’ column and adding this with the ‘One Way’ column. 
5 Note this number represents the total number of participants joined on their commute rather than a 
subtotal or total of this column. This discrepancy is the result of the fact I commuted with some 
participants on two different occasions (i.e., autumn/winter and summer).  
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 Table 3.7. An overview of the relationship between gender and go-along participants’ main mode/s of 
travel to and from work in each city. As people often travelled by multiple modes (e.g., bus, train and 
underground), especially in London, the totals are greater than the number of people commuted with 
during the fieldwork. 




Auckland Female 2 3 7 0 
Male 3 3 6 0 
Sub total 5 6 13 0 
London Female 4 1 1 0 
Male 1 2 2 0 
Sub total 5 3 3 0 
Total 18 10 9 16 
 
Location Gender Train Tram Underground Walking 
Auckland Female 2 N/A N/A 5 
Male 2 N/A N/A 6 
Sub total 4 N/A N/A 11 
London Female 3 0 2 7 
Male 2 0 6 6 
Sub total 5 0 8 13 
Total 9 0 8 24 
 
3.5.3 Participant observation 
Throughout the periods of fieldwork in Auckland and London I kept written and 
audio notes and photographs of observations I made while travelling to and from 
interviews and go-alongs as well as on days off. Alongside this, I endeavoured to use 
a range of different transport modes to get around each of the cities. The only 
exception was that I never drove a car in London. 
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 3.6 Analysing the data: Listening to and observing habits 
and experiences 
The data used for analysis were the digital voice recordings made during the 
interviews and on the go-alongs, written and audio notes made afterwards, 
ethnographic notes, and to a lesser extent, the video files recorded on the go-alongs. 
Data analysis was performed using Atlas.ti (2014) a qualitative data analysis (QDA) 
software package that had a number of features which were particularly important in 
the context of this project (for a discussion see Friese, 2014; Hwang, 2008). First, it 
is capable of handling large amounts of data in a variety of media formats including 
text, audio and video. Second, it provides a range of tools which helped to ‘manage, 
extract, compare, explore and reassemble meaningful pieces from large amounts of 
data in creative, flexible, yet systematic ways’ (Friese, 2013, p. 9).  
The collection and analysis of the data followed, but was not limited to, the general 
procedures of the ‘grounded theory’ methodology (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 
1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987) elaborated upon in Section 3.6.1. This 
methodology was considered appropriate for a number of reasons. First, although 
typically used as an approach to generate theory ‘from the data’, it also provides a 
systematic method for testing, elaborating and modifying existing theories (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994, p. 273). In the present context this involved meticulously playing the 
incoming data against each of the different theoretical paradigms considered in 
Chapter 2, in order to determine the extent to which they were capable of explaining 
the environments and phases of action present in the data (cf. Strauss & Corbin, 
1994). Second, it is founded on two important theoretical principles derived from 
pragmatism (e.g., Dewey, 1929a; Mead, 1934) and symbolic interactionism (e.g., 
Blumer, 1969; Hughes, 1971), both of which relate to understanding the 
environments and phases of action. The first is a recognition that phenomena 
‘continually change in response to prevailing conditions’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 
419). A central feature of the approach, therefore, is incorporate change into the 
method through a focus on process (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The second and 
associated principle is the rejection of both strict determinism and nondeterminism 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Action is considered to be structured but not determined as 
individuals always retain the capacity to act and respond to the social and physical 
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 conditions they encounter. Correspondingly, grounded theory attempts to gain an 
appreciation of both the ‘relevant conditions’ (i.e., external environments of action) 
and how individuals ‘actively respond to those conditions, and to the consequences 
of their actions’ (i.e., internal environments and phases of action) (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990, p. 419). Third, it supports and encourages methodological diversity and 
innovation recognising that different modes of data collection (e.g., interviews, 
observations, government documents, newspapers, videos and books) can all provide 
important insights into the area of study (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Fourth, it 
provides a ‘coding paradigm’, as explained below, which can be systematically 
applied across different types of data including text, audio and video (Strauss, 1987). 
Fifth, following Dewey’s (1938) writings on logic, it recognises that the researcher 
from the selection of area of study through to the collection, analysis and write up of 
the data plays an active rather than passive role and in the process enacts certain 
realities (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987).  
3.6.1 Grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory ‘is a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in 
data systematically gathered and analyzed’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). The 
generation of theory and the doing of social research are accordingly considered to 
be ‘two parts of the same process’ (Glaser, 1978, p. 2) as theory is tested, modified 
and evolves during rather than after the research through ‘the continuous interplay 
between analysis and data collection’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). Analysis is 
an important part of the research process itself, starting as soon as data collection 
begins, it ‘guides the researcher to examine all of the possibly rewarding avenues 
toward understanding’ their research questions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 419; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This reflects the emphasis that the methodology places on  
interaction, ‘temporality and process’ which demands that the researcher is open to 
exploring ‘each new situation to see if they fit, how they might fit, and how they 
might not fit’ with their existing data, interpretations and conceptualisations (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1994, p. 279, original emphasis). The analysis of, and the data generated 
and collected during the fieldwork, can usefully be understood here as a way of 
continuously scrutinising whether the various concepts embedded within each of the 
theoretical paradigms about the environments and phases of action, proved to be 
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 repeatedly relevant to understanding what was happening (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). In this case, the everyday realities of commuting in Auckland and London.  
By providing ‘a way of thinking about and conceptualizing data’ rather than a 
singular methodology, grounded theory has unsurprisingly been employed in a 
variety disciplines including geography (see Crang & Cook, 2007; Yeung, 1997) and 
modified by researchers according to the purpose and focus of, and contingencies 
faced during their research (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 275, emphasis omitted). The 
application of this general methodology in the current context reflected the thesis 
aims and research questions, an initial theoretical sensitivity to social practice theory 
and later John Dewey’s pragmatist writings, and other research and personal 
experiences which informed the inquiry (cf. Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
This ensured the data collection and analysis was sensitive to the ways in which: 1) 
bodily capacities, competences and skills; 2) social and cultural meanings and 
conventions, and 3) the materiality of objects, things, technologies and 
infrastructures, participate in, and may variously ‘authorise, allow, afford, encourage, 
permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible [or] forbid’, action (Latour, 2005, 
p. 72). Correspondingly, the project was guided by the general procedures of 
grounded theory which include ‘the constant making of comparisons, the systematic 
asking of generative and concept-relating questions, theoretical sampling, systematic 
coding procedures’ and following ‘suggested guidelines for attaining conceptual … 
‘density’, variation, and conceptual integration’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; for further details see Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, pp. 274-
275). The remainder of this section focuses on how the development and 
modification of the coding framework in Atlas.ti was informed by grounded theory’s 
coding paradigm and notions of open, axial and selective coding (see Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Strauss, 1987).  
In grounded theory, all types of data including interviews, field notes and videos are 
systematically and intensively collected, analysed and coded, ‘often sentence by 
sentence, or phrase by phrase’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 22). The aim of analysis is not 
simply to collect and order a mass of data but to organise the various ideas which 
have surfaced during the analysis of the data (Glaser, 1978). Strauss (1987, pp. 27-
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 28) argues that a ‘coding paradigm’ is ‘central to the coding procedures’ and 
recommends coding data in reference to:  
1. the ‘conditions’ under which the phenomenon occurred; 
2. ‘interactions’ among act[ants]6;  
3. ‘strategies and tactics’ employed by the actants; and  
4. ‘consequences’ arising from the situation.  
This paradigm was incorporated into the coding framework, which was initially 
informed by the thesis aims and research questions and social practice theory, and 
developed and iteratively modified as the analysis progressed and corresponding and 
conflicting ideas, connections, themes and patterns emerged out of the data and an 
increasingly close reading of Dewey.  
There are three types of basic coding in grounded theory: open, axial and selective 
(see Corbin & Strauss, 1990, pp. 423-424; Strauss, 1987, pp. 28-29). Open coding 
entails ‘unrestricted coding of the data’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 28). The aim here is to 
produce provisional concepts which seem to fit the data but also give rise to wide 
range of questions and ‘equally provisional answers’ that guide further inquiry (p. 
28). Concepts are generated by comparing events, actions and interactions against 
others with the similar ones being ‘grouped together to form categories and their 
subcategories’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 423). This also involves continually 
asking the ‘data a set of questions’ including: 
What study are these data pertinent to? This … remind[s] the researcher [that] the 
original idea of what the study was may not turn out to be that at all. […] What 
category does this incident indicate? […] What is actually happening in the data? 
… Another way to phrase … this is, [w]hat's the main story here, and why? All of 
these questions tend to force the generation of a core category or categories which 
will be at the center of the theory and its eventual write-up (Strauss, 1987, pp. 30-
31). 
For example, several incidents, actions and interactions initially appeared, reflecting 
the original focus of the thesis, which seemed to be associated with clothing and 
comfort. Coded as ‘clothing and comfort’, this was subsequently categorised into 
6 Strauss (1987) originally uses the term ‘actor’ but this has been altered to reflect a Deweyean and 
ANT-inspired understanding of non-human agency.  
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 different properties and dimensions. These included spaces where clothing could 
become (un)comfortable (at home, on the tube, walking from the station, cycling to 
work, sitting at the desk); frequency (everyday, occasionally, infrequently); 
awareness of being (un)comfortable (sweat, feeling hot, feeling cold, feeling self-
conscious); and strategies and tactics for avoiding, preventing or dealing with such 
situations (checking the weather, carrying a spare clothes, storing clothes at work, 
learning to not care). Open coding and ‘its characteristics of making use of 
questioning and constant comparisons’ in this way ‘fractur[ed] the data’ forcing 
‘preconceived notions and ideas’ about clothing and comfort to be ‘judged against 
the data themselves’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 423). 
Axial coding is a critical part of open coding and entails the ‘intense analysis’ of an 
individual category around the ‘axis’ of each of the paradigm items (conditions, 
interactions, strategies and tactics, consequences) (Strauss, 1987, p. 32). It is through 
this process that subcategories are tested against the data and related to a category. 
During this process, additional categories are also developed and the researcher 
continues to search for evidence of them. This type of coding does not typically 
occur during the early stages of data collection and analysis. It becomes more 
common in the midst of longer periods of open coding before the analyst is 
‘committed to a core category or categories’ and moves ‘determinedly into selective 
coding’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 32). Returning to the example of the category ‘clothing 
and comfort’, each time this was encountered the data was scrutinised to establish 
what conditions gave rise to these concerns (a hot and humid day), in what context 
they occurred (arriving in the foyer at work hot and sweaty), by what 
actions/interactions did it occur (cycling to work, encountering colleagues who had 
driven), and what were the consequences (had a shower when normally would not). 
This helps to ensure the theory is ‘more conceptually dense’ and to make ‘the 
linkages more specific’ with the overall intent of systematically seeking to account 
for the variation of the phenomena under scrutiny (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 423).  
Selective coding is the ‘process by which all categories are unified around a central 
‘core’ category and categories that need further explication are filled-in with 
descriptive detail’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 423). The ‘core code becomes a guide 
to further theoretical sampling and data collection’ with the analyst only examining 
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 the conditions, actions, interactions and consequences that ‘relate to the core 
category, coding for them’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 32). Selective coding, in this manner, is 
‘different from open coding but occurs within the context developed while doing 
open coding’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 32). Consequently, this type of analysis usually takes 
place later in the study and becomes ‘increasingly dominant’ as it is ‘more self-
consciously systematic than open coding’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 32). 
3.6.2 Audio-coding the data: Practical, sensorial and epistemological 
considerations 
A particularly important feature of Atlas.ti was the ability to assign codes to specific 
segments of audio and video files (see Friese, 2013, 2014). This meant that the 
analysis of the audio and video data collected during fieldwork could proceed 
without first needing to transcribe these files. After trialling this feature during the 
early stages of fieldwork, the decision was made to work with the data in this way. 
The subsequent analysis followed the procedures described in Section 3.6.1. Instead 
of multiple readings of typed transcripts, however, this entailed repeatedly listening 
to excerpts of audio associated with particular codes. Segments of audio were only 
selectively transcribed, therefore, during and after the analysis if they seemed 
particularly ‘seminal’ or helped to illustrate central themes or concepts (cf. 
Wainwright & Russell, 2010, p. 3). This section ends with a brief discussion of the 
considerations and challenges associated with analysing data in this manner. To 
provide context for this discussion, the way Atlas.ti handles and allows a researcher 
to code audio files is now briefly examined.  
Audio-coding in Atlas.ti7 is similar to coding a document or video in that it requires 
the creation of a ‘primary document’ (PD) for each file (i.e., each interview, go-along 
or audio note). After a primary document has been created a number of tools become 
available including codes, memos, networks and queries. Friese (2013, 2014) gives a 
detailed description of these features for Atlas.ti. Codes are created by the user8 and 
assigned to parts of an audio or video recording and sections of a written document. 
7 Others have discussed the practicalities of using alternative software packages such as Nvivo 
(Wainwright & Russell, 2010), Transana and DRS (Silver & Patashnick, 2011).  
8 Atlas.ti also has an auto-coding function but this was not utilised in this project (see Friese, 2013, 
2014). 
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 An imported audio file, as Figure 3.1 highlights, is displayed as an audio waveform 
which can be listened to and segmented into audio-excerpts or ‘quotations’ (Friese, 
2014, p. 101). Each of these quotations is assigned a timespan to which different 
codes and comments (a description of the quotation) can be assigned. Once created it 
is then possible to re-listen to the quotations coded under each code and as the 
analysis progresses add to, change, collapse or delete codes as required.  
 
Figure 3.1. Example of an audio-excerpt or ‘quotation’ coded in Atlas.ti during the data analysis. 
The practical, sensorial and epistemological considerations of audio coding data have 
received some attention (see Evers, 2011; Markle et al., 2011; Silver & Patashnick, 
2011; Wainwright & Russell, 2010). Many suggest that the features of different 
QDA software packages allow audio to be worked with in equally systematic and 
rigorous ways to the more traditional typed transcript (Markle et al., 2011; 
Wainwright & Russell, 2010). Directly coding the audio, as discussed above, 
significantly reduces the amount of time (and cost) of transcribing the audio files 
(Markle et al., 2011). These gains are not, however, necessarily easily realised. 
Researchers face a number of practical challenges in audio-coding including 
determining how to most effectively use the features of QDA programmes, 
overcoming ‘our habituation with texts’ and in some instances a lack of programme 
functionality (Evers, 2011; Wainwright & Russell, 2010, p. 3). Wainwright and 
Russell (2010, p. 3) observe initially audio data may ‘feel less tangible’ than a 
transcript because it can seem ‘harder to review’ and ‘locate particular utterances’. A 
Name of primary document (PD) 
 







Audio quotation (segment of 
audio waveform) 
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 potential pitfall in this context is that the researcher may end up ‘half-transcribing’ 
rather than coding what they listen to, overcoming this requires a good deal of 
practice (Wainwright & Russell, 2010, p. 3). Following Wainwright and Russell’s 
advice an attempt was to make brief annotations so that one was ‘drawn back to 
listening to excerpts as opposed to reading a summary of what was said’ (p. 3). For 
example, and following the grounded theory coding paradigm, an effort was made to 
code and produce comments by focusing on conditions, interactions, strategies and 
tactics and consequences rather than writing out everything that was said (e.g., 
‘participant describing the conditions on the tube’). Passages such as these were 
subsequently coded as ‘public transport conditions’ across every interview or go-
along. This meant that each excerpt under that code was listened to during the 
analysis.  
Elsewhere, Wainwright and Russell (2010, p. 3) suggest it is more straightforward to 
delineate a transcript than an audio-file partly because it is easier to ‘draw 
boundaries’ while moving your ‘eyes back and forth across a printed page’ than it is 
to ‘stop and rewind’ a recording in most QDA software packages. During the 
analysis for this thesis, audio-excerpts were typically demarcated by obvious 
transitions during an interview or go-along (e.g., the beginning and end of a 
conversation, a change in the topic of discussion, getting on or off public transport, 
silence). Evers (2011) makes a similar point about the limitations of existing QDA 
packages. She argues that at present it is not possible to slow down audio and video 
files while directly coding. This means it is not possible ‘to listen to and reflect upon 
what is being said before deciding on how to code it’ (Evers, 2011, p. 25). This 
limitation was partly overcome during the analysis by creating provisional codes in a 
separate word document simultaneously as audio-excerpts or quotations were 
demarcated in Atlas.ti.  
Despite these practical challenges, there have been epistemological discussions in 
relation to ‘accuracy’ and authenticity of audio and video coding (Evers, 2011; 
Markle et al., 2011; Wainwright & Russell, 2010). Markle et al. (2011) discuss the 
various challenges associated with audio transcription. They argue that much of the 
contextual and additional ‘information’ associated with spoken data is lost through 
transcription. Turning ‘audio data into text data’, for example, ‘sacrifices elements of 
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 natural speech such as intonation, pause, juncture, pitch, stress, and register that 
convey added information by helping to place spoken words inside a greater 
contextual reference that increases insights and understanding beyond the words’ 
(Markle et al., 2011, p. 5). They assert conversation analysis (see Sacks, 1992), 
which has developed symbols for representing these ‘missing pieces of meaning’, are 
not ‘perfect representations’ in that they cannot ‘accurately’ portray for instance ‘the 
awkwardness of a 3-second silence’ (p. 5). In contrast, the ability to ‘move swiftly 
between codes and audio [and video] excerpts’ helps to keep the researcher 
‘sensorially’ closer to the ‘original data’ (Markle et al., 2011; Wainwright & Russell, 
2010, p. 3). Markle et al. (2011) illustrate this point by comparing a typical 
conversation analysis of students developing an animation film with a video of the 
event. They argue conservation analysis helps to ‘describe the interactive nature of 
this event’ but fails to ‘communicate students’ excitement for various ideas’ (p. 7).  
These include ‘subtle nonverbal’ suggestions such as ‘smiling, nodding one’s head, 
and showing excitement in one’s eyes, along with laughter’ which might have been 
sufficient to encourage or alternatively discourage certain lines of thought (p. 7). In 
making these observations they recognise that both approaches are subject to 
personal bias as the recording and analyse of the data is influence by who captures 
and analyses it. Although audio and visual data remain only ‘approximation[s]’, 
therefore, they contend the researcher by directly coding these files gathers ‘more 
sensory information’ about ‘the originally researched subject’ meaning they get 
‘closer to the original than other sources’ (p. 12).   
Wainwright and Russell (2010) are less definitive. They observe that on one hand a 
written transcript may facilitate a ‘certain detachment’ which can be important 
during the analytical process (p. 3).  Meanwhile analysing an interview as ‘spoken 
conversation’ rather than text could potentially offer ‘analytical benefits’ in the 
respect of ‘remaining in-context and respecting coherence and narrative flow’ thus 
potentially strengthening the researchers ‘interpretation and analysis’ (p. 4).  Coding 
the audio in this manner allows the researcher to attend to ‘utterances, silences, 
emotions and the interactive dialectic between interviewer and interviewee in ways 
that are difficult when reading even detailed transcriptions’ (p. 3). Equally, returning 
to an interview transcript they suggest can elicit ‘sensorial memory’ by taking the 
interviewer back to the time and place of the interview (p. 3). The extent to which 
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 such memories are, however, ‘as effective as hearing the recorded voices all over 
again while engaged in analytical reflection rather than transcription or transcript 
checking’ is less clear’ (p. 3). In concluding, Wainwright and Russell (2010, p. 4), 
rather than taking a definitive position on audio-coding observe that such features 
provide researchers with ‘opportunities to engage analytically with their data in new 
and exciting ways and the opportunity to reconsider and challenge the taken-for-
granted necessity of transcription’. More importantly, and reflecting the position 
taken in this thesis, it encourages researchers to reflect on how ‘the mode of 
engagement with data may affect the ways in which it is assimilated and analysed’ 
(p. 4). 
3.7 Reflections on the limitations of the thesis 
Reflecting some of the conceptual and methodological challenges that have arisen 
during the research and the limits to what can be achieved during the time-frame of a 
PhD, it is recognised that there are a number of limitations in the thesis. First, the 
decision towards the end of the first year to change the focus of the thesis meant that 
the initial formulation and early stages of the PhD fieldwork did not benefit from a 
more sustained engagement with the mobilities literature particularly in relation to 
mobile methods. In light of existing debates over the limits of using qualitative 
interviews to research habitual and mundane practices, a range of different methods 
were considered and research diaries and interviews were piloted before the 
fieldwork commenced. Reading around these debates did include some engagement 
with the literature on mobile methods but given the original focus was primarily on 
the home this meant that the challenges of conducting research on the move and with 
differently mobile participants was not a guiding concern. Inadvertently, the decision 
to conduct interviews prior to the go-alongs and to interview all of those who 
responded to initial Facebook advertisements (Sections 3.5.1) provided some 
additional time to engage with the literature on mobile methods and to reflect on its 
implications for the go-along protocol. A more detailed engagement in the lead up to 
the fieldwork would have perhaps encouraged more critical reflection on the 
challenges and opportunities associated with researching mobility practices, events 
and contexts.  
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 Second, and relatedly, the go-alongs would have benefitted from a longer period of 
pilot research. While it is inevitable that one’s research approach evolves over time, 
the challenges of conducting research with differently mobile participants became 
most apparent after the first cycle commutes. Reflecting a personal lack of general 
cycling experience, especially in cities, personal concerns over safety and the speed 
at which we moved, this also meant that it was sometimes difficult to remain 
attentive to how participant’s adjusted to the changing events and time-spaces of the 
commute. On non-cycle commutes, photographs provided a valuable, albeit static, 
way of capturing such events and time-spaces which alongside the digital voice 
recordings and verbal and written notes were an important aide for both memory and 
analysis. It proved to be too impractical and dangerous to take photographs cycling, 
however, as unlike travelling on foot or as a car or public transport passenger it was 
by and large not possible to have two hands free to take photographs. On the 
majority of the initial cycle commutes in London, where time and energy allowed, 
the route of the commute was as a result was retraced and pictures taken afterwards. 
While this also helped to provide a reminder of particular sections of the route it did 
not address the challenge of trying to be attentive to both participant’s adjustments 
and the personal challenges and demands of the commute. The significant levels of 
street and traffic noise encountered and the fact the majority of time was not spent 
directly next to or in close proximity to participants it also became difficult at times 
to pick up what was said in conversations when listening back. In light of these 
experiences, it was decided to purchase both a small and portable video camera to 
record the commutes and to get in particular cycling participants to carry a digital 
voice recorder and wear a microphone. Given the order in which the fieldwork was 
undertaken, this meant that video data was not collected during any of the fieldwork 
conducted in autumn and winter in London. Capturing stable video recordings, 
especially cycling, also proved to be challenging. Although these issues were 
gradually resolved through trial and error, and the purchase of new equipment, it was 
decided that most of the videos were too shaky to playback and discuss with 
participants. As a result the opportunity to innovate and experiment with another way 
of ‘aiding self-discovery’ and ‘facilitating discussion’ with participants’ about their 
experiences, habits and practices of mobility was not available (Merriman, 2014, p. 
177; Spinney, 2009, 2011). The shakiness of some of the recordings, in addition, 
made it difficult to watch them for extended periods during analysis without 
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 experiencing nausea. In some instances it was not possible to sit through the entire 
duration of a commute which meant they were often experienced in a rather fractured 
rather than continuous way. A number of these issues could have been addressed 
prior to the commencement of the PhD fieldwork if the equipment had of been 
subjected to greater trials in a pilot period or through consultation with other 
researchers who have employed similar approaches to cycling (e.g., Spinney, 2009, 
2011). 
Third, of all of the modes of mobility, and reflecting the preceding discussion, 
cycling presented the most challenges in terms of completing go-alongs. Due to a 
personal lack of cycling experience and confidence and the speed at which the 
bicycle used was able to travel, on a few occasions it proved to be particularly 
difficult to keep up with some participants on their commutes. Aside from the 
occasional moment of uncertainty around getting on or off public transport or 
knowing where to go this did not happen on other non-cycling commutes. While all 
cycle participants understood these limitations, this meant that there were a few 
occasions where the decision was made to not commute with more experienced and 
serious cyclists. Some thought was given to asking these participants to record a 
‘commute narrative’ in which they vocalise ‘their stream of consciousness’ (Nixon, 
2012, p. 1665) and/or to video their own commute using a camera attached to their 
helmet or handlebars (Spinney, 2011). Researchers who have used such approaches 
typically interview participants afterwards in order to use these voice and video 
recordings as prompts. For a number of reasons including the fact the interviews 
were used as a means of establishing a rapport with participants, initial issues over 
the shakiness of video, concerns over damage to the equipment and the inability to 
personally experience the commute, it was eventually decided to not adopt such an 
approach. This meant that in addition to the initial interview another avenue for 
gaining insights into how more experienced and serious cyclists’ experiences, habits 
and practices of mobility was not available to be considered as part of self-discovery 
and analysis.  
Fourth, the time spent on fieldwork ensured that the scope of the research and the 
data collected was restricted. The attempt to understand the conditions which give 
rise to particular commuting habits meant that although approximately eight months 
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 was spent in the field, this time was divided between Auckland and London. Despite 
having some pre-existing networks and connections and having spent time in both 
cities prior to commencing the project, a lot of time was still spent contacting, 
explaining the research to, and building relationships with not only potential research 
participants but also with workplaces and organisations in an effort to gain access to 
possible participants. The labour-intensive nature of participant recruitment and the 
limited amount of time available in each city meant that the time available to conduct 
the research at certain times of year, especially during summer and winter in 
Auckland, was somewhat reduced. Moreover, these two factors, but particularly the 
need to generate data in both cities, also resulted in a sense of urgency to interview 
and go-along with a lot of research participants.  
While this helped to generate a wealth of interesting and valuable data, reflecting the 
overall aims of the project it perhaps would have been better to have spent more time 
developing relationships with and trying to gain a more in depth understanding of the 
habits and experiences of a more select group of participants. This became apparent 
during the research as in some instances substantially more time was spent with 
certain participants due to the length of their commute or the fact they agreed to 
participate in repeat go-alongs at different times of the year. Although the length and 
duration of these encounters while at times was physically and mentally demanding, 
it did provide an opportunity for the researcher and participant to reflect on the 
events and contexts of present and past go-alongs or commutes. A more selective 
sample in this way would have, therefore, also provided the opportunity to spend 
more time reflecting on and experimenting with ways of using the materials 
generated by the interviews and go-alongs to encourage participants to reflect on 
their own habits, experiences and practices of mobility.  
Fifth, the focus of study is another limitation of the research. The project reflecting 
its focus on New Zealand migrants in London and British migrants in Auckland is 
not able to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the ways in which experiences 
and habits of mobility are influenced and mediated by cultural traditions and 
practices as well as race (see Aldred & Jungnickel, 2014; Cresswell, 2010). This 
decision also indirectly limited the socio-economic and age diversity of the sample as 
the ability for people to migrate and subsequently remain in either country is 
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 increasingly determined by strict border control policies around age and occupation. 
This meant that the sample, particularly in London, tended to be predominantly 
young (18-29 or 30-39 year old age groups) professionals. As a result the ways in 
which people’s habits and experiences change over longer periods of time as with 
age the physical capacities and skills of their body change were not considered in 
detail. There are a number of other dynamics and issues which were not explicitly 
interrogated which are likely to mediate everyday mobility habits, experiences and 
practices including socio-economic relations such as class and income, identity, 
occupation and gender (see Cresswell, 2010; Hanson, 2010; Law, 1999; Waitt & 
Harada, 2012). Some attention was paid to the ways in which gender dynamics 
within the workplace and beyond and occupation mediate certain commuting-
relevant habits and practices such as getting dressed (see Chapter 5) and the 
experience and timing of the commute (see Chapter 6). Despite being aware of how 
socio-economic relations and income can structure people’s access to and use of 
different forms of mobility (see Cass et al., 2005) these issues were not explored. 
Consequently, age, gender, socio-economic relations and occupation, and the diverse 
ways in which they interpenetrate, did not play a significant role in guiding the 
analysis for the PhD. These concerns are likely to be central to further attempts to 
analyse, understand or critique the ways in action emerges within certain social and 
physical environments.  
Overall, the need to generate and collect data, in this case on the environments and 
phases of action, within the restrictions of budget and time has ensured that like any 
research project decisions had to be made which meant that not every potentially 
interesting or relevant avenue of inquiry could be explored. The thesis in drawing 
upon and considering a wide variety of qualitative data still provides a robust 
analysis of the issues at hand but in doing so it is important to recognise its 
limitations in that it is necessarily sensitive to all of the ways in which action 
continually emerges in certain social and physical environments.  
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the research framework and methodology for the 
PhD was developed from an initial research proposal, written as part of an eventually 
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 successful application for a Commonwealth scholarship, into a research project 
carried out in Auckland and London. The aim of understanding how individual 
action continually emerges in particular social and physical environments has 
informed the selection of these two cities and the decision to focus on ‘locals’ and 
migrants commuting by different modes of mobility. The research was not explicitly 
designed to be a comparative study but instead to understand the role that the social 
and physical environments of Auckland and London played in conditioning 
individual’s actions and thoughts. Despite this, comparisons do emerge directly and 
indirectly at times in empirical chapters, especially Chapter 4. The methodologies 
adopted have subsequently emerged both from the need to generate and collect data 
on routine, ordinary and habitual action. This has involved using a variety of 
methods to generate a range of data on the stable and dynamic aspects of the internal 
(bodily capacities and skills) and external (social, cultural, material) environments, 
and phases (habitual, reflective), of action. The data generated by this approach is 
employed in the next three chapters to illustrate how John Dewey’s situated, 
relational and emergent understanding of action is relevant to contemporary debates 
surrounding behaviour change, sustainability and climate change, especially in 




 Chapter 4. 
A ‘nudge’ in the right direction: From ‘choice 
architectures’ to ‘habit infrastructures’ 
4.1 Introduction: Anne’s drive to the bus stop 
Shortly after we arrive at the stop, Anne checks to ‘see if [the bus is] on time’. She 
moves slightly closer to get a better look at the electronic display board which 
reports the number of minutes until the next expected service, ‘oh [its] not too far’. 
Turning back she enquires as to whether I’m ‘looking forward [to] getting back to 
England’. It is around 0620 in the morning, which is when we left her apartment the 
first time we travelled together. Today we are approximately five minutes earlier as 
Anne wanted to ensure she would be able to secure a park in the nearby street 
where she usually leaves her car during the day. Unmetered and less than a minute’s 
walk from the bus stop it is a popular with her and other bus commuters who arrive 
early enough to secure a parking spot. During the four minute drive from her 
apartment she explained that recently spaces have become a scarce commodity as 
much of the street has been sectioned off to provide parking for the company 
responsible for laying down broadband cabling in the area (see Figure 4.1). After a 
short chat about my remaining fieldwork in Auckland and London and planned PhD 
submission date the bus arrives, which as it transpires is an earlier bus than she 
normally catches, and we board [Auckland Field Notes, Tuesday 18 June 2013]. 
Routine and mundane journeys such as Anne’s commute are increasingly of interest 
for transport planners, modellers, policy-makers, researchers and governments alike. 
A central concern here, which was explored in in Chapters 1 and 2, is identifying 
measures and interventions which will encourage or ‘motivate’ individuals to make 
less resource and carbon intensive transport decisions and ‘choices’ (DfT, 2011, 
2013; MfE, 2007, 2008; MoT, 2008). The ways in which governments in many 
countries including New Zealand and the UK have sought to design and implement 
transport and other public policies are increasingly being influenced by libertarian 
paternalism or nudge theory (Ly & Soman, 2013; Whitehead et al., 2014). 
Libertarian paternalism, it was argued in Chapter 2, provides governments with both 
an explanation as to why behaviour change initiatives have been largely unsuccessful 
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 in the past and as a way of redressing these shortcomings in the future. These 
failures, libertarian paternalists hold, can be attributed to the fact such initiatives are 
founded on the incorrect assumptions of mainstream economics that humans think 
and act rationally (Camerer et al., 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 2008). Drawing 
insight from various disciplines including behavioural economics, behavioural 
psychology and neuroscience they instead argue humans are primarily irrational 
beings whose decisions are shaped by various biases, social norms and the design of 
everyday environments (Ariely, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003; Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Norman, 1988; Simon, 1955; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
 
Figure 4.1. Waiting for the bus to central Auckland with Anne in early winter in Takapuna. The road 
cones in the centre of the picture are being used to cordon of a section of road which has been dug up 
while new broadband cabling is installed in the area. Sections of the unmetered neighbouring street 
where Anne and other bus commuters regularly parked their cars during the day were also cordoned 
off to provide parking for the company responsible for the installation. As a result Anne began leaving 
home earlier to help ensure she could secure one of the remaining parking spots in the street. 
Before elaborating on the aim and structure of this chapter let us momentarily reflect 
on Anne’s commute as a way of introducing how the ideas of nudge might be applied 
to issues associated with transport and climate change. Anne, in some ways, is the 
(environmentally) responsible citizen whom governments are trying to produce 
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 through the implementation of behaviour change policies. Living in an area where 
public transport is a ‘viable option’ she now makes the ‘choice’ to commute 
primarily by bus to work rather than her private car as she did previously (DfT, 2013, 
p. 13; MoT, 2008). In Auckland, and to a lesser extent London9, many people 
including Anne tend to rely on their car to access local public transport services. 
Anne observed during her initial interview that sometimes she leaves ‘home and 
walks to the Takapana bus station and gets the bus from there’. She went on to 
suggest that typically she ends up driving ‘more often than [she] walks’ for ‘two 
reasons’. First, it allows her to go to the gym, which is a fifteen minute drive away 
from her house, straight ‘after work’. Second, her bags in which she carries her 
lunch, iPad, umbrella, and ‘sometimes’ a spare jacket, are ‘often quite heavy’. The 
role the car continues to play in otherwise relatively low carbon commutes such as 
Anne’s can be understood in two contrasting ways. On the one hand, the car and 
associated ‘park and ride’ facilities can reduce the inconvenience of, and makes it 
easier for people to travel by, public transport. On the other hand, such facilities can 
perpetuate car dependence by reducing the provision of feeder services to bus and 
train stations. Rather than exploring these arguments in depth here we will instead 
focus on how nudge theorists might understand Anne’s account. 
Nudge theory would suggest the reason Anne continues to drive can be attributed to 
the fact that like all humans, her automatic (unreflective, emotional and impulsive) 
rather than reflective (rational, slow and deductive) system tends to dominate her 
action and thought (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The environment or ‘choice 
architecture’ which she inhabits additionally serves to reinforce this impulse to drive 
to the bus stop every morning (cf. Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Libertarian paternalists, 
assuming this practice was identified as an issue needing to be resolved, would 
recommend interventions which go with ‘the grain of what is depicted as human 
nature’ (Leggett, 2014, p. 5). Resulting interventions would focus on transforming 
the hard (e.g., road markings, footpaths, roads) and soft architectures (e.g., public 
advertisements, peer-to-peer pressure, feedback, incentives) which routinely result in 
Anne driving more often than not (cf. Jones et al., 2011a, 2011b). More traditional 
9 It is more common for commuters travelling into London from the cities outer zones and bordering 
counties to drive to park and ride facilities before continuing the rest of their journey by public 
transport (Niblett & Palmer, 1993; Palmer & Ferris, 2010). 
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 approaches informed by mainstream psychology and economics, in contrast, would 
attempt to ‘break’ or ‘defrost’ her habit of driving typically by focusing only on the 
soft architectures involved in her decision making (cf. Schwanen et al., 2012). By 
being attentive to how decisions are influenced by biases and the physical (and 
social) environment and trying to work with existing habits it has been argued that 
nudge theory can help to address numerous issues including those associated with 
transport and climate change (see Avineri, 2012; Metcalfe & Dolan, 2012; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). In the context of such assertions and the growing prominence of 
libertarian paternalism within policy-making, this chapter explores what Dewey’s 
account of habit, custom, and experience reveal about the limits of such an approach.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided up into five sections. First, Section 4.2 
examines how notions of ‘nudging’ and ‘choice architecture’ might be applied in a 
mobility context and their limitations. The section finishes by arguing the concept of 
‘habit infrastructures’ provides a better way of understanding how action emerges in 
particular social and physical environments. Second, by engaging the mobilities 
literature Section 4.3 examines how the car has come to dominate cities around the 
world through state promotion and the production of (auto)mobile subjectivities. 
Third, building on these insights Section 4.4 elaborates how particular policy and 
planning decisions have not only shaped Auckland’s urban form and transport 
systems but have significantly contributed to its current auto-dependent habit 
infrastructures and subjectivities. Fourth, Section 4.5 after briefly considering 
patterns of car use in London reflects on how particular (public)mobility 
subjectivities, especially in relation to the underground, have emerged as a result of 
the city’s habit infrastructures. The chapter concludes in Section 4.6 by arguing that 
the notion of ‘habit infrastructures’ by providing a better understanding of the 
internal and external environments of action can better inform attempts to realise 
environmental and climate change policy goals than that of ‘choice architectures’.     
4.2 Nudging: Understanding the mechanics and limits of 
choice architecture 
Libertarian paternalists, to briefly reiterate (see Section 2.3.1), start from the 
assumption that humans are largely irrational beings who rely on various biases to 
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 make decisions and whose choices are influenced by social norms and the design of 
everyday settings. Consequently, they hold ‘choice architects’ can improve people’s 
choices and behaviour by ‘nudging’ them in ‘directions that will make their lives 
better’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). This often involves subtly re-configuring the 
contexts in which choices are made such as in a cafeteria by positioning healthy food 
at eye level and placing sweets in a more obscure location. Such nudges are 
inexpensive, do not limit other choices and attempt to work with people’s automatic 
system and their predictably irrational biases (Ariely, 2008; Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). 
A choice architect is understood as any private or public actor responsible for 
‘organizing the context in which people make decisions’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, 
p. 3). By making what might seem arbitrary decisions (e.g., the design of a building 
or the layout of a bar or canteen) such actors can have significant impacts on 
people’s behaviour. This is attributed to the fact that these ‘small and seemingly 
insignificant details’ by focusing an individual’s attention in certain ways can 
powerfully shape their actions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 3). By recognising this 
power, private sector and government institutions are in a position where they can 
‘nudge’ or ‘move people in directions that will make their lives better’ (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). A nudge is understood thus as ‘any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavio[u]r in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere 
nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, 
p. 6). A number of ways in which these ideas might be translated in a mobility 
context have been suggested, two of which will now be considered as a way of 
illustration (see also Avineri, 2012; DfT, 2011; Jones et al., 2013, pp. 81-110; 
Metcalfe & Dolan, 2012).  
Thaler and Sunstein (2008, pp. 37-38), for instance, use the example of changes 
made to Chicago’s Lake Shore Drive. The road ‘hugs the Lake Michigan coastline 
on the city’s eastern boundary’ and offers the driver ‘stunning views of Chicago’s 
magnificent skyline’ (p. 37). The problem is, however, that there is ‘one stretch of 
this road that puts drivers through a series of [dangerous] S curves’ which many 
drivers fail to reduce their speed for and ‘wipe out’ (p. 37). In response, Thaler and 
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 Sunstein inform us, the city has recently adopted a new approach for ‘encouraging 
drivers to slow down’ which they consider to be illustrative of a ‘nudge’. They 
explain: 
At the beginning of the dangerous curve, drivers encounter a sign painted on the 
road warning of the lower speed limit, and then a series of white stripes painted 
onto the road. The stripes do not provide much if any tactile information (they are 
not speed bumps) but rather just send a visual signal to drivers. When the stripes 
first appear, they are evenly spaced, but as drivers reach the most dangerous portion 
of the curve, the stripes get closer together, giving the sensation that driving speed 
is increasing. One’s natural instinct is to slow down. When we drive on this familiar 
stretch of road, we find that those lines are speaking to us, gently urging us to touch 
the brake before the apex of the curve. We have been nudged (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008, pp. 37-38). 
This is a nudge because corresponding with their definition it alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way, does not forbid any options and is easy and cheap to 
avoid. The Department for Transport’s (2011) relatively recent white paper aimed at 
making ‘sustainable local transport happen’ provides another example of how these 
ideas might be applied but in a UK context: 
The Government wants to encourage and enable more sustainable transport choices. 
… In transport terms, this might be exemplified by reducing unnecessary signs, 
posts and other street clutter to improve road safety and encourage walking, by 
travel planning, or by presenting information in such a way as to encourage choice 
(DfT, 2011, p. 34; see also Jones et al., 2011b; 2013). 
Here again, we see how ‘nudging’ involves making only very limited, if any, 
changes to existing infrastructures and still begins from the assumption that choices 
are the best target for encouraging individual’s to transition to more sustainable 
modes of transport. A significant problem with this approach is that it is increasingly 
recognised that the transition to more sustainable and less carbon intensive lifestyles 
will require large-scale transformation across every sector of society (McGeevor, 
2011; UNEP, 2007). This will entail not simply ‘nudging citizens’ in ‘low cost’ and 
‘low pain’ ways (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 7) but rather dramatic changes in how existing 
social, institutional and infrastructural conditions are organised and function 
(McGeevor, 2011; Shove & Spurling, 2013). Moreover, as McGeevor (2011, p. 306) 
asserts climate change policies including those associated with personal mobility will 
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 require regulations and restrictions that ‘conflict ideologically with notions of 
personal choice and freedom’.  Section 4.2.1 argues a substantial limitation of nudge 
approaches in this context are that they fail to consider or even acknowledge the 
ways in which choices are conditioned, enabled, and in the case of automobility often 
made necessary, by pre-existing infrastructures, norms and subjectivities (see also 
Section 4.3).  
4.2.1 The limits of nudging and possibilities of habit infrastructures 
The concept of choice architecture advances the ways in which the external 
environments of action have come to be understood in much research and policy on 
behaviour change, transport and climate change (see Chapter 2). Technologies, 
interfaces, architecture and infrastructure are typically characterised as simply 
external casual ‘variables’ or ‘factors’. This is reflective of how certain economic 
and psychological accounts of human behaviour have come to dominate both 
research and policy. One of the main limitations of such approaches for Shove 
(2010) is that in identifying these external ‘motivators’ or ‘barriers’ they provide no 
method for understanding how they drive or prevent different behaviours (see also 
Chapter 5). In this context nudge theory does, albeit in a rather limited way, provide 
a method and way of explaining the role of such variables. This entails being 
attentive to how people’s automatic cognitive system, which is assumed to dominate 
thought and action, shapes their interaction with choice architecture and decision 
making. By understanding how the physical and procedural environment in which a 
choice is made influences human behaviour, nudge theorists assert it might be 
possible to redesign or reconfigure these contexts in ways that facilitate positive 
behavioural outcomes. 
Nudge, in this way, does move beyond simply identifying external motivators and 
barriers and attempts to provide some explanation of how they drive or prevent 
behaviours. A growing body of literature has illustrated, however, the social, political 
and ethical limitations of libertarian paternalist thought (Barr & Prillwitz, 2014; 
Davis, 2011; Horton, 2009; John et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2013; 
Leggett, 2014; Pykett et al., 2011; Selinger & Whyte, 2011; Selinger & Whyte, 2010; 
Strauss, 2009; Whitehead et al., 2011). There are three points which emerge from 
this literature which are particularly pertinent to this chapter (for overviews of other 
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 arguments see Jones et al., 2011a, p. 56; Leggett, 2014; Selinger & Whyte, 2011). 
The first corresponds with Shove’s (2010) critique of the way dominant accounts of 
behaviour change understand the external environments of action alluded to above. 
In her view, these explanations also provide ‘no method of establishing [the] history, 
[the] dynamic qualities [and the] interdependence’ of external variables and factors 
(Shove, 2010, p. 1275). Although she does not explicitly consider nudge theory, her 
arguments nonetheless equally apply. For example, Leggett (2014, p. 11), 
corresponding with observations above, argues nudge provides a ‘useful’ way of 
understanding the ‘interface between the agent and their immediate physical 
environment’. In doing so he observes, however, that it ‘neglects how that 
environment is itself a historical product, and one shot through with the traces of 
previous decisions, contestations and relations of power’ (Leggett, 2014, p. 11). The 
configuration and markings of roads, the use of speed bumps and the provision cycle 
paths, in other words, do not start and end with the ‘strategy of individual choice 
architect, abstracted from time, space and institutional relations’ (Leggett, 2014, p. 
11; Strauss, 2009). As Dewey reminds us ‘institutions, social custom, collective 
habit’ persist because ‘individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by 
prior customs’ (1922a, p. 58). Correspondingly, as the second and third points below 
elaborate, by relying on an ‘individualistic conception of the autonomous chooser’ 
libertarian paternalism rarely gives due consideration to how these pre-existing 
conditions constrain action and decision-making (see also Jones et al., 2011a, p. 56).  
Second, despite their attempts to unsettle the very notion of individual choice, 
behaviour is ‘social’ for libertarian paternalists only to the extent that what an 
individual does and thinks can be influenced by social norms and group identities. 
Understood as the ‘aggregate’ of individual choices (Leggett, 2014, p. 11) the social 
or ‘norms’ are considered important in two ways. On the one hand, the actions and 
thoughts of other people ‘conveys information’ to an individual about what ‘might be 
[their] best’ course of action or way of thinking (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 54). On 
the other hand, ‘peer pressure’ encourages individuals concerned about how others 
perceive them to ‘go along with the crowd to avoid their wrath or curry their favour’ 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 54). Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 54) thus assert the 
‘power’ of these ‘social influences’ can be used to ‘promote many good (and bad) 
causes’. To support this claim they draw attention to a number of psychological 
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 experiments which illustrate individuals ‘following the herd’, for instance, by 
complying with their tax obligations, stopping smoking or reducing their energy 
consumption after being made aware that the majority of other people are acting or 
thinking in this way. The ‘real difficulty’ with such an account of the social is ‘the 
individual’ is ‘regarded as something given, something already there’ (Davis, 2011; 
Dewey, 1920, p. 193; Leggett, 2014; Strauss, 2009). There is no recognition how an 
individual becomes a self through the process of living ‘in an environment which is 
social as well as physical’ (Dewey, 1915, p. 91). Thus ‘individuality is not originally 
given but is created under the influences of associated life’ (Dewey, 1920, p. 193). 
The ‘traditional notion of mind as something complete in itself’ falls to recognise 
‘grouped action’ which is ‘some fairly settled system of interaction among 
individuals’ in a ‘particular time’ and a ‘particular place’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 61). 
‘Laws, state, family, friendship’, education, work, and ‘other institutions and 
arrangements’ (p. 188) are ‘means for creating individuals’ (Dewey, 1920, p. 194, 
original emphasis). It is through participation in these institutions and arrangements 
and the shared activities they entail that ‘experiences, ideas, emotions, values are 
transmitted and made common’ (Dewey, 1916; 1920, p. 207).  
Third, by drawing on the collective wisdom of ‘emerging science of choice’ it is 
argued nudge theory provides a more accurate portrayal of human behaviour than the 
that of the self-interested economic man (Camerer et al., 2003; DellaVigna, 2009; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 7). The extent to which these new insights about human 
conduct, however, advance previous understandings is overemphasised (Davis, 2011; 
Leggett, 2014). Libertarian paternalists, Davis (2011) contends, not only remain 
preoccupied with the model of the rational actor they also promote a ‘normative’ 
account of ‘individuality itself’ (p. 62). Moreover, as their interpretation of 
individuality is informed by ‘standard rationality theory’, the implication is ‘rational 
experts ought to help make Homo sapiens behave as much as possible [like] Homo 
economicus’ (2011, p. 62). This is consistent with what Davis sees as their ‘strategy 
of revising Homo economicus rather than replacing it’ (2011, p. 62). Meanwhile, 
Leggett (2014, p. 11) contends that nudge’s agent could just equally be considered ‘a 
regression’ as at least Homo economicus is ‘capable of purposive reasoning and 
action’. The human subject in nudge in contrast is seemingly ‘forever dominated by 
its impulsive, unreflective automatic systems’ (Leggett, 2014, p. 11).  
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 Libertarian paternalists, as we have already seen above, suggest individuals tend to 
do what everyone else does either after observing or being made aware of how the 
‘herd’ behaves. This is reflective of their tendency to portray the social and physical 
environments of action in a ‘deterministic manner’ whereby such ‘choice 
architectures’ are held to ‘almost automatically’ shape human behaviour (Jones et al., 
2011a, p. 56). The individual ‘is taken as something given already’ and ‘anything 
that can be done to [them] or for [them] can only be by way of external impressions 
and belongings: sensations of pleasure and pain, comforts, securities’ (Dewey, 1920, 
p. 194). Dewey, in contrast, observes the social and physical ‘world we have 
experienced becomes an integral part of the self’ (1934, p. 104). Our life ‘possesses 
continuity because it is an everlasting renewed process of acting upon the 
environment and being acted upon by it together with institution of relations between 
what is done and what is undergone’ (1934, p. 104). We are co-constituted rather 
than determined by our contexts for Dewey because even ‘as we act to shape our 
environments, our environments shape our selves’ (Sullivan, 2001; Tan, 2004, p. 29). 
Thus ‘subject matter gains expressiveness because of [the] cumulative continuity’ of 
experience which in turn shapes the ‘self that acts and is acted upon in further 
experience’ (Dewey, 1934, p. 104):  
In their physical occurrence, things and events experienced pass and are gone. But 
something of their meaning and value is retained as an integral part of the self. 
Through habits formed in intercourse with the world, we also in-habit the world. It 
becomes a home and the home is part of our every experience (p. 104). 
In this way, Dewey once again reminds us of the important role that habits, which are 
formed and operate in action play in constituting the self. Nudge theorists as we have 
seen stress in most situations ‘people tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision 
makers’ due to their impulsive and unreflective ‘automatic system’ (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008, p. 37). Habits are ‘controlled by the Automatic System’ and can be 
trained through sheer repetition (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 89). This suggests they 
are understood as simply ‘conditioned responses or passive routine’ (Tan, 2004, p. 
29). Dewey (1922a) instead asserts habits are ‘active means, means that project 
themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting’ (p. 25) that can be ‘intelligent 
and routine’ (p. 71) and capable of change. Importantly, habits are ‘ways of using 
and incorporating the environment’ (p. 15) which have a ‘special sensitiveness or 
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 accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather 
than bare recurrence of specific acts’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 42). Dewey reminds us then 
that the way people ‘respond to environmental cues and ‘choice architectures’’ is 
always mediated by the habits and meanings which emerge in particular social and 
physical contexts and form the basis of their subjectivity (see also Davis, 2011; Jones 
et al., 2011a, p. 56).  
The remainder of the chapter, focusing primarily on systems of automobility and 
public transport, examines how states and transport infrastructures and systems give 
rise to particular collective habits or ‘customs’ and subjectivities. In doing so the aim 
is to reemphasise in light of the reasons outlined above why current understandings 
of ‘choice architectures’ are severely limited. In contrast, the notion of ‘habit 
infrastructures’ informed by a Deweyan understanding of habit, custom and 
experience captures the way subjectivities or ‘choices’ are always conditioned but 
not determined by the histories and politics of physical environments and established 
social norms, values and ideologies, as individuals always retain the capacity to act 
upon the world. In this context the term ‘infrastructure’ is preferred over 
‘architecture’ as it is increasingly being used as a metaphor for ‘making sense of 
human being and sociality in the city’ and acknowledging ‘the liveliness of socio-
technical systems’ (e.g., Amin, 2014, p. 138; Graham, 2010; Graham & Marvin, 
2001; Harvey & Knox, 2012; McFarlane, 2011). Given that contemporary cities 
including those where this research was conducted remain to more (Auckland) or a 
lesser (London) extent ‘rooted in and defined by automobility’ the next section 
examines how the car has become such a dominant global force (Sheller & Urry, 
2000, p. 737).  
4.3 The global dominance of the car 
The global rise of the car has been attributed to the ‘separate and combined choices 
of millions of individuals to purchase and use cars, move to the suburbs, and so on’ 
(Paterson, 2007, p. 91). These choices are believed to be reflective of an intense 
human desire for freedom which the car has allowed to be extended (cf. Dunn, 1998; 
Lomasky, 1997). Such explanations, which largely correspond with the assumptions 
of much research and policy on behaviour change and nudge theory, have been put 
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 forward by pro-car advocates (e.g., Dunn, 1998; Lomasky, 1997) and are apparent in 
more general political discourse (Paterson, 2007). This narrow focus on individual 
agency ultimately naturalises how ‘the car has become the dominant mode of 
transport’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 76). Given that ‘everything is only the outcome of 
millions of individual decisions, and people ‘naturally’ make ‘superior’ over 
‘inferior’ choices, the domination of the car can be presented as inevitable’ 
(Paterson, 2007, p. 76). More critically, Paterson asserts ‘the explicitly normative 
argument that not only can automobility not be stopped, it ought not to be, either … 
as cars represent an, if not the, expression of human autonomy, and thus to criticise 
cars is in effect to be ‘an enemy of freedom’’ (2007, p. 81).  
This emphasis on the autonomous mobile individual it has been argued (see Chapter 
2), however, provides little insight into how an individual’s ‘choice’ to buy and use a 
car is embedded within the system of automobility. It is this ‘system’ which ‘makes 
the act of driving a car – and more specifically the act of driving a car as an act of 
‘autonomous mobility’ – possible’ (Bohm et al., 2006; Paterson, 2007, p. 25, original 
emphasis; Urry, 2004). John Urry (2000; 2004, p. 27), as discussed earlier (see 
Section 2.4.1), argues it is the complex ‘combination’ of social-technical components 
of the system of automobility which have been responsible for the expansion and 
continuing ascendancy of the car and the ‘specific character of domination’ that it 
entails. Although enlightening, his portrayal is largely apolitical providing little 
insight into the ‘concrete decisions and the struggles over them which favoured 
automobility over its alternatives’ (Goodwin, 2010; Paterson, 2007, p. 26). 
Automobility can be understood as ‘systemic’ as Urry suggests, while recognising 
that it is simultaneously ‘composed of concrete decisions to favour certain sorts of 
interests, normative visions, forms of power and so on, and is frequently contested 
and challenged in ways which shape its development as a ‘system’’ (2007, p. 27). 
Following Paterson (2007) the remainder of this section redresses the lack of politics 
in Urry’s account in two ways. First, by examining how states have promoted 
automobility because of the way cars have come to be understood as central to 
encouraging economic growth (Section 4.3.1). Second, and relatedly, by elaborating 
on attempts to promote and produce a ‘new type of person, a new subject, orientated 
towards the sort of movement which cars make possible’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 121; 
Section 4.3.2). 
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 4.3.1 Automobility, economic growth and state promotion of the car 
Paterson (2007, p. 92) emphasises that the growth of automobility needs to be 
understood as a trait of a ‘particular pattern of capitalist development’ which resulted 
in states promoting the car in the twentieth century (for a more detailed analysis see 
Paterson, 2000; 2007, pp. 92-120). Cars have been viewed across extensive and 
varied political and economic discourses as central to ‘the promotion of economic 
growth’ and, therefore, ‘the reproduction of capitalism as a system’ in at least two 
ways (Paterson, 2007, p. 92). To begin the car has in various ways directly 
stimulated the economy. The arrival of the car and suitable roads significantly 
increased the flexibility and freedom of people’s movements. This facilitated 
economic growth by creating new business opportunities for individuals either able 
to travel further afield or potentially sell automobile goods and services (Rae, 1971). 
The flexibility afforded by the roads, in contrast to the railway, also contributed to 
decreasing the costs of goods and services (Hoyle & Smith, 1998) and increased the 
incomes and/or productivity of doctors, farmers, clergymen, insurance agents and 
school supervisors who owned cars (Flink, 1975). Correspondingly, the expansion of 
the car industry has had far-reaching forward and backward linkages (see Dunn, 
1998): 
Investment in a car simultaneously presupposes a range of backward linkages – in 
steel, aluminium, oil, rubber, plastics, lacquers, glass, construction, lead, platinum 
[…] – and entails or creates an even wider range of forward linkages – filling 
stations, tourist cabins, trailer parks, insurance, health care, advertising, 
maintenance (of both cars and roads), spare parts, legal fees, in-car gadgets and so 
on (Paterson, 2007, p. 96). 
These linkages become even more extensive if the investment in cars and associated 
activities is considered in terms of how they have stimulated activity across diverse 
areas of the economy. For example, if the ‘process of suburbanisation’ is recognised 
‘as an ‘effect’ of the development of automobility then increased highway 
construction … and the suburban real estate boom (with associated investment in 
[infrastructures such as] sewers, telephones, electricity provision, schools, shopping 
malls, etc.) all become part of the knock-on economic consequences of the 
emergence of the car’ (Flink, 1975; Paterson, 2007, p. 97; Rae, 1971). 
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 Second, the motor industry by restructuring industrial production (e.g., Fordism) has 
played a significant part in promoting growth through effecting wider political and 
economic shifts in consumption (Dicken, 1998; Maxton & Wormald, 1995; Ross, 
1995). The ‘development of the assembly line, the intensified division of labour, the 
mechanisation of increasing numbers of tasks and then later flexibilised production, 
just-in-time (JIT) delivery, robotisation and so on all led to productivity gains which 
meant that prices could be radically reduced and thus more widespread consumption 
was enabled’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 95). For Paterson in both of these respects the role 
the car has been assumed to play in economic growth has been ‘crucial in 
legitimising [its] expansion, enabling the car to become perhaps the symbol of 
progress for most of the twentieth century’ (2007, p. 92, original emphasis).  
The car industry, unlike previous ‘public’ mobilities such as bicycles, trains and 
trams, provided ‘significant improvements in the capability to commodify means of 
mobility and at the same time accelerate the movement of goods and people in the 
economy’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 115; Urry, 2000). States upon recognising these 
advantages and how they might assist them in their structural role of encouraging 
economic growth eventually started to promote the car in both obvious and less 
obvious ways (Paterson, 2000, 2007). State support for the car, Paterson (2007) 
contends, has assisted not only the car in becoming so dominant but also allowed 
states to reproduce their power. He argues such promotion, therefore, is ‘perhaps best 
understood in terms of the state’s structural role in capitalist societies, its general 
imperative to support the conditions for [economic growth] and the requirements for 
[growth] in specific historical periods’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 115).  
States, after initially placing restrictions on cars (see Wall, 1999), have promoted 
cars in at least three ways (also see Klare, 2001, 2004). First, they have built roads 
both within and between urban areas. For Wolf (1996) one of the essential 
differences between roads and rail is that it is relatively straightforward to make a 
division between the regulation and ownership of roads (transport infrastructure) and 
cars, lorries and trucks (the modes of transport). This division has simultaneously 
allowed states to support the car while giving rise to a system which functions 
through the ‘[p]rivate appropriation of profit’ and the ‘socialisation of costs and 
losses’ (Wolf, 1996, p. 89): 
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 Private profits are appropriated on the vehicle manufacturers, the insurance 
companies and the motorway construction firms; costs are socialised by means of 
public financing of motorway construction, policing, hospitalisation of the injured 
and repairs to the environment (Wolf, 1996, p. 89). 
Road building has been a central component of this system (Luger, 2000). As 
Paterson (2007, p. 116) observes the ‘emergence of the car demanded improvements 
to the quality of road surfaces and the emergence of mass-motorised societies 
demanded substantial increases in the quantity of roads’. All states have come to 
recognise the ‘provision of such investment out of general public expenditure’ 
(Paterson, 2007, p. 116) to be one of their ‘natural function[s]’ (Wood, 2010, p. 77). 
Excluding the few roads which have been privately funded through tolls, the costs 
incurred in building roads have historically been paid by states (Freund & Martin, 
1993).  
The costs incurred in building roads suitable for the car, and to avoid dust in urban 
centres, however, have been significantly higher than those in pre-car eras (Paterson, 
2007). Additionally, the immediate benefits associated with their construction have 
‘increasingly been received primarily by car users whereas previously users of the 
roads of various types, employing a variety of transport modes (horse, carriage, cart, 
bicycle, trams and pedestrians) and for non-transport uses, such as leisure and 
commerce, benefited from road building and maintenance’ (Paterson, 2007, pp. 116-
117). The building of urban expressways served to further increase, and the 
construction of motorways maximised, the benefits of the car (Paterson, 2000). An 
important and distinct feature of the design and regulation of these constructions is 
that they directly exclude pedestrians and bicycles (Paterson, 2000). Moreover, they 
are intentionally planned to ‘compete with/replace trains’, which in the past provided 
the main mode of interurban transport, ‘by avoiding or going straight through city 
centres’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 117). 
The first motorways were constructed by Mussolini and then Hitler, mainly for 
military purposes, but various countries proceeded to develop them shortly 
afterwards. The ‘road’ or ‘highway’ lobby has played a significant role in this 
process convincing governments to spend substantial sums of public money in many 
countries including the United Kingdom (Hamer, 1987; O’Connell, 1998) and the 
United States (Davies, 1975). The ‘coalition of car, oil and construction companies, 
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 allied with highway and municipal engineers, is regarded as the single most powerful 
political lobby’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 117). In the early 1930s, this lobby proposed a 
1,000-mile network of motorways in the UK which was adopted by the Labour 
government of 1946 and finished ahead of time in 1976 (Hamer, 1987). Upon 
completion the network was quickly extended to 3,500 miles, with the government 
again closely following the plans suggested by the British Roads Federation, an 
organisation which was serving as a platform for the roads lobby (Hamer, 1987). 
The second way in which states have promoted cars is by neglecting alternative 
means of transport. Since 1945 state spending on transport has ‘systematically 
favoured roads’ (Headicar, 2009; Paterson, 2000, p. 267). A number of scholars have 
charted the decline of rail during this period in many countries as large sections of 
the network were systemically dismantled (Headicar, 2009; Pooley, 2010; Wolf, 
1996). Paterson (2007) suggests that the ‘recurrent complaint is that there is no ‘level 
playing field’ between road and rail’ with rail investments in the UK, for example, 
being required to ‘show a profit while the costs of road construction are written off 
by the state’ (p. 117). The third and final aspect relates to the ‘hidden subsidies’ 
directed towards the car ‘relative to its competitors’ (Paterson, 2000, p. 267). In 
Paterson’s view the ‘net effect of relevant fiscal policies is usually regarded as 
favourable to the car’ despite ‘high petrol taxation in many countries’ (2000, p. 267). 
He suggests ‘the differential treatment of infrastructure investment between road and 
rail is clearly an important component of this but other aspects are also significant’ 
(2000, p. 267). For instance, the tax relief on provision of company cars is estimated 
to be worth approximately $400 billion in subsidies for the car (Athanasiou, 1996).  
4.3.2 Producing the (auto)mobile subject 
The promotion of the car by states has not been limited to road building, the planning 
and development of low-density suburbs, the neglect and downgrading of public 
transport and non-motorised forms of transport, and fiscal measures which subsidise 
the car. It has also entailed the promotion and production of a new kind of person or 
subject who is orientated towards and values the possibilities that the car creates for 
instantaneous, flexible and seamless movement (Paterson, 2007; Rajan, 1996, 2006; 
Seiler, 2008; Urry, 2004). The possibility of automobility depends on an ‘automobile 
subject’ who as ‘its principal daily agent’ has ‘been produced, has multiple forms 
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 and is continually being reproduced through a complex interplay of popular cultural 
forms, daily practice, regulatory interventions, surveillance and resistance’ 
(Merriman, 2006, 2007; Paterson, 2007, p. 164; Rajan, 2006; Seiler, 2008). Those 
who have sought to ‘take seriously the reality and depth of the identities produced 
around the car’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 122) have drawn inspiration largely from Michel 
Foucault’s (1967, 1977, 2007) work on governance and governmentality and the 
writings on the cyborg or hybrid figure from STS scholars such as Donna Haraway 
(1991) and Bruno Latour (1993).  
For Foucault (1967, 1977, 2007) political attempts to produce and govern mobile 
subjects predate the car and emerged during the eighteenth century. During this 
period he argues governors became particularly concerned with circulation and 
movement (Douglas, 1999; Foucault, 2007), which he suggests marked:  
[…] the emergence of a completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing 
and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulation to take place, of 
controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in 
movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, 
but in such a way that the inherent danger of this circulation are cancelled out. No 
longer the safety of the prince and his territory, but the security of the population 
and, consequently, of those of who govern it (Foucault, 2007, p. 93). 
Movement was problematic then as the ambition of governors was to ‘create the 
conditions for accelerated and controlled movement of people for various purposes 
of ‘government’’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 126). These needs were primarily to produce 
‘mobile, productive bodies’ who ‘could engage in economic production more 
effectively, move physically to where labour was needed and serve in mass armies 
which were becoming required for military/strategic reasons’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 
126).  
Sennett (1994), like Foucault, notes how metaphors of circulation and flow came to 
guide the principles of urban design during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The terms ‘artery’ and ‘veins’ he observes came to be applied to city streets by 
designers, who following William Harvey’s revolutionary scientific findings, ‘sought 
to model traffic systems on the blood system of the body’ (Sennett, 1994, p. 264): 
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 Enlightened planners wanted the city in its very design to function like a healthy 
body, freely flowing as well as possessed of clean skin. Since the beginnings of the 
Baroque era, urban planners had thought about making cities in terms of efficient 
circulation of people on the city's main streets. … The medical imagery of life-
giving circulation gave a new meaning to the Baroque emphasis on motion. … 
[T]he Enlightenment planner made motion an end in itself [by] emphasiz[ing] the 
journey itself (Sennett, 1994, pp. 263-264). 
Correspondingly, Paterson (2007) argues that the car emerged at a historical moment 
during which other forms of mobility such as the trains and trams began to encounter 
at least two problems. First, people began to complain about ‘the rigidities of trains 
and trams and the monopolistic practices of many transport companies’ (Paterson, 
2007, p. 126). These issues helped to allow the car ‘[m]ore than any other consumer 
good’ to provide ‘fantasies of status, freedom and escape from the constraints of a 
highly disciplined urban, industrial order’ (McShane, 1994, p. 148). The experience 
of the First World War was the second impetus for automobility. Although trains 
‘made possible massive increases in the speed of mobilisation’ of weaponry and 
troops they did so in a way which was ‘exceptionally dependent on the strict 
following of strict schedules’ meaning ‘once mobilisation was started, it was 
practically impossible to stop’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 133). The ‘decisive advantage 
came with those who innovated in terms of their ability to move’ through new 
technologies of movement such as the armoured tank (Paterson, 2007, p. 133; 
Virilio, 1986). The car helped resolve, therefore, ‘two blockages to the circulatory 
system’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 134). 
For Foucault (2007) there were two main elements associated with ensuring the 
circulation and flows of people, goods and money. The first was that particular 
modes of movement needed to be ‘proscribed, constrained and limited’ by 
controlling populations through a variety of means (Douglas, 1999; Paterson, 2007, 
p. 126). Second, motion needed to be ‘regularised to prevent disorder’ and ‘make 
people productive’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 126; Usher, 2014). The first strategy involved 
exercising modes of sovereign power by restricting and controlling movement 
through ‘technologies of government’ (Foucault, 1977, 2007; Miller & Rose, 1990, 
p. 8). Meanwhile the second strategy sought to shape and regularise movement 
through what Foucault (1977, 2007) terms ‘bio-power’, a form of disciplinary power, 
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 whereby through ‘technologies of the self’ or subjectivation individuals govern 
themselves (Foucault, 1988, p. 17). For Foucault ‘the tension between these two 
elements in governors’ strategies plays itself out to the present day’ (Douglas, 1999; 
Paterson, 2007, p. 127).   
In the context of automobility, Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of government’ has 
been deployed as a way of understanding the ‘architectures, knowledges, instruments 
and legal frameworks which translate political rationalities and shape the 
performances and movements of drivers, vehicles, and the spaces of the road’ 
(Bonham, 2006; Manderscheid, 2014; Merriman, 2006, p. 76; 2007; Paterson, 2007; 
Seiler, 2008) For example, following Sennett (1994) it has been noted that the 
‘emergence of the modern understanding of travel and transport formed the actual 
precondition for the governance and political institutionalisation of transportation 
and spatial planning policies’ (Bonham, 2006; Manderscheid, 2014, p. 612). This 
entailed redefining the purpose of streets ‘from a public place to which everybody 
had equal access’ to a space of transit where motorised vehicles took precedent over 
pedestrians (Bonham, 2006; Manderscheid, 2014, p. 612; Norton, 2008). Bonham 
(2006, p. 583) argues the re-conceptualisation of travel as transport or the ‘movement 
from one point to another in order to participate in activities at the ‘trip destination’’ 
was a more significant innovation ‘than the train, tram or automobile’ as it: 
has made it possible to objectify travel practices and create knowledge about the 
efficient completion of the journey. The production of transport knowledge has 
involved separating out, classifying, and ordering travel practices in relation to their 
efficiency. This ordering of travel establishes a hierarchy which not only values 
some travel practices (rapid, direct, uninterrupted) and some travellers (fast, 
orderly, single purpose) over others but also enables their prioritization in public 
space (Bonham, 2006). 
Discourses on and representations of the car and automobility are by no means 
restricted to policies, planning and traffic (see Section 4.3.1). Cars have come to be 
variously understood as symbols of progress, freedom, autonomy and safety in 
popular culture (for an overview see Paterson, 2007, pp. 142-162) such as literature 
(Howe, 2002; Samuels, 2002), films (Eyerman & Lofgren, 1995; Mottram, 2002) 
and music (Field, 2002; Widmer, 2002), and advertising and marketing (Gunster, 
2004; Paterson & Dalby, 2006; Wernick, 1991). Public transport, in contrast, is 
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 typically connected with ‘inflexibility, impunctuality, slowness and poverty’ 
(Manderscheid, 2014, p. 613). As Manderscheid (2014, p. 613) argues this 
‘discursively produced hierarchy of different forms of transportation associates 
automobility with ‘normality’’ and public transport, cycling and walking as 
‘additional or deviant cases’. This mode of thinking, corresponding with the earlier 
critique of choice architectures (Section 4.2.1), ‘pre-structures spatial and transport 
policies and planning, perpetuating the bases of power upon which they build’ 
(Manderscheid, 2014, p. 613). Moreover, as Urry argues mobility landscapes which 
embody such sedimented knowledge and power tend to stabilise and reinforce the 
socio-spatial order of the automobile: 
The ‘structure of auto space’ forces people to orchestrate in complex and 
heterogeneous ways their mobilities and socialities across very significant 
distances. The urban environment, built during the latter half of the twentieth 
century for the convenience of the car, has ‘unbundled’ territorialities of home, 
work, business, and leisure that had historically been closely integrated and 
fragmented social practices that occurred in shared public spaces. …. Automobility 
divides workplaces from homes, so producing lengthy commutes into and across 
the city. It splits homes and business districts, undermining local retail outlets to 
which one might have walked or cycled, thereby eroding town-centres, non-car 
pathways, and public spaces. It also separates homes and various kinds of leisure 
sites, which are often only available by motorized transport (Urry, 2006, p. 19). 
The Foucauldian concept of ‘technologies of the self’ has been used to highlight the 
ways in which ‘drivers’ were produced as ‘particular sorts of individuals who could 
function successfully in the new automobile environments’, and others were 
‘reproduced’ as ‘people who needed to adapt to them’ (Bonham, 2006; Merriman, 
2006; Paterson, 2007, p. 137). New ‘rules, advice and training for drivers, road signs’ 
and various other paraphernalia simultaneously emerged to ‘prepare drivers for new 
driving conditions and the skills and mentalities required to navigate them’ 
(Merriman, 2006; Paterson, 2007, p. 137). Merriman (2006, 2007), for example, 
illustrates attempts to redress the problems associated with drivers lacking 
appropriate skills and experience to safely negotiate the M1, the first large motorway 
in the UK, upon its opening in 1959. He emphasises how motorway drivers where 
produced through different elements of governance including the development of the 
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 Motorway Code which aimed ‘to persuade drivers to translate its coded 
recommendations into embodied and habituated techniques for conducting oneself 
and one’s vehicle safely along the motorway’ (Merriman, 2007, p. 144). Moreover, 
there was a ‘parallel production of other subjects who must co-exist with cars’ 
(Paterson, 2007, p. 137) through education programmes such as the Look Both Ways 
Club which focused on children as part of an approach to encourage the widespread 
adoption of specific walking practices (Bonham, 2006). In particular, the 
programme’s ambition was to ‘cultivate the habit of looking to the right then looking 
to the left before leaving the safe haven of the footpath’ (Dollman, 1930 cited in 
Bonham, 2006, p. 67).  
This attentiveness towards Foucault’s writings has been proceeded by an interest in 
the work of STS scholars such as Donna Haraway (1991) and Bruno Latour (1993) 
as a way of tracing ‘the materialities and practices associated with such hybrid or 
cyborg figures’ (Merriman, 2006, p. 76) as ‘human-car co(a)gents’ (Michael, 2000, 
p. 73), the ‘car-driver’ (Lupton, 1999; Sheller & Urry, 2000, p. 752) and ‘carson’ 
(i.e., car-person) (Bohm et al., 2006; Katz, 1999; Michael, 2000, p. 90; Urry, 2000). 
These hybrid or cyborg identities cannot be understood in terms of ‘the grafting of 
particular skills and orientations onto pre-existing humans who then are able to 
control machines which remain separate from them, but rather the production of 
hybrid subjectivities which are the particular meshing of humans and machines’ 
(Paterson, 2007, p. 139). As Paterson elaborates: 
The ambiguity present in the very term 'automobility' serves as a good way of 
introduction to this way of thinking about the 'automobile subject’. There is little 
ambiguity in the noun 'automobile' - an artefact which moves itself. It is 
immediately connected to the term 'automatic' or 'automation', which again implies 
movement or action without external force being applied. But at the same time the 
whole ideological apparatus of automobility serves to emphasise that not only does 
it refer to the vehicle moving itself but that the person using the vehicle is 
simultaneously 'moving autonomously' - this is a mobility which serves, produces 
and makes possible human autonomy. In one mode of imagining, the car is a 
machine which moves itself; in another automobility involves a fusing of car and 
driver which means that the car is a prosthetic and it is the driver who is moving 
autonomously. … [The] coining [of] the term 'carson' refer[s] to the merger of car 
and person …. There is widespread recognition and articulation that 'drivers 
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 experience cars as extensions of their bodies' (Thrift, 2004, p. 47) – a widely quoted 
comment by a Californian city planner in the 1930s was that 'it might be said that 
Southern Californians have added wheels to their anatomy' (Paterson, 2007, pp. 
139-140). 
Both the work inspired by Foucault and STS serve as a reminder that the emergence 
and continued reproduction of automobility is at once a ‘means to liberation and 
means of domination’ (Douglas, 1999, original emphasis, p. 149). Cars ‘express 
human freedom but they simultaneously express it through the subordination of the 
human body not only to the technology of the car itself and the disciplines this 
imposes (concentration, immobility within the car itself, etc.) but also to the whole 
panoply of regulatory mechanisms constraining the automobilist’s practices as a 
driver – from parking restrictions and traffic lights to tax regimes or pollution control 
requirements. People thus participate intimately in the production of their subjection 
to this order, conceiving it precisely as the realisation of their freedom’ (Paterson, 
2007, p. 142). 
Importantly, as Section 4.2.1 indicates these literatures are by no means incompatible 
with Dewey’s pragmatist writings. A number of similarities have been noted between 
Dewey and Foucault including their writings on power and subjectivity (Auxier, 
2002; Rabinow, 2011; Reich, 2011; Stuhr, 1997, 2003). Dewey, for example, 
observes ‘[p]ower, as well as, interest comes by use and practices’ (1987, p. 224) and 
that ‘liberalism knows that an individual is nothing fixed, given ready-made. It is 
something achieved, and achieved not in isolation but with the aid and support of 
conditions, cultural and physical: — including in ‘cultural’, economic, legal and 
political institutions as well as science and art’ (1935, p. 227). Elsewhere he notes 
attempts to encourage individuals to ‘concentrate in moral introspection upon their 
own virtues and vices’ and thus ‘perfect ourselves from within’ (Dewey, 1920, p. 
196). Reich (2011, p. 186) argues that Foucault’s work, however, ‘insists more 
decidedly on an analysis of power and power relations’ than Dewey’s. Moreover, 
prior to Latour and other STS scholars Dewey articulated similar arguments 
‘regarding humans’relationship to nature, the problem of theoretical dualisms, 
knowledge as socially constructed, and the location of action and meaning in the 
relations between people and/or things’ (Brinkmann, 2004; Cutchin, 2008, p. 1564; 
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 Hickman, 2011). Dewey (1922a, p. 25) writes a saw and hammer, for instance, are 
only ‘potential means’ until they are ‘employed in some actual making’: 
They are actual means only when brought in conjunction with eye, arm and hand in 
some specific operation. And eye, arm and hand are, correspondingly, means proper 
only when they are in active operation. And whenever they are in action they are 
cooperating with external materials and energies (Dewey, 1922a, pp. 25-26). 
Furthermore, in his later writings, especially the Knowing and the Known (1949) 
which he wrote with Arthur Bentley, he stressed the importance of understanding the 
self as emerging out of ‘transactions’ rather than ‘interactions’ with the environment. 
Interaction ‘assumes the organism and its environmental objects to be present as 
substantially separate existences or forms of existence, prior to their entry into joint 
investigation’ (Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 123). Meanwhile, transaction ‘indicates 
dynamic entities that are continually undergoing reconstitution through their 
interconstitutive relations with others’ (Sullivan, 2001, p. 13). A point Dewey and 
Bentley (1949, p. 128) emphasise in observing: ‘Organisms do not live without air 
and water, nor without food ingestion and radiation. They live, that is, as much in 
processes across and ‘through’ skins as in processes ‘within’ skins’.  
4.4 Habit infrastructures I: Politics, materiality and 
customs   
[…] The train pulls into Homai Station (0857) and two women and their sons 
(perhaps 6 or 7 years old) board the carriage I’m on. They sit on two of the bench 
seats that face each other close by. It strikes me as unusual as I can’t recall any 
instances of seeing children that age with their parents on the train. … I overhear 
the two mums talking about the ‘last time’ they were on the train. One observes it 
was ‘really busy’. … At Middlemore station (0914) the ticket inspectors come 
through our carriage. The ladies explain the ‘last time’ they caught the train they 
could buy tickets on board. Witnessing these events another lady has started talking 
with an older women who appears to be travelling with her grandchild. She explains 
how since they have introduced the automated ‘Hop card’ system it has got worse 
for the ‘occasional traveller’. The ticket inspector lets the two mothers purchase on 
board tickets. As he leaves he asks the two boys ‘Are you enjoying the train?’ 
Looking at their children both of the mothers nod and one suggests ‘it is great fun’. 
… Another man observes to his mother-in-law he catches the train ‘once in a blue 
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 moon’ while boarding at Sylvia Park (0929). He soon finds a seat with her, his wife 
and five children. It is at this point I realise it must be the school holidays [Journey 
on the Southern Line from Takanini to Britomart, Auckland Field Notes, Tuesday 
23 April 2013]. 
It was argued in Section 4.3 that the car has come to dominate the ways in which 
many cities, and those who inhabit them, continue to be (re)defined and (re)produced 
(Sheller & Urry, 2000). This dominance has not arisen ‘through the ‘natural’ actions 
of millions of individuals’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 76) or as an outcome of a non-linear, 
autopoietic system, which by generating ‘the preconditions for its own self-
expansion’ (Urry, 2004, p. 27) became ‘locked in’ following its establishment (p. 
32). The first explanation, to reiterate, neglects to recognise the ways in which 
individuals are always embedded within this system. Meanwhile, the latter ‘begs the 
question of how the process started, since the various processes of ‘lock-in’ occur 
only after the system has become dominant’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 125). Both fail to 
recognise how historically the system has been ‘socially produced’ and promoted 
through physical interventions (e.g., road building, suburbanisation) and political and 
cultural practices (e.g., advertisements, discourses, rules, regulations) (Paterson, 
2007, p. 87). Moreover, the opening excerpt highlights the importance of 
understanding how ‘automobility is continually reconstituted and is thus always 
changing’ rather than simply ‘locked in’ (Goodwin, 2010, p. 62). Although it 
demonstrates how Auckland’s rail network remains a ‘novelty’ for many it 
simultaneously draws attention to ongoing attempts to upgrade and modernise 
existing infrastructures in an attempt to encourage a shift away from the car. The 
remainder of this section explores how history and politics have and continue to 
shape the habit infrastructures of Auckland. Building on Section 4.3 it begins by 
elaborating how particular moments in the development of Auckland’s urban form 
and transport infrastructures have contributed to its current auto-dependent habit 
infrastructures (see also Bush, 1971, 2014; Harris, 2005; Mees & Dodson, 2002).  
4.4.1 Auckland: City of the car 
Social phenomenon ‘cannot be understood’, Dewey (1938, p. 492) asserts, except ‘if 
there is a prior understanding of physical conditions and … their interactions’. 
Auckland has gone through a series of development phases since European 
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 settlement around 1840 (see Bloomfield, 1967; Dahms, 1980; Gu, 2010). The 
suburbanisation of the city began with the construction of tramways (horse 1884-
1901; electric 1902-1956) from 1884 but increased during the 1920s and especially 
the 1930s as a result of new tramlines, roads, privately developed middle-class 
suburbs and state-funded lower-income housing estates (Bloomfield, 1967; Dahms, 
1980; Pool et al., 2007). Bloomfield (1967) notes that the ‘all-weather’ bitumen 
roads constructed during this interwar period in response to ‘growing car ownership’ 
were a ‘significant factor in suburban expansion’ (p. 18). These developments 
coincided with other changes including new suburban shopping centres and roadside 
garages along main roads, a shift in architectural style from the ‘European villa to the 
American bungalow’, and the relocation of manufacturing industries into suburban 
locations (Bloomfield, 1967, p. 18; Dahms, 1980). The development of these new 
industrial areas in Penrose, Onehunga, Westfield and Otahuhu has been attributed to 
The Industrial Efficiency Act of 1936 which encouraged ‘local’ manufacturing for 
the national market which necessitated greater production and larger factories than 
could be accommodated in the central city (Dahms, 1980). These relocations created 
a new ‘pattern of commuting’ which ‘signified a revolutionary change’ from when 
the ‘tram was supreme and most jobs were found in the central core’ (Dahms, 1980, 
p. 7). Dahms (1980, p. 7) argues as a result the ‘spatial extent, character and physical 
form of these areas were quite distinct’ from those of earlier suburbs and it was from 
this point onwards that the car began to ‘challenge older forms of transport’. 
Despite these changes public transport patronage prior to the mid-1950s was high 
with approximately 58% of trips made by public transport and 42% by car (ARPA, 
1956). These figures tend to overstate the role of the car as the study which was 
conducted as part of the planning process for the city’s first master transportation 
plan did not count cyclists or pedestrians (Mees & Dodson, 2002). After 1955 
patronage declined significantly whereby by 2000 only 2% of trips were made by 
public transport and 96% by car in the city (Mees & Dodson, 2002). It has been 
observed that this 89% decrease is ‘the largest decline in public transport recorded 
over this period in any large city in the world’ (Mees & Dodson, 2002, p. 279). This 
dramatic transformation has been attributed to the election of National in 1949, a 
centrist party dominated by market liberals (McKinnon, 2003; Pugh, 1983). Previous 
Reform (1911-1928) and particularly Labour (1935-1949) administrations adopted a 
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 state-led approach to urban development building new towns and suburbs that were 
to be connected to central business districts by railway (Evans, 1972; Harris, 2005). 
Such initiatives were started in Auckland prior to 1929 but were arrested initially 
because of a focus on Wellington immediately prior to, and following, World War 
Two (Harris, 2005). Labour had revealed plans to replicate the Wellington model in 
Auckland and Christchurch as part of a ten year regional development plan in 1946 
(Harris, 2005). Up until mid-1954 both Labour and National had maintained a formal 
public commitment to completing the Auckland rail upgrade but as the November 
1954 election approached the central government ‘began to show signs of changing 
their mind’ (Gunder, 2002; Harris, 2005, p. 44).  
Harris (2005) charts the role Railways Minister W. S. Goosman played in helping to 
ensure Auckland’s rail upgrade was no longer an election issue. Following a series of 
meetings with Goosman the Chairman of the Auckland City Council Town Planning 
Committee K. B. Cumberland and Auckland Councillor Dove-Meyer Robinson set 
up a five-member committee to investigate whether to ‘transfer the cost of the 
railway upgrade to the building of motorways’ (Harris, 2005, p. 45). The 
committee’s recommendation to develop a Master Transportation Plan was accepted 
by the Auckland City Council on 28 October 1954. This plan would be overseen by a 
technical committee of the Auckland Regional Planning Authority (ARPA) and 
headed by an Auckland City Engineer. This same engineer had earlier been critical 
of a report (Halcrow, 1950) commissioned by the New Zealand Railways department 
which had recommended that the rail network be electrified, the development of an 
underground system in Auckland, greater integration of rail and bus services and a 
single transport authority (Dickson, 1954; Mees & Dodson, 2002). He had also 
advised the original special committee that motorways could ‘kill two birds with one 
stone’ by catering for both cars and bus transit (Dickson, 1954, p. 1111; Harris, 
2005). Aside from the head engineer the rest of the technical advisory committee was 
made up of representatives from Auckland’s twenty-two municipalities, all of whom 
sent their traffic engineers, and one rail representative (Mees & Dodson, 2002).   
The committee considered the recommendations made in the Railways department 
report against the proposal of the municipal road planners and National Roads Board 
to develop a network of motorways and a bridge across the Auckland Harbour 
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 (Gunder, 2002; Mees & Dodson, 2002). Reflecting the composition of the 
committee, it unsurprisingly recommended the motorway scheme justifying their 
decision in the following manner: 
The individual has been freed from the absolute dependence on tramways and 
railways with their inflexible routes… The pattern of travel has become more 
diffused and traffic cannot now be channelled along a few fixed routes with the 
same destination. There is a rising curve of motor usage and a decline in the use of 
public transportation (ARPA, 1956, p. 5). 
Elsewhere it was observed the motor vehicle ‘is probably the greatest mechanical 
convenience man [sic] has yet devised for himself’ (ARPA, 1956, p. 87). Following 
their recommendations construction began on the motorways and the Auckland 
Harbour Bridge and by the end of the 1970s most of the proposed network was 
completed (Mees & Dodson, 2002). The initial development of the motorways as 
Figure 4.2 highlights also entailed attempts to convince the public of the value of 
investing in ‘modern roads’.  
 
Figure 4.2. Visual representation of Auckland’s proposed motorway system included in a document 
explaining the district scheme for Auckland. Harris (2007b, p. 17) notes ‘the resemblance to early 
landscape paintings, of the kind that are devoid of people save for a sheperherd or two and some ruins, 
is no doubt unintentional but nonetheless striking’. Source: ACC (1958).  
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 Another important development which proceeded the 1955 Master Transportation 
Plan, and is often overlooked in accounts of the rise of the car in Auckland (e.g., 
Gunder, 2002; Harris, 2005; Mees & Dodson, 2002), was the dismantling and 
replacement of the city’s extensive tram network with electrically powered trolley 
and diesel buses between 1946 and 1956 (see Stewart, 1993, 1996, 1997). Figure 4.3 
illustrates how prior to this point cars had to compete with both trams and buses for 
road space. The introduction of buses was justified on the basis that by not requiring 
tracks they were both less costly to maintain and more flexible than tramways 
(Stewart, 1993, 1996, 1997). 
 
Figure 4.3. Peak hour traffic congestion into Auckland’s central business district. Source: ARPA 
(1956). 
Since 1955 pro-automobile policies have remained entrenched institutionally and 
intellectually in Auckland transport planning (Hickman et al., 2014; Mees & Dodson, 
2007). This brief overview of the history of Auckland’s urban form and transport 
infrastructures can usefully be situated in relation to renewed consideration in 
geography of the ‘counterfactual’ (Gilbert & Lambert, 2010), or in Massey’s (2005, 
pp. 111-117) terms, ‘possibility’, ‘chance’, ‘undecidability’ and ‘happenstance’. 
Pooley’s (2010) counterfactual historical geography of twentieth-century Britain is 
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 particularly thought-provoking in the current context. Drawing on historical and 
contemporary research on travel and transport he has sought to envisage what current 
transport infrastructures, patterns of individual mobility and urban life might look 
like if a decision had of been made to prohibit the ownership of private cars in 1910. 
Patterns of everyday mobility, Pooley (2010, p. 266) contends, ‘would not have 
differed significantly from today so long as other forms of transport had remained or 
expanded to cope with this demand’. Under this scenario, however, journeys would 
likely have been planned in alternative ways, ‘may have been qualitatively different 
from travel today’, and might have resulted in particular population groups such as 
women being disadvantaged (2010, p. 266). Importantly, a ‘landscape without cars 
would probably also have altered the form of cities, with services provided closer to 
where people live, and levels of air pollution substantially lower’ (2010, p. 266).  
In Auckland, even if the committee had recommended the New Zealand Railways 
department proposal the city would be by no means ‘car-free’ given the various 
changes that favoured the car from the 1920s onwards. It is likely the city’s urban 
form and subsequent approaches to planning and policy, however, might have been 
less car-centric (see Harris (2007a) for an interesting discussion of an ‘alternative 
Auckland’). Recent political events indicate changes are beginning to occur albeit 
slowly. These include the formation of a new ‘super-city’ council in 2010 (which 
amalgamated eight local councils and one regional council) and the election and re-
election of Len Brown, a strong public transport advocate, as mayor, and investment 
in public transport infrastructure. Notable recent developments include the opening 
of Britomart (2003), a central city railway station, and the purpose-built Northern 
Busway (2008), introduction of a new integrated ticketing system (2012) and the 
operation of the first electric trains (2014; nearly a century after they were first 
proposed) (see Auckland Council, 2014; Auckland Transport, 2014). In 2012, public 
transport trips exceeded 70 million for the first time since the tram lines were 
removed in 1956 (Auckland Transport, 2014). Despite these increases, 85% of all 
trips within the region continue to be made by car (Auckland Council, 2014) and 
Auckland has one of the highest levels of car ownership in the world (Auckland 
Regional Council, 2005). Unsurprisingly automobility continues to be the dominant 
habit infrastructure that shapes people’s habits, meanings and experiences of 
mobility in the city.   
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 4.4.2 Making sense of and experiencing everyday mobility in 
Auckland 
A number of participants reflected on the ways in which the urban form of Auckland 
and other cities in New Zealand had contributed to the development of a certain 
‘mindset’. Brian who was born in the city and has commuted to work by car all his 
working life was relatively apologetic about his continued car use throughout his 
interview. He initially suggested the weather and Auckland’s inadequate public 
transport system were the main reasons for why he continues to drive (see Section 
5.1). Upon further questioning he rather defensively attributed his car use to the 
‘Kiwi mindset’ that ‘we’ve always driven so we’ll always drive’. In places such as 
New York and London he later elaborated there is ‘a different mindset’ towards the 
car because they have ‘very good public transport system[s]’. In contrast, he felt that 
there is ‘a way to go yet [before] public transport in Auckland is … close to being 
there’. To further support this point he observed how he has or would also drive in 
most major cities in Australia. For Brian then his and others car use has become 
normalised through inadequate public transport provision. Similarly, Mike a regular 
cycle commuter who has been living in the city since 2006 was aware of how 
previous political decisions have had a lasting effect on the city and its people. In his 
view there needs to be a change of culture as well as infrastructure: 
… I think New Zealand is a wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing you know? Like we 
pretend to be all fantastical and we are not. … [T]here needs [to be] a culture shift. I 
think Auckland just needs a kick in the pants to be honest and they kind of have 
[had one]. There were some really bad … political decisions made back in the day 
by some really right wing people and there were some knife edge things that 
happened it could have swung either way and it would have changed the way that 
Auckland … works. And … it is … overcoming norms … and getting away from 
these central concepts … of the car and the freedom that a car involves. And I'm not 
saying that you have to take freedom fully away from people but I think that you 
need to give people options and I don't think those options are fully provided 
currently. They are just coming at it from a bad angle eh? Because everyone now 
that they are so dependent on cars is saying ‘build more motorways’ and it is a 
limited mind set [that] will only get you so far. 
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 Brian and Mike’s accounts illustrate how the promotion of the car in Auckland has 
contributed to the formation of the city’s habit infrastructures, which again is 
understood as a particular assemblage of the social and the material. Moreover, as 
Mike emphasises these habit infrastructures continue to (re)produce predominantly 
(auto)mobile subjectivities which Brian embodies. For Dewey (1922a) the social 
customs or collective habits of a specific time and place shape the actions and 
thoughts of individuals. In his view the ‘assimilation of [one’s] own acts to the 
pattern’ of the activities of those who ‘are already there’ is a ‘prerequisite of a share 
therein, and hence of having any part in what is going on’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 58). He 
uses the rather fitting metaphor of a road to illustrate his point: 
Few persons have either the energy or the wealth to build private roads to travel 
upon. They find it convenient, ‘natural’, to use the roads that already there; while 
unless their private roads connect at some point with the highway they cannot build 
them even if they would (Dewey, 1922a, p. 59).    
Edensor (2006) and Paterson (2007) have, in a corresponding manner, emphasised 
how (auto)mobile subjectivities take on multiple and localised forms as they emerge 
out of the intricate interplay between daily practice, social norms, popular culture, 
rules and regulations, resistance and surveillance. Such subjectivities as Brian and 
Mike highlight became apparent in the way people made sense of their experiences 
of everyday mobility in Auckland.   
Olivia who was living in London before immigrating to Auckland six years ago, 
observed how ‘much  easier [it was] to get around [as] there is less traffic and it takes 
about a quarter of the time to get anywhere’. She explained how she had previously 
driven in London until the congestion charge was introduced:  
I preferred driving even though it took about the same time … but then they put in 
the [congestion charge] … and you couldn’t drive certain ways and … the parking 
started to dry up. So in the end I could only go by train. I didn't have an option.  
Since moving to Auckland she has mostly lived within walking distance of work. 
Although work is ‘a ten minute walk’ up the hill from her current property she 
admitted initially driving ‘a lot because … [she was] really lazy whereas now it is 
more and more [she does not] take the car’. Upon first arriving in Auckland, 
however, she ‘live[d] over on the Shore [which] would take maybe thirty minutes in 
traffic and outside of traffic maybe fifteen minutes’ to get to work. Reflecting on 
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 driving in London she suggested it was not really ‘traffic’ though because ‘everyone 
is very polite’. ‘You just patiently wait’ and it ‘is just a bit more relaxed and stress 
levels are down’. She went on to explain as it is a different type of driving you are 
required to become a different ‘car-driver’ (Lupton, 1999; Sheller & Urry, 2000) as a 
result: 
I've been driving since I was seventeen because my dad is all about cars. So I’ve 
driven all over [the UK]. … But you have to learn to drive aggressively [in London] 
compared to here. This is a different type of driving [than what] I was trained in 
[laughs]. … I've never experienced people cutting me up. … [B]ecause you don't 
have to be as snidey and tough I think the [laughs while saying] driving is not so 
good. [P]eople aren't used to having to drive very aggressively and know what they 
are doing and know what is going on around them. ... So it is a different kind of 
driving where you are driving almost in allowance for other people not knowing 
how to drive on the road. And that's a generalisation for everybody. [As] I don't 
have to [drive aggressively] … anymore it is very relaxing driving now. 
Olivia was not alone in noticing how the habits, meanings and experiences associated 
with her (auto)mobile subjectivity had changed as a result of living in Auckland. 
Beth and Jack moved to Auckland eight years ago from the UK for lifestyle reasons. 
They outlined the various benefits and challenges of living and bringing up children 
in Auckland rather than their native Newcastle upon Tyne. Not having any ‘family 
support’ they suggested has meant they have become a ‘very tight unit’ with the 
children being ‘are very family focused’. In one of their many extended discussions 
they reflected on Auckland’s driving culture: 
Beth: I was telling Jack about this the other day. … I was saying in England 
travelling [the] distance [I do to work] would not have seemed such a 
big thing. But I think it is a cultural thing in New Zealand and in 
Auckland. … [I]f anyone has to get on the motorway basically it 
becomes this big thing about what a big journey you've got. And I've 
heard that so many times and thought why are people whinging like this 
because gosh in England travelling up the road that far is not really bad. 
…  I've got caught up in that Auckland culture … thinking I've got a 
commute when really it is not even a commute is it? […] I've got caught 
up mentally in that culture. So now I've got this tiny little [commute] 
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 and people are like [puts on a different voice] 'oh you've gone to 
Ellerslie' like it is the jungle and it is not a commute really.   
Jack:  Because I use to commute between Newcastle and Sunderland going 
through the Tynne Tunnel and it wasn't a bother. 
Beth:  It is probably the same distance I'm travelling and that's not a bother. 
And it wasn't a bother when I use to travel … from Peterlee to 
Newcastle or vice versa. [Y]ou were just travelling. I must admit the 
motorway wasn't as jammed as it is here so maybe that is why people 
get feed up. 
Over the course of this interaction we see how Beth reflects on how through her 
experiences of driving as well as interactions and conversations with work colleagues 
and friends she has come to understand that her commute is a ‘big journey’ despite 
the fact that back in the UK she would have perhaps interpreted it differently. This 
occurs because ‘if an activity which is an interaction of various factors, or a grouped 
activity, comes to consciousness it seems natural that it should take the form of an 
emotion, belief or purpose that reflects the interaction, that it should be an ‘our’ 
consciousness or a ‘my’ consciousness’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 62).  
In Section 4.3 it was observed how the ‘structure of auto space’ tends to normalise 
car use (Urry, 2006, p. 19). Notably, Beth and Jack initially struggled to explain why 
they had rarely used or even contemplated using public transport in Auckland. Jack 
noted that living in Newcastle he would regularly ‘use the bus, the metro and train to 
get to Sunderland’. Beth initially suggested it was probably ‘because [they] knew it’ 
having ‘grown up there’ whereas they ‘don’t really know it [in Auckland]’. Picking 
up on this Jack observed: 
And I wouldn't know how to get a bus see from here to school say I had to rely on 
public transport. All I would be able to know is to walk along where the end where 
the diary is and look for the bus stops and stop at each one as it went down to 
school. … [W]hereas in England there is that much because we used the Metro and 
the buses a lot. It was easier to access them.  
In his attempt to find an explanation he further reflected on living in Newcastle: ‘If 
we lived closer to Auckland city and the parking was a problem like it is in 
Newcastle at times […] we would look at the suitable transport’. ‘I think that is why 
we use to use the Metro or bus to get in’. At which point Beth observed ‘[y]ou don’t 
147 
 have to take the car’. They highlight as a result how in comparison to Auckland at 
least, the habit infrastructures of Newcastle are not only less auto-dependent but as 
Maureen observed in a London context, encourage you to ‘think about not using the 
car’. Reflecting Maureen’s sentiments a number of New Zealand born participants 
such as Tom and Lydia discussed how their experiences of living in London had 
encouraged them to reconsider their (auto)mobile subjectivities.  
Tom has been back in Auckland for almost two years after living and working in 
London on a two year youth mobility visa with his partner. He was a ‘lot keener to 
use the train coming back’ and noted that it had actually ‘improved a lot since [they] 
left’. The close proximity of Kingston railway station to their shared flat also made it 
really easy to ‘just go and grab it’. In explaining that if it was ‘a bit further away’ he 
perhaps ‘would [not] use it as much’, Tom reflected upon how he had changed since 
being back: 
It is actually funny … [because] when you are in London … you walk 
everywhere…. [E]ven though you have a car it is quicker and … easier to walk and 
you can just get on a tube and go. Probably don't walk as much as we use to … 
because we have cars and we can park fairly easily. So that's something we feel a 
bit guilty about actually [laughs]. Should probably walk around more. 
He went on to suggest that he has ‘kind of gotten back into the Kiwi way of life’ 
which is ‘a bit more laid back [as] you don't have to worry about walking to … and 
then getting the tube’:  
[Y]ou just … jump in your car and go. You kind of tend to love your car a lot more. 
Like when we were in the UK we we're always like ‘oh man we will be walking so 
much more’. Like we [thought] we [would] be walking from Kingsland to 
Ponsonby [as] that's kind of normal [in London] and it won’t be an issue but we 
don't. […] [Y]ou get out of that habit. I think for a while we were walking a bit 
more but then you just kind of stop walking. And it is probably the fact that there is 
a lot more distance between your friend's houses and you can't just get a train there 
you have to drive basically.  
Thus Tom illustrates how the auto-dependent habit infrastructures of Auckland 
‘coerces’ people to live ‘their lives in [the seamless], spatially stretched and time-
compressed ways’ the car makes possible (Urry, 2004, p. 28, original emphasis). 
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 Lydia, who has now been back in Auckland for three years, talked about ‘the shock 
of coming home and driving a car or having someone drive you and … having one 
engine ... powering a few people to drive a distance is quite a crazy luxury’. ‘Because 
beforehand [she] had just thought, assumed that you had to have a car, and it was 
normal and everyone has a car and never really questioned it’: 
[When I got back though] I didn’t want a car [as they are] too expensive and I'd 
done without it in London and I was like maybe I can do without it here. It is kind 
of unusual but maybe it is possible [laughs]. So yeah that's why I was like [I] 
definitely [need to find a place to live somewhere] central. 
Living in London she observed ‘really influenced’ her and her husband’s ‘thinking’ 
in that they ‘thought … it is actually just a luxury to have a vehicle … for two people 
or … just for one person and do we really need to do that’. Subsequently they 
decided to join to the Cityhop car sharing scheme which has a parking station ‘super 
conveniently’ located close to where they live. They ‘try to not to [use it too 
frequently though] because it is [laughs while saying] actually quite expensive’. Here 
the fact there is a supermarket in close proximity, Lydia is within a short walk from 
work, and her partner works from home, all support their auto-independence: ‘If we 
[says while laughing] move anywhere else we are screwed’. For example, ‘if they 
moved a bit more of a villa or somewhere that is not as close then [they] would have 
to cave and get a car because it's just a bit harder’. 
Despite the suitability of their current location she went on to observe how outside of 
the working week it can get a ‘little tricky’ both logistically and socially as not 
everyone agrees with their decision to not own a car: 
[O]ur friends are really nice to us and pick us up all the time. I don't know how long 
that is going to last. [W]e did get a lot of flack when we first kind of came back and 
we were like 'nah we're not getting a car' everyone was like 'what's the hell wrong 
with you?' 'What are going to do? You are screwed' [laughs]. But um we resisted 
that and [laughs] stuck with it. 
Lydia’s account reveals how the particularities of Auckland’s habit infrastructures 
continually co-constitute the subjectivities of those who co-exist in diverse ways with 
and without cars. Correspondingly, the next section reflects on how the habit 
infrastructures of London in part promote and produce the (public)mobile subject. 
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 4.5 Habit infrastructures II: (Public)mobility subjectivities 
[…] I get to the Walkabout in Shepherds Bush shortly before kick-off. I was 
pleased when Delwyn told me he was watching the game here as it is one of those 
‘Kiwi’ institutions in London I’ve always meant to visit. Entering the bar I’m struck 
by the number of New Zealand guys everywhere. I semi-seriously joke to myself 
that I should think about trying to do some participant recruitment. Walking through 
the bar trying to find Delwyn and his mates I observe a couple of guys dressed in 
All Blacks jerseys having a conversation: ‘Did you see Robo has got a new 
girlfriend? She is a good chick and [raises his voice with excitement] she has got a 
car man!’ […] [London Field Notes, Saturday 20 October 2012]. 
London has one of the most intricate public transport systems in the world which 
reflects the scale and complexity of the city and the fragmented and disjointed 
manner in which it has developed (Pooley et al., 2005). As the opening excerpt 
illustrates these transport systems have played significant role in ensuring that car 
use and ownership in parts of London has and is increasingly becoming a rarity. 
Reflecting its complex and fragmented history of social, political and infrastructural 
development there were many moments of ‘possibility’, ‘chance’ and ‘happenstance’ 
(Massey, 2005, pp. 111-117) which could have altered the current habit 
infrastructures of the city (see Barker & Robbins, 1963, 1974). For example, the 
London Underground which today forms an integral component of the city’s 
transport network was by no means a certainty. The construction of underground 
lines had been considered as early as the mid-1830s by would-be railway promoters 
but doing so presented significant challenges. The ‘law obliged anyone who 
burrowed under buildings to buy them outright, even though [they] might undermine 
only a part of the foundations’ (Barker & Robbins, 1963, p. 100). Due to the 
extremely high cost of property in central London ‘it followed that only routes likely 
to pay their way were those which ran under roads and open spaces and passed 
underneath as few buildings as possible’ (Barker & Robbins, 1963, p. 100). Robert 
Stephenson, for instance, had considered ‘extending the future London & 
Birmingham Railway to the Thames’ by running a line under ‘Gower Street and 
down to the north end of Waterloo Bridge’ (Barker & Robbins, 1963, p. 100). But 
the ‘hazards of constructing a railway just below the surface in the midst of 
expensive property, where the slightest subsidence would lead inevitably to a 
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 succession of extravagant claims for compensation’ were viewed to be too great 
(Barker & Robbins, 1963, p. 100). 
Another scheme which proposed to ‘run from King’s Cross, down the valley of the 
river Fleet as far as the main Holborn-Cheapside road at Snow Hill’ also came to 
nothing (Barker & Robbins, 1963, p. 100). Importantly, it attracted the interest of 
Charles Pearson who was to become a City Solicitor and a leading promoter of 
several schemes (Barker & Robbins, 1963; Day & Reed, 2010). He helped establish 
the City Terminus Company in 1852 with the intention of building an underground 
railway from Farringdon to King’s Cross (Day & Reed, 2010). Despite receiving 
support from the City of London for the plan the company struggled to proceed as 
the main-line railway companies were not prepared to ‘bear the risks’ for what was 
considered ‘an adventurous speculation’ (Barker & Robbins, 1963, p. 104). 
Recognising the ‘financial possibilities’ of such a venture, the Metropolitan Railway 
soon developed alternative scheme with a Bill supporting it passing through 
Parliament unopposed in 1854 (Barker & Robbins, 1963). The outbreak of the 
Crimean War meant that like Pearson and the City Terminus, the company struggled 
to raise capital to support the scheme. It was not until 1859 that sufficient capital 
could be raised to allow the construction of the line to begin (Barker & Robbins, 
1963). Opening in 1863 the line was extremely successful carrying 9.5 million 
passengers in its first twelve months which resulted in a flood of applications to 
parliament for new railways in London (Simpson, 2003).   
More recently, the establishment of the Congestion Charge Zone in 2003, as Olivia’s 
account highlighted (Section 4.4.2), has played a important role in not only reducing 
traffic volumes but also the various infrastructures that support the car such as the 
availability and cost of parking. A recent TFL report notes how over the past decade 
there has been ‘a progressive decline in the volume of traffic’ especially in central 
London where ‘vehicle kilometres fell by 23 per cent between 2000 and 2012’ (TfL, 
2014, p. 13). Correspondingly, it is observed that the introduction of congestion 
charging has ‘had a significant impact in shifting people away from using cars, 
contributing to an overall reduction in vehicle kilometres in London of 11 per cent’ 
over this same period (TfL, 2014, p. 13). The introduction and success of this 
scheme, however, was far from certain. Richardson (2004, p. 488) has argued that 
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 the possibility of making such ‘radical (and perhaps less consensual)’ decisions on 
managing traffic was only possible in London. This is because ‘powers over public 
transport have remained more complete’ in London than other UK local authorities 
whose power have been ‘stripped through deregulation and privatization of public 
transport in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Richardson, 2004, p. 488). Equally important 
though was ‘visionary political leadership’ of Mayor Ken Livingston who decided to 
proceed ‘despite the extent of expressed opposition’ among London citizens and 
especially key stakeholders such as the business community (Richardson, 2004, p. 
488). Meanwhile, Shove and Walker observe the success of this scheme was ‘by no 
means guaranteed’ as ‘the imposition of the cordon and the charge represented an 
intervention in the complex ‘living’ system that is London’ (2010, pp. 473-474). In 
reality its ‘effect’ was ‘strongly mediated by existing routines, by location, by both 
the sociotechnical fabric of actual and potential mobility (means, modes, times etc.) 
and by a parallel patterning of destinations, obligations and related practices’ (Shove 
& Walker, 2010, p. 474).  
4.5.1 London: Life without a car 
In London, as a number of Auckland participants observed (Section 4.4.2), the 
normality of the car is starting to be significantly challenged for various reasons 
including the city’s complex and extensive transport system and congestion charge. 
Car use and ownership varies widely within London. As Figure 4.4 highlights when 
compared to Central London (2%), car use is significantly higher in Inner (21%) and 
Outer London (47%) (TfL, 2015). These differences corresponding with earlier 
arguments (4.3.1) are reflective of different histories of urban planning and 
development within London (see Barker & Robbins, 1963, 1974; Headicar, 2009). 
When compared with other parts of the UK rates of car use and ownership both in 
Inner and Outer London are significantly lower than any other major city (Morris et 
al., 2014).  
The primary aim of this section is to reflect on how London’s habit infrastructures 
produce and promote what this chapter terms (public)mobility subjectivities. To do 
so it draws exclusively on the New Zealand migrants reflections on their experiences 
of living in and around the city. These subjectivities like those of automobility are 
recognised as being multiple and continually reproduced by habit infrastructures. In 
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 exploring these subjectivities the section seeks to question Urry’s (2004, p. 36) 
assertion that any post-car system is unlikely to see the ‘dominance’ of forms of 
‘public mobility’ such as ‘buses, trains, coaches and ships’ re-established. Given the 
depth and extent of (auto)mobile subjectivities he may very well be correct. By 
focusing on the production of the (public)mobile subject this section will attempt to 
problematize his claim, however, that a post-car system will necessarily entail the 
creation of modes of ‘individualised movement that automobility presupposes and 
has simultaneously brought into being’ (Urry, 2004, p. 36). 
 
Figure 4.4. Mode share for trips wholly within Central, Inner and Outer London (average day, seven 
day week. 2011/12 to 2013/14 combined). Source: TfL (2015). 
Earlier we saw that for some Auckland participants how their experiences of 
London’s habit infrastructures brought into question the normality of the car (Section 
4.4.2). This was also the case for Catherine who travelled by tube every day from 
Fulham to Kings Cross where she worked as a business administrator in a nursing 
agency: ‘You don’t realise how much you use a car until you get over here. I 
wouldn’t dream of having a car in London’. She and others such as Adam a foreign 
exchange trader explained this was because the ‘UK is better set up in terms of 
transport’: 
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 There is a lot of national rail that you can get to every major town and suburb. Of 
course in London you have the tube which you can get to every nook and cranny … 
just about. And if you can't you can always take a bus. [T]hat is one massive 
difference that the UK has over New Zealand. 
Despite this, Adam like many others still lamented that he misses ‘having a car’ and 
‘doing your own thing’: ‘Like being able to drive to the beach or the golf course or 
just like someone's house even. It is just ease of access. [It is] off your own back 
instead of having to wait for public transport all the time and go through that sort of 
kerfuffle’. Jane elaborated how discussions with friends and family who had lived in 
London had made her aware of such ‘kerfuffle’ before she arrived: ‘commuting [by 
public transport to] work is just what happens and [so] you have to deal with it’. She 
discussed how she was starting to think about heading back to New Zealand as ‘there 
is only so much of London that you can take’ for various reasons: 
I think sometimes it is just […] all the people [you encounter every day]. I mean I 
really like the public transport [as] I drive at home but I hate driving and I like to be 
able to just sit on the train in the morning and not have to think. But then there are 
also times when it's like it would be nice to just jump in the car and drive 10 
minutes down the road [to work] than rather having to wait for a [extends out the 
word] bus and that sort of thing. The weather, definitely the weather [laughs]. 
Here Jane captures how her (auto)mobile self, corresponding with the earlier 
discussion (Section 4.3.2), continues to shape the ways in which she understands and 
makes sense of her (public)mobile self. Elsewhere, she re-iterated how in contrast to 
her previous ‘10 minute drive’ she now has significantly longer days as her commute 
adds ‘an hour either side of [the working] day’. Over time she has learnt to adjust, 
however, to the demands of traveling in London: 
[My commute] is not too bad. It is about an hour door to door which obviously 
quite long compared with at home. Like I have to [travel] [a]cross London. So I 
have to go up to north London and I compare that to my flatmate who goes outside 
of London whose journey is only twenty minutes. I don't mind it I think because 
I've been doing it for so long and you kind of expect that you have to travel for a 
long time to work when you’re living in London. [So] it doesn't bother me. 
Above Jane observes how over time it becomes normal to travel long distances in 
London, it is simply what you do. In reflecting on the amount of time it took to get 
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 anywhere Chantelle attested to the almost ‘mystical’ quality of London’s habit 
infrastructures: ‘Even though everything is further away somehow it seems easier. [It 
requires] less effort I really don't understand it’. Especially as it ‘still takes a lot of 
planning’: 
Like back home if I was talking to someone and they said come out. … I could 
make a decision and … be there within the hour if I had to have a shower and get 
ready. And it would be like 10 minutes to get there. Whereas now I'll be like I've 
got to have a shower and get ready and I've got to check the train times. Ok there is 
a train in like another 40 minutes so I'll be there in just under two hours [laughs]. 
Richard also reflected at length on how he has reorganised his life around the tube. In 
this context Dewey (1922a) reminds us that habits do not exist in an ‘insulated 
compartment’ and operate ‘without affecting or being affected by others’ (p. 38). 
Instead ‘character’, or the self, is due to the ‘interpenetration of habits’ (p. 38). This 
became apparent as Richard discussed what might be understood as the gradual 
emergence of his (public)mobile subjectivity or self: 
Initial[ly] [it] was quite odd when I first got here … in 2003. … I felt like [it was] 
very expensive … and I didn't have a car so I didn't have that freedom of owning a 
car. All those sorts of things whereas … now … I don't begrudge the money I spend 
on it. It gets me home every night. It is also very easy on the weekends I can just … 
jump on. … You can have five or six beers and just get on the tube and go home. 
You don't have to worry. You never have to leave your car. When I was in 
Wellington one night I'd had a few beers after work. I left my car in the carpark it 
was broken into. You just don't have those sorts of things. The tube is just very, 
very easy in that regard. [I]n winter it is freezing cold. You jump down there and it 
is warm and it is dry. And it is sort of the magic steel bus that gets you home and 
somehow it always gets you home. […]. 
On the one hand he has thus come to associate the tube with freedom, albeit a 
different sort of freedom, from the car. He went on to elaborate at the same time how 
London’s habit infrastructures also encourage you to ‘adapt your lifestyle’ but in a 
different way to the car: 
[A] lot of the things I do is to minimise the impact of the transport on my life. So I 
live in a flat that is close to the tube … even though I walk further [to a less 
crowded station] it is to minimise the impact on me personally. I try not to ever 
double commute. So on a Friday night if I'm going out in central London I'm not 
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 going to go home first. .... I couldn't bear the thought of coming to central London 
on a Saturday to pick something up that I could have picked up on a Friday. [T]here 
is no point sitting on the train because it is half an hour, twenty five minutes each 
way. You are essentially wasting fifty minutes of your life. […] Where at home 
[i.e., New Zealand] it is very easy to just walk down stairs and jump in the car or go 
out. … I think that is a mentality shift that [happens] when you have to go and jump 
on the tube.  
As Tom observed earlier (Section 4.3.2) the habit infrastructures of London often 
coerce you to walk rather than drive more. This was a common experience for most 
participants including Jean who observed how she no longer has to wear a thick coat 
during winter in Auckland: 
I guess in the end it just gets that little bit colder doesn't it … and because I would 
have to spend a lot of time outside. Walking to the tube and at the tube station on 
the platform…. And then I would have to walk from the tube station to school, 
which [was] about fifteen minute[s]. … So yeah there was a lot more time outside 
[whereas] the car is warm […]. 
Catching public transport often results in increased exposure to daily and seasonal 
variations in the weather (see also Chapter 5). London’s climate in turn, as Maureen 
noted, requires one to adjust their wardrobe accordingly as well as often encouraging 
the purchase of one or more umbrellas: 
I’ve got four umbrellas now […].One that I take if I think the weather is going to be 
windy and wet because the weather is quite strong. And a much lighter one if it is 
just going to be showery. And then a big non-foldup one that I take if I'm not 
having to carry it with me into work or something, like if I'm just going into the 
shops … Yeah I've got about three foldup ones … and a non-foldup one. I've 
certainly got more umbrellas than I've ever had in my life now […]. 
London’s habit infrastructures also gave rise to particular habits, which to reiterate 
are for Dewey certain modes of response. Just as Olivia and Beth observed in 
relation to driving in Auckland, the existing customs of the city played an important 
role in shaping one’s habits. Catherine lamented the fact everyone was always in 
hurry and impatient: ‘[There is] the pushing and everyone rushing up the stairs … to 
get there that point one of a second ahead of everyone else’. She explained how she 
has started to adopt some of these habits: 
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 I've definitely started like I'll walk down the escalator I won't stand. Half the time 
I'll walk up them unless they are like those really steep ones like Hyde Park [says 
while laughing] Corner then I'm just like I'll chill out and stand on the side. But … 
I definitely have figured out where to stand on the platforms just for the commute to 
work because it is so hard. … [I]f I do end up having to change … to get the 
Piccadilly … [I] know where to stand there to get on the Wimbledon for the exit at 
Fulham.  
Similarly, Rosie observed how you ‘always stand to the right’ on the escalators in 
London whereas you ‘stand all over them’ in New Zealand. She noted how like other 
‘Londoners’ she has started to ‘get a bit annoyed … when people don't get out of 
your way when you are trying to get off the tube’:  
And you are like [puts on a frustrated sounding voice] 'ah these new people'. And 
I[’ve] … probably become a bit more grumpy … I don't know if grumpy is the right 
word. But a bit more sort of ‘why don't they know how to do things already’, 
[laughs] which someone probably did to you when you first arrived. 
Meanwhile, Charles and a number of other participants discussed how he purposely 
catches an earlier tube in the morning and positions himself on the platform where he 
is most likely to get a seat ‘as … it is a nice[r] way to start the day than standing’. As 
he gets into work earlier this enables him to ‘either go to the gym in the morning 
before work or have a coffee and relax before I start the day with the paper’. In 
describing his return commute he went on to suggest as a result of travelling on the 
tube your personal comfort zones change: 
It is just public transport. So there are just lots of people and sometimes you are 
very close to them and you kind of get used to that. … I guess comparing [it] with 
New Zealand that would feel a bit odd, people standing so close to you. But your 
personal comfort zone gets narrower. You can't avoid it really. You can't say I'll 
stay late because the rush is hour is from four thirty [1630] till eight [2000] so yeah. 
In this way Charles again illustrates one of the many ways in which (public)mobility 
subjectivities are co-constituted by London’s habit infrastructure. In some ways these 
subjectivities correspond with existing (auto)mobile subjectivities, for instance, in 
the way that they are both simultaneously a means of liberation and means of 
domination. Much like the car many people also hold a degree of ambivalence 
towards these public transport systems and the socialities they co-constitute. 
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 4.6 Conclusion 
Reflecting the growing prominence of libertarian paternalism or nudge theory within 
behaviour change, transport and climate change policy-making debates this chapter 
has sought to reveal the limits of such an approach. Libertarian paternalists as it was 
observed in Chapter 2 tend to understand humans as primarily irrational beings who 
depend on various biases to make choices and whose decisions are significantly 
shaped by the design of everyday settings and social norms. Focusing primarily on 
systems of automobility and public transport this chapter has highlighted the 
limitations of nudge theory in four main ways.  
First, the chapter commenced by outlining how the notion of choice architecture by 
being attentive to the ways in which social and physical contexts shape choices 
advances existing individualistic understandings of the external environments of 
action. Nudging involves purposefully making small and inexpensive changes to 
these choice architectures in a way that encourages people to make better choices 
without simultaneously preventing any options. Examples in a mobility context it 
was observed include reducing the number of signs and posts and representing 
information in ways that encourage people to make more sustainable choices. It was 
argued that given libertarian paternalists focus on individual choice, emphasise on 
making minor and low cost changes to existing ‘choice architectures’ and 
unwillingness to restrict or regulate any choices is entirely inadequate given the 
large-scale transformations climate change responses demand. Another substantial 
limitation of nudge approaches are they neglect to consider how choices are 
conditioned, enabled, and in the case of automobility often made ‘compulsory’ 
(Soron, 2009, p. 181), by pre-existing infrastructures, norms and subjectivities. The 
Deweyan-inspired concept of ‘habit infrastructures’ was then introduced as a 
framework through which to recognise how individuals always retain the ability to 
act upon their social and physical environment while simultaneously being shaped or 
conditioned by those environments.   
Second, the mobilities literature on automobility was explored as a way of 
demonstrating the extent to which individual decisions and preferences are always 
pre-conditioned by the physical and social environment or habit infrastructures. In 
the process the lack of politics in Urry’s (2000, 2004) account of the system of 
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 automobility was addressed following Paterson (2007) in two ways. To begin it was 
argued that it was necessary to understand the growth of automobility as an outcome 
of the role it played in supporting economic growth and, therefore, the reproduction 
of the capitalist system and state power. States correspondingly promoted the car 
through road building and developing low-density suburbs, neglecting alternative 
means of transport and heavily subsidising the car. Additionally, states were involved 
in the promotion and production of (auto)mobile subjects who were both orientated 
towards and valued the manner in which the car affords instantaneous, flexible and 
seamless movement. The promotion and production of such subjectivities was 
elaborated through an engagement with both work that has drawn on Michel 
Foucault’s work on governance and governmentality and STS scholars such as 
Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour. It was observed Foucault’s writings have been 
employed to explain how states have sought to proscribe, constrain and limit 
movement with various ‘technologies of government’ (e.g., architectures, road signs, 
rules, regulations) while also regularising it through ‘technologies of the self’ (e.g., 
driver training, motorway codes) to avoid disorder and increase productivity. 
Meanwhile, Haraway and Latour’s metaphors of the cyborg and the hybrid figure 
have been used as a way of accounting for the unique identities that emerge out of 
the intertwining of the driver and the car. Both literatures in different ways draw 
attention to how the emergence and continued reproduction of automobility is both a 
source of liberation and domination. In this context the overlaps between Dewey and 
Foucault’s writings on power and subjectivity and the similarities between STS 
scholars’ arguments and his account of habit and transaction were noted.  
Third, corresponding with these insights the ways in which particular policy and 
planning decisions have shaped Auckland’s urban form and transport systems was 
considered. In particular, specific attention was paid to the 1955 Master 
Transportation Plan which resulted in the development of an extensive network of 
motorways. In doing so the role of the National government and certain key 
individuals such as Goosman and the City Engineer was emphasised in promoting 
roads over rail. These developments it was suggested have in part resulted in the 
continuation of pro-automobile policies and planning and largely ensured that 
automobility remains the dominant habit infrastructure in Auckland. Empirical 
materials collected in Auckland were then drawn upon as a way of illustrating how 
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 these habit infrastructures tend to normalise car use in everyday life and generate 
locally specific habits, meanings, experiences and subjectivities. Consistent with the 
mobilities literature discussed earlier the compulsiveness or coerciveness of the car 
was re-iterated showing how people can become unaware or dismissive of 
alternatives or how those seeking to reduce its role in their life suddenly find 
themselves back behind the wheel or being both reliant upon and criticised by others.  
Fourth, it was suggested that at least in some parts of, particularly central, London 
the normality of the car is starting to be significantly challenged. This was attributed 
in part to the city’s complex public transport network and the introduction of the 
congestion charge in 2003. London, reflecting the extent and depth of (auto)mobile 
subjectivities, highlights how attempts to reduce car dependence will likely require 
attempts to restrict or regulate the car or the central elements of the system. 
Moreover, focusing primarily on tube users it was outlined how the habit 
infrastructures of London in part promote and produce (public)mobile subjectivities. 
Such subjectivities, like those of the automobility, it was suggested are multiple and 
continually reproduced but typically involve a higher degree of organisation, an 
increased level of preparedness for walking and being outside, the development of 
specific habits of (im)mobility and the adoption of different approaches for dealing 
with the proximity of others. The emergence of these subjectivities perhaps also 
indicate that counter to Urry’s (2004) claims, public mobilities rather than car-like 
forms of individualised movement, could very well become a significant component 
of a post-car system.  
Overall, this chapter has aimed to highlight how the Deweyan-inspired notion of 
‘habit infrastructures’ can be used as a framework for understanding how the social 
and physical environments of action continually co-constitute rather than determine 
action. Such an account corresponds with recent scholarship in which ‘the social and 
the technological are imagined as hybrids of human and nonhuman association, with 
infrastructures conceptualized as a sociotechnical assemblage, and urban social life 
as never reducible to the purely human alone’ (Amin, 2014, pp. 137-138). This 
emphasis on association and (re)production which is embodied within the concept of 
habit infrastructures also overlaps with attempts to move beyond Urry’s account of 
how societies simply become ‘locked in’ to the system of automobility (Bohm et al., 
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 2006; Goodwin, 2010). Instead automobility is understood as forever in a state of 
change as it is constantly reconstituted through various social, institutional and 
infrastructural conditions. Dewey’s writings on habit, custom and experience which 
are incorporated into this framework provide a means of understanding such change 
as well as stability. As observed earlier given their similarities, Foucault’s more 
critical analysis of power and power relations might help to complement and 
strengthen this slightly less developed aspect of Dewey’s writings. The next two 
chapters further reflect on how such habit infrastructures mediate people’s 
experiences of mobility in Auckland and London. This chapter has illustrated how 
this provides a useful way of understanding how such experiences are pre-
conditioned and re-constituted by the social and physical environments of action. As 
a metaphor, habit infrastructures are less equipped, however, to account for the 
immediacy and problematic aspects of experience. As a result Dewey’s (1938) 
notion of the situation is introduced as a way of further understanding the context for 
events and meanings and the relationship between habit and thought.
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 Chapter 5. 
Breaking down the ‘barriers’: (Re)turning from 
enclosed to exposed mobility 
5.1 Introduction: The ‘car of the future’, weather and low-
carbon mobility 
On Thursday 3 April 2014 a story was aired on the New Zealand current affairs 
television show Campbell Live about the Tango, an ultra-narrow electric sports car, 
designed and built by Commuter Cars (see Figure 5.1). In his preview the show’s 
host John Campbell remarks how this car could ‘revolutionise [the way] we get about 
town’:  
Now some cities own [hire] bikes, you drive into town or you use public transport, 
rent a bike for an hour or two and then leave it behind and then head out again by 
car or bus, sounds pretty sensible. Not great in the rain and not great if you are 
dressed up. So what say a really tiny car could do something similar in the inner 
city?    
The story begins with a shot of a Tango accelerating away from the camera as the 
female reporter observes: ‘Blink and you’ll miss it. It might not look like your 
average motor vehicle but this is the car of the future’. Viewers learn that the 
promise of the car lies in its small size (~99cm wide and ~257cm long), which its 
inventor Rick Woodbury suggests could help solve traffic congestion and parking 
problems in cities by reducing the size and density of cars (see Commuter Cars 
Corporation, 2015). Despite its size, he assures viewers it does not lack any features 
they have come to expect: ‘[W]e put in a nice stereo system. It has air-conditioning 
and heat. Everything you would want in a regular car’.  
It is later revealed that Woodbury and the Tango have been invited to Auckland by 
IT engineer Toa Greening. Frustrated by the fact the $100 million spent on upgrading 
the South Western motorway had ‘not solved anything’ he thought there ‘had to be a 
better way’. Greening has subsequently proposed setting up a car sharing scheme 
which would make 15,000 Tangos available for Auckland commuters to lease (which 
was turned down by the Auckland Council a week after the show aired). He explains 
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 this would entail ‘work[ing] out what the price point would be for people to get out 
of their big full sized vehicles that are basically hauling air and to get into these 
smaller vehicles’. The story then transitions to footage of vehicles driving through 
central Auckland in the rain. Over the sound of tyres driving on wet roads, the 
reporter muses: ‘Because in Auckland when it rains a car suddenly seems a very 
attractive option’.  
 
Figure 5.1. A front and the side view of the Tango Commuter Car, an ultra-narrow electric sports car 
which its makers suggest could reduce traffic congestion and parking problems in cities such as 
Auckland. Source: Wikimedia Commons (2015a, 2015b). 
The Tango is certainly a unique and original concept. The intention of this chapter is 
not to explore the potential merits, however, of such a technological innovation.  
Instead, as elaborated further below, this chapter seeks to rethink the notion of 
‘barriers’ to behaviour change by focusing primarily on commuter cycling and the 
weather and seasons. What is interesting about this story then is that in the space of a 
five and a half minute clip the weather, or more specifically, rain is mentioned twice. 
Initially the show’s host and later the story’s reporter insinuate that the benefit of the 
car over other modes of mobility such as walking, cycling and public transport is that 
it allows the drivers and passengers ‘cocooned’ inside to essentially travel door to 
door without being subject to the vagaries of the weather. ‘Regular’ cars, as 
Woodbury the Tango’s inventor reminds us, even allow people through the use of 
air-conditioning and heating to modify the car’s internal environment to their own, 
and in some cases others, desired comfort levels as Brian’s account now illustrates.  
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 These ‘affordances’ of comfort were particularly important for participants such as 
Brian who has been commuting by car every day from Takapuna on Auckland’s 
North Shore to his work in Otahuhu for the last 10 years. On the first go-along he 
demonstrated how his Suzuki four door sedan was capable of modifying the micro-
environment (i.e., temperature; air-flow) of the driver and passenger’s sides of the 
car separately. In doing so he once again reiterated his fondness for air-conditioning 
explaining that its arrival in cars ‘has been the best thing since sliced bread’. This 
was a point he elaborated on in the initial interview when discussing comfort:  
If [we] come back to the commute you are obviously going to turn the heater on and 
make sure it is warm or vice versa in the summer to cool [the car] down. … [T]hat's 
probably been valuable when I think about it, an important tool. [O]ver the years as 
modern transport has become better suited to manag[ing] your micro-environment 
you can feel less stressed as a result. I mean in the old days when you didn't have air 
conditioning in cars it got bloody hot [and] the seats were plastic, so you were hot. 
And so you didn't feel as comfortable. But modern technologies I think can improve 
you comfort state significantly.  
Notably, and reflecting the sentiments expressed in the Tango story, he listed the 
weather along with the inadequacy of Auckland’s public transport system as one of 
the reasons why he does not travel to work by ‘other means’: 
Well that’s the moot point. Because given the weather, wet. Often it is wet in 
Auckland. It's actually easier to drive. And that's the issue with Auckland because 
we don't have a sound public transport system even now. It's coming. But over the 
years it wasn't there. And so I've always driven.  
Brian’s account and the Tango story, understood through the lens of transport 
research and policy, tend to suggest that low carbon modes of mobility such as 
cycling face a number of ‘[s]eemingly insurmountable barriers, such as hilly 
topography, high levels of rainfall and cold winters’ (Horton, 2007, p. 133; see DfT, 
2013; Parkin et al., 2007; Thornton et al., 2011).  
This chapter focuses on daily and seasonal fluctuations in weather as these 
‘seemingly insurmountable barriers’ are likely to present a substantial challenge in 
attempts to transition to a low-carbon transport system. Significantly, various studies 
have shown that a variety of weather conditions including rain, snow, wind, and cold 
and hot temperatures, are correlated with observable, and sometimes significant, 
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 declines in numbers of pedestrians (Aultman-Hall et al., 2009), cyclists (Bergström 
& Magnusson, 2003; Heinen et al., 2011; Parkin et al., 2007) and public transport 
passengers (Guo et al., 2007). There are at least three other reasons why weather and 
seasons will likely remain prominent in attempts to decarbonise transport systems.  
First, changing weather and seasonal conditions will continue to influence the ways 
in which cities are experienced, negotiated and inhabited. In fact there is evidence to 
suggest that in many cities, including Auckland (Hennessy et al., 2007) and London 
(Mayor of London, 2011), increased weather variability will be become the norm 
rather than the exception. Second, a number of low-carbon modes of transport such 
as walking, cycling and public transport often involve spending a considerable 
amount of time outside, especially when compared to the car (Böcker et al., 2013; 
Section 4.5.1). Correspondingly, walking and cycling, in particular, might be 
understood as exposed rather than enclosed modes of mobility.  
Third, as Brian illustrates above, there is often more potential for individuals to 
'control' the ways in which the weather and seasons are experienced and negotiated 
in the car (Parkhurst & Parnaby, 2008). There is some scope for policy interventions 
to ‘adjust … climatic conditions’ (Parkin et al., 2007, p. 76) for public transport and 
air-conditioning is increasingly being introduced into many transit spaces and on 
buses and trains in many cities (e.g., TfL, 2014). For example, one of the bus 
operators in Auckland proudly displays on the side of its buses that they are ‘air-
conditioned for your comfort’. Similarly, air-conditioning, or the lack thereof, on 
underground platforms and trains has been the source of ongoing tensions between 
commuters, Transport for London and politicians particularly during the summer 
months when temperatures soar (e.g., Churchill & Morgan, 2014). Such interventions 
in relation to cycling, and to a lesser extent, walking, are ‘generally not possible or 
practical’ (Parkin et al., 2007, p. 76). Some participants observed it was possible, 
however, to avoid getting wet for at least part of their journey by walking underneath 
store frontage or verandas designed for other purposes (e.g., reducing glare; heat) in 
Auckland. Meanwhile, in London and other cities with complex transport networks 
and associated commercial services it is possible to move between locations without 
spending much time outside (see Hitchings, 2010; but also Section 4.5.1). 
Additionally, some cities (e.g., Wellington, New Zealand) have introduced covered 
walkways and waiting shelters for pedestrians at intersections. It would of course be 
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 possible to create covered cycling corridors but they are ‘often costly or otherwise 
impractical within many contexts’ (Parkin et al., 2007, p. 76). Transitions from high 
carbon to low-carbon transport systems will necessarily entail, therefore, not only a 
reconfiguration of infrastructure but also the way many people in car-dependent 
cities negotiate and experience the weather and the seasons (see also Section 4.5.1), 
if and when, they move to more exposed modes of mobility.  
This chapter argues that framing daily and seasonal fluctuations in weather as simply 
‘barriers’ to behaviour change offers little insight into how behaviour change 
initiatives might be designed to support exposed modes of mobility across the 
seasons. This is in large part because understanding weather and seasons in this way 
serves to reinforce particular ways of thinking about behaviour. Dewey’s writings on 
habit, experience and situations are demonstrated to be much more insightful. The 
remainder of the chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 explores what 
various quantitative studies of the impact and effect of hourly, daily and seasonal 
variations in weather, and automated cycle count data from Auckland and London, 
reveal about cycling patterns. It is maintained while these studies highlight daily and 
seasonal variations in cycling volumes they provide no explanation for why these 
trends exist, how or why they have or might change, or how people anticipate, 
experience or negotiate such variations. Section 5.3 argues that if such insights are to 
be generated there is a need to move beyond the notion of barriers to behaviour 
change. Focusing on Brian’s explanation for why he continues to commute by car, 
theories of socio-technical systems, practices and situations are introduced as three 
different but interrelated ways of breaking down these barriers. The next two sections 
then present empirical material from interviews and go-alongs with regular 
commuter cyclists in order to explore how cyclists anticipate, experience and 
negotiate daily and seasonal variations in the weather at home (Section 5.4) and on 
their commute (Section 5.5). In doing so the chapter demonstrates why Dewey’s 
theory of situations when compared provides the best way of understanding the 
continuous and contingent contexts in which these experiences unfold and associated 
habits and meanings emerge. It concludes in Section 5.6 by reflecting on what the 
chapter reveals about the limitations of barriers to behaviour change.  
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 5.2 Quantifying barriers: Cycling, weather and seasons 
Various transport, health and biometeorological studies have sought to investigate 
the impact and effect of hourly, daily and seasonal variations in weather on levels of 
physical activity, activity choices, trip generation, destinations, transport modes, 
routes and departure times (for reviews see Böcker et al., 2013; Chan & Ryan, 2009; 
Koetse & Rietveld, 2009; Tucker & Gilliland, 2007). Section 5.2.1 initially focuses 
on the reported effects that precipitation and temperature have on reported and 
observed numbers of cycle commuters. These two ‘variables’ have been selected as 
they both have received considerable attention in this literature and were frequently 
referred to, precipitation in particular, in regular cycle commuters accounts (see 
Sections 5.4-5.5). Aside from these, a number of participants discussed how daylight 
(i.e., making sure you were ‘seen’; the ability to observe and enjoy one’s 
surroundings) and wind (concern over being ‘blown off’) also altered their 
commuting experience (see also Böcker et al., 2013). Automated cycle count data is 
then presented in Section 5.2.2 as a way of examining seasonal variations in cycling 
volumes in Auckland and London. Section 5.2.3 considers what these studies and 
count data reveal about barriers and why a better understanding is required.  
5.2.1 Effects of precipitation and temperature on cycling 
Precipitation has been reported to be negatively correlated with levels of 
participation in active outdoor leisure activities and positively related to non-active, 
indoor, home-based activities such as watching film and television, internet browsing 
and playing video games (Chan & Ryan, 2009; Tucker & Gilliland, 2007). 
Moreover, the types of trips people make and the modes they use to make them by 
are affected by precipitation. For example, a national travel survey conducted in the 
Netherlands found a significant relationship between precipitation and increases in 
the number of people travelling by car or public transport as large numbers of 
cyclists and pedestrians switch modes (Sabir, 2011). Research from Bergen, Norway 
(Aaheim & Hauge, 2005) and Toronto (Saneinejad et al., 2012) also report that 
precipitation results, albeit to a lesser degree, in a similar shift from active (i.e., 
walking and cycling) to motorized modes of transport.  
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 Precipitation has been identified as one of the main reasons for not cycling in 
questionnaire research on active transportation from Sweden (Bergström & 
Magnusson, 2003), the Netherlands (Heinen et al., 2011) and Australia (Nankervis, 
1999). The negative effect of precipitation on cycling has also been found in studies 
of observed cycle counts in Melbourne (Nankervis, 1999), Montreal (Miranda-
Moreno & Nosal, 2011), Vienna (Brandenburg et al., 2007) and the Netherlands 
(Thomas & DeRobertis, 2013) and automated cycle counts in Auckland (Tin Tin et 
al., 2012), Melbourne (Richardson, 2000), Vermont (Flynn et al., 2012) and different 
German municipalities (Goetzke & Rave, 2011). For example, a study of automated 
cycle count data in Auckland found that over the course of the year rainfall 
contributed to a notable reduction in the hourly volumes of cyclists (Tin Tin et al., 
2012). That study reported an 8% decrease in cycle movements during spring and a 
13% decrease in summer and autumn with a 1 mm increase in rainfall (Tin Tin et al., 
2012).  
Studies have examined the effects of temperature on physical activities and mobility 
both directly by examining how they vary with temperature and indirectly by 
analysing their association with seasonality (i.e., warmer or colder periods of the 
year) (Böcker et al., 2013). In a European context, studies have observed that 
temperature in comparison to precipitation typically has less of an effect on travel 
behaviour (Cools et al., 2010; Sabir, 2011). Despite this both studies still report that 
walking and especially cycling are positively correlated with temperature and car and 
public transport use are negatively correlated. Most cycling studies also report 
increases in cycling rates during warmer weather (Bergström & Magnusson, 2003; 
Brandenburg et al., 2004; Hanson & Hanson, 1977; Keay, 1992; Nankervis, 1999; 
Richardson, 2000). Some studies have reported that higher temperatures (c. 25-30 
°C) can also result in a reduction in cycle volumes (Keay, 1992; Miranda-Moreno & 
Nosal, 2011; Richardson, 2000). Miranda-Moreno and Nosal (2011), for example, 
found that combined with high humidity, temperatures in excess of 28 °C had a 
negative effect on cycling in Toronto.  
Review studies of physical activity have revealed that people undertake more 
physical activities in summer than winter (Chan & Ryan, 2009; Tucker & Gilliland, 
2007). Transport studies also detect seasonal trends in cycling. For example, Müller 
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 et al. (2008) in their study of travel-to-school mode choice in Dresden, Germany, 
found there was a threefold increase in cycling during summer compared to winter, 
which coincided with less students travelling by car or public transport. Similar 
seasonal cycling patterns have been reported in Australia (Nankervis, 1999) and 
Sweden (Bergström & Magnusson, 2003), and as Section 5.2.2 now details, 
Auckland and London. Importantly, these studies also highlight that there are often 
higher average cycling levels in cities that are windier, colder and wetter than those 
that are drier and hotter which indicates that although weather may shape underlying 
patterns it is not a determining factor (see Böcker et al., 2013; Sabir, 2011).  
5.2.2 Seasonal variations and increases in cycle volumes in Auckland 
and London 
Auckland Transport (AT) (2014) and Transport for London (TfL) (2013) both collect 
cycle count data as a way of measuring the impact of cycling campaigns and 
infrastructure investment. This data, which is made publicly available, is collected 
automatically at nine sites in Auckland and sixty sites on roads designated as TfL 
Road Network (TLRN) in London, which equates to approximately 5% of roads. 
These data sets are limited and not representative, therefore, of overall rates of 
cycling across Auckland and London. They do provide some indication of the 
relationship, however, between cycling and the seasons in each city. More 
significantly, this data suggest as rates of cycling increase in both cities there is a 
corresponding increase in the number of ‘year round’ cyclists.  
Seasonal variations in cycling in Auckland 
The relationship between the total number of recorded bicycle movements in 
Auckland and the seasons for the years 2011 to 201310 is depicted in Figure 5.2. It 
highlights two main trends. First, there has been a gradual increase in cycle 
movements each year over this period (see also Table 5.1). Second, compared to 
other seasons there is a reduction in the number of movements made by bicycle 
during winter and an increase during summer and autumn. Moreover, the extent of 
seasonal and yearly variation in the data also exemplifies the contingent nature of 
10 As the seasons do not align with the calendar year summer includes one month from the previous 
year. For example, the period summer 2011 begins in December 2010 and finishes on February 2011. 
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 cycling in the city. The data demonstrates that there has been a steady increase in 
cycling over the period (see Table 5.1). More importantly, this increase has coincided 
with a yearly increase in the number of cycle movements during winter, which 
suggests there has been an increase in the number of ‘year-round’ cyclists (see Figure 
5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2. The relationship between total cycle movements recorded at nine sites in Auckland and the 
seasons for the years 2011-2013. The counts are collected monthly by telemetry from automatic cycle 
counters located at nine sites in Auckland. The horizontal line in each of the boxes shows the median 
value for the season that year, the bottom and top of the box show the 25 and 75 percentiles and the 
whisker shows 1.5 times the interquartile range of the data.  
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 Table 5.1. Summary of the number of cycle counts recorded by automatic counters located at nine 
sites in Auckland for the years 2011 to 2013. 





Seasonal variations in cycling in London 
TfL’s (2013) Travel in London annual report presents a summary of cycle count data 
collected on the TLRN. Based on this data the report concludes that ‘weather is a key 
factor in driving cycle demand’ as rates of cycling peak in summer and are lowest in 
winter (TFL, 2013, p. 48). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.3 which 
presents indexed11 pedal cycle counts for each season between 2010-2013. 
Indirectly, Figure 5.3 also highlights that there has also been a steady increase in 
cycling over this period (see Table 5.2). TfL observe that cycle flows closely reflect 
average daytime temperatures with the ‘highest flows in each year corresponding to 
the warmest months and lowest flows corresponding to the coldest months’ (2013, p. 
49).  
Table 5.2. Summary of index cycle counts recorded by automatic counters located at sixty sites on 
Transport for London Road Network (TLRN) roads for the years 2010 to 2013. 





11 The bicycle pedal counts are presented as indexed flow relative to a baseline of March 2000, which 
is represented as a flow level of 100 on the index. 
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Figure 5.3. The relationship between indexed bicycle pedal counts on Transport for London Road 
Network (TLRN) and the seasons for the years 2010-201312. The pedal counts are collected monthly 
by telemetry from 60 automatic cycle counters and are presented as indexed flow relative to a baseline 
of March 2000, which is represented as a flow level of 100 on the index. The horizontal line in each of 
the boxes shows the median value for the season that year, the bottom and top of the box show the 25 
and 75 percentiles and the whisker shows 1.5 times the interquartile range of the data. 
The relationship between rainfall and cycle flows is less apparent as particularly wet 
periods during winter tend to coincide with decreases in average temperature (TFL, 
2013). Furthermore, heavy rainfall during warmer periods only results in minor 
decreases in cycling (TFL, 2013). The ambiguity of this relationship is attributed to 
the fact rainfall ‘tends to be more variable and less predictable than temperature on 
any given day’ (TFL, 2013, p. 50). Consequently, as the ‘decision to cycle is taken 
early in the day’ rainfall in the afternoon or evening is ‘unlikely to impact 
12 As the seasons do not align with the calendar year winter includes two months from the following 
year. For example, the period winter 2011 begins in December 2010 and finishes on February 2011. 
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 significantly the decision to return home by bicycle’ (TFL, 2013, p. 50). Notably, 
and corresponding with the trend also seen in the Auckland data, it is observed that 
both ‘seasonal peaks and seasonal troughs have risen’ which indicates that the 
‘number of ‘year-round’ cyclists is increasing’ (TFL, 2013, p. 49). 
5.2.3 Understanding seasonal cycling habits 
The various transport, health and biometeorological studies and cycle count data 
from Auckland and London highlight overall how variations in precipitation, 
temperature and other weather and seasonal variables, result in observable and 
sometimes significant declines in rates of cycling. In researching and revealing such 
trends these studies may indirectly help to reproduce existing policy narratives that 
high levels of rain and cold winters are one of a number of apparently 
insurmountable barriers to cycling. Tin Tin et al. (2012, p. 7), for example, in 
concluding their paper on the temporal, seasonal and weather effects on cycle 
volumes observe that it ‘is likely that a relatively high rainfall in Auckland 
discourages people from cycling’. In a similar manner, Horton (2007) has illustrated 
how ironically the ‘fear of cycling’ is continually reproduced through various 
initiatives aimed at making cycling safer. Road safety education programmes, helmet 
promotion campaigns, and the development of ‘new cycling spaces’, he suggests 
constantly re-construct cycling as an ‘inherently dangerous’ form of mobility 
(Horton, 2007, p. 145). In his view ‘as long as cycling remains something to fear, it 
remains a marginal and marginalised practice’ (Horton, 2007, p. 147). Consequently, 
he argues that cycling promotion schemes need to recognise their role and develop 
‘more effective strategies’ if cycling is to no longer remain ‘a practice to be feared’ 
(Horton, 2007, p. 137). This sentiment might equally apply to research which 
continues to examine and frame weather and seasonal conditions as barriers to 
sustainable transport.  
These studies simultaneously demonstrate that the impact these fluctuations have on 
cyclists varies within the same city, as well as, different cities, regions and countries. 
In doing so they indicate that daily and seasonal variations are by no means a 
universal barrier. The cycle count data from Auckland and London highlights that as 
rates of cycling in both cities have increased the numbers of year round cyclists has 
also risen. This suggest that at least for some cyclists these ‘barriers’ might over time 
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 fade or disappear. Although count data and other typically quantitative studies are 
capable of revealing such trends, as Tin Tin et al.’s (2012) rather speculative 
conclusion about cycling and rainfall in Auckland indicates, they are not sufficiently 
able to explain how or why these trends have come to exist and why they might 
change. For example, they provide no insight into: 1) why or in what ways for 
instance precipitation matters; 2) why temperature rather than rain may have less of 
an effect on travel behaviour; 3) why the number of year round cyclists might be 
increasing in Auckland and London; or 4) how people anticipate, experience and 
negotiate changing conditions alongside a range of other everyday routines and 
practices. These failures can be attributed to the way in which these studies, 
alongside other psychological and economic accounts, consider the ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ environments of action in isolation and rather static and fixed ways. As a 
result they do not sufficiently capture the complexities of action. Correspondingly, a 
better understanding is required to challenge the relation between action and barriers.  
5.3 Breaking down the barriers 
This chapter commenced by reporting a story about the Tango commuter car which 
like a ‘regular’ car allows drivers and passengers to travel between home, work and 
various other destinations largely without being exposed to the vagaries of the 
weather. Fitted with air-conditioning and heat it actually enables one to control and 
alter the internal environment of the car to suit their personal comfort. This story, and 
subsequently Brian’s account, demonstrated how the continued use of the private car 
is in part justified on the basis of daily and seasonal weather variations, especially 
rain. In much transport research and policy such justifications often result in the 
assumption that rain and cold temperatures are and will continue to present 
formidable barriers to low carbon modes of mobility such as cycling. It has been 
argued that understanding these external factors as barriers is severely problematic as 
it results in a failure to recognise how individual action and thought is always 
embedded in broader social, cultural, political and material contexts (Sections   
5.2.3). The remainder of this section explores how Brian’s reluctance to travel by 
public transport might be reinterpreted through three different approaches which 
move beyond simply understanding the motivators of or barriers to action.  
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 5.3.1 From barriers to practices and socio-technical systems 
A number of scholars adopting socio-cultural approaches have sought to gain a better 
understanding of how individuals consume (read, ignore, reject), use or act upon 
environmental information. Some of this work has examined how individuals 
appropriate specific arguments, discourses or ‘commonplaces’ (Myers & 
Macnaghten, 1998) and ‘how and why particular debates are mobilised in certain 
contexts and to what political ends’ (Burningham & O'Brien, 1994; Hobson, 2001, p. 
202). Hobson (2001), for example, has explored the role the voluntary information 
campaign Action at Home, administered by the charity Global Action Plan UK, had 
on encouraging individuals’ to make shifts towards more sustainable lifestyle 
practices. She argues that such campaigns are informed by a rather ‘narrow 
conception of the ‘environment’’ which fails to recognise ‘the place of 
‘environmental’ issues in lay discourses and practices’ (p. 206). This corresponds 
with the rather ‘implicit assumption’ that underpins such initiatives; the ultimate goal 
of all individuals is to make sustainable lifestyle changes but at present they are 
unable to do so because of a range of ‘barriers to action’ (p. 206). Hobson (2001, p. 
203) disagrees with these sentiments instead following Billig (1987) arguing that 
they are best understood as an embodied ‘set of discursive practices’ which 
individuals use to deal with social controversies and to make sense of information 
associated with environmental problems. Such a reframing she suggests allows an 
appreciation of ‘why actions and awareness are not always related’ (Hobson, 2001, p. 
202). 
Accordingly, the weather and Auckland’s inadequate public transport system are not 
necessarily ‘barriers’ that prevent Brian from travelling on sustainable transport. 
Instead they are arguments which he mobilises as a way of justifying his continued 
car use while avoiding any social controversy. This became apparent when upon 
further questioning he rather defensively provided additional reasons for why he 
continues to drive:  
My wife … takes the bus into the city from where we are. It is easier because then 
there [are] no parking issues. But for me because of … the location [I] would have 
to change buses [trials off slightly]. I think it is a mindset. You know it comes back 
to the Kiwi mindset we've always driven therefore we'll always drive. But … if we 
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 went to New York or London you just take the tube because it's available and it's 
easy to work and you go from there.  
Such socio-cultural approaches, therefore, provide a useful way of moving beyond 
rather simplistic and individualistic understandings of barriers to action. Reflecting 
their focus discursive practices, such approaches provide no insight into how 
physical, infrastructural and institutional arrangements contribute to car-dependent 
lifestyles, and by implication social norms, or as Brian terms it the ‘Kiwi mind set’. 
Following Spaargaren and van Vliet’s (2000), such scholarship can help to provide 
insights into how people’s everyday practices are shaped by their discursive and 
practical consciousness. Equally, they emphasise like other socio-technical and 
practice theorists the importance of understanding how these practices are always 
embedded in ‘collective socio-material systems’ (2000, p. 64) or ‘socio-technical 
environments’ (p. 55). This assertion is now explored in relation to what Urry (2004, 
p. 32) describes as the ‘system of automobility’.  
Section 5.2.3 argued that although various quantitative studies highlight how cycle 
volumes positively and negatively fluctuate with daily and seasonal variations in 
weather they are incapable of explaining how or why these trends come to exist or 
change in a given time or place. This is because like other research informed by 
individualistic understandings of action such scholars typically assume these results 
support the assertion that the weather is one of many internal or external motivators 
or barriers which either drive or prevent people from choosing to cycle to work. The 
internal (individual) and the external (social, cultural and material) contexts of action 
are presumed to be separate entities which shape and influence behaviours (Section 
2.3.3). Scholars drawing on various strands of science and technology studies (STS), 
in contrast, emphasise in different ways how the internal and external contexts of 
action, or rather ‘the social’ and ‘the technical’, co-evolve or emerge simultaneously 
(Section 2.4). The car and other technologies, artifacts and things ‘shape and are 
shaped by social, economic and political considerations’, they are socio-technical 
systems (Geels, 2005b; Shove, 2003, p. 46) or institutions (Bohm et al., 2006). 
From this perspective, it is inadequate to understand the weather and Auckland’s 
‘poor’ public transport system as external barriers which prevent Brian from making 
more sustainable transport choices in at least three ways. First, his actions like any 
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 other individuals are always ‘embedded in a socio-technical context’ (Strijbos, 2006, 
p. 366), in this case a system or ‘regime’ of automobility (Bohm et al., 2006), which 
structures, enables and often makes necessary, what behavioural scientists 
understand as, his ‘(ir)rational choice’ to drive to work. It would not be possible for 
Brian to drive without a diversity of other elements which ‘inter-relate in structured 
and systemic ways’ including ‘road and traffic system infrastructures; fuel 
infrastructures from oil companies to petrol stations; car manufacture, maintenance 
and distribution networks’ (Geels, 2005; Shove, 1998; Watson, 2012, p. 492). 
Simultaneously automobility has reorganised ‘how people negotiate the opportunities 
for, and constraints upon, work, family life, leisure and pleasure’ (Sheller & Urry, 
2000, p. 738). 
Second, his ‘preference’ for driving is also shaped by popular, academic and political 
discourses and meanings which have co-evolved with this system (see also Section 
4.3). The ‘Kiwi mind set’ that Brian describes is reflective of a more universalised 
social ideology (Gorz, 1973) which holds that driving a car embodies the ‘ideals of 
freedom, privacy, movement, progress and autonomy’ which in turn justify its 
‘principal technical artifacts’ including cars, roads, and motorways (Bohm et al., 
2006, p. 3; Urry, 2004). This ‘unique combination’ and interlocking of the social and 
the technical elements have generated and reproduced ‘the ‘specific character of 
domination’ of automobility across most societies across the globe’ (Sheller & Urry, 
2000, p. 738). In doing so they contributed to the ‘normalisation of driving and car 
ownership’ (i.e., ‘what normal people do’) thereby producing and legitimizing ‘the 
construction of alternative modes’ such as public transport and cycling as ‘deviant’ 
(Bohm et al., 2006, p. 8, original emphasis). 
Third, it ‘entails a phenomenology, a set of ways of experiencing’ (Bohm et al., 
2006, p. 3) or ‘inhabiting’ the world (Thrift, 2004: Urry, 2006 #1882), that of a car-
driver hybrid (Urry, 2000) or assemblage (Dant, 2004). For Urry (2000, p. 59) this 
hybrid has reconfigured civil society by giving rise to unique ways of ‘dwelling, 
travelling and socialising in and through, an automobilised time-space’. ‘Dwelling at 
speed’, for example, ‘car-drivers lose the ability to perceive local detail, to talk to 
strangers, to learn of local ways of life, to stop and sense each different place’ (Urry, 
2006, p. 23): 
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 Sights, sounds, tastes, temperatures and smells get reduced to the two-dimensional 
view through the car windscreen and through the rear mirror …. The environment 
beyond that windscreen is an alien other, kept at bay through the diverse privatizing 
technologies incorporated within the car. These technologies ensure a consistent 
supply of information, a relatively protected environment, high quality sounds and 
increasingly sophisticated systems of monitoring. … And as cars have increasingly 
overwhelmed almost all environments, so everyone is coerced to experience such 
environments through the protective screen and to abandon streets and squares to 
these omnipotent metallic iron cages (p. 23). 
Cars have not always been inhabited in this way. Automobility, up until the Second 
World War, entailed ‘inhabiting the road’ as the car-driver was ‘part of the 
environment through which the car travel[ed]’ and not ‘insulated from much of its 
sensuousness’ (Urry, 2006, p. 23), including the vagaries of the weather, it remained 
a form of ‘exposed’ mobility.  
A range of technologies have subsequently enabled the car to become ‘a world in 
itself’, an enclosure (Thrift, 2004, p. 51). ‘Sound’ and ‘video systems, climate 
control, better sound insulation, ergonomically designed interiors [and] easy recall of 
certain memories’ have conspired ‘to make the car into a kind of monad which 
increasingly refers to the world outside itself via heavily intermediated 
representations’ (Thrift, 2004, p. 51). These sentiments are certainly apparent in 
Brian’s earlier remarks regarding, for instance, how air-conditioning has become an 
‘important tool’ which has allowed him to control and manage his car’s 
‘microenvironment’ and ‘improve’ his level of comfort. The car, following Shove 
(2003), might be understood as another site where resource intensive standards and 
expectations of comfort, cleanliness and convenience have emerged and are being 
(re)produced as part of everyday social practices such as driving. Moreover, it is 
likely the car and changing work and leisure patterns which have resulted in many 
people in the Global North spending over 90% of their time within buildings (Höppe, 
2002; Kosonen & Tan, 2004), are currently and will continue to fundamentally 
change the ways in which we understand, encounter and experience weather. In this 
way the weather should not be understood as an external barrier per se but as one of 
many natural events which are increasingly being mediated and sensed through 
screens (Morse, 1998) or windows and removed from ‘the conventions of normal 
practice’ (cf. Guy & Shove, 2000, p. 70). Many people are increasingly living 
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 ‘enclosed’ rather than ‘exposed’ lives. The next section introduces Dewey’s theory 
of situations as a means through which to understand the immediate and mediated 
aspects of these lives. 
5.3.2 From practices and socio-technical systems to situations 
Situations ‘provide the context for understanding events and meanings’ (Cutchin, 
2008, p. 1561), including those associated with the weather and seasons, and are 
illustrative of the ‘lived qualitative unity of continuously developing experience’ 
(Alexander, 1987, p. 105). For Dewey (1938) situations have a number of specific 
dimensions including: 
they are open-ended, durational-extensional-existential affairs not to be confused 
with ‘surroundings’; they are both immediate and mediated by human thought and 
action; they have problematic aspects for those experiencing them, and; although 
they are unique, but as parts of a field, they are connected to other situations (see 
also Alexander, 1987, pp. 106-110; Cutchin, 2008, p. 1561). 
Experience for Dewey always takes place in situations, which ‘are individuals … 
each one is just that one and no other and as such will never be repeated. Yet 
situations are not atomic; they have relations with each other and with the past and 
future; there may be traits appearing in a uniquely qualified way in one situation 
which appear in a differently qualified way in another’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 113). He 
understands each situation as ‘a process, an activity, which always has potentialities 
to act and be acted upon’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 114). Characterised in this way 
situations are ‘organic wholes’ which have ‘both an immediate aspect and a mediated 
one, an actual and a potential side, a radically unique and a formal or general 
character’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 114). Following Dewey weather and seasons rather 
than being barriers are always part of an organic whole – a situation. This is not to 
suggest that they do not impact or act upon individuals. On the contrary they are 
undergone or had, enjoyed or suffered, in experience. The ways in which they are 
had or undergone is mediated in part by habits and meanings. Situations might 
equally be understood, therefore, as the body-mind-world assemblage from which 
habits and meanings continually emerge (cf. Venn, 2010). ‘Habits enter into the 
constitution of the situation; they are in and of it, not, so far as it is concerned, 
something outside of it’ (Dewey, 1911, p. 552). For Dewey (1922a) habits are ways 
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 of incorporating and using the environment (Sections 2.6 and 4.2.1). In Brian’s case 
it is the car habit which ‘makes it possible for car, driver, road, signs, passengers, 
traffic rules to merge into a seemingly effortless whole and what underpins the 
routine use of cars to access places’ (Schwanen et al., 2012, p. 526). Thus it is 
Brian’s car habit and his specific situation or body-mind-world assemblage including 
his air-conditioned four-door Suzuki sedan, that continue to mediate his experience 
of daily and seasonal fluctuations in the weather.   
Meanings ‘reflect the complexity of situations as both immediate and mediate, as 
qualitative and relational’ and are derived from the use and interpretation of things 
(Alexander, 1987, p. 118). The notion of the ‘mind’, which Dewey understands as a 
range of dynamic processes including ‘intellectual, affectional, volitional, and 
purposeful’ activities which shape the way we interact with the world (Hildebrand, 
2008, p. 31), is central to his account of meaning. An individual’s mind, he asserts, 
only ‘emerges once a merely sentient awareness of qualities’ (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 
32) can be ‘taken up into a system of signs’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 259) through 
language: 
Without language the qualities of organic action that are feelings are pains, 
pleasures, odors, colors, noises, tones, only potentially and propleptically. With 
language they are discriminated and identified. They are then ‘objectified’; they are 
immediate traits of things (Dewey, 1929a, pp. 258-259).  
The mind is, therefore, ‘at least the ability to adapt and adjust to problems using 
language, and even more, the ability to create, plan, and project one’s vision of the 
future’ (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 32). Dewey in this manner draws a distinction between 
‘consciousness’ and the ‘mind’. Following William James he understands 
consciousness as a ‘stream of thought’ including the ‘inconsequential trifling with 
mental pictures, random recollections, pleasant but unfounded hopes, flitting, half-
developed impressions’ (Dewey, 1986, pp. 113-114). Simultaneously, he also 
suggests it ‘denotes meanings actually perceived, awareness of objects: being wide-
awake, alert, attentive to the significance of events, present, past, future’ (Dewey, 
1929a, p. 298). These ‘bright moments’ of consciousness ‘are made possible because 
of their context’ (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 32, original emphasis) or rather ‘an organized 
system of meanings of which we are not at any one time completely aware’, in other 
words, a mind (Dewey, 1929a, p. 305). Moreover, given the important role that 
181 
 language plays in its development the emergence of the mind always presumes a 
social context; ‘conjoint or shared undertakings’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 299) which entail 
‘association, communication, participation’ (p. 272), the ‘sort we describe as culture’ 
(Tiles, 2003, p. 64).  
It is the ‘double function of meaning, namely signification and sense’ which ensures 
the mind (intellect) is present in a situation (Dewey, 1929a, p. 261). Sense is ‘the 
meaning of the whole situation as apprehended’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 261). Meanwhile, 
signification ‘involves using a quality as a sign of something so that it may serve as a 
‘clew’ to the sense of a situation’ (Tiles, 2003, p. 60). Habits and a sense for a 
situation ensure the ‘flood of action … overrides all but the most considerable 
obstructions’ as it ‘flows [too] forcibly and rapidly in one direction to be checked’ 
(Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). Even if understood as ‘considerable obstructions’, 
fluctuations in weather or seasons do not stop action, as the notion of a ‘barrier’ 
tends to imply, but only temporarily interfere or inhibit its directional ‘flow’. These 
‘‘moment[s]’ of hesitation’ force us to ‘stop and think’, observe, recollect and 
anticipate before redirecting or intensifying a particular course of action (Dewey, 
1929a, p. 314). It is during these ‘problematic’ or ‘undetermined’ moments that the 
weather or the seasons is distinguished as a functional part of a situation, as an 
object, an event ‘with meanings’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). They have discriminated 
qualities of a qualitative situation because they have ‘meanings which go beyond the 
moment or the immediate situation ’, they ‘are relations’, distinguished because of 
their use or potential consequences (Alexander, 1987, p. 115; Tiles, 2003). For Brian 
his enclosed and air-conditioned car allows him to avoid the vagaries of the weather, 
which as Sections 4.4 and 5.1 highlighted perhaps reflect broader social customs and 
meanings. Despite this the weather can still become problematic but its specific 
manifestation reflects the way in which the car mediates these situations. For 
example, heavy rain often causes car-drivers to reduce their speed, drive more 
carefully and sometimes alter their route to avoid associated increases in the number 
of cars on the road. 
Deweyan pragmatism shares a number of similarities with the socio-technical and 
practice literatures (Section 2.6). All three approaches recognise that individual 
action is always embedded and evolving in relation to particular social institutions 
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 and arrangements and material or physical settings. Despite this it was argued that 
socio-technical and practice approaches in stressing the importance of collective 
meanings tend to underplay the dynamic ways in which individuals make sense of 
and negotiate these meanings in everyday life. Unlike Dewey, they fail to distinguish 
‘between the focal meaning (‘consciousness’) and the context of meanings (‘mind’)’ 
(Hildebrand, 2008, p. 34): 
Consciousness is thinking-in-flight, an ever-reconfiguring series of events that are 
qualitatively felt as they transform experience at its most urgent. If mind is the 
‘stock’ of meanings on hand, then consciousness is the realizing and reconstructing 
of those meanings so that experience can be redirected, readapted, and reorganized. 
It is ‘that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing 
redirection, transitive transformation’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 308). Consciousness is the 
dramatic aspect of mental life, with mind providing the indispensable ‘back-story’ 
or narrative (2008, p. 34). 
Moreover, they do not recognise habits as a disposition or capacity which in turn 
shapes the self or subjectivity. Focusing on how cyclists anticipate, experience and 
negotiate daily and seasonal variations in the weather the next two sections 
demonstrate how Dewey’s theory of situations helps to illuminate how experiences 
unfold and associated habits and meanings emerge in the continuous and contingent 
social and physical environments of action.  
5.4 Getting ready in the morning 
There was a great deal of variation in terms of how people got ready in the morning, 
what it involved, and in a number of instances, a specific individual’s routine. This 
section focuses on the routines of two regular cycle commuters. Rather than being 
‘representative’ the intention is to use these two accounts to help draw out the ways 
in which the weather and seasons are always part of a situation which is both 
immediate and mediated by habits, consciousness and meanings. To provide some 
additional context these are also at times compared and contrasted with the habits 
and experiences of other research participants.   
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 5.4.1 Mixing up the morning and dressing for the weather and work 
Britta lives with her partner in a rented apartment in the London suburb of 
Hampstead and cycles almost religiously to her workplace in Farringdon, where she 
works as a town planning consultant: ‘I always cycle […] even if it is snowing or 
sub-zero temperatures, I cycle in any conditions’. A German expatriate in her late-
thirties, her wake up and departure times are reasonably fluid: ‘six fifteen [0615] 
would be the earliest and seven fifteen [0715] the latest, […] I don’t like being 
rushed in the morning’. She decides when to wake up the evening before taking into 
account whether she is going to go swimming and how busy she is at work. Her 
morning routine also entails some degree of variability: 
After getting up the first question is do I shower immediately or do I shower after 
breakfast? And that can switch around depending on how I feel. Also sometimes I 
go swimming in the morning. So then that affects the morning routine as well 
because I would be [having] less breakfast and clearly I shower then at the 
swimming pool. So say I have first breakfast, well I think the first thing I actually 
do is feed the cats [laughs] and then I go [back to bed for] a little bit […] again and 
think about what I'm going to wear because by that time I've looked out the 
window. [W]hen I've decided what I'm going to wear I'm going to get up and make 
breakfast which is cooked breakfast. I tend to read the newspaper while I eat. Yeah 
then [I] have my shower [and] get dressed. Pack my bag, pack my lunch, [and] I 
think the last things I collect is keys. Remind [myself if] I've got my cycle lights on 
[my bike], cycling gloves, say goodbye [to my partner] if she is already around, 
sometimes she has morning shifts and is already gone, and … then collect my bike 
and off I go [laughs]. 
Deciding what to wear for Britta involves more than simply putting on a t-shirt and 
shorts and ironing a shirt for later (see Section 5.4.2). Instead it largely hinges on the 
fact she does not want to get completely changed at work: 
Ah … [getting dressed] that's actually an interesting one because: a) I need to 
decide, well is it going to rain or not, and [b)] how pretty do I have to be for work. 
[…] [So] I have various combinations which are slightly weird. I prefer not to get 
changed when I arrive at work [and] because often I do things on the way back I 
don't want to be in cycling clothes. [M]ost of the time it is jeans. But if there is a 
risk of a bit of rain I don't have mud guards [so] I know I will get wet. So 
184 
 sometimes that [prompts the] decision […] to wear a skirt [which] I can put my 
cycle trousers over […]. So all I need to is strip down the cycle trousers [and then] I 
don't have to get properly changed, if that makes sense. 
Rain, as she goes onto explain, is ‘a key consideration’ which she assesses during 
‘the time [she has] got up [to] feed the cats and go[ne] back to bed’. Her smartphone 
provides a sense of the ‘forecast for the day’ and whether it is ‘going to rain in the 
afternoon or not and the likelihood of it’. Prior to this looking out the window of 
their third floor apartment also gives her a ‘handle’ on the weather:  
[G]iven we've got this fantastic view I get a good handle on what the weather is. 
You [can see] the shape of the clouds. You know [how] you can read weather a 
little bit? So you know certain clouds might get rainy or whether it is going to turn 
or [if] it is already raining anyway and what type of rain it is. [That] is also a 
consideration because the other thing is I have another bike which has […] got mud 
guards but it is slower. It is sort of my shopping bike. [So] sometimes if there is just 
a little drizzle where I think I might get away not wearing any waterproofs then I 
would choose that bike. But whereas if I have to wear waterproofs anyway or things 
that have to get properly wet then I still ride the road bike [which is faster]. 
These last two excerpts illustrate how daily variations in the weather have become 
folded into Britta’s morning routine and a series of related decisions such as getting 
dressed and which bicycle to ride. Although we see that the weather or more 
specifically rain, is a primary concern it is by no means the only matter she considers 
while getting dressed. Other aspects of her subjectivity, which are reflective of the 
contextually embedded and embodied nature of not only mobility but also work and 
leisure, are equally apparent.  
Britta mentions that on some occasions such as client meetings there is a requirement 
to look ‘pretty’. A ‘couple of [pairs] of heels [are kept] under [her] desk’ especially 
for such events as they are ‘not so nice to cycle in’. Importantly, feminist 
geographers remind us how ‘culturally embedded economic practices, workers, and 
organizations are embodied in dominant notions of masculinity and femininity’ (e.g., 
Halford & Savage, 1997; Leidner, 1993; McDowell, 1997; Oberhauser, 2000, p. 71). 
The need to look ‘pretty’, as McDowell (1997) suggests, following Butler (1990, 
1993), is reflective of the way gender and sexuality are continually performed or 
enacted in the workplace. In her analysis of cultural capital in London, she discusses 
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 how women are severely limited in terms of the ways they can present themselves. 
This is because there is no such thing as ‘neutral fashion’ for women, as clothes 
always ‘send a message’ as they ‘could have been different’ (p. 145; Tannen, 1994). 
According to McDowell (1997, p. 31) ‘socially sanctioned gendered identities and 
ways of behaving are reinforced and policed through a set of structures that keep in 
place dominant and subordinate social relations’. These ‘mechanisms include not 
only institutional force and sanctions from above’ like dress codes but also as Britta 
intimates ‘self-surveillance’ (McDowell, 1997, p. 31).  
It became apparent in discussions with other female participants these conventions 
varied between workplaces and occupations (see also Leidner, 1993; McDowell, 
1997). Julia who worked as a document restorer within a research institute observed, 
‘we don’t have to dress like in suits or anything like that. So I just tend to wear the 
same kind of thing [and] don’t think about it much’. In contrast, Nicola who worked 
at an English Language school suggested although ‘nothing is written down’ you 
would be told if it was ‘not appropriate’ but that ‘certain people’ could ‘get away 
[with] stuff’ and others could not. Meanwhile, Ellie said in some instances, unlike 
Britta, she would not cycle on days when she had a meeting or presentation as she 
felt could not ‘wear a dress on biking days because then you have to get completely 
changed when you get to work which is a total hassle’. Despite such variations, these 
accounts do illustrate how the simple task of getting dressed for work is still 
influenced, at least to some degree, by ‘dominant norms and culturally embedded 
social practices in society’ (Oberhauser, 2000, p. 72). 
This equally applies to Britta’s desire to not be ‘in cycle clothes’ on days when she 
has after-work plans or activities such as socialising with friends. This became 
apparent when elsewhere she talked in more detail about cycling in different weather 
conditions, which again reflect broader cultural norms:  
I [have a] real sense of frustration [that] there is no rain gear that looks good. [In] 
rain trousers you always look like a complete muppet. And my philosophy is, 
doesn't matter if you are wearing lycra or normal clothes, always cycle in style. And 
… I find it really off putting cycling in winter having this cumbersome, plonky rain 
gear it is terrible. 
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 In response to a follow-up question about whether she had managed to find 
something more suitable and fashionable she suggested it was something you ‘work 
on’. Other cultural conventions and the challenges of designing practical clothing 
that keeps out water also limit her options: 
If [I am] cycling [to] work I can go to the ladies [when I arrive] and take [my] 
trousers off there. But … cycling somewhere else or [if] you want to go into a shop 
as a woman you cannot take trousers off in public even if you are wearing normal 
jeans underneath, it is just not on. But the resolution would be to have a zip at the 
side but that makes a weak spot in the water protection so that's why you don't have 
it.  
Britta’s account is illustrative of how the weather instead of presenting itself as a 
‘barrier’ is always part of a qualitative whole, a given ‘situation’ (Dewey, 1929a). 
Her description of getting dressed helpfully demonstrates how while a situation is 
always a one off, ‘never to be repeated’, it still retains ‘relations’ with past and future 
situations as ‘traits’ such as a ‘little drizzle’ or needing to be ‘pretty’ for work 
reappear albeit in an otherwise ‘qualified way’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 113). Within a 
situation, objects or events including the weather and dress conventions only stand 
out when they are crucial or pivotal at a specific moment in time (Dewey, 1929a). To 
deliberately highlight this and how an individual’s experience and habits are shaped 
or mediated by their social and cultural environments, the gendered and embodied 
nature of appearance in the workplace and other everyday spaces has so far been 
emphasised. The next section examines Nick’s morning routine and highlights how 
the weather and seasons in a similar but different way remains part of his ‘active, co-
constitutive relationship’ with his social and physical surroundings (Sullivan, 2001, 
p. 17, original emphasis) or his cycle habit. Focusing on rain, Section 5.4.3 further 
elaborates on these similarities and differences.   
5.4.2 ‘Fathering’ and seasonal adjustments 
Born in Auckland, Nick has lived in the city almost all his life. He currently resides 
in the house they own with his wife and son in Auckland’s western suburb of Mount 
Albert. With rare exceptions he commutes every day into the central city where he 
works as a consultant. Excluding their obvious cultural and gender differences, he is 
187 
 similar to yet very different from Britta. Pretty ‘confident on a bike’ having grown up 
doing a ‘fair bit of riding as a sport’ and he also owns more than one bicycle (a fixed 
gear road bike for commuting and a mountain bike for recreational purposes).  
Nick’s working hours are flexible and his morning routine is also characteristically 
fluid: ‘[I]t might be … anywhere between half an hour and an hour after I get up 
[that] I leave [for work]’. The variable nature of Nick’s morning reflects the 
challenge of getting ready for work and juggling the needs and demands of young 
children. Flexibility, in contrast to Britta, is worked into Nick’s routine more out of 
necessity than personal preference. Thus from the time he gets up at ‘six-thirtyish’ 
[0630]: 
There are two scenarios. One if [my son] is awake and one if he is not. So I guess it 
is probably 50-50 whether he is awake or not. If he is awake obviously I get up to 
him during the week. Change his nappy, get him out of bed. Cook his breakfast in a 
hurry because he loves to eat, which is porridge and then we'll eat that together. 
And then he'll sort of hang out and play while I make a lunch. Typically I would 
most mornings iron a shirt and pack a bag. If [my son] is not awake [it is the] same 
thing but minus getting him up and managing him for the morning. And when I am 
ready to go I will go and wake my wife up, if she is not awake, and hand [him] over 
and then I ride to work. 
For Nick, and other fathers, and reflecting the gendered nature of child care 
(Schwanen, 2007) but equally the changing ‘emotional work’ and practices of 
‘fathering’ (Aitken, 2005; 2009, p. 3), the period between waking up and leaving the 
house was often a time in which they would help their partner or wife (who were 
sometimes also working either part time or full-time) with looking after the children. 
This was the only time that some participants, usually males, were able to spend with 
their young children during the working week because their hours of employment 
and/or the timing of their return commute did not coincide with their child’s sleeping 
patterns. Other participants structured their day so they could spend afternoons 
and/or early evening with their child or children. Peter who travelled 43 miles each 
way from Essex to London, for example, left his house at ‘at ten past five [0510]’ 
every day so that he could ‘get back just in time’ for his daughter’s bath and a few 
days a week pick her up from childcare allowing his wife to work longer. Beth a 
mother or three lamented the fact she could not do ‘mum things’ like doing her two 
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 daughters hair in the morning because of when she has to leave for work. Initially 
she explained that she contemplated getting them up at six thirty [0630] with her 
before deciding it would not be fair on them. During the interview her husband Jack, 
who drops off and picks up the children from school, pointed out it was ‘swings and 
roundabouts’ as prior to taking the new job she spent time with the children in the 
morning and caught up on work at night whereas now this trend has reversed. Nick 
explained his job enabled him to not have to make such a trade-off. Since the arrival 
of his son he has been ‘pretty keen to [leave work] as close to five [1700] as 
possible’.  
Nick’s variable departure times reflect his fathering duties and responsibilities which 
constrain his time in a different way to Britta who remains relatively independent and 
within reason leaves when she ‘chooses’. Another a notable difference is that Nick 
wears non-work clothes to cycle in and showers at work. Thus looking out the 
window does not have the same significance that it does for Britta: 
I look out the window [laughs] [when deciding what to wear on my commute]. 
We've [...] got [a] ventilation system in the house which pulls air down from the 
roof and [...] it's got an inside temperature and a roof temperature on it. And it is 
outside [my son]'s bedroom so I see it when I go and see him in the morning. [S]o 
I'll typically go and have a quick look at that and the roof temperature is often a 
couple of degrees warmer than outside so. [...] [Y]ou [also] sort of get into a 
routine. At this time of the year, [early autumn], it is t-shirt and shorts [and] maybe 
in the morning it is starting to get into the weather where you might need a light 
jacket or something so it is seasonal as well. [...] [F]or commuting [though] I’ll just 
typically wear shorts, a t-shirt and a jacket if I need it. 
Here, Nick illustrates how gradual adjustments are made throughout the year as the 
seasons change. Auckland’s ‘subtropical climate’ with its warm and humid summers 
and mild winters mean he ‘typically’ just wears shorts, a t-shirt and a jacket. Rather 
than a ‘barrier’ then, the vagaries of the weather and seasons are something that 
cyclists such as Britta and Nick through the development of their specific habits have 
come to incorporate into their morning routines and the way they dress. In both cases 
looking out the window is important but as we shall now see for different reasons. 
The observations Nick made during this morning ritual occasionally influenced the 
timing of his commute and in some instances whether or not he cycled. His and other 
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 cyclists’ reasons for not cycling are explored in more detail in Section 5.5.1. The 
remainder of this subsection drawing on field notes from his first go-along focuses 
on Nick’s knowledge about the weather:  
I've just arrived at Nick's house … having driven around 10 minutes from my Uncle 
and Auntie’s house in the nearby suburb of Point Chev. On top of the folded down 
seats in the back of my sister's car is the mountain bike I have borrowed [...]. I was 
originally toying with the idea of cycling to Nick's [but] the sound of heavy rain on 
the roof during the night … and the eventual sight of it tumbling down outside my 
bedroom window at 0630 were enough to make me think otherwise. As the clock in 
the car ticks over to 0729 I gather my things and head up the driveway dressed and 
ready to go in my cycling gear. I quietly knock on the glass sliding door and as 
Nick approaches I notice that he is wearing a black pull over, jeans and his glasses. 
Initially I'm surprised as he doesn't appear to be dressed for cycling. Pulling the 
door open and inviting me in, he informs me there has been a change of plans and 
we will no longer be cycling.  
Fifteen minutes later, sitting in his open plan kitchen helping his son eat his 
porridge, Nick breaks the silence: ‘I did see you coming up all changed and ready to 
go and I was like ah yeah this is his thing [PhD]’. Apologising he says he probably 
should have texted me and offers to repeat the commute again by bicycle. I tell him 
driving over I thought ‘he is pretty keen to be going out in this’. He laughs and 
suggests that it can be hard to read weather like we have today: 
‘Yeah [this is the] thing about this sort of showery sort of stuff. Like now it hasn't 
been raining for half an hour [so you] could have been at work in that gap in 
between. But it is just a bit cold and nasty. [...] I think everyone has their own point 
where they are just nup I'm not going today, it's too shitty. But even [though] it has 
[been] raining it is probably going to be an alright afternoon’.  
When I query him on this observation he observes: ‘looking at the weather last 
night it looks like it is supposed to get a bit better during the day’. Interested in his 
general knowledge about the weather he responds to an additional enquiry about his 
ability to read the weather by looking out the window: 
‘You can look that way and see what showers are coming over. [...] [G]enerally it 
comes from the West. So on days like today I'd have a peak out there and if it is like 
it is now I'd take off [Figure 5.4]. […] Most of the time I just decide to go [and] 
ride. If it is like this then I will wait for a few minutes until it stops raining here 
because I find it easier to go out when it is dry or to get wet once I've started rather 
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 than going out when it is already raining. It is Auckland so you can't really pick the 
weather that well really’ [Auckland Field Notes, Friday 21 June 2013]. 
 
Figure 5.4. The view to the west from Nick’s front window in Mt Albert, Auckland, New Zealand. On 
showery days such as the day of our first commute he would usually look out this window in this 
direction when deciding whether to depart on his commute. 
Once again Nick’s account demonstrates how daily and seasonal variations in the 
weather are always a feature of any given situation, a part of the world we 
experience. The ways in which we experience these conditions, as Section 5.5 further 
elaborates, in turn are mediated by our habits, meanings and other environing 
conditions. The weather only ‘stands out conspicuously’ as an ‘object or event’ when 
‘because of its especially focal and crucial position at a given time’ it presents itself 
as a problem of use or enjoyment (Dewey, 1929a, p. 72). Dewey (1929a) defines 
such instances as ‘problematic situations’. Subsection 5.4.3 concludes this section by 
considering the significance of the weather.  
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 5.4.3 The significance of rain: Weather as a problematic situation 
Dewey asserts ‘we do not stop unless there is interference’ as ‘without inhibition 
there are no hesitations, crises, alternatives, need of re-direction’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 
314). As long as, what he refers to as ‘established organic-environmental 
integrations’, can ‘maintain themselves, they do so’ (p. 314). Consequently there ‘is 
then no opportunity for transforming meaning into idea’ as in ‘completely integrated 
function there is no room for distinction between things signifying and things 
signified’ (p. 314). It is only in instances where ‘behavio[u]r is divided within itself’ 
that ‘some of its factors have a subject-matter which stands for present tendencies 
and for their requirements or indications and implications, while others factors stand 
for absent and remote objects which, in unifying and organizing activity, complete 
the meaning of what is given at hand’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). The degree to which 
such division necessitates conscious thought is determined by whether or not an 
alternative response already exists. 
This is apparent in both accounts whereby the weather redirects and changes their 
morning routines. In Britta’s case it influences the way that she dresses and, in some 
instances the bike she chooses to ride, when it is raining. Anticipating the weather for 
the commute and the day ahead involves a deliberate routine of looking out the 
window and studying an online weather forecast. Alongside this we also saw how 
over time she has come to identify a range of ‘slightly weird’ combinations of 
clothing and associated responses such as wearing a dress under her waterproof 
trousers so that she is able to avoid having to get completely changed when she 
arrives at work. The fact she has identified particular combinations of clothing and 
developed set responses highlights how she also is able to recognise similar traits in 
particular situations. Although these responses involve thought it is likely it only 
minimal as the ‘readier a response, the less consciousness, meaning, thinking it 
permits’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 314). 
Cycling, unlike the car (Sections 4.5.1and 5.3.2), entails a different, more direct and 
immediate experience of daily and seasonal fluctuations in the weather. A cyclist is 
‘exposed’ to, rather than ‘enclosed’ from, changing elements of sun, wind and 
precipitation. For Dewey it is because of the immediacy of our relationship with 
nature such as weather that our knowledge ‘stretches’ and grows ‘in increasing 
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 sophistication and complexity’ (Ryan, 1997, p. 1010). In both cities it became 
apparent that many cyclists such as Britta and Nick, as well as some walkers, had 
developed in some cases rather intricate understandings of certain features of 
everyday weather, especially associated with rain. Such understandings allowed 
cyclists and walkers to prepare and dress appropriately for and/or delay or change 
their commute. As the two accounts above show the level of knowledge acquired, the 
means of acquiring this information, and, perhaps more importantly required, varied 
between participants. 
Of all the participants involved, Britta seemed to possess a particularly sophisticated 
and extensive knowledge of meteorological features such as cloud formations and the 
type and likelihood of rain. This appears to have evolved, at least in part, alongside 
her preference to not get changed after cycling to work (Section 5.4.1). For Nick, on 
the other hand, who always gets changed at work adapting his clothing to the 
conditions is a less important consideration. Instead, his main concern looking out 
the window is determining whether he will delay his departure or in some instances 
catch the bus instead. There did appear to be place-specific differences in that the 
way people talked about Auckland’s climate there seemed to contain some aspects 
which were more ‘predictable’ than London’s. In particular, Nick and other cyclists 
often commented how rain came from ‘the west’ and tended to pour down for short 
periods of time, hence it was possible to make it to work during a break in the rain: 
Josh:  I look out the window […] to the west generally and [if] I think I've got 
10 minutes of non-downpour to get to work …  I'm going to go for it 
[Jen: Yeah totally]. That's essentially [it]. And if it is down pouring I 
might wait a few more minutes you know [laughs]. 
Holly:  It is true because in Auckland it does [just] stop [laughs while saying] it 
is amazing. 
Overall, Britta and Nick’s accounts also help to reveal at least two other important 
aspects of Dewey’s pragmatism. First, habits are not only automatic, mechanistic or 
unreflexive responses to environmental stimuli or ‘barriers’. Instead as Britta and 
Nick’s accounts illustrate they are characterized by a special sensitivity to particular 
classes of stimuli. The weather and seasons thus are by no means a generic or 
universal stimulus. Rain, for instance, only stands out as an event or object, as a 
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 functional part of situation, when it has consequences for action such as wanting to 
stay dry to avoid completely changing at work or when it becomes ‘too shitty’ to 
cycle. Second, while it is possible to separate action, in this instance getting ready for 
and cycling to work, into discrete acts or stimulus (i.e., it is raining, rain is forecast) 
and response (i.e., wear particular clothes, delay departure), it should never be 
interpreted independently from the series it belongs. This is because the ‘end’ (i.e., 
response) is not ‘an end or finality in the literal sense, but is in turn the starring point 
of new desires, aims and plans’ (i.e., means) (Dewey, 1984, p. 60):  
Each step forward, each ‘means’ used, is a partial attainment of an ‘end’. It makes 
clearer the character of that end, and hence suggests to an observing mind the next 
step to be taken, or the means and methods to be next employed (1984, p. 60).    
Importantly, habits and meanings provide the means and mediate these ends. Both 
emerge in our continual experience of acting upon and being acted upon by the 
environment. Attempting to understand how cyclists anticipate, prepare and dress for 
their commute thus necessitates an appreciation of how individuals experience their 
commute and how this in turn shapes their subjectivity. 
5.5 Cycling seasons: Experiencing weather and seasons 
Daily and seasonal variations in weather it has been argued are not barriers but rather 
always a feature of an ‘actual and specifiable situation’, and only taking on 
significance when conditions became ‘problematic’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 67). Section 
5.4 reported how anticipating and responding to such conditions cyclists develop a 
range of, sometimes unique, habitual actions and patterns of thought. This section 
reflects on how cyclists experience weather and seasons in the course of the 
commute. It starts by exploring some of the reasons provided by some cyclists why 
they choose not to cycle in particular conditions. For some cyclists these occasions 
provide a timely reminder of why they cycle. Building on this it finishes with a short 
discussion of how year round cyclists develop a gradual indifference to certain types 
of weather such as rain, and, in some instances, even learn to cherish particularly 
challenging conditions.  
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 5.5.1 Cycling in a weathered city 
Nick on some occasions decides not to cycle to work (Section 5.4.2). On the day of 
the winter go-along he explained that his recent cold was a contributing factor. He 
hinted at this during the initial interview when observing that the decision to ride on 
wet days is partly dependent on how he ‘feels’: 
It depends what I feel like if I'm honest. If it is showery which it is often here [in 
Auckland] I don't care I'll ride. If it is [...] I've got wet weather gear, I'll get wet 
anyway, but I've got a jacket and enough stuff to stay warm so that doesn't really 
bother me. Typically if it is really raining hard and is windy it is probably half the 
fact a) I don't want to ride it but half is a safety concern as well. Yep. I don't mind 
getting wet when I'm riding but going out in the rain is always a little bit more 
difficult. Especially when you are warm and cosy from bed you don't want to 
charge out into mid-winter rain [laughs]. 
Nick is prepared to cycle in the rain and does not ‘mind getting wet’ but on some 
days finds it challenging in leaving the comforts of home and concerned about his 
safety in certain conditions. When pressed further he suggested safety was not 
specifically an issue he associated with the wet as he ‘regularly [has] close calls’ 
with ‘vehicle[s] passing closely or someone pulling out in front of [him]’. 
Consequently, he explained that ‘[for] the majority of the time [you can] avoid those 
sorts of issues’ by ‘rid[ing] conservatively and defensively’. The adoption of such 
strategies was common amongst cyclists in both cities (see also Fincham, 2006; 
Jungnickel & Aldred, 2013; Spinney, 2010). These strategies are further considered 
in Chapter 6. For the time being these observations reinforce the argument made in 
Chapter 4, car-centric urban forms and transport infrastructures shape the 
experiences and associated habits and meanings of other road users.  
For regular cyclists close calls or near misses are always part of the qualitative whole 
or situation associated with cycling. Phil discussed how the materialities of the road 
can further increase your sense of vulnerability. Originally from the UK, he recalled 
how he used to regularly cycle a 32 mile round trip from ‘New Meals into 
Manchester pretty much four times a week’. ‘Every week’ he ‘would have a near 
miss or a bit of a confrontation [with] somebody’. Despite this in his view Auckland 
was even more ‘frightening’ as people ‘don’t see anything outside of their car’. The 
city in his view could be a joy to ‘ride around’ as there are ‘nice hills to ride up’, 
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 ‘nice flat bits’ and ‘fantastic views’ except that the ‘lay out of the roads and the 
drivers take away the fun’. He suggested that the road surfaces were ‘really good’ 
except on especially rainy days as the wet conditions altered the grip of his tyres on 
the road surface:  
[T]he surfacing … is really smooth and it is great in the dry but it [could be] lethal 
[in the wet]. It gets really greasy and … doesn't drain particularly well and the 
actual material they use for the white lining is really slippery, so it is even worse 
than the UK. So it is kind of quite hairy when it is wet which is another reason why 
I don't cycle when it is really chucking it down. 
Correspondingly, he talked about how his approach to both cycling and such weather 
events has changed with his age. Unlike when he was living in the UK and first 
arrived in Auckland he no longer cycles all the way to work in the morning instead 
opting to catch the ferry part of the way. When he does ride the full trip it is typically 
on the way ‘back’. Now in his early forties, he explained the reasons for these 
changes were he was ‘getting too old’, and if ‘honest’, he ‘just [couldn’t] be bothered 
anymore’. In making these observations he indirectly reminds us of the ‘human 
energy expenditure’ required by cyclists, and pedestrians for that matter, as they 
move between different spaces (Spinney, 2010, p. 123). Phil illustrates how bodily 
transformations, such as those associated with ageing, can change a cyclist’s 
capacities, meanings and by implication, the subjectivity they associate with cycling. 
In particular, the meaning and the subjectivity he associated with being a ‘proper 
cyclist’ became apparent when he talked about his changing approach to challenging 
weather conditions: 
I tend not to ride in the rain as I use to. I use to make a point of riding through snow 
[when] it was [like] minus ten (-10) [degrees] and rain just to prove I was a proper 
cyclist sort of thing. These days I don't really care about that anymore. [I]f it is 
raining, if it is chucking down, [and] I'm thinking I'm not going to ride all the way 
back in that, I'll get on the ferry [Emphasis added]. 
For Phil then greasy road surfaces coupled with his ageing body, changing meanings 
and sense of self he identifies with his cycle commute, all contribute to him catching 
the ferry back on wet days. Other cyclists also discussed how regular cycling had 
changed who they were. 
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 5.5.2 Longing to cycle: Changing subjectivities 
Ellie when first starting out in London around seven years ago was a bit ‘chicken’ 
and only rode her first bicycle in parks before it was eventually stolen. It was only 
after purchasing a Brompton through a cycle to work scheme, which she had 
intended to use to ride just to and from the nearest train stations to home and work, 
that this all changed. Arriving at her nearest station for the first time she decided to 
cycle a bit further and before long she had ‘accidentally [ridden] the whole way to 
work’. From this point on she was ‘hooked’ and now ‘cycle[s] everywhere’. Ellie’s 
morning weather routine, like Britta, involved looking out the window and checking 
the weather on her phone. The MetOffice app, in particular, plays an important part 
in determining whether or not she cycles:  
If [the app] says … it is not going to rain between six and nine (0600-0900) [I] 
think cool I can ride. [I]f it is going to rain for like the period … I'm biking home 
from six (1800) or something and … I'm going home and not … out [after work] I 
don't really care if I get wet [and] I just bike. But if it is going to rain during the 
way to work then I really can't bike because my wheels are small and the road is 
slippery and if I get to work covered in rain it is just going to be a bad day.  
There is a lot 'riding' on getting this decision right Ellie explained as ‘sometimes you 
get it wrong and [...] don't bike when you could have and that is as annoying as hell’ 
because ‘biking is like a million times better than any other way of getting around’. 
At the same time she is very aware of the dangers associated with cycling on wet and 
icy roads (see Figure 5.5). An awareness which in part can be attributed to the fact 
that she has previously broken her ‘leg in four places’ after coming off her Brompton 
going around an icy corner on the way home from work. 
A number of cyclists including Ellie explained how cycling not only had changed 
their impression of other modes of transport, but had in subtle and sometimes 
significant ways and on different time-scales (i.e., days; weeks; years), transformed 
their bodily responses, and in some cases who they were as an individual. For 
example, Nicola suggested it was ‘easier’ and ‘quicker’ catching the train as arriving 
at work ‘you don’t have to do any of that faffing about’ such as ‘gett[ing] dressed’ 
and ‘doing [your] make-up’. Despite this she explained how ‘you don’t feel as good’ 
as after cycling ‘you just feel you’ve had some exercise and a bit more energized’. 
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 She went on to suggest how ‘sometimes’ on days when she did ‘pack’ onto the train 
due to bad weather she found it altered her mood: 
I suppose going on a train and getting all, just staying warm or whatever, and being 
stuffed up against someone … I sometimes find my mood is not [as good]. Well it 
is not always great anyway but … sometimes when you've had to get on the train 
with people shoving into you and stuff and being all packed [in] you’re not in as 
good a frame of mind to start the day. 
 
Figure 5.5. A picture taken a few minutes before my morning cycle commute with Ellie on Thursday 
23 January, in the London suburb of Hackney. The image captures some of the remnants of the snow 
that had fallen the previous week and over the weekend. Reflecting Ellie’s reservations about cycling 
on wet and icy roads it was not clear in the days leading up to the commute whether or not we would 
cycle. In an email on the Sunday 20 January she observed: ‘Oh and by the way, if it's still icy from the 
snow by Thursday, I won't necessarily be cycling. We'll have to play that bit by ear’. The night before 
the commute she was still cautious but optimistic about our chances: ‘I am still planning to bike 
tomorrow […] but I am quite worried about the ice, which makes cycling treacherous. I'll make a call 
in the morning as to whether it's safe or not. It was fine tonight, so it should be OK. If in the morning 
you don't feel it's safe to cycle from where you're coming from, that's fine and I can take public 
transport instead’. In the end the commute went ahead as planned.  
Similarly, Ellie observed how she ‘use to like [the tube]’ before she started cycling 
but now ‘can’t stand it as a commuting tool’. It ‘is just miserable because everyone is 
squashed up’ and ‘the pole that you hold onto is always really greasy and slippery 
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 like it is covered in … disease or dirt or something gross’. More importantly, she 
now feels her body does not function properly if she has not cycled for a few days: 
I do notice if I don't ride my bike for a few days that my brain isn't as good and … I 
feel more stressed. […] I've missed that opportunity to just let things go that you 
have when you are biking. The thing with biking is it is pretty much the only time 
in my life that I can think of when I am only doing one thing at a time. Because I 
have to only do [that] and that's why I don't listen to podcasts or anything I'm just 
biking. And I'm not checking email or talking to people. I'm just with my thoughts, 
pedalling and it's really, really important for me that I have that mediation time I 
suppose. 
Rob discussed how over time his body had grown accustomed to his 15 kilometre 
‘door to door’ commute from Auckland’s western suburb of Te Atatu West into the 
central city. When he first began cycling this journey he used to ‘feel really good’ 
when arriving at work. Over time as he has continued to repeat this journey the 
enjoyable sensations or ‘goodness’ which he use to register have slowly transformed 
as these bodily impressions have become normalised:  
When I first started cycling into work this longer ride, because before when I lived 
out east it was quite a short commute so it probably wasn't long enough to get the 
endorphins going or anything. But riding in here … you arrive and feel really good 
and definitely I would notice that I would have a much better [and] more productive 
day as a result of riding in than if I didn't. But now unfortunately because I ride in 
all the time what seems to have happened is that is normal and so what you notice 
now is if you don't ride in you just feel like shit. So that kind of [laughs] … 
goodness has become normal [laughs]. And that's definitely a consideration that I 
have when I think about [whether] to ride in or not. There is [a] conscious of 
awareness of how I'm going to feel as a result of not riding in. 
In a somewhat similar manner other cyclists observed how they gradually became 
indifferent to fluctuating weather conditions and, as we will see in Rob’s case again, 
even learned to cherish them.  
5.5.3 ‘No-one ever died from getting wet’ 
A number of cyclists described how their modes of response became so 
‘normalise[d]’ or habitual that they only encountered difficulties in relation to the 
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 demands and challenges of particular seasons when attempting to recommence 
cycling after having stopped for a short period of time, as Mike notes: 
[Cycling during different seasons] is something that I normalise and then every now 
and then I might recalibrate [it]. … [F]or a … couple of months … I was catching 
the … car in [to work] with my wife … because I'd had some quite long and 
stressful days at work and found commuting either side … wasn't fitting in. And it 
was during winter that I got back into cycling again. I was right I've got to start this. 
And the first couple of times were really hard. You've got to get your stuff 
organised because you don't quite remember what you need for the temperature. Is 
one jacket enough? Is one jacket too much? I [would] get five minutes down the 
road and [was] stinking hot. But it doesn't take long … a week or two riding, and 
you are used to it and it is normal. And you recalibrate your brain into knowing 
what you need, when you need it. You know if it rains I'm going to need a bit more 
time to clean myself off at the other end. And you think through that whole process. 
Seasonal variations in temperature and rain have in this way just become something 
that Mike and other year round cyclist adjust to and learn to accommodate (Sections 
5.4.1 and 5.4.2). These conditions are incorporated into an individual’s cycling habit 
in different ways but especially in the way they dress. For Veronica, who changed 
upon arriving at work, there was also a sense in which ‘you dress accordingly’. 
Staying warm was important but often as you are ‘moving anyway … your body 
generates enough heat’. Meanwhile, she explained remaining dry was commonly less 
of a concern:  
My cycling gear … is pretty much standard. I have my underwear for cycling 
[laughs] and I … bring different clothes for [work]. I wear a t-shirt, cycle pants, [in] 
this kind of [wintery] weather leggings, socks, shoes, a high vis vest, [and again as] 
it is winter a fleecy top. […] [After] you cycle for a little while anyway you … get 
hot. If it is wet I don't have full on rain gear, I just have a plastic poncho thing 
because I find you get more wet from the water on the ground than you do from it 
coming down really.  
The intention behind the poncho was not to keep the rain off but instead to ‘protect 
her bag’ and to keep her spare clothes dry. She went on to explain like many other 
regular cyclists how you learn to accept and become relatively indifferent to the 
‘consequences’ of being exposed to the fluctuations in the weather: 
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 Ultimately you are going to get wet. So that doesn't bother me. It is just one of the 
consequences and no-one ever died really from getting wet. And so as long as 
you've got dry clothes to change into I don't see that it is really a major [laughs]. I 
learnt that a long time ago when I was quite active in athletics and I can remember 
asking … a coach about what happens if we are training when it is raining? And the 
short answer was you get wet. So since [then] I've kind of … gotten over that hurdle 
[laughs] [and] it doesn't bother me. 
 
Figure 5.6. This picture taken in central London during winter captures the variety of different ways in 
which cyclists dress to accommodate the changing demands of the seasons. 
This is not to say that regular cycle commuters did not find it difficult cycling in, as 
Mike described them, ‘challenging’ conditions. Winter, in particular, is an especially 
difficult time of the year. This is certainly reflected in research on daily and seasonal 
variations in cycling patterns (Section 5.2). Over time year-round cyclists develop a 
range of modes of responding to these conditions from altering the way they dress to 
learning to accept them as part of their journey (Figure 5.6). Alongside this many 
cyclists also came to appreciate or value the different aesthetic or material qualities 
associated with different seasons, despite their associated demands on the body. 
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 Rachel captures this sentiment in describing how after witnessing the rich tapestries 
of colour in the winter sky she struggles to get her helmet off: 
Well it is never as bad as you expect [when you first leave the house even though] it 
always looks cold and dark outside [during winter] […]. And actually cycling at 
this time of this year is lovely because the light is just changing and it is getting 
lighter and the colours are just stunning. I get a real kick out of my morning cycle. 
Just coming across the river and getting that lovely sort of colour you get with [a] 
dawn sunrise. Um so no by the time I get to work I'm frozen. I couldn't get my 
helmet off this morning because my hands were so cold even with gloves on. So I 
just had to look like a dork for a bit until [they warmed up]. 
Similarly, Rob in discussing the role comfort plays in his life, discussed how variable 
conditions from storms to sunshine in different ways help to remind him he is ‘alive’ 
and add variety to his everyday life: 
I guess for me [one aspect of] comfort is … being in your house where it is dry and 
warm and then the opposite … is going out the door jumping on your bike into a 
storm. But it is not that I feel uncomfortable, I really like that environment I'm 
comfortable in that environment, but … I wouldn't describe it as comfortable. It is 
kind of like an adrenaline rush and it gives you energy and shows that you are 
living life and makes you a part of the environment. [It] makes you kind of feel a bit 
small and vulnerable which also makes you feel alive. And then you … get to work 
have your … hot shower and you're … comfortable again. And then you leave [and] 
sometimes the ride home can be equally as comfortable on a sunny day when 
you’re in no hurry, it is really nice. So comfort is a good thing [and] very important 
[but] I would get bored in [my] life if that's all [I] had. It is good to push yourself.  
5.6 Conclusion: Weather and (re)turning to exposed 
modes of mobility 
The Department of Transport’s (2013, p. 15) strategy for improving the integration 
of sustainable transport in the UK observes that given ‘the majority of short trips are 
made by car, we need to ask why people do not use public transport, cycle or walk 
for these short journeys’. In their view what is required is insight into ‘people’s 
current transport choices and the barriers to using greener modes of transport’ (DfT, 
2013, p. 15). This chapter has argued framing the ‘weather’ and other factors such as 
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 ‘traffic-related safety risks’ as barriers (DfT, 2013, p. 13) only serves to reinforce 
existing individualistic understandings of action including that barriers are real, 
behaviour is a linear process and habits are just automatic responses to 
environmental cues or stimuli (see Section 2.3.3). Focusing on cycling, the weather 
and seasons, this chapter has subsequently sought to demonstrate the limitations of 
the notion of barriers to action in three main ways. 
First, drawing on existing and primarily quantitative research it was observed that far 
from being a universal barrier the impact that particular weather and seasonal 
conditions have on rates of cycling often vary in different local, regional and 
international contexts. These studies do illustrate that precipitation, temperature, 
wind and daylight can result in shifts from active to motorized modes of transport. 
Equally though they reveal that in many instances there are often higher average 
rates of cycling in cities that are windier, colder and wetter than those that are drier 
and hotter suggesting that weather may contribute to but does not determine 
underlying patterns. Meanwhile, automated cycle count data from Auckland and 
London illustrates similar trends but also suggests corresponding with annual 
increases in the number of people cycling there has been an increase in the number of 
‘year round’ cyclists. Although count data and other typically quantitative studies are 
capable of revealing such trends they provide no explanation for why these trends 
exist, how or why they have or might change, or how people anticipate, experience 
or negotiate such variations. Consequently, it was argued that there is a need to move 
beyond quantifying the extent to which weather and seasons act as barriers as such 
attempts produce rather static and fixed accounts which fail to sufficiently capture 
the complexities of action.  
Second, three different conceptual approaches which move beyond the limitations of 
individualistic understandings which distinguish between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
barriers were introduced. Theories of practice, social-technical systems and situations 
were used to consider Brian’s explanation for why he continues to commute by car. 
Socio-cultural-inspired approaches it was observed provide insights into how 
people’s everyday practices are shaped by their discursive and practical 
consciousness, especially the ways in which individuals mobilise particular 
arguments to avoid social controversies and justify their actions. Other practice-
203 
 based and socio-technical accounts stress the need to understand how Brian’s actions 
are embedded in a socio-technical context, the system of automobility, which 
continues to condition, enable and often make necessary the need to drive and alter 
the ways in which we understand, encounter and experience the weather. Driving is 
thus no longer understood as an outcome of ‘(ir)rational choice’ but as a conditioned 
demand and meanwhile ‘barriers’ are reframed as ‘conventions of normal practice’ 
(Guy & Shove, 2000, p. 70). Corresponding with such interpretations it was observed 
Dewey’s theory of situations provides a way of understanding the context of events 
and meanings. In recognising how situations are mediated by meanings it was 
suggested like socio-technical and practice theorists that he also stresses the 
importance of understanding how collective meanings or ‘minds’ emerge in 
particular social and physical environments. More importantly, though in 
acknowledging the immediacy or the felt aspects of these situations he does not 
underplay the dynamic way in which individuals make sense of and negotiate these 
meanings in everyday life. Additionally, in emphasising that habits are not simply 
the outward performance of acts Dewey accounts for the role that these dispositions 
or capacities play in forming the basis of the self or subjectivity.  
Third, interviews and go-alongs with commuter cyclists were drawn upon to provide 
some insight into daily and seasonal cycling trends and the limitations of attempts to 
interpret the weather and seasons as external barriers. Here, it was argued that 
Dewey’s theory of situations helps to illuminate how experiences unfold and 
associated habits and meanings emerge in the continuous and contingent social and 
physical environments of action. To demonstrate this contention the ways in which 
cyclists anticipate, experience and negotiate daily and seasonal variations in the 
weather, both at home and on their commutes, were explored. In doing so it was 
illustrated how cyclists ‘inhabit the road’ in ways that are distinctive from car-drivers 
and what implications this has for their habits, meanings and subjectivities. The 
accounts of two cyclist’s morning routines were used to draw attention to how the 
weather is rendered important or unimportant during the course of getting ready for 
and cycling to work alongside a range of other concerns including feeding cats, 
dressing for meetings and looking after children. Correspondingly, it was asserted 
that the weather or seasons are always part of an organic whole and only 
distinguished as a functional part of a situation when they become ‘problematic’. 
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 Importantly, it was observed they act by no means as generic or universal stimuli or 
barriers which automatically trigger or block particular habits. Rather weather events 
as such were demonstrated to only be significant in a situation where they had 
specific implications for action such as heavy rain which results in a cyclist delaying 
their departure or catching the bus instead.  
The consequences of such events for action are also by no means universal and 
accordingly habits were shown to entail a special sensitivity to particular classes of 
stimuli (e.g., type, duration and likelihood of rain) which reflected an individual’s 
requirements or needs. Moreover, it was contended that while it is possible to 
separate action into discrete acts or stimulus such as looking out the window or 
checking the weather on a phone, these should never be interpreted independently 
from the series which they belong, namely getting ready and cycling to work. The 
ways in which cyclists experience and negotiate the weather over the course of their 
commutes were then explored to further contextualise these insights. These accounts 
revealed the ways in which over time cyclists come to incorporate these conditions 
into their cycle habit. Their modes of response varied from altering how they 
dressed, as well as, learning to accept or in some instances coming to value these 
daily and seasonal variations. Accordingly, it was observed how in various ways the 
weather helps to reveal how particular social and physical environments contribute to 
the emergence of cycling subjectivities.  
Overall, the notion of ‘barriers to action’ reflecting the individualistic assumptions 
underpinning it assumes technologies, infrastructures and weather as separate from 
people produces rather static and linear accounts which fail to recognise the ways in 
which these environments might give rise to low carbon habits, meanings and 
subjectivities. In contrast, Dewey’s theory of situations provides a way of accounting 
for the immediate and mediated, actual and potential, and radically distinct and more 
general character of experience. These experiences, which emerge out of an 
individual’s interactions with their social and physical environments, are 
fundamental to the development of such habits, meanings and subjectivities. Chapter 
6 now explores in further detail the potential implication of Dewey’s theory of 
situations for understanding the relationship between habit and thought.  
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 Chapter 6. 
Re-valuing habit and thought: The role of habit, 
reflection and experimentation in commuting 
6.1 Introduction: The trials and tribulations of being a 
working mother 
Emma’s mobile phone rings as she gathers together various work-related items to 
take home. Checking the number she takes the call. Hanging up three or four 
minutes later she elaborates: ‘This is how the day goes and I could just spend, well 
technically I'm supposed to be at work until five thirty-ish [1730]’. She ‘has a 
deadline’ for her two year-old son, however, who has to be ‘picked up by five 
thirty’ [1730] from day care. Additionally, her five-year-old daughter needs to be 
collected from after school care by six [1800]. Fortunately most of her clients ‘are 
pretty flexible [and] family orientated or aware’ and she is ‘often’ on her ‘emails at 
night time anyway’. Collecting the rest of her things, Emma suggests that she 
typically aims to ‘to do a lot of work at home each night [but] by the time [the] 
children go to bed [she is] usually absolutely knackered’ and does not get anything 
done. 
Loading everything she has brought from the office into the car, Emma provides a 
glimpse into the challenges of juggling work and family life: ‘I'm really 
disorganised [today] because I haven't got any dinner organised for the kids. So 
now in my mind I'm going crap what's on the way home that I can pick up? And 
this is kind of how it is’. Having brought in the work rubbish and recycling bins 
from the street we get into the car. Rather than starting the engine, however, Emma 
takes out her iPhone: ‘There is a girl on Facebook who does food. … Jess's 
Underground Kitchen and she cooks meals and you have to order by twelve [1200] 
and you pick them up after five [1700]. … And she always has extras. … So I will 
just quickly … see if she has got anything. … [reading out someone else’s 
Facebook post and Jess’s response] ‘Can I get fish pie? All sold out sorry’. … So 
that's not going to work for me. Ok we'll [have to] think of another alternative’. She 
starts the car and we leave.  
Five minutes or so later Emma turns off the main road onto a back street: ‘I forgot 
this road is quite nightmarish too. So what I've decided to do now, and this can 
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 often happen on my commute home, there is a butcher at the top of this road and all 
going well I can get a car park and watching my time I will run in and grab some 
meat for us to have for our dinner, because I’m disorganised (see Figure 6.1). 
Normally I'd try to have a crockpot on or something’. As a result ‘we’ve come up 
one [road] earlier’ than the one she normally takes directly to the day care, 
observing that these back roads are ‘quite a popular’ as ‘Auckland’s traffic is 
always just so busy’ [Auckland Field Notes, Wednesday 19 June 2013]. 
 
Figure 6.1. A quick detour later, and the crisis of ‘what to cook the kids for dinner’ is averted. Having 
realised upon leaving work she did not have anything at home, Emma ran through a series of 
contingency plans before finally settling on picking up some meat from the butcher. Conveniently 
located on the corner of a back street in Ponsonby [to the left of the picture], which allows her to 
avoid Auckland traffic and the main road which her son’s day care and daughter’s school is located on 
she explained it allows her to not go out of her way. An additional advantage is that she can ‘normally 
pull straight into’ the bus stop directly out front, even though ‘it’s a bit naughty’ and quickly run in to 
get something. Combined these factors make it a ‘quick and easy solution’. 
At first it may seem like Emma’s evening commute shares very little in common 
with the commuter cyclists’ accounts presented in Chapter 5. For a start, and of 
course reflecting the aim of the chapter, they all centred on the ways in which 
cyclists variously anticipate, negotiate and experience weather and the seasons at 
home, on their commute and at work. Meanwhile, Emma’s account highlights how 
what could be a relatively simple and short commute13 from her office in Grey Lynn, 
where she is a manager and owner of a corporate branding company, to the nearby 
13 Door to door the 1.6 mile (2.7 kilometre) journey according to Google Maps would take 
approximately 6 minutes to drive (without traffic), 8 minutes to cycle, and 28 minutes to walk. 
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 central Auckland suburb of Ponsonby is complicated by various parental duties and 
responsibilities she needs to negotiate alongside her work day. These needs include 
among others: picking up her son from day care, daughter from school, making them 
dinner, getting them washed and ready, and putting them to bed. Upon closer 
inspection, and informed by Dewey’s writings on situations, habit, and thought, 
however, we might start to draw out some similarities.  
The ‘flexibility’ of the car aids Emma in maintaining the relatively complex spatial 
and temporal schedules that are crucial to ensuring she is able ‘to manage family 
routines and to combine home and paid work’ (Dowling, 2000, p. 349; Dyck, 1990; 
Rosenbloom, 1992). Such affordances, which Chapter 4 argued have largely been 
created by car-centric urban planning and design, have ensured the car has not only 
become a ‘management tool’ but also central to what Dowling (2000, p. 347; see also 
Dyck, 1990) terms ‘cultures of mothering’. These individual and shared ‘beliefs, 
attitudes, and symbols attached to mothering’ are shaped by dominant media and 
popular culture representations which tend to ‘valorize motherhood as constructed 
within the context of the traditional nuclear family’ (Dowling, 2000, p. 347; Dyck, 
1990). Equally important, as Emma’s account reminds us, are the specific activities 
or ‘practices of mothering’ which become ‘associated with these representations, for 
ideals of motherhood, regardless of their source, become part of daily life’ (Dowling, 
2000, p. 347). She talked at length in interview about the challenges and stress 
associated with providing the ‘main [child-care] role’ (see also Section 6.5.2). Work 
was particularly important as it was her ‘time’ in which she got a ‘little break from 
home life’ and to deal with ‘adults rather than children’. In this way Emma illustrates 
how the institution of motherhood much like that of fatherhood (see Section 5.4.2) 
‘hinges on an ‘idea’ that does not embrace the ‘fact’ of [mothering and] fathering as 
a daily emotional practice that is negotiated, contested, reworked and resisted 
differently in different spaces’ (Aitken, 2009, p. 230; Dowling, 2000). Thus these 
ideals or representations of motherhood, in the same way as social norms and 
conventions around clothing mediate a cyclist’s weather and seasonal-related 
practices, are always part of the qualitatively unique, emergent and socially shared 
situations in which action unfolds.  
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 There are two other similarities, as Section 6.2 elaborates on, which correspond with 
this chapter’s focus on how habit limits and contextualises thought in ways that over 
time shape people’s practices associated with, and experiences of, their commute. 
The rest of this chapter consists of five main sections. First, Section 6.2 briefly 
outlines the characteristics of dual-process or dual-system theories before elaborating 
on their limitations in relation to attempts to understand and change the actions of 
citizens. Such accounts are then contrasted with a Deweyan understanding of habit 
and thought which it is argued offers a way of moving beyond such dualistic thought. 
Second, focusing on catching the tube and cycling Section 6.3 explores how people 
gradually learn to adjust to transport systems, travelling and commuting in a new 
city. This initial phase is marked in part by excitement, uncertainty and 
experimentation. Over time as new adjustments are made and corresponding new 
habits form, what initially occupied the conscious ‘foreground’ of a situation 
increasingly becomes part of the ‘background’ which equate to the ‘dimly 
apprehended field of non-cognitive experience’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 111). Third, this 
transition from excitement and uncertainty to the familiar and certain is portrayed in 
Section 6.4 as the arrival of the mundane commute. Here we see a range of 
sometimes interrelated responses from trying to mix up the commute, grinning and 
bearing it and learning to value and actively use their travel time. Fourth, Section 6.5 
then explores how even mundane commutes are still associated with problematic 
situations by examining the ongoing challenges faced by cyclists in car-dominated 
cities and the changing demands of family life. The chapter concludes in Section 6.6 
by arguing Dewey’s ‘tenacious insistence’ on the ‘radical temporality’ and 
‘situationality’ of experience, habit and thought helps to reveal the limitations of 
existing dual process accounts which tend to demarcate habit and thought 
(Alexander, 1987, p. 61). 
6.2 Moving beyond dual-process accounts of habit and 
thought 
This section begins by outlining the characteristics of dual-process or dual-system 
theories noting that they are a class of theories rather than a unified account. It then 
explores how these ideas have been mobilised in libertarian paternalist and social 
psychological approaches and their associated limitations. The section concludes by 
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 elaborating how a Deweyan account of habit and thought moves beyond such 
dualistic thought by revisiting the similarities between Emma’s practices of 
mothering (Section 6.1) and how cyclists anticipate, negotiate and experience the 
weather and seasons (Sections 5.4 and 5.5).  
6.2.1 Dual-process and dual-systems theories and their limitations 
Many individualistic accounts of behaviour draw a ‘distinction between two kinds of 
thinking, one fast and intuitive, the other slow and deliberative’ (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013, p. 223). Notably, these dual-process theories underpin many psychological and 
libertarian paternalist accounts which have or are becoming increasingly central to 
behaviour change initiatives aimed at encouraging shifts towards less carbon and 
resource intensive modes of everyday mobility (Section 2.3.1). Recently, Evans and 
Stanovich (2013, p. 224) have noted how as the popularity of dual-process and dual-
system have increased ‘so too have the voices of criticism’. Within psychology these 
criticisms include ‘the multitude of dual-processing accounts, the vagueness of their 
definition, and the lack of coherence and consistency in the proposed cluster of 
attributes for two system accounts’ and the ‘evidence on which such claims are 
made’ (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 224; Gigerenzer, 2010; Keren & Schul, 2009; 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004). For Evans and Stanovich (2013, p. 
224) these critiques are ‘problematic’ because they do not attack ‘any particular 
theory but rather a class of theories, effectively treating all dual-process and dual-
system theories alike’ despite the fact they ‘are not, by any means, the same’. As 
they elaborate (see Table 6.1): 
There are many applications in which authors have proposed that two forms of 
processing are competing or combining in order to produce the behaviour observed. 
[T]hese Type 1 and Type 2 processes … [correspond] roughly to the familiar 
distinction between intuition and reflection. … Some authors have gone further, 
suggesting that there are two evolutionary distinct brain systems responsible for 
these two types of processing. … Such theories generally … add additional 
characteristics, such as the idea that there is an evolutionarily old and animal-like 
form of cognition and also a recently evolved and uniquely (or distinctively) human 
system for thinking. … [T]hese are often referred to as Systems 1 and 2 or 
sometimes as an old and new mind (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 224).  
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 Despite this diversity, as Table 6.1 demonstrates, these theories are still very much 
founded on a dualistic distinction between habitual or automatic and rational or 
reflective cognitive systems and/or modes of behaviour which inform both nudge and 
social psychological approaches.  
Table 6.1. Clusters of attributes frequently associated with dual-process and dual-system theories of 
higher cognition. Source: Evans and Stanovich (2013, p. 225). 
Type 1 process (intuitive) Type 2 process (reflective) 
Defining features 
• Does not require working memory 
• Autonomous 
• Requires working memory 




• High capacity 
• Parallel 
• Nonconscious 




• Experience-based decision making 
• Independent of cognitive ability 
• Slow 
• Capacity limited 
• Serial 
• Conscious 




• Consequential decision making 
• Correlated with cognitive ability 
System 1 (old mind) System 2 (new mind) 
• Evolved early 
• Similar to animal cognition 
• Implicit knowledge 
• Basic emotions 
• Evolved late 
• Distinctively human  
• Explicit knowledge 
• Complex emotions 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) rely on a mixture of the different attributes reported in 
Table 6.1 in drawing a distinction between the automatic and reflective cognitive 
systems (see Section 2.3.1). They emphasise the importance reconfiguring choice 
architectures in ways that work with the automatic system and thus nudging people 
towards making better decisions or acting in more desirable ways (see Sections 2.3 
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 and 4.2). As argued elsewhere such an understanding is severely limited because it 
fails to recognise the ways in which choices are conditioned by infrastructures, 
norms and subjectivities (Chapter 4). Equally though nudge overlooks the role habits, 
meanings and thought play in mediating our experiences of and encounters with our 
social and physical environments (cf. Jones et al., 2011; Pinch, 2010; Selinger & 
Whyte, 2010). As Selinger and Whyte (2010, p. 475) observe ‘Thaler and Sunstein 
underestimate how difficult it can be to understand and predict how different 
communities of people will perceive the meanings that nudges present because 
Nudge’s illustrative examples all focus on situations where technologies, interfaces, 
and built environments are used in delimited contexts’. In each of their examples 
‘users appear to have common perceptions of meaning’ and their interaction with 
these choice architectures do not seem ‘to engender new perceptions of meaning’ 
(Selinger & Whyte, 2010, p. 475). Pinch (2010) illustrates this point while 
simultaneously drawing attention to the important role habits.  
A common problem encountered by road architects Pinch (2010, p. 489) notes is 
attempting to ‘design intersections between two roads where one road does not have 
priority over the other’ while maintaining traffic flows and safety. Two common 
solutions are roundabouts (UK) and four-way stop signs (United States). For Pinch 
both can be understood as ‘nudges’ but in making this claim he emphasises the 
important role that driving habits play in ensuring they function successfully: 
If we think of these two traffic control devices as nudges to help drivers navigate an 
intersection it is immediately obvious any assessment of their effectiveness for the 
‘choice architect’ depends crucially on skills we acquire in interacting with 
technology and the wider social cultural framework within which those skills are 
learnt. In the UK … drivers learn to slow down the correct amount as they approach 
a roundabout (they rarely need to come to a complete stop) and how to let traffic 
feed in from the correct direction …. As part of driving instruction in the UK, road 
users learn how to navigate this ‘nudge’, adjusting to the relevant traffic flows, 
including complicated … multi-lane roundabouts (2010, p. 489). 
He suggests that in this way the roundabout ‘fit[s] perfectly with Thaler and 
Sunstein’s conception of a nudge’ as if more were introduced into the United States 
they could ‘save wasted gas as cars unnecessarily stop and then accelerate away and 
would permit far more quick and efficient journeys’ (2010, p. 489). The problem is 
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 that the ‘skill to navigate a roundabout properly is something [that needs to be] 
mastered’ (2010, p. 490). Pinch illustrates this point by observing his observations of 
how drivers in his hometown of Ithaca New York navigate the roundabout recently 
introduced by the municipal authorities: 
I often watch my fellow US drivers struggle with this nudge. … US drivers … 
repeatedly stop at the roundabout and anxiously wait for no traffic at all before 
proceeding. … Talk of [the] ‘biases’ [of the automatic system] unnecessarily 
confuses the issue. It is more a matter of skills learnt in navigating and interacting 
with the semiotic and material infrastructure of road technology, something that in 
this case is clearly culturally learnt (2010, p. 490). 
Nudge accounts, Pinch (2010, p. 490) and Selinger and Whyte (2010) assert would 
have ‘much more to offer’ if they were to recognise the role the wider social and 
cultural contexts play in shaping an individual’s habits and meanings which in turn 
mediate their interactions with technologies, interfaces, and built environments. 
Moreover, while libertarian paternalists recognise the possibility of reflective thought 
they rarely consider its role instead emphasising how behaviour is largely driven by 
impulse, arousal, ‘[i]nertia, procrastination and imitation’ (see Jones et al., 2013; 
Leggett, 2014; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 238).  
Social psychology theories which consider both habitual and reflective phases of 
action vary in their understanding of habit. In some instances habit is simply deemed 
to be equivalent to past behaviour (Conner & Armitage, 1998). Others define habits 
on the basis of how frequently the behaviour has been performed in the past, with 
regularly repeated behaviours being considered habitual (e.g., Neal et al., 2006; 
Triandis, 1977). Non-habitual or infrequently performed behaviours are said to be 
influenced by attitudes, intentions or perceived behaviour control (Aarts et al., 1998). 
These same ‘factors’ are believed to play only a limited role in habitual behaviours 
(Aarts et al., 1998). For example, in Triandis’ (1977) Theory of Interpersonal 
Behaviour (TIB) as Figure 6.2 shows behaviour is understood to be determined by 
habitual or intentional paths. Operating in parallel, these paths offset each other such 
that if habit is strong then intention is weak and vice versa. Importantly, behaviour 
can become completely unintentional and unconscious if an individual ‘frequently 
and consistently pursues the same goal in similar settings’ (Aarts et al., 1998, p. 
1369). For example, if ‘travel mode choice’ is ‘performed many times in a stable 
214 
 context’ it can become ‘automatically activated’ by the ‘situational context 
associated with that behaviour’ (Aarts et al., 1998, p. 1369; Bargh, 1990; Bargh & 
Barndollar, 1996). An individual’s ‘intentional control’ is ‘effectively passed over to 
the environment in which the behaviour occurs’ whereby habitual behaviours are 
triggered by certain contextual cues (i.e., places, times, people and other behaviours) 
(Darnton et al., 2011, p.3). 
 
Figure 6.2. Triandis’ (1977) Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB). 
Reflecting these understandings interventions informed by social psychological 
theories focus on ‘breaking’ or ‘defrosting’ habits by disrupting the environment 
which cues an individual’s automatic response. This typically involves ‘modifying 
the costs and benefits associated with habitual and alternative behaviours’ 
(Schwanen et al., 2012, p. 523). This might entail, for instance, the provision of free 
bus travel for a limited period of time (Fujii & Kitamura, 2003; Matthies et al., 2006; 
Thogersen, 2009) or making short-term alterations to infrastructural conditions such 
as by closing roads (Fujii et al., 2001). Alternatively, it can involve delivering habit-
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 breaking interventions during ‘moments of change’ when individuals are more open 
to or capable of changing their existing behaviour (Bamberg, 2006; Darnton et al., 
2011). These ‘windows of opportunity’ include certain life events which disrupt 
people’s routines (e.g., moving house, switching jobs, the birth of a child or retiring 
from work) (Bamberg, 2006; Darnton et al., 2011) and travel behaviour research 
suggests often people reflect on the way they travel and investigate new journeys at 
these junctures (Bamberg, 2006; Verplanken et al., 2008). This observation coincides 
with Dewey’s (1929a, pp. 86-87) emphasis on how such ‘problematic situations’ 
result in reflective thought or active inquiry and experimentation (see Section 6.5). 
As Section 6.2.2 elaborates unlike these accounts he stresses the important role that 
habits, however, play in limiting and contextualising thought. Social psychological 
theories thus while at least giving due consideration to the role of reflection and 
deliberation like nudge theories typically conceptualise habit and thought as opposite 
ends of a continuum, with the former simply being understood as unreflexive and 
automatic responses to environmental cues.  
6.2.2 Habit as the channel of thought and the fabric within which 
thinking operates 
Dewey’s interpretation of the relationship between habit and thought provides the 
foundation for the remainder of the chapter. This is elaborated on by exploring the 
two other similarities between Emma (Section 6.1) and the cyclist’s accounts 
(Sections 5.4 and 5.5). The first relates to when thought takes place during action. 
Following Dewey it has been argued (Sections 2.5 and 5.4.3) that thought only 
occurs when we are confronted with a crisis or what he terms a ‘problematic’ or 
‘undetermined’ situation. This takes place when an individual’s ‘confident, 
straightforward [and] organised’ activity is arrested by some aspect of the environing 
conditions (Dewey, 1922a, p. 181). The operation of normally efficient and 
undisturbed habits is impeded or interrupted resulting in ‘shock, confusion, 
perturbation, uncertainty’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 181). This frees impulse to energize 
deliberation, which is ‘dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing lines 
of action’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 190). For some commuter cyclists the sight or prospect 
of rain in the course of their morning routine results in such moments of hesitation 
during which they recollect, observe and plan. Meanwhile, for Emma it is a matter of 
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 figuring out ‘what's on the way home that [she] can pick up’ for dinner. In both cases 
the ‘objects experienced in following out a course of action [in their imagination] 
attract, repel, satisfy, annoy, promote and retard’ (i.e., what to wear; which bicycle to 
ride; whether to delay their departure; whether to catch the bus; what to eat; how 
long will it take to cook; where to buy it) until the ‘mind is made up, composed, 
unified’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 192). 
The second relates to the role that habits play in qualifying thought. As noted above 
nudge and social psychological accounts underpinned by dual process theories hold 
that although the automatic/habitual or rational/reflective ‘paths’ or ‘systems’ offset 
one or the other, the automatic/habitual usually tends to dominate action. For Dewey 
habit and thought, in contrast, are ‘not polar opposites, but phases within human 
experience’ (Hickman, 2001, p. 132). Habits, for Emma, the cyclists and all of us, are 
‘blinder[s]’ that prevents their ‘thought[s] from straying away from its imminent 
occupation [with dinner or rain] to a landscape more varied … but irrelevant to 
practice’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 172). They ‘restrict [the] reach’ of our intellect or ‘fix its 
boundaries’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 172). Meanwhile, the ‘body of undisturbed habits’ 
which maintain ‘a steady background of objects and meanings that qualify the 
setting’ (Scheffler, 1974, p. 217). Embodied habits are ‘what we know [and] … 
present themselves with definiteness and assurance’ (Dewey, 1922a, pp. 183-184, 
original emphasis). They are ‘retrospective’ in that ‘they are conditions which have 
been mastered, incorporated in the past’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 184). Impulse, on the 
other hand, has a ‘definite forward tendency it constitutes the forward, prospective 
character of knowledge’ which strives to ‘unify our responses, to achieve a consistent 
environment which will restore unity of conduct’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 184). Upon her 
realising she has nothing for tea impulse ‘determines the direction of movement’ 
attempting to ‘bring to notice something which is imminent … yet escapes’ her 
(Dewey, 1922a, p. 180). Simultaneously impulse calls on Emma’s undisturbed habits 
which provide ‘definite objects and meanings as instruments of solution’ (Scheffler, 
1974, p. 218) such as her ability to drive and knowledge of the network of main and 
back roads, associated local shops and their parking prospects and proximity to 
where she needs to pick up the children.  
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 This chapter is concerned then with how habit ‘determines the channels within which 
thought operates’ and the ways in which ‘thinking takes place within the fabric of 
habits’ (Hickman, 2001, p. 132). More specifically, these two concerns provide a 
platform for exploring how habit, experimentation and reflection over time shape 
people’s practices associated with, and experiences of, their commute. In providing 
context it is useful to re-emphasis that for Dewey (1922a, 1929a) habit and 
experience arise out of the interaction between an organism and its environment. 
This entails undergoing, ‘the action of that environment upon the organism (and 
hence its capacity to be acted upon)’ and doing, ‘the action of the organism on the 
environment (its capacity to act upon the world and the capacity of the world to be 
acted upon)’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 126). Both doing and undergoing are always 
‘related to each other or coordinated’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 127) and a ‘part, phase or 
aspect of an environing experienced world - a situation’ (Dewey, 1938, p. 67). Thus 
situations are experienced as both immediate, in that existences are undergone, given 
or felt (i.e., primary experience), and mediated through habits, consciousness and 
meanings (i.e., secondary experience). ‘Consciousness’, for Dewey, ‘is only a very 
small and shifting portion of experience’ (1916, p. 6) and ‘surrounding, bathing, 
saturating, the things of which we are explicitly aware is some inclusive situation 
which does not enter into the direct material of reflection’ (1960, p. 99). Typically, it 
is the ‘familiar [that] does not consciously appear’ as our ‘deep-seated habits are 
precisely those of which we have least awareness. When they operate in a situation to 
which they are not accustomed, in an unusual situation [such as traveling in a new 
city], a new adjustment is required’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 311).  
6.3 Travelling and commuting in new city: Excitement, 
novelty and uncertainty 
Drawing out the similarities between Emma and the cyclists accounts Section 6.2.2 
explored both when thought occurs and the ways in which habits always direct and 
provide the context for thinking. In Emma’s case it was observed how while she is 
preoccupied with what to get for dinner various features of the situation such as how 
to drive a car and which roads to turn down are for the most part ‘taken for granted’ 
and do not ‘come into question’ (Dewey, 1960, p. 99). This is because she ‘know[s] 
how’ by ‘means of her habits’ which allow her and others to ‘do [these and] a 
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 thousand useful acts without thinking of them. We know something, namely, how to 
do them’ (Dewey, 1922a, pp. 177-178). Habits do ‘practical work’, therefore, by 
providing a ‘prompt and exact adjustment to the environment’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 
178). Emerging out of repeated encounters with a particular social and physical 
environment, these habits provide people with an immediate familiarity, a sense of, 
or a feeling for, a situation as a qualitative whole (Dewey, 1929a). Before these 
habits emerge unusual situations such as those which we are unaccustomed to are 
experienced in various ways as novel, uncertain, exciting and risky. Focusing on 
catching the tube and cycling this section explores how people gradually learn to 
adjust to transport systems and infrastructure and travelling and commuting in a new 
city. Dewey’s (1929a) uses the metaphor of a ‘field’ in his attempt to depict the 
relationship between habit, consciousness (‘focal meaning’) and the mind (‘the 
context of meanings’) (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 34):  
If we consider the entire field from bright focus through the fore-conscious, the 
‘fringe’, to what is dim, sub-conscious ‘feeling’, the focus corresponds to the point 
of imminent need, of urgency; the ‘fringe’ corresponds to things that just have been 
reacted to or that will soon require to be looked after, while the remote outlying 
field corresponds to what does not have to be modified, and which may be 
dependably counted upon in dealing with imminent need (Dewey, 1929a, p. 311). 
This section attempts to chart how through repetition what initially presents itself as 
an ‘imminent need’ (focus) gradually becomes either a ‘sub-conscious ‘feeling’’ 
(fringe) or, in some instances, part of the ‘remote outlying field’ (horizon) for tube 
users and cyclists.  
6.3.1 Minding the gap or the barrier gates? 
Many participants who were not originally from London discussed the mixture of 
excitement and uncertainty they experienced when they first arrived and began using 
the tube. For example, Ryan who was originally from New Zealand but had been 
living in London for nine years at the time of his interview captured these sentiments. 
He described how travelling to unfamiliar parts of the city and problems with the 
tube which initially provided him with a sense of adventure and unease have 
subsequently become a source of annoyance or frustration:  
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 I guess when you first come over London is really big and it feels a bit weird. … 
[E]verything is new … so it's exciting. You are slightly uncomfortable going 
somewhere that you haven't been before or if a tube line is down you are like oh 
what happens now? But I remember at the time of that happening it was an 
adventure. Now it is just kind of annoying. And it's not uncomfortable except for 
the fact I might have to stand up when I'd rather not or I won’t get home as quickly 
as I wanted to. Or I won’t get where I wanted to go. 
Ryan captures the way in which the unfamiliar city is experienced, or more 
specifically, undergone or had as ‘really big’, ‘a bit weird’, ‘new’, ‘exciting’ and 
‘uncomfortable’. These situations, or particular events within a situation, later come 
to have a different quality and significance. The tube line going down in both 
instances because it impedes and interrupts his journey becomes ‘problematic’ and 
the focus of his attention. It is marked out in the situation as an object or an event 
with meaning because it has ‘significance [in] respect to [its] consequences’ (Dewey, 
1929a, p. 271). When new to London, Ryan is uncertain as to ‘what happens now’, 
or how he should respond and what his alternatives are. The situation is defined and 
regulated by its uncertain (and ‘adventure’-like) quality, this determines his 
‘immediate focus of intensive concern, [his] proximate sense of context, and [the] 
tacitly felt horizon’ (Alexander, 1987, p. xix). ‘Now’, due to subsequently acquired 
habits and meanings which mediate the situation, he is not only aware of his various 
transport alternatives14 but also their consequences (i.e., having to stand, not getting 
home as quickly or not getting to where he wanted to go). Typically annoyance as a 
result becomes the dominant quality of such situations.  
Gareth, also from New Zealand, talked about how he had ‘never really lived in a big 
city’ and had always driven a car prior to shifting to London. Arriving eight months 
ago he was ‘not used to’ London’s ‘transport systems’ and found it ‘quite a daunting 
challenge’: ‘When you [initially] look at the tube map you are like what the?’ He was 
fortunate though in that friends and family members ‘explain[ed] how [the] systems 
work[ed] a little bit’: 
14 This became apparent on morning go-alongs with Ryan in summer and winter as on both occasions 
services on his normal route were disrupted, once due to snow and on the other occasion because of a 
train breaking down. 
220 
                                                 
 Basically [people said] just forget about all the names and things just focus on the 
colours and try and find the train which is going past where you want to go on … 
whatever line it is. Look for the names at the end of each … line and if you see a 
train which is heading that way you know your stop will be before then. 
For him, in addition to heeding this advice, it was something ‘you kind of do … a 
few times and get used to … pretty quickly. [After a short time] you can navigate 
your own way pretty quick but those first few times are a bit daunting’. A point he 
illustrated by recalling ‘a really embarrassing story’: 
I remember the first time I got my Oyster card. [I] went up to the kiosk and bought 
the Oyster card and put some money on it and all the rest of it. And then went to the 
gates and I don't actually know you had to put the thing on the yellow scanner. So I 
had to go back to the kiosk and so go 'what do you do now'? [Laughs]. And they are 
like 'see that yellow thing?' And I'm like 'Ok sweet you know got it' [laughs]. So 
from then on it was it was pretty sweet [laughs] but it was pretty [laughs while 
saying] embarrassing the first time around. […] [T]hen as soon as you have done it 
[a few times it] really [is] just second nature. 
In this context Gareth uses the term ‘second nature’ to characterise how he ‘pretty 
quickly’ overcome his initial and rather ‘embarrassing’ difficulties thereby making 
the transition from a novice to a more accomplished and efficient user or ‘navigator’. 
His turn of phrase is rather appropriate as Hegel used ‘second nature’ to evoke the 
‘naturalness of habit’ (see also Bernstein, 2002; Carlisle, 2014, p. 16): ‘From the 
lowest level of life, it seems the continuity or repetition of a change modifies, 
relative to this change itself, the disposition of a being, and in this way modifies 
nature’ (Hegel, 2012 [1894], p. 208 (§ 401)). Dewey perhaps in part reflecting his 
earlier Hegelianism15 characterises habits in a similar way observing they are 
‘secondary and acquired, not native and original’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 89). 
Inadvertently as we shall see Gareth also alerts us to the differences between an 
experience ‘had’ or undergone, a thing, object or event ‘known’, and habits as ‘know 
how’, by observing how you need to travel on the tube a ‘few times’ before it 
becomes second nature.  
15 See Good (2006) for a discussion of Dewey’s ‘permanent Hegelian deposit'.  
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 ‘The self’, Dewey (1911, p. 553) asserts, ‘experiences what it undergoes, and … 
what we are aware of is determined by things that we are undergoing, but that we are 
not conscious of and that we can not be conscious of under the particular conditions’. 
In this way he contrasts the ‘notion of ‘undergoing’ a thing with the experience of 
having an ‘awareness’ of a thing, a process that is genetically and temporally 
subsequent to undergoing yet still antecedent to knowing’ (Hildebrand, 2003, p. 26). 
This implies that it is only after something is undergone and we become aware of it 
that ‘knowing may take place’ (Hildebrand, 2003, p. 26). This is because ‘knowing is 
a relation to things which depends upon other and more primary connections 
between a self and things; a relation which grows out of these more fundamental 
connections and which operates in their interests at specifiable crises’ (Dewey, 1911, 
p. 552). For example, having purchased and topped up his Oyster card Gareth 
attempts to go through the barrier gates but upon arrival is unsure of how to proceed. 
Returning embarrassed to the kiosk he is made aware of the yellow card reader and 
its connection to his Oyster card and the barriers. Over time he comes to ‘apprehend’ 
but not ‘know’ this yellow card reader as ‘[r]ecognition (the re-cognizing) succeeds 
by virtue, by and large, of factors that are not immediate’ (Hildebrand, 2003, p. 44). 
His original uncertainty ‘initiated an inquiry that was settled’ and afterwards 
‘repeated encounters helped create a habit of interpreting such perceptual material’ 
(Hildebrand, 2003, p. 44) as an Oyster card reader. Consequently, as this and other 
aspects of the tube become ‘second nature’ or ‘know how’ they cease to be 
‘knowledge’ as ‘habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, 
observe or remember … as [it] is too organized, too insistent and determinate to need 
to indulge in inquiry or imagination’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 177). It is not knowledge in 
the traditional sense, therefore, as it ‘lives in the muscles, not in consciousness’ 
(Dewey, 1922a, p. 177). 
6.3.2 ‘Living in the space in-between’  
The previous section examined the ways in which travelling by the London 
underground was initially experienced as variously exciting, uncertain and in 
Gareth’s case embarrassing. Additionally, it explored the role which new habits and 
meanings play in gradually transforming these novel and unusual situations into 
something that is organized, recognisable and familiar. It is important to emphasise, 
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 however, that although excitement, novelty and uncertainty are the pervasive 
qualities of these initial encounters they are also mediated by a background of habits, 
objects and meanings which help to qualify the situation. In terms of the 
underground some rather obvious examples if we think back to Ryan and Gareth 
might include their ability to walk and move in and around stations, to recognise and 
follow various signs and maps, and possibly a familiarity with escalators, corridors 
and waiting platforms. In this context the mediating role of habit perhaps became 
more apparent when cyclists reflected on their initial experiences of cycling in 
Auckland and London. 
In Section 5.5.2 we saw how Ellie gradually became less ‘chicken’ and more assured 
and mindful on the roads after getting some ‘miles under her belt’. Prior to riding her 
Brompton to work for the first time Ellie had only ever ridden her first bicycle in 
parks around London. Like Ryan and Gareth her first time cycling to work was 
marked by a mixture of excitement and uncertainty but also fear as ‘London roads 
are quite scary [especially if you’ve] never cycled on them before’. Purchasing a 
Brompton she initially ‘thought [she] would … ride [her] bike to the station and then 
because it … folds up … take it on the train to work’. As we saw in the previous 
chapter she soon became a passionate cyclist, however, despite getting horribly lost:  
[The] first day I rode to the station and thought wow that was a bit quick I'll just 
keep riding and when I feel tired or something I will stop and get the tube. Well 
then despite I got really lost and it took a long time and I arrived at work sweaty 
and purple faced I did actually accidentally ride the whole way to work. And I 
thought that was the coolest thing. I couldn't believe what I have achieved. … And I 
kind of raved to everyone at work I was like [puts on a different voice] ‘Oh my god 
ah I biked to work’. So then that was that really. 
She attributed her initial difficulties in finding her way to work to having previously 
only travelled by the underground: ‘[T]he tube is quite poor’ for ‘your geography 
[and] for knowing where stuff is’ as ‘your sense of … London … becomes the tube 
map which isn’t geographical at all’. In contrast, cycling she explained helps you to 
‘learn where things really are … it is quite a confident … or a knowledgeable feeling 
which is really nice. And you discover things that you wouldn't have found otherwise 
because there are things that don't have tubes near them’. Cycling has, in other 
words, changed her sense of herself and the city. 
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 Over time such knowledge, or rather know how following Dewey, and experiences 
she has had have also resulted in the gradual transformation of her cycling habit. As 
a consequence she is now able to better apprehend, feel more in control or has a 
better sense of how to deal with various unexpected or problematic situations that 
arise on her commute:  
You get a lot more confident so you cycle differently in that you are much more 
aware of when you can run a red light, when it is actually safer to run a red light. 
What you should do. More aware of what other traffic is doing [like] buses, white 
van men [and] taxis. [Also learning] [h]ow to cope with other cyclists because they 
are actually the worst. […] [T]he ‘Tour de France’ [cyclists are] really serious … 
wear all the kit … go fast and … do things like over take you on the inside or get to 
close or just generally behave like dicks. [T]hen there … are [cyclists who are] 
maybe a bit ignorant, maybe they are not drivers. I find cyclists who aren't drivers 
really [frustrating] because they don't look at the right places and they are just a bit 
dopey [laughs]. 
Upon further questioning about her observation about ‘dopey’ cyclists not being 
‘drivers’ she went on to explain even though she has never driven in London 
previous experiences of driving in New Zealand and the United States provide her 
with another way of mediating her encounters with cars: 
You know where to look if you are a driver … That you've got to be looking out 
here [raising her hand points to right] because everyone is on the left. [S]o you are 
always looking, and you know not to overtake someone and [to] look at what the 
cars indicators are doing and … respond to that. And you also know … to look at 
what a driver is doing and look through the glass into the car or the truck at where 
they are looking to be aware of what they are up to. Because you have been in that 
position yourself. But yeah the indicating thing is a big one you know. 
Ellie demonstrates how her driving habits and meanings after initially playing a 
mediating role have over time become incorporated into her cycling habits and 
meanings.  
Mike having only ever cycled on ‘town roads’, prior to moving up to complete a 
Masters degree, talked about having to learn to adjust the way he cycles in Auckland. 
In doing so he emphasised how habits or ‘skills’ developed cycling to school and 
mountain biking had greatly helped him to adapt: 
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 Yeah [I] definitely had [to change how I cycled in Auckland] because I [had] been 
used to town roads. Mind you I'd done a lot of cycle skills growing up. You know 
you don't necessarily learn all of the skills on a road bike because you often don't 
encounter some [of the] odd situations [you do in the city]. But […] I did a lot of 
mountain biking too so I gained a lot of skills and I think because of that […] when 
I get to traffic lights I don't need to clip out of my pedals [as] I can stay on my bike 
and stay in one spot […].  
Despite these pre-existing habits, Mike emphasised the important role that his 
experiences of potentially risky and dangerous situations had played in helping him 
to learn to ‘live in the space in-between’ cars: 
[I had] to learn to ride between cars and stuff like that [which] can be scary. And I 
had a few experiences that […] I learned some lessons from like car doors swinging 
open, you never expect it to happen but it does. [And I learnt] that some cars can be 
unpredictable […], that was a lesson hard learned. Big open road and you are 
following a car probably a bit too close but hey there is no reason that they would 
stop for anything and then they just hit the brakes and pull in [to the side of the 
road] you know. I hit the back of one car. It was no major but […] I [tend to] beat 
myself up around stuff like that [just] because I'm frustrated that it happened more 
than how it happened. […] I probably push the limits a fair bit when I'm cycling but 
I've had very few crashes, probably two in the whole time I've been up here. […] I 
heard this really interesting [and] cool quote from […] a cycle courier in New York. 
[It is] mental the stuff they’ll do [like] they are just not scared to run red lights, life 
threatening [stuff]. I wouldn't push it that far […] but he said ‘we live in the space 
in-between’. And I quite like that because I kind of think well there is space there 
and as long as cars are predictable like there is no problem with us using that space 
in my opinion. 
Coupled with his pre-existing cycle skills, such experiences he went on to suggest 
allow him to now ‘move in harmony with traffic’. Consequently, Mike was reluctant 
to encourage novice riders to start commuting by bicycle in Auckland: 
… I think I move in harmony with traffic a lot better than … other people because 
I'm just use to it. And I don't know where they would get the skills from for a start. 
Cos I can move, remember I was saying I can move quick enough to move with 
traffic and with some of these people that are just starting out they move really 
slowly you know. So whereas at traffic lights I would wait right in the middle of the 
car, the first car. And I will move faster off, accelerate faster of the light than a car 
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 can and that gets me through the intersection safe[ly] and then […] I'll move to the 
side and cars can go past me. But the intersection is the dangerous part whereas a 
first timer if they are really slow of the mark you can't do that. You can't start in the 
middle of the lane. You've got to stick to one side which puts them in more risk and 
if they do they try to stay in the middle of the lane cars will beep their horns and get 
all angry at them you know. 
Mike also demonstrates in this context how previous habits which originally 
mediated his early experiences of cycling in Auckland have helped his habits to 
evolve to the point which he now is able ‘to move in harmony with traffic’. Notably, 
like Ellie these experiences have also altered the way he interprets the levels of risk 
or meanings that he now associates with dangerous encounters with motorised 
traffic. This is a point which is returned to in Section 6.5 section. 
Lauren who has ‘always cycled’ recalled her early experiences of cycling in London 
in the following way: 
When I […] first moved to London when I was just out of university 22 [years old], 
and I was absolutely petrified and I didn't know how to cycle here. So I just learnt 
[…] be a bit defensive, well not defensive, just position yourself on the road 
properly and don't be too risky and have lots of lights and reflective stuff on and 
stuff like that.  
When asked her to elaborate on this learning process she emphasises that it involved 
readjusting her existing cycling habits to London’s road infrastructure and, more 
importantly, motorists. This transition occurred, as she explains, in part through a 
process of active experimentation: 
[…] I didn't take a course or anything like that [it was] just almost trial and error. It 
sounds like I had loads of accidents but I didn't. [I] just sort of went oh […] people 
are obviously responding in a different way if I move out into the road more. So just 
noticing how other people are responding. And occasionally doing things that 
frightened [me] and going oh I'm not doing that again.  
The above excerpt captures the role that observation and reflective thought play in 
modifying an existing habit. Lauren explained when she first arrived in London she 
tended to cycle as close as possible to the curb of the roadside as she was ‘petrified’ 
of London traffic. Though her varied, and sometimes ‘frighten[ing]’, experiences of 
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 cycling in London she has gained more confidence and, as she alludes to in the first 
excerpt, learnt to be ‘a bit [more] defensive’. These experiences and, more 
specifically, particularly dangerous or risky encounters with motorists have triggered 
moments of conscious deliberation and her subsequent experimentation with her road 
positioning. She explained by moving further out into the road that she not only 
becomes more visible but that motorists are often forced to slow down when they 
pass her by as they typically need to cross the centre line in order to overtake (see 
Figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.3. A video still taken from the second leg of my cycle go-along with Lauren in August 2013.  
In the interview she explained that when she became more confident cycling in London she started to 
experiment with where she positioned herself on the road and observed motorists responses. As 
captured in this image, moving further out from the curb increases her visibility and often forces 
motorists to slow down as they need to cross the centre line when overtaking.  
Elsewhere she discussed how she has had to learn to negotiate particularly 
‘frightening’ junctions such as one on ‘the other side Kew Bridge’:  
You can cycle on the pavement [over the bridge as] it is a shared path until the 
bottom and then you have to merge with the traffic. [P]eople are coming at you 
from all different directions and yeah I was just not […] use to that and […] didn't 
time myself going out into the traffic very well. [It was] just [me] not being use to 
the aggressive London drivers and […] lots of traffic and people kind of diving 
through [amber] lights when they should really stop (see Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4. A video still taken from the first leg of my cycle go-along with Lauren in August 2013.  
We are approaching what Lauren described as one of the more “frightening” junctions which she 
encounters on her commute. This is because cars coming over the bridge can travel straight ahead or 
turn off to the left. Other motor vehicles such as the black car and the white van can also join from a 
street located to the right hand side of the road. 
On both return commutes we stopped at the bottom of Kew Bridge and waited to 
merge into the traffic. While waiting she observed another cyclist had been killed at 
this particular junction. She explained in the interview she always exercises 
particular caution here as even though it can appear to be safe often it is not:  
[When] I get to the end of the pavement bit where you are allowed to cycle […] I 
just wait […] until everything has come to a standstill basically because there is a 
bit where there [are] keep clear signs and traffic can come in from the right and go 
across. So I just make sure that there is no possibility that anyone can dive through. 
Just wait for it to be completely stationery.  
Overall, Lauren’s account like the others presented in this section is illustrative of the 
ways in which people gradually learn and adjust to transport systems and 
infrastructure, travelling and commuting in a new city. Her account in particular 
illustrates the ways in which the initial transition period is marked by uncertainty, 
worry and experimentation, while others such as Ryan and Ellie highlight how it can 
equally be a time of excitement because of its novelty. Moreover, as new adjustments 
are made and corresponding new habits form, what originally occupied the conscious 
foreground of a situation increasingly merges into the sub-conscious background. 
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 Earlier habits and meanings are transformed through repeated encounters and what 
were once novel and indeterminate increasingly become more settled and stable. 
Consequently, people gain a sense for the situation (Tiles, 2003) which ensures 
action, in contrast to libertarian paternalist and social psychology accounts, is guided 
by more than simply impulse, arousal, inertia and procrastination or a response to 
environmental stimuli. This of course is not to imply that future situations will not be 
unpredictable as they always entail a ‘‘stable’ or formed structured aspect’ and ‘a 
‘precarious’ or dynamic aspect’ (Alexander, 1987, p. 110). As we saw in Ryan’s case 
the mediating role of habits, consciousness and meanings alter the way in which they 
are experienced. They are perhaps no longer novel or exciting but instead routine or 
mundane. 
6.4 The arrival of the mundane commute 
This section explores the arrival of what is termed the routine or mundane commute 
and the ways in which it is undergone or had by various commuters. In doing so we 
see how the transition from the novel to familiar is differently experienced and the 
meanings assigned differ. Some actively try to avoid the mundane by mixing the 
commute up, others grin and bear it accepting it for what it is while others learn to 
value and actively use their travel time. Particular events such as getting lost, close 
proximity to others on public transport, being stuck in traffic or risky encounters with 
cars which were in the past felt as bodily impressions (i.e., excitement, delight, 
stress, anxiety or fear) progressively lessen. As Section 6.4.2 illustrates the various 
demands of commuting which individuals endure or undergo in experience become 
easier to bear as the self is reconstituted through habit or ‘subtle, slow creep 
transformations which gradually build up over time’ (Bissell, 2014a, p. 192; 2014b). 
In doing so they help to illustrate how habits are much more than merely unreflexive, 
automatic and mechanistic responses to environmental stimuli. Instead, as each of 
these subsections highlight they are modes of response which allow individuals to 
use and incorporate these social and physical environments in different ways.  
6.4.1 Mixing up the commute: Avoiding ‘Groundhog Day’ 
Rachel, who was living in Edinburgh before she moved to London, explained how 
the decision on where to live was one that she carefully planned: 
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 I moved down for a job actually. […] So and actually for the first time I sort of 
decided where I was going to live based on travel. You know […] was moving to 
London and thought where am I going to live? Massive place, never lived in 
London before. Ok get a Google Map plot where my friends live. I'd been down and 
swum in a brilliant lido, the London Fields Lido, which is […] a 50 metre [open air] 
heated swimming pool. Plotted that, plotted where Croydon was and looked at the 
main train lines and just thought there is no way I want a long commute I want to 
make this as easy as possible. So kind of traced up the different you know thought 
London Bridge, Farringdon and ended up living in Farringdon while I was working 
there. So I kind of commuted against the grain on the train and cycling down to 
Croydon for two years I think.  
Rachel has subsequently moved a number of times around Farringdon and most 
recently to Stephney Green. This was because she ‘wanted to be back in [her] own 
place’ and ‘nearer to friends’ and in her view this area is more affordable on a single 
salary and has good transport connections. Such connections help her to visit both 
her ‘friends from Scotland who are married with babies in south-west London [and] 
new friends … in east London’. Importantly, having access to a range of transport 
connections help her to avoid Groundhog Day16, something that she was particularly 
worried about before shifting to London: 
My commute is different every day. And I do that on purpose because my biggest 
fear of living in London is that you get into a routine and end up doing the same 
thing every day, day in day out. That is like a fate worse than death for me [laughs]. 
So even when I worked in Croydon I just mixed it up and would take a different 
route in where I could. And so I might have two or three ways of getting in. And it 
is dictated by weather, what I'm doing before work, what I'm doing after work, if I 
have to be smart for a meeting. You know there [are] different things that will […] 
determine how I get in and out of work. [S]o I normally cycle but I might cycle on 
my Brompton, or I might cycle on my road bike or I might take like a Boris bike 
[laughs]. Depending on what I'm doing before and after. If it is really miserable, 
pouring with rain I will get the tube but it takes longer. But that is just so I'm not 
sitting in wet clothes for the rest of the day. Because it is not, it is a twenty minute, 
twenty-five minute cycle. So I cycle in my work clothes. The only thing I don't 
16 Groundhog Day is a 1993 film starring Bill Murray as a weatherman who wakes up one day to find 
that he is living the same day over and over again. This was a phrase used by another participant to 
describe the repetitive nature of his commute. 
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 cycle in is a pencil skirt because it doesn't allow you to [laughs]. But I will cycle in 
short skirts and I will cycle in anything. […]. 
Rachel here again illustrates the many ways in which cycling subjectivities are 
negotiated, contested, reworked and resisted in relation to the weather and dress 
conventions (see also Sections 5.4 and 5.5). She goes on to describe the different 
scenarios emphasising the main difference is the time they take and observing that 
Boris bikes are currently her ‘favourite’: 
[…] I'm a five minute walk to the nearest [Boris bike station at the home end] and a 
five minute [walk] at [the work] end. And they are kind of heavier and slower and 
so that probably takes me more like twenty-five, half an hour journey time. So I sort 
of need to factor that in. So like this morning I was just kind of running, I'm always 
running late. And I always think I'll leave the house at half past seven [0730], I have 
to be in at work at eight [0800] and I always leave after that or I don't factor in that 
time that it takes me to unfold my Brompton and get down stairs or whatever that is. 
But that is the quickest way to just jump on the Brompton and do door to door. But 
then you are stuck with a bike all day, well not all day, I park it at work. And that's 
fine if I'm going home at the end of the day. But I love Boris bikes […] [and] it 
works perfectly when I've got one less than five minutes from my door and less 
than five minutes from [work] and […] everyone else is doing the opposite 
[journey] to me. So they are all picking up bikes from Waterloo […] so there [are] 
lots of spaces for me to drop them off […]. That is probably my favourite at the 
moment. Tube takes about 40 minutes but I sometimes do it just for a change. I 
sometimes get bored cycling the same route in and out. I try and mix it up with 
which bridge I come over and that is about it [laughs]. […] 
Rachel illustrates once again how although pre-existing infrastructures, norms and 
subjectivities shape or condition individuals they always retain the ability to act upon 
these environments (see also Chapter 4). Like others living in cities such as 
Auckland and London she, albeit to a lesser extent, is somewhat limited by her 
circumstances. She has had to relocate to an area where she can afford a flat by 
herself and that is close to friends. At the same time she is fortunate enough to 
remain within close proximity to a number of transport connections including a Boris 
bike station and the Stepney Green Underground Station. In contrast, to other 
participants with families or who own their homes she still remains largely 
‘autonomous’ and, therefore, retains more flexibility in terms of where she can live, 
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 when she can leave home and the modes of mobility best suited to her own personal 
needs. This was certainly not the case for all participants as Section 6.4.2 
demonstrates. Rachel also noted that another trade-off of maintaining this variability 
was that her morning ‘routine [always] feels quite long … and not very [well 
organised]’ as she often ends up having to ‘find’ or ‘remember’ all the different 
components associated with each different variation such as the ‘Boris bike chip, 
coat, gloves, hat, helmet and lock’. In contrast, to other participants whose morning 
routines became more ‘precise, graceful and effortless’ through habit (Bissell, 2014b, 
p. 485), Rachel’s continues to require thought and effort. Moreover, despite the 
variability she purposely builds in, her account still nonetheless illustrates how her 
experience of the commute continues to be mediated by existing habits and meanings 
associated with, for example, repetition, weather and cycling.  
6.4.2 Grinning and bearing it: Making the best of a bad situation 
Other commuters reflected on how over time they have had to learn to live with the 
realities of their commute. Brian has been driving by and large the same route to 
work for the last ten years (see also Sections 4.4.2, 5.1 and 5.3). He encounters 
Auckland’s traffic congestion problems every day as he recounts here in describing 
how he gets to work: 
Well yeah I … leave the house decide which way I will get onto the motorway and 
that is the longest period of waiting as to enter to get onto the motorway itself at 
Takapuna. [S]o I might grab a coffee on the way through to that point or wait until a 
bit later in the commute before I go and get a coffee. But generally I might get a 
coffee on the way in heading into Esmond Road and then enjoy that while I'm 
edging along until we get onto the motorway proper. […] [T]here are serval coffee 
bars that are open at that time of the morning, quarter past-twenty past seven [0715-




Figure 6.5. A picture taken in the early stages of a morning commute with Brian from his house in 
Takapuna located on Auckland’s North Shore to Otahuhu located south-west of the city centre. He 
explained you have ‘chosen where you live … [and] work and therefore you’ve got [no choice but] to 
go from A to B’ despite the traffic. 
Alongside enjoying his coffee he listens to ‘talk back radio’ or if he is a ‘bit sick of 
that [he] turn’s some music on’ and ‘just watch[es] the world [laughs while saying] 
go by’. In reflecting on how he finds the commute he observed that he has learnt to 
accept his fate: 
A lot of people would find it frustrating but having done it for years and over time 
having to commute further and further to the southern parts of Auckland to this 
point … I'm pretty laid back about that. Unless I'm late for an appointment 
somewhere and then it is a bit critical. But other than that it is what it is. You've 
chosen where you live you've chosen where you work and therefore you've got to 
go from A to B. 
When asked to elaborate further he observed how through sheer repetition you 
sometimes end up on ‘autopilot’, whereby as you become habituated to the rhythms 
of the traffic it allows your mind to wander: 
…  I mean I use to I remember in the earlier days when I was working even closer 
to the city than I do now. I'd sometimes think well how did I get to work? Your 
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 mind just wanders. You just drive. You just put yourself on autopilot and … 
listening to the radio so it all just helps pass the time. And you get there and you 
think 'oh' how did I get here and what happened on [says while laughing] the way in 
obviously nothing. So um and it's much the well it's not quite the same because 
you've got more motorway impact to be aware of so in the traffic flows and heavily 
flowing traffic so you are a bit more conscious of what is going on. 
Similarly, in London many New Zealand passengers observed how they gradually 
cultivated particular habits in response to the socialites and materialities of the 
different time-spaces of their journeys (see also Section 4.5.1). As this excerpt from 
Katie’s return commute from her workplace in Westminster to her flat in Marylebone 
illustrates, over time some of the peculiarities of everyday experiences, such as the 
fact everyone ‘stops talking’ when they board onto the tube, often fade into the 
unconscious background: 
It is a little bit after 5pm [1700] when Katie appears at the front door. … Walking to 
St James Park station she asks me what I am hoping to get out of travelling with 
people. I mention that sometimes as we go-along participants start talking about 
things they do or notice which they do not necessarily reflect on or mention during 
an interview. She responds: ‘I’m trying to think of something interesting to point 
out but there is nothing’. A moderately busy District Line train to Upminster arrives 
shortly after we step onto the platform (see Figure 6.6). At first Katie suggests we 
will get the next one but at the last minute noticing there is some space in the door 
she asks: ‘Should we’? We hurriedly board and a few moments later the door 
closes. We are only travelling one stop to Victoria. 
On the tube it is busy and there is not much space (see Figure 6.6) but not as 
crowded as other tubes I’ve been on previously. Katie is hanging on to the handrail 
on the ceiling with her right arm and appears to have a fairly vacant stare. She looks 
tired. Nobody is speaking. In between the automated announcements informing 
people of the next station the only sounds that break the silence are coughs, the 
screeching caused by the friction between the carriages and tracks and the sound of 
the tube accelerating and decelerating. It is not until a few moments before the door 
alarm sounds that Katie points out how she tries to line up the carriage exit with the 
station exit like ‘everyone else’.  
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Figure 6.6. The picture on the left hand side is of a moderately busy tube and platform at a station on 
the London Underground, not too dissimilar to the one which we encountered on our go-along. The 
picture on right is from the commute with Katie from St James Station to Victoria Station on the 
District Line and captures the backs of the people standing in close proximity of me. It also highlights 
that while the tube was crowded there was still some space to manoeuvre and take covert pictures. 
As we depart the train and proceed to the Victoria Line platform she enquires: ‘Do 
you notice how every time you get on the tube everyone stops talking? You could 
do a PhD just on that, behaviour in confined spaces’. Nodding in agreement I 
mention that I have been asking people about whether they talk on the tube in my 
interviews. She responds: ‘No not even if you are with someone. You always or I 
always, feel a bit funny having conversations because everyone can hear. It is like 
that thing when people get in lifts and everyone faces the door. And no one ever 
says a thing’ [London Field Notes, Tuesday 11 December 2012]. 
The above excerpt illustrates again how the go-along provides a particular mode of 
engagement which allows participants and researchers to reflect on their lives, habits 
and experiences of commuting. Moreover, it reveals how particular (public)mobility 
subjectivities have emerged as a result of London’s unique habit infrastructures 
(Section 4.5.1). As has been argued throughout the thesis these habit infrastructures 
do not determine an individual’s particular modes of response as these variously 
emerge over time through repetition, observation and reflection and sometimes 
collective discussions with other friends and colleagues. As Section 4.5.1 noted 
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 common habits include catching earlier services, positioning oneself on the platform 
and/or within the carriage so they can get a seat or make a swift exit upon arrival at 
their stop and as is further expanded upon now the adoption of different approaches 
for dealing with the proximity of others. 
Katie was not the only participant to notice that people stop talking and avoid eye 
contact mainly on the London Underground but also the London Overground and 
local and regional train services, especially during periods of peak hour travel17. In 
many of interviews ‘behaviour in [these] confined spaces’, to borrow Katie’s words, 
was a source of amusement, curiosity and frustration. Becky who had only been 
living in London for three and a half months at the time of our interview also touched 
upon this: 
I noticed it immediately upon getting here like people just don't make eye contact 
and if you do, it is super awkward. [You] have to pick an unnatural spot on the wall 
to look at. Where you might usually look straight ahead you have to look up at the 
ceiling. [E]ven looking at the window across from you, you realise ‘ops’ I'm 
accidentally looking at the [reflection of the] person beside me. Does he think I'm 
staring at him? Is this about to get aggressive? Oh and you can’t just stare into the 
distance [as] whops I’m freaking that guy out. 
She went on to note that when she briefly visited London before getting a job there 
someone had ‘jokingly, semi-jokingly said to me it is an offence to stare at somebody 
[…] [so] watch out they will cut you [laughs]’: 
They were joking but I've had people say a similar thing quite a few times now. I 
mean I haven't seen it in action but I have seen how it can get a bit you know 
awkward. You are trapped in a really small space and it is just like if someone is 
standing right next to you shoulder to shoulder you wouldn't turn and look them in 
the face because it would be odd and it is kinda like that. It is like everyone wants to 
stay in their own little world and forget that you know we are sort of trapped 
underground together (see Figure 6.7). I often wonder if what would happen if the 
17 A number of participants noted that they did sometimes interact with people but these typically 
tended to be during periods of delay or disruption (e.g., to services, children or tourists on the tube), 
outside of peak commuting times such as late in the evening or on weekends. Similar interactions 
were observed during periods of participant observation in London. Additionally, it was noticed that 
people would sometimes interact with a partner or friend upon boarding but often would then reduce 
the volume at which they talked at if they continued to do so on the tube.  
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 train broke down for a long time especially if it was really packed. How long would 
you have to be sitting there together before people would start to interact?  
 
Figure 6.7. These two images taken during the morning on the Northern Line (left) and the District 
Line (right) capture commuters using newspapers, smart phones, eReaders (i.e., Kindles) and tablets 
to help them escape into their own ‘little world[s]’. 
Becky has sought to find activities which help create a ‘little world’ of her own on 
the commute and help her to escape such awkward encounters: 
Lately I've mainly been listening to podcasts. When I first got here I was listening 
to podcasts that are like say 40 minutes about a topic. So I might get through like 
one of those on my commute there and one back. So I would listen to a couple of 
them a day. And then more recently I've been listening to audio series but I've 
suddenly caught up [on that] so there [are] no new episodes so that has stopped. But 
I was listening to that which I quite liked that because it took me more out of where 
I was because it was like watching a TV show but audio so [laughs] [I] just sort of 
totally zoned out.  
When the audio series finished she decided that she would try to ‘start reading more’ 
but soon found that it was difficult to read if she did not manage to get a seat: 
So I tried to always have a book on me but that only lasted a couple of weeks 
because if you don't get a seat it is really difficult. Especially if it is so packed that 
you can't even plant your feet apart you really have to hang on to something 
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 otherwise you are all over the show. So it is pretty difficult to keep control of your 
bag and coat and to hold onto a pole and hold a book open. And then how are you 
supposed to […] change the page [as] you are […] [only] stationary [at the station]? 
So yeah pretty much back to the podcasts, I occasionally listen to music but I […] 
like the things that distract me more whereas music is just sort of background. [T]he 
great thing about a book, or a Kindle if you have one, I'd love a one, [however, is] 
you've got something to look at. Because when you are listening to your iPod or not 
doing anything at all it is [once again that] awkward thing of where do you look?  
Ryan, like Becky, has developed a range of activities that help him to ‘escape’ his 
commute. Travelling back on his evening commute he contrasts his approach to 
commuting with that of his wife: 
The thing about commuting is that it is a necessarily evil. And I do things to make it 
as comfortable as possible. My wife doesn't like commuting and I think she hasn't 
accepted it and doesn't engage with. The thing is I don't engage with it at all. I just 
read a book or something. And I'm set doing that and that's fine. It works well. She 
is sort of rebelling against it and going commuting is horrible. 
His ability to read on the tube is greatly assisted by his Kindle which allows him to 
carry a large number of books on a small and portable device. Ryan like many 
commuters is not always assured of getting a seat. In such instances he has learnt to 
adapt the way in which he reads rather than abandoning the pursuit as Becky does: 
If I can get a seat fine I'll sit down and read my Kindle. If I can't get a seat I usually 
want a hand free to hold something right? So I'll usually read a different book on 
my iPhone. I've got a Kindle app on that. So I can do that with one hand easily. So 
it's just a slight difference. I could read the same thing but for whatever reason I 
usually read short stories on my iPhone and slightly lighter things whereas I've got 
more, longer, [dedicated] books on my Kindle. 
Working long hours and living with his wife and nine month old daughter Ryan 
emphasised that his commute was the only time he got to read. Correspondingly, in 
his initial interview he discussed the frustration of seeing someone he knew on his 
commute: 
Actually you will find this funny. In the last year or so, I bumped into a guy I play 
rugby with [on my commute]. We've played rugby together for maybe 6-7 years. So 
you know we are quite good mates and get on with each other. I was really annoyed 
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 when I saw him there because I wanted to read my book and now I have to talk to 
him. Why did I say hello? I could have just turned around and pretended I couldn't 
see him. 
Ryan’s agitation at having to talk to his friend it could be argued, stems in part from 
his desire to read, a desire that has emerged in a particular environment and been 
incorporated into the body through repetition (cf. Dewey, 1922a; Ravaisson, 2008 
[1838]). Additionally, his account briefly illustrates how the time and space of the 
commute can become and be seen as particularly valuable.  
Becky and Ryan’s accounts also illustrate the ways in which existing habit 
infrastructures shape and condition the development of particular habits. It has been 
argued correspondingly that the way in which carriages have been configured on 
many European trains including the tube has contributed to the development of such 
customs: 
The nineteenth- century European railway carriage placed its six to eight passengers 
in a compartment where they faced one another, a seating plan derived from the 
large horse-drawn coaches of an earlier era. When it first appeared as train seating 
… this arrangement provoked a sense of ‘the embarrassment of people facing each 
other in silence’ for now the cover of noise in the horse-drawn carriages was gone. 
The comfortable smoothness of the railroad carriage, however, permitted people to 
read by themselves. The railway carriage filled with close-packed bodies who read 
or silently looked out the window marked a great social change: silence used as a 
protection of individual privacy. On the streets, as in the railway carriage, people 
began to treat as their right not to be spoken to by strangers, to treat the speech of 
strangers as a violation (Sennett, 1994, p. 343). 
Carriages on London Underground and Overground trains continue to be designed 
mainly with the aim of increasing carrying capacity during peak times. Figure 6.7 
highlights how seats on many lines are now typically located along the wall as this 
provides space for people to stand in the aisle. When vacant, however, this means, 
like earlier nineteenth century carriages, that an individual looks directly at anyone 
sitting opposite of them. As Becky observes this is not typically considered 
appropriate. This section has explored the transition from a new to a routine or 
mundane commute. Section 6.4.2 especially focused on the ways in which this also 
often involves a transformation in relation to how the commute is experienced and its 
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 associated habits and meanings. Despite this as Section 6.5 now illustrates 
individuals still routinely encounter problematic situations on their commutes. In 
doing so it seeks to emphasise how such transformations, however, condition the 
ways in which people respond to these challenges.  
6.5 ‘Problematic situations’ and the mundane 
Section 6.2.1 observed that many social psychology theories emphasise that 
disrupting the environment which cues an individual’s automatic response can be 
essential if an individual’s habits are to broken or defrosted. Some social 
psychologists have accordingly suggested that certain life events such as having a 
child which disrupt people’s routines can provide ‘windows of opportunity’ in which 
to deliver habit-breaking interventions (Bamberg, 2006; Darnton et al., 2011). It was 
argued that such an observation corresponds with the importance that Dewey places 
on problematic situations as moments which give rise to deliberation and reflection. 
Moreover, in recognising these ‘windows of opportunity’, social psychology 
accounts it was suggested overlook, as Section 6.5.2 illustrates, how habits limit and 
contextualise thought. Equally, there is no recognition of as Section 6.5.1 
demonstrates how habits can be gradually reconstituted through reflection and 
deliberation, which is directed by and occurs within a fabric of undisturbed habits 
and meanings.  
6.5.1 Defensive riding and re-interpreting close calls 
In learning to negotiate traffic, dangerous roads and intersections, as illustrated in 
Section 6.3.2 (see also Section 5.5.1), cyclists in Auckland and London have drawn 
on and gradually adapted various skills they have previously learnt in other, and 
sometimes very different, contexts. The adoption of particular strategies discussed 
here were common amongst cyclists in both cities (see also Fincham, 2006; 
Jungnickel & Aldred, 2013; Spinney, 2010). These accounts again reinforce the 
argument made in Chapter 4 that the existing urban forms and transport 
infrastructures in perpetuating the dominance of the car also shape the experiences 
and associated habits of other road users. For regular cyclists close calls or near 
misses are always part of the qualitative whole or situation associated with cycling. 
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 Phil alluded to this in Section 5.5.1 when describing what it was like to cycle in 
Auckland. A point he elaborated on elsewhere in the interview: 
[In Auckland] people have no awareness at all and […] don't see anything outside 
of their car, which is bad enough when you are in a car. But when you are on a bike 
and people come past you they are [extremely] close. Buses will pull past me and 
then pull in literally right in front at the bus stop. You know what are you fucking 
doing? And why could you not wait it would have taken me another second or two 
to get past the bus stop. People actively kind of drive at you every now and again … 
if they wanted to knock me off obviously they would … but they are just trying to 
buzz me. You get a lot of people shouting out windows and stuff like that […].  
Cyclists as we saw develop particular strategies and tactics for dealing with their 
vulnerability. As Nick described, retaining a sense of the situation is a particularly 
important aspect of a defensive or conservative riding strategy:  
But I will always assume that someone will pull out in front of me. [I ride] 
conservatively in terms of speed. [I]f it is flat, straight and clear then no worries 
about speed. But … going down a hill if there [are] roads that come out onto that 
hill I'm pretty conservative as to how fast I go. [I also alter] where I ride my bike. 
… [T]here [are] situations where I will ride further towards the centre of the road 
purposively to stop someone trying to pass me for a short section of road if I know 
there is a concern there. […] If a truck passes or a bus passes me I typically won't 
pass it back at a set of lights because those are the sorts of the vehicles that take up 
a fair bit of room. So … it is just about being aware of who is around you and what 
they are doing.  
In Phil, Nick and the earlier cyclists’ accounts we see how retaining a sense of 
awareness remains an important aspect of cycling. Similarly, in Section 6.3.2 we saw 
how various aptitudes and abilities Mike developed cycling to school and riding on 
off-road mountain bike trails were particularly important in this context. 
Correspondingly, he talked about how he has also learnt to adjust and control the 
way he responds emotionally during potentially dangerous encounters with Auckland 
motorists: 
I don't know if it is worth mentioning as well but I certainly had an attitude 
adjustment after 3 years of being up here. I use to get quite angry at cars and I think 
I just use to be really aggressive and yell at cars that do me wrong because they do 
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 all the time. It is a daily occurrence but um I'm prepared for it […] whereas before I 
would let them know that they had wrong[ed] me. I think now I just wait for them 
to look at me and I find that 95% of people don't mean to do it. And […] it is self-
regulating they realise they have done it and they've learnt a lesson from it. So I 
don't feel as if I need to remind people of that or rub it in it's like it just winds them 
up and it makes them have a bad day, it winds me up. I don't need to do it. So these 
days [the] only people I'll yell at [are those] who do it intentionally which people do 
or […] some people will wrong me, they will cut me off or open up a door or 
something and they wouldn't have realised they have done it, like they haven't seen 
me. And for those people I won’t be aggressive I'll just yell so they know I'm there 
and they've seen me and then once again it's had the impact that they realise.  
This ‘attitude adjustment’ as he intimates was by no means instantaneous. Rather as 
he goes on describe below it was something that he has had to consciously cultivate 
and work at over time:  
[I]t was a conscious thing too. […]  I learnt once […] about hijacking, have you 
ever heard of the term hijacking? [It is] when your brain overrides your common 
judgement. [So] the primal part of your brain [takes over and] it happens when you 
are tired and angry. [A]nd so I found I was hijacking quite a lot and […] that is 
when I would fly off the handle at people. And I learnt this thing that basically 
you've got a split second after something happens to decide how you are going to 
react to it and I made a conscious decision to do that more often. [I] take that split 
second and use it and just think […] this could go one of two ways you know and 
[…] yeah maybe call it maturity but it's kind of allowed me to think about these 
situations a bit more objectively. And it has kind of changed my personality a bit I 
guess.  
Mike’s account illustrates the conscious and unconscious work involved in 
developing different ‘ways or modes of response’ to particular situations (Dewey, 
1922a, p. 42), in other words, forming a new or modifying an existing habit, a point 
to which we will now turn. 
Each of the above excerpts illustrate how in the past a range of events encountered 
almost ‘daily’ on his cycle commute to work, such as being cut off by cars and 
people opening their door as he approaches, use to elicit a range of emotional 
responses including anger, aggression and shouting. Such responses, moreover, 
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 highlight how emotion, ‘called out by objects, physical and personal’ as a deliberate 
‘response to an objective situation’ (Dewey, 1929a, p. 390), emerges out of the ‘fluid 
boundary connecting’ an individual and an event (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 28). A car 
pulling in front of him or a door opening in his path, to put it another way ‘interrupts 
and inhibits’ his cycling habit and creates a tension which is ‘experienced as 
emotion’ (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 28). As he goes on to demonstrate in his discussion 
of ‘hijacking’, such a habit, however, is plastic and through varying degrees of time 
and conscious and unconscious effort can be modified. For Mike this has involved 
developing a new empathy and understanding of (e.g., ‘95% of the time they don’t 
mean to do it’), and repressing and re-channelling his previous aggressive and angry 
tendencies towards (e.g., ‘I’ll only yell at people who do it intentionally’ or 
‘wouldn’t have realised’ otherwise), the motorists he encounters in such situations. 
Notably, Mike observes at the end of the second and the following quote that this 
transformation has to some extent also ‘changed [his] personality’: 
I mean I still hijack [in other parts of my life] and […] it's going to be challenging 
having a little baby where you deal with stressful situations and you are tired 
because I don't deal with being tired that well. [But] yeah it certainly has [as] you 
can choose to things like [rather than] getting frustrated with people for [what they 
do] […] you think is it really them or is it [the] angle that I've come at this with. 
[Have I come at this from] the wrong angle? […] [Y]ou know once again did that 
person [who] cut me off mean to do it? Do they need to be yelled at to feel bad for 
it or have they already kind of found out what they needed to find out? Um so yeah 
it certainly has [changed me]. 
In this way Nick illustrates how habits can be gradually reconstituted through 
reflection and deliberation and due to the ways in which they interpenetrate with 
other habits reconstitute one’s self or subjectivity which has implications for other 
spheres of everyday life (see also Bissell, 2014a, 2014c).  
6.5.2 Planning ahead: Anticipating parental roles and responsibilities 
In Section 6.1 we saw how Emma encounters a number of trials and tribulations in 
the course of negotiating her various parental duties and responsibilities alongside 
her work day. This subsection explores how when a child starts pre-school or school 
this presents new challenges for parents who end up co-ordinating dropping off 
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 and/or picking up their child around existing work commitments. Emma illustrated 
this during the initial interview which took place not long before her daughter started 
school: 
I think between the eight [0800] and the nine [0900] that's where my day is about 
me. That's half the reason Ben will take Chloe to preschool so I've only got one to 
deal with. And I'll often put Isaac into a play thing or get toys around him and if I've 
had a shower, if I'm lucky enough …, I can then go and choose my outfit for the 
day. And I've got to think ahead … am I meeting people or am I just having an 
office day. So I'll get my clothes … try and flick my makeup on and … and blow 
dry my hair. Everyday things for a normal woman who don't have children become 
quite busy for families or mums…. I try and choose my clothes, get my make up on, 
do my hair, make the beds, chase Isaac around from wherever he has hidden in the 
house [laughs] and then the thing … I find hard … is getting out the door. I'm 
finding, I'm gathering, I've got to take bottles for him for his formula at day care…. 
I've got to grab nappies. I'm grabbing my work. So I'm often doing two or three 
trips out to the car. Loading him, loading all the gear [and] checking the house 
making sure … I haven't left an appliance or lights … on, doing the final sweep of 
the house, turn the alarm on and out the door. So it literally is a juggling act and I'm 
dreading my daughter going to school because I'll be doing both of them as of next 
week because school doesn't start till eight forty five [0845] and my husband just 
can't be that late to work. So it has been great having him help me drop one off and 
then me have an hour just to get up to day care and get the other one up but that is 
about to change. 
Here, Emma illustrates how once again a problematic situation which frees impulse 
to energize deliberation and inquiry. Some social psychologists it has been observed 
suggest her daughter starting school may present a ‘window of opportunity’ to 
encourage a habit breaking intervention. In Emma’s case this change in fact only 
serves to reinforce her use of the car as it allows her to negotiate her complex spatial 
and temporal life-work schedule (Dowling, 2000, p. 349; Dyck, 1990; Rosenbloom, 
1992). She explained on her subsequent go-along this schedule now includes buying 
a coffee and breakfast on the way to work after dropping off the children (see Figure 
6.8). Other participants had different and varied parental roles and responsibilities 
although like Schwanen (2007) has asserted often these are ‘underpinned and 
informed by rather traditional gender norms’ (p. 460) associated with household 
‘division of labour’ (p. 459). As Section 5.4.2 and Ryan’s account now highlight 
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 practices of ‘fathering’ are changing, however, with fathers increasingly taking on 
various caregiving roles and responsibilities (Aitken, 2009).  
 
Figure 6.8. This image of Chloe and her classmate’s school bags hanging up outside of her classroom 
was captured shortly after Emma had dropped her off at school. Five minutes earlier she dropped off 
her son Isaac at preschool across the road. Upon returning to the car she explained: ‘the next part of 
the journey is normally my coffee [and] breakfast pick-up which is what we will be doing because 
there is no way that I can’t do that part [laughs]. … [So] we left at thirty-four past [0834] and already 
it has taken me just under twenty minutes to get on the road to work so it is quite an ongoing mission’.  
Ryan noted on his second morning commute that he and his wife were currently 
renting a flat in an apartment block while their recently purchased new house 
undergoes some renovation work. A short way into our walk to Kilburn Station on 
the Jubilee Line he explains that he now has two routes to work. He points out the 
road which he would normally turn right onto four out of five days of the week. This 
route takes him out of his way but allows him to drop off his 17 month old daughter 
at nursery in Kilburn before carrying on to his workplace in Moorgate. Later while 
waiting for the Jubilee Line on the platform at Kilburn Station we talk about taking 
his daughter to nursery: 
Brendan: And so how long have you been taking her to nursery?  
Ryan: So today is the one day that she doesn't go to nursery. She is at nursery 
four days a week. […] I [take her] most days. It depends. If I've got an 
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 early meeting I can't. But usually I'll just take her. And usually [Laura] 
will pick her up. In fact almost always [Laura] picks her up. 
Brendan: And is it quite close to where you live? 
Ryan: Yeah it is […]. So it is probably a 10 minute walk. I'm not sure what we 
are going to do when we move because I think it will be quite 
inconvenient from there but I think we'll just keep her there and just 
have to leave a bit earlier which is alright. There are worst things 
[laughs]. 
Brendan: So does that mean you potentially bus down there? 
Ryan:  Yeah we'll bus down there and then come back to Kilburn this way. I 
think it could be alright I think. It will just be … to be safe probably 
almost a half hour adjustment although it won’t actually take that long. 
But […] probably start doing that to err on the side of … caution. 
This brief interchange with Ryan reflects how increasingly dual-earner households 
have begun to juggle employment and caregiving by co-ordinating their commutes 
and working day around dropping off and picking up their children from childcare 
providers and school. Fathers such as Ryan are often taking on at least some of the 
responsibility for chauffeuring children (Schwanen, 2007). Simultaneously his 
account illustrates how it is often mothers such as Emma and his wife Laura who end 
up having to ‘monitor and renegotiate’ the juggling of ‘employment and [the] 
escorting’ of children (see also Jarvis et al., 2001; McDowell et al., 2005; McDowell 
et al., 2006; Schwanen, 2007, pp. 455-456). In the context of this current chapter his 
account also reveals how his undisturbed habits provide fixed objects and meanings 
as ‘instruments of [the] solution’ (Scheffler, 1974, p. 218). As Ryan observes when 
they eventually shift into their new house this will require a half an hour adjustment 
in the time they leave home. Such an adjustment will likely mean he will have to get 
up even earlier if he is to continue going to the gym before work two to three times a 
week or fit this into another part of his day. Unlike Emma, and reflecting how 
London’s habit infrastructures condition everyday mobility, he will most likely end 
up catching the bus with his daughter to pre-school. Despite their differences both 
Ryan and Emma’s accounts remind us of how existing habits always channel 
thoughts and provide the fabric within which thinking occurs. 
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 6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to move beyond individualistic understandings of habit and 
thought underpinned by dual-process or dual-system theories in four main ways. 
First, the characteristics and limitations of dual-process or dual-system theories and 
the ways in which these ideas have informed libertarian paternalist and social 
psychological approaches were explored. In addition to not accounting for the ways 
in which choices are conditioned by infrastructures, norms and subjectivities, it was 
asserted libertarian paternalists also fail to recognise the role that habits, meanings 
and deliberation and reflection play in mediating individual’s interactions with their 
social and physical environments. Meanwhile, it was argued that although some 
social psychology accounts at least recognise the role that problematic situations play 
in generating reflective thought they still conceptualise habit and thought as polar 
opposites and the former as simply unreflexive and automatic responses to 
environmental stimuli. Instead, following Dewey the chapter asserted that habit and 
thought should be understood as different phases of experience in which habit always 
channels thought and provides the context in which thinking operates. This 
understanding was then used to examine how over time habit and thought shape 
practices associated with, and experiences of, commuting and what these further 
reveal about the limitations of dual-process or dual-system theories.  
Second, people’s initial experiences of catching the tube and cycling were examined 
to reveal the ways in which people progressively learn to adjust to transport systems, 
travelling and commuting in a new city. These early experiences were demonstrated 
to be characterised by excitement, uncertainty and experimentation. Subsequently it 
was illustrated how as new adjustments are made and associated habits form what 
initially dominated the conscious foreground of a situation gradually merges into the 
sub-conscious background. People correspondingly gain a sense for the situation as 
earlier habits and meanings are transformed through repeated encounters. In contrast, 
to libertarian paternalists and social psychology, action is thus not simply a response 
to particular environmental stimuli or guided by impulse, arousal, inertia and 
procrastination. Instead, these habits which sometimes emerge out of reflection and 
experimentation allow individuals to develop sometimes sophisticated modes of 
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 response which use and incorporate features of their social and physical 
environments.  
Third, the arrival of the routine or mundane commute and the ways in which it is 
undergone or had by various commuters was explored. In doing so it was argued that 
individuals experience and negotiate the transition from the novel to the familiar in 
different ways including by trying to avoid routine, learning to live with it or by 
actively using and valuing their travel time. Importantly, it was argued that habits far 
from being automatic and mechanistic responses instead allow individuals to slowly 
adjust to the demands of commuting such as close proximity to others on public 
transport, being stuck in traffic or risky encounters with cars. These often subtle, 
slow creep transformations thus alter the ways in which individuals experience their 
commutes and the meanings they associate with it.   
Fourth, the ways which even mundane commutes are still associated with 
problematic situations and how people’s responses are mediated by their habits and 
meanings were highlighted. To begin it was shown how some cyclists gradually learn 
to re-interpret and alter the way in which they respond to close calls with car-drivers. 
This illustrated the importance of recognising how habits can be broken or defrosted 
but also how they can be gradually reconstituted through reflection and deliberation. 
Moreover, the ways parents attempt to anticipate and negotiate chauffeuring their 
child/ren to school and childcare providers illustrated how although these may 
present ‘windows of opportunities’ as people reflect on their existing routines the 
solutions they generate continue to be directed by and emerge out of a background of 
undisturbed habits and meanings. Overall, then Dewey writings of situations, habit 
and experience helps to reveal the limitations of existing dual-process and dual-
system theories. More importantly, unlike socio-technical and some practice based 
accounts he provides a way of rethinking and revaluating the relationship between 
habitual and reflective phases of action which recognises their situated, relational, 
more-than-individual and emergent characteristics.  
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 Chapter 7. 
Conclusion: Towards a low carbon commute 
7.1 Introduction 
When developing low-carbon transport systems, behavioural change and 
infrastructural investments are often as important as developing more efficient 
vehicle technologies and using low-carbon fuels (Sims et al., 2014, p. 648). 
This opening excerpt is from the Transport chapter in the IPCC’s Climate Change 
2014: Mitigation of Climate Change report. It is illustrative of a growing recognition 
that if transport-related fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions are to be 
reduced at least some degree of behaviour change is not only required but also, as the 
chapter’s authors suggest, potentially important. Commuting, especially in cities, has 
been one site where states have sought to intervene, influence and change the actions 
and everyday mobility of citizens for sustainability and climate change. This thesis 
explores what contemporary commuting habits and experiences might reveal about 
the limitations of existing approaches to behaviour change. Correspondingly, it seeks 
to generate new insights into the challenges and opportunities for states seeking to 
develop low-carbon transport systems and cities more generally.  
In conclusion this chapter considers the research aims and questions in relation to the 
findings (Chapter 4-6) and the conceptual framework (Section 2.5) and the 
contribution and future areas which arise out of the thesis. The remainder of the 
chapter is divided into five sections. First, Section 7.2 begins by momentarily re-
examining the overall aims and focus of the thesis. Second, the research questions 
are examined in relation to the main findings from each of the preceding chapters 
(Section 7.3). Third, the chapter reflects on how a Deweyan-inspired approach 
generates a particular approach to researching and analysing everyday mobility, and 
in action more generally, and some of the strengths and limitations of this framework 
(Section 7.4). Fourth, the research implications of this thesis in the context of debates 
on behaviour change, climate change and mobility are considered (Sections 7.5.1-
7.5.2). Fifth, the chapter concludes by elaborating on some of the future areas of 
research emerging out of the thesis (Section 7.5.3). 
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 7.2 Reflecting on the aims of the thesis 
The overall aims of this thesis are two-fold. First, to examine, in the context of 
debates on behaviour change, climate change and everyday mobility, the limitations 
of dominant understandings of the environments and phases of action. Second, to 
demonstrate how these dominant understandings can be advanced by an approach to 
action which is informed by Deweyean pragmatism. In doing so the thesis seeks to 
contribute to critical studies of behaviour change, climate change and mobility by 
providing a dynamic understanding of how action and subjectivity continually 
emerge out of an individual’s interactions with their social and physical 
environments. This is important because everyday mobility is typically understood in 
terms of transport behaviour whereby individuals travel by car, public transport, 
bicycle or on foot, out of ‘choice’ or even more problematically, ‘habit’. If the 
behavioural shifts deemed necessary by the IPCC (Sims et al., 2014), states (DfT, 
2004, 2011, 2013) and others (Anable et al., 2012; Banister, 2008; Chapman, 2007) 
are to be realised then cities become particularly important sites of intervention and 
response (Banister, 2008, 2011; Bulkeley, 2010; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003).  
If cities are to play a significant role in addressing transport-related sustainability and 
climate change imperatives this will require at least some insight into how the 
histories, politics and materialities of physical environments shape everyday 
mobility. This thesis argues Auckland and London’s physical environments, 
especially their transport infrastructures, have contributed to the establishment of 
particular discourses, social norms, values and ideologies. The role such physical and 
social environments play in the formation of mobility habits, experiences and 
meanings forms the focus of this thesis, which shows how these environments 
condition but do not determine individual action. It is argued these environments 
influence the material and discursive ordering of different modes of mobility which 
in turn shape the emergence of particular habits, experiences, meanings and 
subjectivities. As a consequence the thesis seeks to make an important contribution 
by demonstrating that behaviour change for the purposes of sustainability and 
climate change entails much more than simply changing individual choices or 
practices and/or technologies or infrastructures. Creating less resource and carbon 
intensive lifestyles requires the widespread modification of existing, or adoption of 
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 new, habits which will not only change the way we inhabit the world but also who 
we are as individuals, our subjectivities.  
7.3 Revisiting the research questions 
This section revisits the research questions by examining the findings from each of 
the preceding chapters in three subsections. Each subsection addresses one of the 
first three research questions. Reflecting the significant overlaps between these 
questions, the final research question is considered in the responses to the first two 
questions, and there is some similarity between the second and third sections. As a 
reminder the four research questions outlined in Section 1.4.1 were: 
1. How, why and with what consequences can the relationship between 
individuals and the social and physical environments of action be considered 
in non-dualistic and non-individualistic ways? 
2. How, why and with what implications might habit be understood as more 
than simply unreflexive and automatic responses to environmental cues? 
3. How, why and with what implications might the relationship between habit 
and thought be understood in a manner which is non-dualistic and non-
individualistic? 
4. What role do habit, experience and social and physical environments play in 
shaping subjectivity? 
7.3.1 Individuality emerges within social and physical environments 
Individuality it is argued is not ‘an original possession or gift. It is something to be 
achieved, to be wrought out’ through social and material relations once again that are 
always more-than-individual (Dewey, 1984, p. 61). These situated and more-than-
individual relations are understood in two different ways. The metaphor of habit 
infrastructures is introduced in Chapter 4 as a way of understanding how people’s 
habits, meanings and experiences of mobility are shaped by the city in which they 
live. Political decisions and infrastructural investments which have favoured the car 
since the 1920s in Auckland are shown to have significantly influenced the city’s 
existing habit infrastructures (Section 4.4.1). Important events include the 
development of new housing settlements and industry in the suburbs, the dismantling 
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 and replacement of the tram network with buses, the failure to modernise and extend 
the train network and the construction of an extensive motorway network. 
Meanwhile, in London it is suggested that the city’s complex transport network and 
the introduction of the congestion charge in 2003 have been important in 
significantly challenging the dominance of the car especially in the central part of the 
city (Section 4.5).   
It is demonstrated how these different habit infrastructures tend to generate locally 
specific habits, meanings, experiences and subjectivities (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
Auckland’s habit infrastructures tend to normalise car use but also contribute to the 
development of new driving habits for local conditions and through social 
interactions the re-interpretation of previous understandings of car-based travel 
distances and times (Sections 4.4.2 and 6.4.2). The experiences of Auckland 
participants also highlights the compulsiveness of auto-dependent habit 
infrastructures and the extent and depth of (auto)mobile subjectivities they 
continuously help to (re)produce, as people become unaware or dismissive of public 
transport and critical of those who do not own cars. Those seeking to reduce the role 
of the car in their life following their experiences of London’s less car-dependent 
habit infrastructures serve to demonstrate how individuals always retain a capacity to 
act. Simultaneously though their accounts again illustrate how social and physical 
environments preconfigure actions and thoughts as those who did gradually found 
themselves back behind the wheel, restricted by where they could live and work and 
being both reliant upon the generosity of friends and family for rides (Section 4.4.2).  
London’s habit infrastructures this thesis argues have in part promoted and produced 
particular (public)mobile subjectivities, which like the car are multiple and 
continually reproduced. These subjectivities are characterised by at least four 
similarities (Sections 4.5.1 and 6.4.2). First, reflecting the dependence on timetabled 
services, the significant distances travelled and the time involved which often result 
in a greater degree of personal and social organisation. Second, as public transport 
services rarely provide door to door connections they typically result in increased 
levels of preparedness for walking and being outside. Third, existing customs and 
infrastructures contribute to the development of specific habits of (im)mobility such 
as standing on the right of or walking up escalators and waiting at specific points on 
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 the platform in order to be closest to the exit at the arrival station. Fourth, the close 
personal proximity to others often gives rise to habits which minimise the duration, 
intensity and in some instances the potential for these encounters. Examples here 
include catching an earlier service to work, positioning oneself on the platform or in 
the carriage to maximise the likelihood of getting a seat, and listening to music, 
reading books, newspapers or playing on smartphones or tablets. 
Dewey’s (1938) theory of situations is the second means through which the 
environments of action can be understood. Introduced in Chapter 2 it is employed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 as a way of drawing attention to how the social and physical 
environments are experienced as organic wholes characterised by immediacy and 
mediacy, actuality and potentiality, uniqueness and generalness. In different ways 
both chapters illustrate how understanding the external environments of action as co-
constitutive of situations which are undergone (i.e., immediate, given or felt) or had 
(i.e., mediated by habits, meanings and consciousness) by individuals in experience. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that although social norms and conventions around comfort, 
dress codes and fatherhood impact upon and are reproduced through individual’s 
habits, they are simultaneously negotiated, challenged and change along with an 
individual’s subjectivity. This is apparent in the way people dress and get ready for 
work, the meanings they progressively begin to ascribe to other modes of transport 
(e.g., the tube and bus) and the ways they gradually adjusted to, come to accept, or 
even value, the (dis)comforts of changing weather and seasonal conditions while 
cycling.  
Similarly, Chapter 6 illustrates how earlier habits, meanings, experiences and 
subjectivities gradually change in very different mobility contexts as a result of 
repeated encounters with particular social and physical environments. It is observed 
how at first catching the tube, cycling or driving in a new city are marked in part by 
excitement, uncertainty and experimentation but over time as people become more 
familiar with these environments they are experienced as more settled and stable. As 
they become more mundane people gain a sense for these situations which can 
transform the ways in which they interpret social norms and conventions around, for 
instance, the convenience of the car at times of significant traffic congestion, 
personal space on the tube or the risks and dangers cyclists routinely encounter while 
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 sharing the road with cars. Individual actions, thoughts and subjectivities it is argued, 
therefore, are always conditioned but not determined by surrounding social and 
physical environments (Section 2.5.1). 
7.3.2 Habit as a force or a capacity 
The thesis argues that habits are not merely unreflexive, automatic and mechanistic 
responses to environmental stimuli in at least four ways. First, rather than being a 
mechanistic and static response, habits are characterised by a special sensitivity to 
particular classes of stimuli. This is apparent in the way that cyclists developed 
different ways of anticipating, preparing and dressing for daily and seasonal 
variations in the weather (Sections 5.4 and 5.5). Rain, for instance, is by no means a 
generic or universal stimulus. If anticipated or noticed by looking out the window, 
listening to the radio forecast or through the use of a weather app, responses vary not 
only between participants but also for the same individual. The type, duration and 
likelihood of rain for some cyclists mean altering what they wear, riding a different 
bike, delaying their departure time or deciding not to cycle at all. Habits in this way 
are understood as modes of response to certain stimuli, rather than simply the 
repetition of previous acts, and the readier these responses become the less conscious 
thought they require and the more active they become. Different cyclists in this 
context develop rather intricate knowledge of specific weather features and patterns 
that were associated with their own requirements or needs. More precisely, the 
weather, like any event or object, only stands out when it has consequences for 
action such as needing to keep dry in order to avoid getting completely changed at 
work or when heavy rain, ice or snow made the roads too slippery to negotiate by 
bicycle (see also Section 7.3.3). The relationship between cycling and the weather 
correspondingly illustrates how although action can be separated into discrete acts 
(i.e., stimulus and response) it should never be interpreted in isolation from the series 
it belongs, in this case getting ready for and cycling to work.  
Second, each of the empirical chapters illustrates how habits as ways of using and 
incorporating the social and physical environments always mediate an individual’s 
experiences of these environments. This is apparent in the ways in which those who 
cycle, walk and catch public transport gradually adjust to and learn to accommodate 
daily and seasonal variations in temperature and rain through, for instance, wearing 
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 different types of clothing and by carrying an umbrella (Sections 4.5, 5.4 and 5.5). 
On public transport, various objects such as books, newspapers, e-book readers, 
smartphones and tablets are employed as a means of escaping the situation, passing 
or making use of the time and avoiding awkward social encounters such as eye 
contact (Section 6.4.2). Meanwhile, cyclists illustrate how they had to adjust and 
develop particular strategies for dealing with the risks and dangers of cycling on 
Auckland and London’s busy roads. Examples included being acutely aware of and 
anticipating what other road users especially drivers might do and riding in particular 
positions on the road such as further out from the curb in order to become more 
visible and to make it harder for cars to overtake (Section 6.3.2). These examples all 
demonstrate that habits are always situated, relational and more-than-individual (see 
also Section 7.3.1). 
Third, the above examples also highlight how habits are also a source of constancy 
and change. Habits, as already alluded to in Section 7.3.1, provide a source of 
stability by gradually transforming what were once novel, unusual or problematic 
situations into something that is organized, recognisable and familiar. Such 
transformations also change the ways in which these environments are interpreted 
and experienced. Situations, or rather particular events, which were previously felt as 
bodily impressions (i.e., stress, anxiety or fear) such as the close proximity to others 
on public transport, being stuck in traffic or close calls and near misses gradually 
lessen. As Bissell (2014b, p. 485) observes the strains ‘of the daily commute become 
easier to bear’ as the ‘agitations that once impacted with force lose their capacity to 
affect’. Moreover, what ‘were initially movements that were clumsy, difficult and 
required effort, through habit become increasingly precise, graceful and effortless’ 
(Bissell, 2014b, p. 485) such as riding a bicycle, catching the tube or driving a car. 
The ability to perform these acts largely without thought allows individuals to further 
develop these or new habits. For example, being able to navigate familiar 
environments while processing personal, familial or work problems, cycling in 
harmony with traffic or knowing when and where to get on the tube to increase the 
chances of getting a seat.  
Fourth, as habits provide a source of constancy and change and do not exist in 
isolation but rather interpenetrate they are central to the development of the self or 
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 subjectivity. Chapter 4 highlights how (auto)mobile and (public)mobility 
subjectivities are produced and promoted in part through the development of new 
habits in Auckland and London. Similarly, some people notice how cycling alters the 
functioning of their mind and body and by implication their sense of self in that they 
do not feel like same person on non-cycling days. Overall, then it is argued that 
habits which arise out of and function in action are active, energetic and dominant 
modes of response or dispositions which emerge in particular environments and are 
central to the constitution of the self (Section 2.6.1). 
7.3.3 Habit and thought as different phases in human experience 
The thesis argues it is best to understand habit and thought as different phases in 
human experience rather than polar opposites. The ‘activity of thinking is just as 
much a matter of habits as any other form of bodily activity’ including eating, 
walking or playing an instrument (Johnson, 2010, p. 131). For the ways ‘we think are 
the result of developed and still-developing habits for working through experience’ 
(Johnson, 2010, p. 131). This is apparent in the ways in which previous habits, 
meanings and experiences, and Auckland and London’s habit infrastructures mediate 
how individuals act, reflect on and make sense of their own actions, in the social and 
physical environments of these cities. For example, Auckland participants discuss 
how using public transport and living without a car in London has encouraged them 
to think about walking and using public transport more and the necessity of owning a 
car upon returning to the city. Similarly, both local and migrant participants observe 
how they rarely even think about let alone consider using public transport in 
Auckland while those living in London can often not imagine owning or using a car. 
The nature of these thoughts is attributed to the fact participants intellectual habits 
are acquired in part through their experiences of living in these cities. Importantly, 
these habits like any others ‘are realized in our bodies and brains, in relation to our 
surroundings’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 131). ‘It comes to us from others, by education, 
tradition and the suggestion of the environment’ (Dewey, 1922a, p. 314).  
Dewey’s (1938) notion of the situation is employed in Chapters 5 and 6 as a way of 
comprehending the complexities of the environments of action including how habit 
and thought function and operate in experience (Section 7.3.1). Driving, walking, 
cycling, catching the bus, train, or tube, to work are argued to always unfold in an 
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 organic whole, or a body-mind-world assemblage, a situation. People are gradually 
able to navigate and negotiate these environments largely without thought or on 
‘autopilot’, it is observed in Section 7.3.2, due to habits which form and operate in 
action. These habits and associated meanings acquired through repetition allow 
individuals to get a sense for or an apprehension of the situation. This is possible 
because although each situation is unique they typically retain traits or similarities of 
those which have been experienced or encountered previously. People drive, walk or 
cycle down the same streets with similar flows of cars, pedestrians and bicycles or 
catch the same bus, tube or train, with similar volumes of commuters and a limited 
number of seats. Thinking only enters into action when these habits can no longer 
successfully function or when a situation becomes problematic. For example, when 
heavy rain is forecast (Sections 5.4 and 5.5), a regular train or tube service is not 
running because of a fault, an accident closes a road or a child is starting school 
(Section 6.4). Under such circumstances these events or objects are distinguished as 
functional parts of a situation and take on meaning because of the consequences they 
have for action. As Dewey observes ‘thinking would not exist … in a world that 
presents no troubles’ (1916, p. 19).  
The breakdown of a habit once again illustrates that ‘it is not we who think’ but 
rather that ‘thinking is something that happens to us’ (Dewey, 1910, p. 34). In 
asserting the significance of problematic situations for thought the importance of 
drawing a distinction between thinking as the ‘casual having-of-ideas’ and as a 
‘structured, intellectual undertaking’ is emphasised (Campbell, 1995, p. 57). The 
difference between the two is that reflective thought is ‘deliberately controlled to be 
orderly’ and orientated towards the goal of improving one’s life by providing the 
‘solution to problems’ (Campbell, 1995, p. 57). ‘The function of reflective thought’ 
in each of the examples highlighted above is to ‘transform a situation in which there 
is experienced obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of some sort, into a situation 
that is clear, coherent, settled, harmonious’ (Dewey, 1986, p. 195, emphasis omitted). 
Even though problematic situations arise when dispositions breakdown, habits still 
remain significant. This is because intellectual habits, as already noted, are acquired, 
and as a result these dispositions limit the channels in which thought operates and 
provide a background of objects and meanings that allow individuals to assess and 
evaluate a setting. Consequently, following Dewey thought is located in the world, 
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 rather than ‘the mind’, ‘as an ongoing process of habitual ways of engaging 
experience, and sometimes of reshaping it’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 131). 
7.4 A Deweyan-inspired approach to understanding action 
This thesis critically examines different conceptual approaches to understanding 
behaviour change and mobility, paying particular attention to how they theorise, 
research, and attempt or propose to, govern citizen’s actions or behaviours (Chapter 
2). Of those considered, John Dewey’s pragmatist writings, especially on habit and 
experience, is used to develop a conceptual framework that understands the 
environments and phases of action in five interconnected ways. First, the individual 
continuously becomes a self or a subject through experience as they act on and 
simultaneously are acted upon by the social and physical environments (Sections 
2.5.1 and 2.5.2). Second, habits which are formed and operate in action are active, 
energetic and dominant modes of response which emerge in particular environments 
and are central to the constitution of the self (Section 2.5.1). Third, the environments 
of action are experienced as situations which are organic wholes characterised by 
immediacy and mediacy, actuality and potentiality, uniqueness and generalness 
(Section 2.5.2). Fourth, events or objects, which are functional parts of situations, 
take on meaning through shared social activities but also in instances whereby 
temporary interfering or inhibiting action an event or object becomes problematic 
(Section 2.5.2). Fifth, habit always qualifies thought by limiting the channels in 
which it operates and providing a background of objects and meanings that allow us 
to assess and evaluate a setting and, therefore, habit and thought should not be 
understood as separate but rather as different phases in human experience (Section 
2.5.3). The strengths and limitations of the framework are now considered. 
7.4.1 The strengths and limitations of the framework 
Action, in accordance with this conceptual framework, is considered to continually 
emerge out of an individual’s interactions with their social and physical 
environments. Such an interpretation recognises the dynamic, relational, more-than-
individual, contextualised and embodied nature of action. By acknowledging both 
the environment’s capacity to act upon us and simultaneously our capacity to act on 
these environments, Dewey captures both the immediate or felt and the mediated or 
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 stable character of experience. Unlike individualistic approaches Dewey emphasises 
that individuality is something that arises out of participation in grouped action, in 
particular time and place, rather than something individuals ‘possess’ and removed 
from their surroundings. A Deweyan-inspired framework, therefore, provides a 
means of overcoming a range of unhelpful dualisms such as mind-body, internal-
external, subject-world and habit-thought, while in contrast to social practice theory 
still recognising individuality.  
Deweyan pragmatism is also ‘pluralist and inclusive and emphasizes the importance 
of a multiplicity of perspectives’ (Sullivan, 2001, p. 5). One limitation of such 
pluralism is that it ‘proceeds from a particular perspective with its own hidden 
assumptions and blind spots that are in need of critical examination’ (Sullivan, 2001, 
p. 5). Notably, Dewey like other classical pragmatists rarely considered lived 
experience from the perspectives of gender, sexuality or race (Haddock Seigfried, 
1996; Sullivan, 2001, 2006; West, 1989). Subsequent feminist interpretations, in 
particular, and the thesis to a lesser degree, have illustrated that as Dewey 
understands the self as emerging in relation to existing social customs, institutions 
and arrangements, his writings are by no means incapable of accounting for such 
perspectives (see Haddock Seigfried, 1996; Sullivan, 2001). Corresponding with 
Dewey’s writings on power and subjectivity, another potential limitation of the 
framework is the extent to which it seeks to interrogate power and power relations 
(see Reich, 2011; Stuhr, 2002). Foucault’s more critical analysis, as Chapter 4 
argues, given their similarities might help strengthen this slightly less developed 
aspect of Dewey’s writings. Despite these limitations, as Section 7.5 elaborates on 
this approach provides a means through which to both critique and advance existing 
ways of conceptualising and understanding action. 
7.5 Research implications and future avenues of research 
This section reconsiders the conceptual framework developed to address the research 
aims, objectives and questions and reflects on the contribution the thesis has made to 
critical studies of behaviour change, climate change and mobility.  
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 7.5.1 Contribution to critical studies of behaviour change 
Drawing on the conceptual framework and empirical materials the thesis critically 
examines what Jones et al. (2013, p. 164) describe as ‘behavioural government’ and 
the ‘behavioural scientific foundations on which it is built’ (see also Schwanen et al., 
2012a; Shove, 2010). Chapter 2 argues that dominant approaches in psychology and 
economics tend to consider the individual as existing largely independently from 
their social and physical environments. As a consequence these environments are 
typically understood as simply external casual ‘variables’ or ‘factors’, or rather, 
‘motivators’ or ‘barriers to action’. Chapter 4 observes nudge theory does, albeit in a 
rather limited way, provides a method and way of explaining the role external 
motivators and barriers play in driving or preventing certain behaviours (Section 
4.2). It is assumed people’s automatic cognitive system, which dominates thought 
and action, shapes their interaction with ‘choice architecture’ and their decision 
making. In doing so nudge theory advances earlier individualistic approaches, for 
instance, from social psychology where barriers are simply considered to be ‘weak’, 
‘neutral’ or ‘strong’ (e.g., Stern, 2000; Triandis, 1977).  
Chapter 5 highlights that these earlier theories from social psychology have resulted 
in efforts to quantify different barriers. Such attempts it is observed can usefully 
reveal trends such as the effects of daily and seasonal variations in weather on rates 
of cycling. In doing so, however, these studies are not capable of explaining how or 
why these trends have come to exist or why they might change (Section 5.2). Despite 
attempting to advance such explanations it is argued nudge theory by still starting 
from the notion of the autonomous chooser also gives insufficient consideration of 
how pre-existing political, social and physical conditions constrain action and 
decision-making. Chapter 2 argues these individualistic models of behaviour 
perpetuate a number of unhelpful binary positions including mind-body, internal-
external and subject-world. This tendency is again revealed in Chapter 6 which 
demonstrates the significant limitations of dual process models which are founded on 
a distinction between the automatic and the reflective systems of the brain. Here, 
again it is observed how habits are simply portrayed as the unreflexive and automatic 
responses to environmental cues (see also Chapters 2 and 4). Conceptually and 
empirically, the thesis has, therefore, demonstrates that these individualistic models 
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 generate rather static and restricted accounts of the environments of action, which as 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 highlight, severely limits their ability to explain how high carbon 
and resource intensive patterns of mobility have emerged and how and why they 
might change. The contribution of the thesis to critical studies of behaviour change 
also extends to the ways in which this Deweyan-inspired framework advances the 
social-technical transitions and theories of practice literatures. 
7.5.2 Contribution to understanding low carbon mobility 
The three other approaches considered provide more dynamic and relational accounts 
of how the social and physical contexts variously enable and constrain action 
(Chapter 2). The social-technical transitions literature examines the emergence, 
(re)production and change in environmentally problematic ways of life at a systems 
or macro level. The notion of ‘socio-technical system’ is a central concept in this 
literature as it recognises how heterogeneous social and technical elements come to 
be aligned and configured in ways ‘that work’. John Urry it is observed has adopted 
this concept, and those of ‘co-evolution’ and ‘path-dependency’, to explain how the 
car has become and continues to be the dominant form of movement globally. These 
concepts have also been appropriated by social practice theorists as means of helping 
to explain how practices emerge, persist, change and disappear over time as material, 
procedural and symbolic elements become linked and unlinked or they attract, retain 
or lose those who ‘carry’ and perform a given practice. Deweyan pragmatism is 
observed to share some similarities with the socio-technical and practice theory 
literatures. All three approaches refuse to distinguish prematurely between the social 
and physical environments of action or to take certain standards or expectations such 
as the comfort and convenience of the car as pre-existing or given. Instead they 
usefully draw attention to how individual action is embedded in particular social 
institutions and arrangements and material or physical settings. An individual’s 
choice to buy and routinely use a car, for instance, is always embedded within the 
system of automobility which makes driving possible and often necessary. Moreover, 
the meanings and symbolic attachments which are attached to the car co-evolve as 
part of this system.  
A Deweyan-inspired perspective advances socio-technical and practice approaches in 
at least three main ways. First, their understanding of the role politics plays in 
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 shaping action. In Chapters 2 and 4 it is argued Urry’s fails to consider how the 
development of the system of automobility has been influenced by different political 
decisions which favoured particular interests, normative visions and modes of power 
and the ways in which these were disputed and challenged. In contrast, practice 
theorists have recognised the political nature of transport and urban planning and 
how this has and continues to influence the development of automobility. Due to 
their determined insistence on moving away from the individual as the central unit of 
analysis it is argued they tend to underplay the importance of the promotion and 
production of particular subjectivities which are a central aspect to the continual 
emergence and (re)production of, and changes in, dominant practices such as driving 
(Chapter 2). Chapter 4 asserts that Urry’s and practice theorist’s political 
shortcomings, as well as, the limitations of nudge theory’s concept of ‘choice 
architectures’ can be redressed through the notion of habit infrastructures.  
Habit infrastructures embody a Deweyan understanding of habit, custom and 
experience and reflect the way in which subjectivities or ‘choices’ are continuously 
conditioned but not dictated by the histories and politics of physical environments 
and established social norms, values and ideologies, as individuals always possess 
the capacity to act upon the world. This notion is further developed through an 
engagement with mobility scholars, especially Paterson (2007) who demonstrate that 
the car has come to dominate cities around the world both through state promotion 
and the production of (auto)mobile subjectivities. Drawing on these insights, it is 
demonstrated how the political and historical development of Auckland and 
London’s urban form and transport systems have to a large degree resulted in the 
unique habit infrastructures of these cities and the locally specific (auto)mobile and 
(public)mobile subjectivities that emerge in each city.  
Second, socio-technical and practice approaches in emphasising the importance of 
collective meanings tend to underplay the dynamic ways in which individuals make 
sense of and negotiate these meanings in everyday life. This argument is developed 
in Chapters 5 and 6 through the use of Dewey’s theory of situations. Both chapters in 
diverse ways highlight that prevailing norms and conventions act upon and are 
reproduced through their habits (7.3.1). At the same time the way these norms and 
conventions are continually negotiated, challenged and sometimes changed by 
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 individuals (7.3.1). Third, it is argued that although social practice theory provides a 
more sophisticated understanding of habit than individualistic approaches it is 
nonetheless limited. Such an account does recognise the role that social and physical 
contexts are responsible for the relative stability and longevity of habits. The central 
problem is, however, that habits are only understood as the outward performance of 
actions (cf. Schwanen et al., 2012a). There is no recognition of habits as a disposition 
or a capacity which is a source of stability and change, an active tendency or a force, 
constantly emerging out of specific environments and as fundamental to subjectivity. 
Consequently, social-technical and practice approaches fail to recognise the 
important role that habits, meanings and subjectivity play in contributing to the 
emergence, persistence and disappearance of unsustainable practices.  
7.5.3 Future avenues for research 
Policy interventions aimed at encouraging behaviour change, the reconfiguration of 
existing institutions and infrastructures and the development of new innovations and 
technologies will all be crucial for attempts to facilitate large-scale transitions to low 
carbon societies. This thesis argues that everyday mobility in cities presents both 
significant challenges and opportunities in this context. Cities are sites of high carbon 
emissions and energy consumption in large part due to the dominant role cars 
continue to play in shaping these environments and citizens’ habits, meanings, 
experiences and subjectivities. A better understanding of how everyday mobility 
configured around public and exposed modes of mobility such as trains, buses, 
cycling and walking can potentially not only help to redress these issues but also 
improve the vibrancy and accessibility of cities, as well as, the experiences, health 
and wellbeing of citizens. More specifically, the creative potential to design policies 
which offer coordinated responses to these issues and recognise the ways in which 
social and physical environments always condition everyday mobility and action is 
where this thesis aims to encourage and inform future research.   
Throughout the thesis emphasises that if behaviour change interventions are to play a 
meaningful role in responding to global social and environmental challenges they 
need to move beyond existing dominant psychological and economic models of 
behaviour. The growing role that soft libertarianism is playing in reframing and 
reshaping approaches to policy it is argued is a cause for concern for various reasons, 
263 
 not least that it appears incompatible with the scale of response and the social, 
institutional and infrastructural changes required. The thesis thus illustrates the 
continuing importance for critical studies of behaviour change (Jones et al., 2013; 
Shove, 2010). More specifically, there is a need for future studies to further 
interrogate the political and ethical significance and unintended consequences of the 
behaviour change agenda ‘as they relate to the concerns of efficacy, ethics and 
empowerment’ (Jones et al., 2013, p. 190). Here, analyses informed by Foucauldian 
(Jones et al., 2013, p. 167) and feminist (Pykett, 2012) scholarship which have 
interrogated different behavioural strategies including nudge, and how these 
‘reconfigure objects of governance, modes of expertise and spaces to be governed’ 
with implications for the ‘reshaping of human subjects’ may provide a productive 
and constructive starting point. The thesis argues John Dewey’s pragmatist writings 
could also make a significant contribution to such attempts.  
Nudge theory, on a more optimistic note, has in contrast to earlier psychological and 
economic theories, at least encouraged policy makers to reflect, albeit in a limited 
manner, on the significance of context for action and thought, and the role state and 
other institutional actors play in shaping these environments. Section 7.5 reiterated 
how a Deweyan-inspired approach, and theories of habit more generally, might 
overcome these limitations. There is scope for this (see also Bissell, 2014c; 
Schwanen et al., 2012a), as well as, other alternative theories, methodologies and 
approaches which take seriously socio-material relations and embeddedness of action 
to continue to influence and reshape existing academic and policy debates. 
Encouragingly, social-technical transitions (Geels, 2012; Schwanen et al., 2011), 
theories of consumption (Gronow & Warde, 2001; Southerton et al., 2004), and 
theories of practice (Shove, 2012; Spaargaren, 2011; Watson, 2012) have already 
begun to have some impact on this front (e.g., Darnton et al., 2011; Jackson, 2005; 
Southerton et al., 2011). Continued scholarship on, and evaluation of, pilot 
interventions or programmes, guided by these frameworks will provide no guarantee 
of their uptake (cf. Jones et al., 2013) but will likely be necessary to demonstrate 
their applicability to the development of policy and behaviour change programmes 
and interventions (cf. Jackson, 2005).  
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 There are also at least three potential avenues for future research which reflect 
matters which have emerged out of the research and the study’s limitations. First, 
there is scope to further explore how people’s habits, meanings, experiences and 
subjectivities change over longer periods of time as the physical capacities and skills 
of their body change with age. The potential importance of better understanding such 
bodily transformations is illustrated in the way individuals describe how their 
subjectivities had changed as a result of cycling or using public transport (Chapters 5 
and 6; see also Bissell, 2014a, 2014c; Schwanen et al., 2012b). Second, socio-
economic relations such as class and income, occupation, gender and race and their 
intersections all condition people’s access to and use of different mobilities 
(Cresswell, 2010; Hanson, 2010; Law, 1999; Waitt & Harada, 2012). The thesis, 
corresponding with previous scholarship, draws attention to the importance of a 
closer analysis of the relationship between gender and commuting (Hanson, 2010; 
Law, 1999; Schwanen, 2008). More specifically, reflecting how cycling remains 
male-dominated this thesis illustrates that there is much scope to further interrogate 
women’s habits and experiences of cycling and how these intersect with negotiation 
of dress codes, changing facilities and perhaps bodily sensations of sweat including 
smell, touch and sight (see Waitt, 2013), in different everyday contexts including the 
workplace. Meanwhile, the focus on British and New Zealand migrants helps to draw 
attention to how city habit infrastructures condition action. This methodology could 
potentially help to generate insights into the dynamics of mobility and race through 
examining how other migrant populations adapt and adjust to new cities.  
Third, in focusing on commuting the thesis does not explicitly explore the potential 
role that mobile working practices such as working in different locations (e.g., home, 
shared offices, cafes) or through virtual connections could play in attempts to 
decarbonise transport emissions. There is much scope to understand how mobility 
affects productivity, working practices and work-related experiences, meanings and 
subjectivities (see Brown & O'Hara, 2003; Laurier, 2004). Fourth, and consistent 
with the first two points above, the thesis highlights the importance of further 
understanding the emergence, production and promotion of non-car subjectivities. 
Here, Paterson (2007, p. 235) rather provocatively asks how can we ‘shape people 
(or more precisely, given the governmentality logic, to work so that people shape 
themselves) for whom cycling, walking and the train become the ‘normal’ daily 
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 practice?’ This thesis does not explicitly consider the political and ethical 
significance of such a project, but does emphasise how the social and physical 
environments of action always create individuals. Reflecting earlier assertions about 
the unintended consequences of the behaviour change agenda, however, such 
questions deserve much closer attention and could helpfully contribute to recent 
debates on citizenship and morality in mobilities studies (see Spinney et al., 2015a; 
Spinney et al., 2015b).  
Building on the arguments and observations the preceding chapters make the thesis 
draws attention to three implications for future research on sustainable and low 
carbon cities, economies and societies. First, it is asserted in Chapter 4 that the global 
rise of the car needs to be understood in the role that the growth of automobility has 
played in reproducing the capitalist system. There is a need for future research, 
therefore, to not only consider how public transport, walking or cycling might 
replace car journeys but more importantly how these forms of mobility might 
become a ‘central part of an economic development process’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 
229). For example, Robert’s (1995) has argued that a cycle-orientated economic 
strategy differs markedly from a conventional growth strategy (see also Paterson, 
2007). Second, it is argued that the behaviour change agenda is reflective of 
neoliberal orientations towards policy-making which seek to create ‘subjects of 
responsibility, autonomy and choice’ (Rose, 2006, p. 155). At present it is not clear 
how these neoliberal modes of governance are understood and interpreted by 
businesses and organisational approaches to sustainability and climate change. For 
instance, to what extent do businesses feel responsible or accountable for the 
everyday mobility of their employees and how do they support low carbon modes of 
mobility. Third, and relatedly, this thesis illustrates how different habits 
interpenetrate across the different time-spaces associated with home, the commute 
and work. A better understanding of how habits or ‘bundles of practices’ (Shove et 
al., 2012, p. 17) intersect will be crucial for ensuring the development of low impact 
lifestyles. Particular modes of mobility, especially running and cycling, can result in 
what were once home-based practices such as showering and eating breakfast being 
transferred to the work-place. What implications might this have for energy and 
water demand? Can efficiency gains be made through economies of scale or will an 
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 increase in cycle commuting simply generate more demand for electricity and hot 
water as people start to shower more often? 
These varied avenues for future research are reflective of how issues of behaviour 
change, climate change and everyday mobility cannot be easily disentangled from 
other spheres of society. In many ways this diversity mirrors Dewey’s own 
pragmatist writings in which he traversed subjects as varied as politics, education, 
nature, art, thinking, habit and experience. Despite this there a number of 
commonalities running through his work (see Cutchin, 2008, pp. 1566-1567), which 
are particularly helpful for addressing global challenges such as sustainability and 
climate change. In particular, the thesis has argued it is his tenacious insistence on 
the situated, relational, more-than-individual and emergent character of action, which 
helps to reveal both the challenges and possible openings for developing a less 
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1. Example of the participant recruitment page on the 
website created mainly for the research phase of the PhD. 
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 Appendix 2. Interview schedule used during interviews in 
Auckland, New Zealand and London, United Kingdom 
The everyday commute: connecting home and work 
1 Introduction 
• Introduce myself and my PhD research 
• Outline what the participant’s involvement will be in the project and their 
rights. Ask them to complete a consent form and if they are happy to have the 
interview recorded. 
2 Living in Auckland/London 
1. How long have you been living in Auckland/London? 
2. How did you find living in Auckland/London? 
3. How is it different from the New Zealand/British way of life? (for New 
Zealand British migrants) 
3 Home and everyday life 
4. How did you come to live in your current house? 
5. What do you like doing at home? 
6. What does the ideal home mean to you? 
7. How far is what you do at home influenced by the wider environment? 
4 Preparing for the commute to work 
8. Thinking a bit more about the commute. Do you have a routine that you go 
through in the morning and can you describe it for me? 
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 • What time do you get up? 
• Do you shower before departing? 
• How does your routine fit with others in the house? 
9. How do you decide what to wear? 
• Do you take into consideration the weather? 
• How do you know what the weather is like? 
• Do you have a dress-code at work? 
10. Do you carry a bag with you?  
• What do you carry in the bag? 
5 The commute to work 
11. Can you please describe your commute to work? 
• What do you do on your commute? 
• Do you interact with people on the commute? 
• How do you find cycling/walking in Auckland/London 
• How does your commute change with the weather/different times of 
the year? 
12. Can you talk me through what you do when you arrive at work? 
• Do you have showers? 
• Do you have space to store things? 
13. What does a normal work day involve for you? 
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 6 The commute home 
14. Do you have a routine to finish up your day at work? 
15. Do you do anything different on the commute home? 
16. Do you have a routine that you go through when you arrive home? 
17. What would the ideal commute look like for you? 
7 Meanings and experiences of comfort in everyday 
life 
18. How have you found the British/New Zealand lifestyle? (expatriates only) 
19. When someone mentions the word ‘comfort’ what do you think they mean? 
20. How does comfort play a role in your day to day life? 
21. Are there any places or spaces where you are more comfortable than others? 
• How comfortable do you find home, work and the commute? 
22. Does temperature play a role in your notion of comfort? 
8 Possible contacts/Joining them on the commute 
• Ask if they know anyone else who might be interested in being involved in 
the study 
• Explain that as part of the research I am interested in travelling with people 
and ask if they would be happy for me to join them on their commute. 
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 Appendix 3. Example of the initial email sent to participants 
asking if it was still possible to join them on their commute in 
London 
Hi [Interviewee’s Name], 
You may recall at the end of interview I asked you if you would be happy for me to 
join you on your commute (a 'go-along'). I will be in London from Monday 14 
January until Saturday 2 February. If you are around during this time and happy for 
me to still join you on your commute could you please let me know what days would 
potentially suit you and approximately when and where you usually depart from. 
My ideal scenario for the go-along is: 
1. Meet you at your house/flat/apartment a few minutes (5-10 minutes) before you 
leave to go on your commute. This just gives me a chance to observe the final stages 
you go through before getting ready to depart on your commute 
2. Join you on the commute to your workplace 
3. A quick tour around your office (either straight after the commute, during a break 
or before you depart work) 
4. Join you on your commute home at the end of the day 
5. A quick tour around your house/flat/apartment 
I am aware for various reasons that you may not necessarily be able to accommodate 
each of the stages. With this in mind I am happy to tailor the go-along to your 
specific requirements or preferences. For example, I'm quite happy to meet you close 
to rather than in your house and/or work place (e.g., closest bus stop/tube station) or 
to join you on just one leg of your commute. 
Thanks in advance and I look forward to hopefully catching up with you shortly. If 
you are not free or available I would once again like to thank you for your 
involvement in the project so far. 
All the best, 
Brendan.
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